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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the development of agricultural policy under the post-war 
Labour Government, and examines the various economic and political factors that 
influenced the formulation of policy in the period from 1945-51. The long-term 
impact of Labour policy on the industry is also discussed. 
The introductory Chapter discusses inter-war agricultural policy and the impact of the 
war on the industry. 
Chapter I examines the development of wartime policy and traces the evolution of 
Government thinking on the direction policy should take in the post-war period. 
Chapter II discusses the development of Labour's agricultural policy from the 1918 
Party Conference to the 1945 Election Manifesto. 
Chapter III examines the growth of policy from 1945 to 1947. 
What will emerge from these three Chapters is that while Labour's policies were in 
many respects simply a continuation of wartime measures and mechanisms, the latter 
embodied basic principles that had formed a crucial part of Labour's programme in 
the 1930's. 
Chapter IV examines the annual price review system in the context of labour's broader 
economic and financial policies in this period, and measures the cost of the expansion 
programme against what was achieved in terms of increased output and increased 
efficiency. 
Chapter V discusses the development of marketing policy after 1945. 
Chapter VI reviews the progress of the expansion programme after 1947, and 
examines the impact the expansion programme had on both agricultural policy and 
production after 1951. 
Chapter VII reviews the development of Conservative Party policy after 1945, and 
examines the political considerations that influenced both Labour and Conservative 
policy in this period. 
Chapter VIII examines the relationship between Labour and the agricultural workers 
in the post-war period. 
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In the inter-war years British agriculture was frequently described as the 'Cinderella' 
of British Industries, a description of relative neglect which could with some 
justification be applied to the industry's treatment by modem economic historians. For 
while CAP and its implications have generated a considerable body of work on 
contemporary farming issues,l comparatively little work has been done on the 
development of policy in the immediate post-war period. In studies of post-war 
economic policy farming receives at best a few brief mentions.2 The two most 
comprehensive studies of post-war agriculture are Self and Storing, The State and The 
Farmer and Holderness, British Agriculture Since 1945. Both are based solely on 
secondary sources and so can only provide a partial account of the development of 
policy after 1945.3 
The immediate post-war years were, however, of great significance to the industry, the 




For example, see B.E. Hill, The Common A ricultural Polic : Past 
Present and Future (1984); S.T. Rogers an B. M. Davey (eds.), T e 
Common Agricultural policy And Britain (1973) ; R. Norton-Taylor, 
Whose Land Is It Anyway? (1982) 
For example, See Sir A. Cairncross, Years of Recovery : British 
Economic Policy 1945-51 (1985) ; K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-
51 (1985) ; G. C. Peden, Brit~sh Economic and Social polic* (1985). 
The emphasis in S. Pollard, The Development of the Britis Economy 
1914-1980 (1983) is on agriculture after 1950. Worswick and Ady do, 
however, devote a chapter of The British Economy, 1945-1950 (1952) 
to agriculture. 
P. Self and M. J. Storing, The State and the Farmer (1962) ; B. A. 
Holderness, British Aqriculture Since 1945 (1985). Like Pollard, 
op.cit., Self and Stor~ng largely conce~t~ate on ~he development of 
J?olic¥ in the 1950' s. E. H. Whetham, Br~t~sh Fa~ng 193~-49 (19~2) 
~s ma~nly concerned with the war years, but ma~es some ~nterest~ng 
criticisms of certain aspects of pos.t-wa:r po~~cy.. Another survey 
of the broad trends in post-war pol~cy ~s g~ven ~n J. K. B?wers, 
'British Agricultural Policy Since the Second World War', ~n the 
Agricultural History Review Vol. 33 (1985), Part One. 
1 
comprehensive system of price guarantees. As a corollary to these guarantees the 
industry assumed an obligation to maintain minimum standards of husbandry and 
estate management. These standards would, if necessary, be enforced by the State 
through the activities of the Minister's local agents, the County Agricultural Executive 
Committees (CAECs). These Committees were themselves in part composed of local 
farmers, landowners and farmworkers. If a farmer consistently failed to meet the 
Ministry's requirements he could ultimately be dispossessed of his land by compulsory 
purchase or by having his tenancy terminated. Thus the post-war period saw the 
government assume a greater degree of control over the industry than had been the 
case in the inter-war period. 
If the agricultural policy of the 1930's was, as Self and Storing argue, permeated with 
a 'depression psychology',4 then the key to policy after 1945 was expansion, Labour's 
target being a 50% increase in net output over pre-war by 1951/52. The price 
mechanism was the main engine of the expansion programme, and so the years after 
1945 saw the farmers building on their wartime gains, a far cry from their experiences 
in the years after 1918. 
The demands of wartime production brought the industry, in the form of the National 
Farmers' Union (NFU), into an increasingly close relationship with Whitehall, a 
process which culminated in creation of the annual price review (APR) procedure for 
the transition period from war to peace. However, the Agriculture Act 1947 made the 
review mechanism, and thus the NFU's role in the policy making process, a permanent 
4 self and storing, op.cit., p.19 
2 
feature of post-war economic policy. As J. K. Bowers argues, the NFU were granted 
a unique position amongst British industries, in having a statutory right to consultation 
with the government over the prices they would receive for their produce. 5 
A study of the archival sources available in the PRO also reveals that both politicians 
and civil servants assigned British producers a key role in the nation's economic 
recovery, particularly after the economic crises of 1946/47. The industry was seen as 
the country's chief dollar saver and as playing a crucial role in solving the UK's 
serious balance of payments problems, its contribution being seen as important as that 
of the coal industry in this period. 6 
The object of this thesis is to make an initial contribution to the study of post-war 
British agricultural policy, by focusing on the crucial years between 1945 and 1951, 
the period which saw the construction of a framework which was to underpin 
agricultural policy until the early 1970's.7 
As later chapters will show, the 1947 Act made permanent measures and mechanisms 
which had been introduced during the war or had been devised to bridge the transition 




J. K. Bowers, Ope cit., p.67. 
For example, see Hugh Dalton, Hi~h Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-60 
(1962), p.191. 'It (the expans~on programme) cost a lot of mon~y 
but ... I wanted the maximum production of home gr<;>wn food"an<;i,.~n 
my long battle against dollar shortage, I often sa~d that Br~t~sh 
agriculture is best dollar saver".' 
under CAP the Market is 1"1anaged to bring l>rices up to their 
guaranteed level, which is achieved by high tar~ffs on produce from 
outside the EEC and the furchase of any surpluses. The cost of 
agriculture therefore fa Is on the consumer rather than on the 
Exchequer. 
3 
flexible in operation,.8 The wartime policy discussions only envisaged a modest level 
of expansion in the long term, with a fairly rapid return to an essentially pre-war 
pattern of production.9 However, in the years after 1945 the deterioration of world 
food supplies in the face of poor harvests, and Britain's worsening BOP position, 
undermined these wartime assumptions. Labour were forced to initiate a programme 
of agricultural expansion of a far greater scale, and on a more comprehensive basis, 
that had been envisaged in any of the wartime discussions on the future of the 
industry. 10 
The transition from war to peacetime production was also to have been accompanied 
by a reduction in agricultural incomes from their high wartime levels, and aggregate 
net income did fall between 1945 and 1947. However, the expansion programme was 
accompanied by a considerable increase in aggregate net income. 11 Net income 
reached its post-war peak in 1949/50 and although it declined thereafter, by the end 
of Labour's period in office aggregate net income was still considerably higher than 
it had been at the peak of the wartime production campaign.12 
By the mid 1950's the terms of trade had moved against primary producers to an 






LPC (45) 216, october 29 1945, 'Agricultural Policy', memorandum by 
the Min~ster of Agriculture, Secretary of State for Scotland and the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Agriculture 
Ministers), in PRO CAB 71/22. 
See Chapter III. Meat, rather than ~rain, was the commodity thought 
most likely to be in short supply ~n the long-term. 
See Chapter III. 
See Chapter VI. 
At its wartime peak, aggregate net income reached £230.5 million. 
K. A. H. (Lord) Murray, Agriculture (1955), p. 379. 
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largely receded and 'worldwide gluts seemed to be replacing the frequent shortages in 
traded agricultural commodities that had clouded the immediate post-war years,.13 
These factors, and the election of a Conservative government pledged to decontrol, 
ushered in a new phase in the development of British agricultural policy. 
With the end of state control and rationing in 1953/54, fixed guaranteed prices were 
replaced by a system of deficiency payments,14 a mechanism which allowed the 
Conservatives to combine a policy of cheap food with continuing support for the 
industry. Consumer food subsidies were replaced by producer subsidies, and cost-
effectiveness increasingly began to replace expansion as the driving principle behind 
government policy. As later chapters will show, this change of direction served to 
reveal a number of underlying weaknesses in Labour's agricultural policy. Despite the 
changes in policy after 1951, the 1947 Act remained the 'touchstone' for any 
subsequent legislation; even as late as 1960 the Conservatives still found it necessary 
to pledge their commitment to maintaining the value of the guarantees under the 
Act. 15 
Any study of post-war agricultural policy must gIve some consideration to the 
development of both the industry and of policy itself in the inter-war period. An 
examination of structural change within the industry between 1918 and 1939 will help 




BA Holderness, op. cit., p.19. 
under the new system, farmers sold their produce for the best market 
price they cou1.d obtain, and the difference between the average 
market pr~ce and the fixed price at the APR was paid retrospectively 
on each unit of output sold. 
See Chapter VII. 
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industry, in context. It will also provide a basis on which the significance of the 
events of the post-war period can be assessed. 
While the early years of the First World War saw little change in the structure of 
agricultural production, the second half of the War saw considerable structural change, 
as Table One illustrates. 
TABLE ONE British Farm Output Structure 1914 - 18 
(percent of total output) 
1909-13 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Cereals & Potatoes 16.6 16.6 17.3 14.9 18.8 26.1 
Dairy Produce 16.8 17.7 17.1 16.6 15.2 13.9 
Livestock 40.5 38.4 38.2 38.8 36.0 29.8 
Other 26.1 27.3 27.4 29.7 30.0 30.2 
Source: P. Dewey, British Agriculture in the First World War, 
(1989), P.212 
By the end of the war cereals and potatoes, which had accounted for approximately 
17% of pre-war output, constituted 25% of total output, while livestock production had 
fallen from 40 to 30% of British Farm output. 16 Livestock production had been hit 
by growing shortages of animal feed, and by declining slaughter rates for cattle and 
sheep. The latter had in tum been caused, at least in part, by an ill-judged pricing 
policy.17 The high price and scarcity of animal feeds was also responsible for the 
16 Dewey, op. cit., p. 213. 
17 ibid., p. 214. 
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decline in dairy production during the War. It was not until the mid 1920's that the 
numbers of cattle, sheep and pigs on British farms recovered from the losses inflicted 
by the wartime 'ploughing up' campaign. 18 
As Dewey argues the War appeared to have little lasting impact on British farming. 
The price guarantees enshrined in the Com Production Act 1917 and the Agriculture 
Act 1920 were soon abandoned in the face of collapsing prices. The War had no 
lasting effect on the structure of production, as pre-war trends in production quickly 
began to reassert themselves after 1918. The position of the industry within the 
British economy remained unchanged.19 One legacy 'lay in the lessons of policy' and 
would not in fact emerge until the outbreak of the Second World War, when the 
policies of 1917-18 were 'replayed ... to much greater effect'.2o The other legacy, and 
one which will be discussed in detail below, was its lasting impact on the structure of 
agricultural land holding. 
The Food Production Campaign had brought an additional one million acres into 
arable production?1 When the Campaign ended in March 1919 British producers 
soon began to return to their normal patterns of production. Many grassland farmers 
returned their fields to pasture, while arable producers attempted to return their fields 
to a normal rotation after three years of intensive cropping. As Edith Whetham 
18 E. H. Whetham, The Agrarian History of England & Wales, Vol. VIII 
: 1914 - 1939 (1978), p. 173. 
19 Dewey, op. cit., p. 240 - 241. 
20 ibid., p. 241. 
21 whetham (1978), p. 103. The arable acreage increased from 11 million 
acres in 1914 to 12.3 million acres by 1919. The area sown to 
permanent grass declined from 16.1 million to 14.4 million acres 
over the same period. 
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argues, the adverse effects of these wartime cropping patterns were still being felt in 
the late 1930's.22 Between 1918 and 1921 the total arable acreage fell by 400,000 
acres, while the area under both temporary and permanent grass increased. Between 
1918 and 1929, the area of land sown to arable crops declined from 12.4 million to 
9.9 million acres, while the area sown to permanent grass increased from 14.6 million 
to,15.5 million acres over the same period.23 
With the repeal of the Corn Production Act, the 'Great Betrayal' of the farmers by the 
Government, agricultural prices, incomes and wages were once again abandoned to 
the free play of market forces. 24 The agricultural price index [base 1911-13=100] 
fell from its peak of 300 in September 1920 to 157 by December 1922. As Whetham 
argues, no farmer could avoid making losses in this period, as he would have to sell 
his output at a price level which was always lower than the level of costs. The 
marketing of produce became a gamble, and the rapid fall in the price level also 
prevented any effective long-term planning.25 
Within the general decline in the agricultural price index, cereal prices came nearer 
to falling to their pre-war level than livestock prices; at the 1922 harvest cereal prices 





ibid., p. 124. For example, as late as 1935 farms on the Yorkshire 
WOIas were still plagued with weeds, a direct result of the extra 
grain crops taken in the last years of the war. 
ibid., p. 173. 
Howard Newby, Country Life (1983), p. 167 and Whetham (1987), p. 
142. The collapse in prices was due, at least in part, to a renewal 
of the international trade in cereals from North America and 
elsewhere. 
Whetham (1978), p. 142, and Murray, Ope cit., p. 18-20. 
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had stabilised at between 50% and 60% above their pre-war level. 26 After a period 
of relative stability, the return to the gold standard in 1925 prompted a further, albeit 
more gradual, decline in prices. The price index for agricultural produce had fallen 
to 144 by 1927 (base 1911-13=100), although grain producers often secured prices 
only a few points higher than in pre-war years. As the prices producers received for 
livestock and livestock produce were generally above average, and the prices of 
animal feeds below average, dairying and livestock were more likely to yield a profit 
than arable production. 27 
The agricultural depression of the 1920's was thus primarily an arable one, and 
conditions in m'fy traditional arable districts were worse than those which had 
prevailed in the 1880's and 1890's. In 1923 the Lincolnshire Wolds were described 
as an 'economic white elephant', and the Cotswolds were similarly affected. In the ten 
years from 1921, farm capital in the Eastern arable counties diminished by 66%.28 
The impact of the trends in cereal prices can be trace in Tables Two and Three. 
The post-war collapse of prices, and the relative stability of agricultural wages after 
1924, provoked a variety of responses from producers. While some farmers simply 
reduced the amount of labour they employed, others moved into more intensive 
production, growing vegetables and sugar beet instead of the more traditional root 
crops. Some producers undertook new, more labour intensive enterprises, such as 
26 Whetham (1978), p. 143. 
27 ibid., p. 148. 
28 J. Brown, Agriculture In England A. Survey of Farming 1870-1947 
(1987), p. 84. 
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TABLE TWO Area of Cultivated Land in England and Wales 1918 - 29 
Million Temporary Tillage Total Permanent 
Acres Grass Arable Grass 
1918 2.1 10.3 12.4 14.6 
1919 2.3 10.0 12.3 14.4 
1920 2.5 9.5 12.0 14.5 
1921 2.6 9.0 11.6 14.5 
1922 2.4 9.0 11.3 14.7 
1923 2.7 8.5 11.2 14.8 
1924 2.6 8.3 10.9 14.9 
1925 2.6 8.1 10.7 15.1 
1926 2.5 8.0 10.5 15.1 
1927 2.5 7.8 10.3 15.3 
1928 2.5 7.6 10.1 15.4 
1929 2.4 7.5 9.9 15.5 
Source: Whetham (1978), P.172. 
specialised dairy and pig rearing or soft fruit production. The more efficient producers 
were able to benefit from the intensification of production and output. The less 
efficient, constrained by shortages of capital and credit, were forced to cut both inputs 
and outputs in order to survive 'conditions of near insolvency,.29 
Economy in the use of labour, cheaper cereals and transport and lower rents did allow 
producers to reduce their costs as prices fell, although there was still little surplus 
income available to either payoff debts or invest in new machinery. While a small 
number of producers were able to make a reasonable living in the 1920's, low 
incomes, debts and a lack of education and capital forced the majority to operate at 
low levels of both production and income. 
29 whetham (1978), p. 213 - 216. 
10 
British farmers enjoyed a high level of profit during the War.30 However, the slump 
of 1921-1923 ate into capital, and the subsequent slow decline of prices between 1924 
and 1929 left large numbers of producers 'bumping along with profits just enough to 
cover their basic charges, certainly not enough to rebuild capital,.31 A large number 
of farmers had also sunk the bulk of their wartime gains into the purchase of their 
own holding in the immediate post war period. The War had also turned the cost of 
labour into a serious problem; in 1922 agricultural prices were 50% to 60% higher 
than pre-war, while agricultural wages remained at twice their pre-war level and could 
not be reduced in line with the fall in prices, despite the employers' efforts to the 
contrary.32 
The collapse of agricultural prices between 1929 and 1932 was 'unparalleled in its 
severity', and left the industry in an even more seriously depressed condition than the 
slump of 1921-1923.33 During the winter of 1932-33, the agricultural price index 
fell to within a few points of its pre-war level. Cereal prices had in fact fallen below 
their pre-war level in the winters of 1929/30 and 1930/31, and the wheat acreage fell 
to its lowest recorded level during 1931. The gross return on grain fell by 50% 
between 1929 and 1931.34 
30 Peter Dewey, "British Farming Profits and Government Policy during 
World War One", The Economic History Review (2nd Series), Vol. 37 
(1984), p. 386-87. 
31 J. Brown, Ope cit., p. 84. See also Murray, Ope cit. p. 18-20. 
32 See Whetham (1978), P. 142 and Newby, Ope cit., p. 160-170. 
33 Murray, Ope cit., p. 34. 
34 Whetham (1978), p. 232. 
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The 1920's had seen a resumption of pre-war trends in the structure of agricultural 
production and the total collapse of prices after 1929 intensified this process. 
Production continued to shift to those commodities where prices had fallen least, to 
livestock, milk, poultry and egg production. Eastern England was the area worst hit 
by the 1929-32 depression, containing as it did the majority of the large arable 
farms; 35 arable producers' capital and credit had already been seriously eroded by 
the decline in grain prices during the 1920's. Many grain farmers had diversified into 
other forms of production, but there were still large areas of the country where cereals 
remained the main crop.36 However the collapse of cereal prices was followed in the 
winter of 1931/32 by the collapse of livestock and livestock product prices, and so the 
effects of the depression were felt across the country. Only those farms with 
extremely high yields or extremely low costs escaped disastrous losses after 1929.37 
Bankruptcies and agricultural unemployment both increased. After a visit to Norfolk 





'Agricultural buildings are coming down, the farmers are despairing and the 
labourers are losing their employment ... The waves of past depression have 
left their mark on Norfolk, where you can see the marks of the old fences 
reminding one that the land in the past has been cultivated.,38 
ibid. , p. 238. 
ibid. , p. 232. 
ibid. , p. 233. 
Quoted in H. Newby, Ope cit. , p. 172. 
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Even in counties such as Lancashire, where the financial effects of the depression 
were less severe, farms only survived 'by the old principle "do not spend", and many 
farm families literally did not spend cash on themselves during the worst years of the 
depression. ,39 
The decline in arable production continued during the 1930's, as Table Three 
illustrates. The total area under agricultural production also continued to decline. 
Although the subsidy introduced by the 1932 Wheat Act brought stability to arable 
producers in the South of England, large areas of the North East could not be made 
to pay under wheat and so were allowed to fall out of production. The area sown to 
fodder crops (swedes and turnips) also fell sharply, from one million acres in 1929 to 
just over 600,000 by 1939, as imports of animal feeds into the UK increased. Milk 
production increased steadily in the years up to 1939, as the number of cows and 
heifers in milk and calf rose from 2.7 to 3.1 million between 1929 and 1939.40 By 
contrast, there was little change in the number of animals reared for home beef 
production. Labour costs remained at roughly twice their pre-war level, while the 
agricultural price index (base 1911-13=100) had only recovered to 137 by 1938, 
having fallen to 107 in 1933.41 Only those commodities which enjoyed a regulated 
market provided farmers with a secure income. During the same period the cost of 
living index remained steady at between 150 and 160. Thus, as Edith Whetham 




Whetham (1978) p. 239. Lancashire farmers retailed their own milk, 
eggs, poul try and vegetables, and so were less dependent on 
wholesale markets. 
ibid., p. 288-289. 
ibid., p. 314. 
13 
TABLE THREE Cro~ Acreages and Livestock Numbers on Farms III 
Great Britain, 1914-1939 
(millions) 
1914 1918 1932 1939 
Total crops other 10.43 12.40 8.49 8.31 
than grass 
Temporary Grass 3.86 3.45 3.92 3.56 
Total arable 14.29 15.85 12.41 11.87 
Permanent Grass 17.61 15.89 17.42 17.33 
Total agricultural 31.90 31.75 29.83 29.20 
area 
CowslHefers in milk/calf 2.94 3.03 3.34 3.62 
Other Cattle 4.15 4.38 4.25 4.30 
Sheep 24.29 23.35 26.41 25.99 
Pigs 2.63 1.82 3.35 3.77 
Poultry 73.83 64.14 
Wheat 1.87 2.64 1.34 1.76 
Barley 1.70 1.65 1.03 1.07 
Potatoes .61 .80 .65 .59 
Source: Murray, Agriculture (1955) 
introduced after 1932 simply served to redress, if only in part, the shift in the terms 
of trade against agricultural production that had occurred between 1929 and 1933.42 
42 ibid., p. 314. 
14 
The gross output from British Farms (by volume) increased by 2-3% per year from 
1924 to 1939; the reaction of the typical family farm to falling prices was to increase 
production. Over the same period the total area sown to crops and grass was reduced 
by one million acres in England and Wales, while the total arable area fell by two 
million acres. The agricultural labour force fell by just over 100,000 men.43 These 
trends produced a considerable rise in productivity in the 1930's both per acre and per 
man. This rise was owing to a variety of factors: better management techniques, more 
intensive production, increases in imported feeds and the use of more machinery all 
played a part in increasing agricultural productivity.44 The relative stability of 
agricultural wages meant that those farms which required paid workers had to offset 
the cost of wages by either increasing output per man, or by the use of labour saving 
machinery. Mechanisation was a difficult process, as the commodities whose 
production was most easily mechanised had suffered the largest fall in prices. Milk, 
pigs and potatoes enjoyed more stable markets and relatively higher prices, but were 
less adaptable to the use of machinery.45 
The increase in productivity did little to improve the low level of agricultural incomes. 
Farm Management surveys conducted in 1937 and 1938 revealed that nearly 33% of 
producers returned either a loss or an income equivalent to the wage earned by a 
skilled agricultural worker. Farm earnings and wage rates of agricultural workers 
remained at between 60-65% of non-agricultural incomes throughout the inter-war 
43 From nearly 800,000 to just under 700,000. 
44 Whetham (1978), p. 315. 
45 ibid., p. 266-269. 
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period. 46 The relative poverty of the countryside was also revealed by a general 
lack of facilities. The early wartime surveys revealed that only half the agricultural 
holdings in England and Wales had a piped water supply, and only 25% were wired 
for electricity. Rural housing was generally of poor quality and in short supply. The 
relative poverty of the farming population also extended to those who owned land, 
unless they could draw on income from commercial or industrial sources.47 As 
Whetham comments in the Agrarian History of England and Wales: 
'The country was unkempt, with overgrown hedges, choked drains and ditches, 
abandoned fields, derelict steadings and condemned cottages falling into ruin 
... a depressing witness to the loss of income, of capital and of hope, inflicted 
by 20 years of remorseless deflation on the farming communities in England 
and Wales'.48 
Owner-occupation increased steadily during the early years of the First World War, 
accelerating after 1917 into a 'wild buying spree' in the immediate post-war period.49 
Rising land prices, low rents and, after 1910, the threat of heavy taxes encouraged 
landowners to sell. Tenants' increased security of tenure under the Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1908 may also have encouraged landlords to sell. Tenants purchased 
46 E. M. Ojala, Agriculture and Economic Progress (1952), p. 135. 
47 whetham (1978) p. 318-19 and p. 325. 
48 ibid., p. 287. 
49 s. G. sturmer, 'OWner-Farming in England and Wales, 1900 - 1950' in 
W. E. Minch~nton (ed.), Essays in Agrarian History: Volume II 
(1968), P. 286. 
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their land because at the prices ruling it seemed a good investment, and because in the 
later years of the war there were tax incentives to do SO.50 
The demand for farms in the immediate post-war period forced many farmers to 
purchase a holding, as farms for rent became increasingly scarce. Purchase was also 
seen as an investment for surplus funds and as a means of avoiding increased rents 
under a new landlord. This explosion of demand for holdings pushed up the price of 
land to £35 per acre by 1920. The low returns from land ownership encouraged 
landlords to sell in the post-war years.51 While many tenants bought their holdings 
willingly, some bought their land under the threat of eviction. 
The onset of depression in 1921 ended the spree. Now owner-occupiers, who had 
bought at high prices, found themselves in increasing difficulty, as large numbers of 
holdings were lost to mortgagors or sold at greatly reduced prices. The number of 
bankruptcies rose from 44 in 1920 to 472 by 1923, with producers either going out 
of business or becoming tenants of their mortgagors.52 
Some land was sold for owner-occupation during the worst of the depression, although 
not enough to counter the general decline in numbers. The demand for farms for sale 
or rent recovered in 1924 and 1925, although both land sales and the increase in 
owner-occupation ceased after 1925. By 1927, just over 33% of the land in England 
50 ibid., p. 292. 
51 ibid., p. 292-93. 
52 ibid., p. 294. 
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and Wales was farmed by its owners, compared with just 12Y2% in 1908.53 More 
detailed figures are given in Table Four. 
Owner-occupiers were particularly hard hit by the effects of the inter-war depression. 
Mortgage payments, undertaken in the immediate post-war prosperity, were fixed as 
the depression cut farmers' real incomes. The number of bankruptcies increased, 
reaching a peak of 560 in 1932, and the number of owner-occupiers declined. 
Mortgages were often foreclosed, or farmers decided to cut their losses and sell, often 
becoming the tenants of the purchaser of their land. During the worst years of the 
depression, many landowners and mortgagees-in-possession were forced to farm land 
themselves.54 
TABLE FOUR Owner Occupation in England and Wales 1909 - 14 and 1927 
1912 1913 1914 1927 
Number of Owner 50,972 48,760 49,204 146,887 
Occupied Holdings 
Percentage of holdings 11.7 11.2 11.3 36.6 
Owner-occupied (%) 
Area Crops/Grass Owner 2.95 2.89 2.96 9.23 
Occupied (million acres) 
Percentage of area 10.9 10.6 10.9 36.0 
Owner -occupied (%) 
(Holdings over 1 acre) 
Source: S.G. Sturmey, 'Owner Farming in England 
and Wales, 1900-1950' 
53 ibid., p. 295-296 
54 ibid., p. 302-303. 
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The lack of growth of owner-occupation after 1925 was a symptom of the 'deep 
depression which even the government apparatus of protection and support could not 
fully stem'.55 Farmers who had bought their own holdings found themselves in 
severe financial difficulties; landlords also found themselves in severe financial 
difficulty, and unable to make the long-term capital improvements that the land 
required. Landlords often allowed inefficient or ailing tenants to remain on their 
holdings, as a heavy investment would be required for the property to attract a better 
tenant. 56 
'Much of the country thus continued to be farmed by families chronically in 
debt, without the knowledge or the capital to develop the potential of the land 
they occupied. ,57 
The 1929-31 slump produced a revolution in British agricultural policy. From the mid 
1850's to the early 1930's, with the exception of the war years, Britain enjoyed the 
benefits of cheap food and feedingstuffs, with the government adopting a 'laissez-faire' 
attitude towards both food production and the industry itself. The repeal of the Com 
Production Act left producers to their own devices to face a harsh economic 
climate.58 Apart from legislation on agricultural rates and the British Sugar Subsidy 
Act 1925, the legislative measures introduced before 1932 were essentially permissive, 
designed to encourage self-help and organization amongst producers. However, the 
55 Pollard, Ope cit. , p. 88. 
56 whetham (1978), p. 317-18. 
57 ibid. , p. 318. 
58 Murray, Ope cit. , p. 27-28. 
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policies introduced in the wake of the 1929-31 slump represented an active policy of 
assistance for British farmers. 
Policy developed along four lines; the reorganisation of marketing and the regulation 
of home produced supplies, the regulation of imports, subsidies and price assurance, 
and measures to improve efficiency and reduce production costs. 59 Marketing boards 
were established for Potatoes, Milk, Pigs and Bacon and a number of other 
commodities. By 1939 some form of guaranteed price operated for milk, fat cattle, 
sheep, bacon pigs, wheat, barley, oats and sugar beet. The Agriculture Act 1937 
introduced subsidies on lime and basic slag in an attempt to increase soil fertility. 
However, despite this policy of state intervention, reversing 'a policy of laissez faire 
which was nearly a century old, prices barely rose to levels at which British farmers 
could make a profit'.60 Although the industry would not have survived without 
protection, the policies introduced could not reverse the general downward trend in 
British farming that had begun in the 1870's. 
The events of 1929-31 sounded the death knell for the principle of free trade, and 
with it the dominance of the Liberal wing of the Conservative party.61 
59 ibid., p. 28. 
60 Pollard, op. cit., p. 86. 
61 A. Budd, The Politics of Economic Planning (1978), p. 49-50. 
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'Everywhere, the idea of the market as a sensitive, self-regulating mechanism 
for allocating resources suffered a setback, not only on the familiar grounds of 
equity but also of efficiency. ,62 
Nevertheless the policies of the National Government, which was dominated by 
Conservative politicians, were essentially pluralist and did not, overall, entail a greatly 
increased role for the State. 
Walter Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture after 1932, was an advocate of corporatism, 
and during his period he attempted to foster a corporate relationship between the 
nation and its farmers. Elliot was appointed in the aftermath of the failure of the 
Ottowa Conference. The National Government became increasingly concerned with 
the development of domestic production and with the industry's role in the country's 
growing economic nationalism. Agriculture was seen as having specific 
responsibilities and a defined place in the structure of the British economy. 63 Elliot 
saw the transformation of agricultural policy, and the creation of a new order in the 
industry, as giving a lead to the 'twentieth century state'. He attempted to promote the 
cartelization of agricultural through the marketing boards set up under the 1933 
Marketing Act. The 1933 Act was Elliots' major piece of legislation. While the Act 
built on the foundations laid down by Addison in his marketing legislation the 1933 
was more far-reaching, giving as it did a basis for the regulation of the supply of 
62 ibid., P. 49, quoting D. Winch, Economics and Policy (1969), p. 73. 
63 A. F. Coo~er, British Agricultural Policy, 1912-36 : A study in 
Conservat~ve Politics (1989), p. 160. 
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agricultural goods.64 The move towards marketing boards also entailed the with-
drawal of agricultural policy from direct parliamentary scrutiny. 65 
Producers welcomed the new marketing boards, as they appeared to promise an end 
to the 'gluts' of production which were depressing prices. The boards were also sold 
to the farmers as a form of 'local self government'; the control of production would 
not involve 'farming from Whitehall,.66 The introduction of the new marketing 
boards under the 1933 Act ushered in a new phase in the relationship between the 
producers, in the shape of the NFU, and the government. As well as assuming a 
degree of administrative responsibility for the running of the marketing boards, the 
NFU also gradually became more involved in the policy process as a whole.67 
However, the NFU's new role did not divert the Union from the pursuit of its 
members' interests. Prices, rather than the efficiency of the industry, were the NFU's 
mam concern. As Chapter Five will show, once any price objectives had been 
satisfied, little was done towards realising the other objectives that the Marketing Act 
was designed to promote.68 
64 ibid., p. 168. The 1933 Act provided a basis for the regulation of 
the total supply of agricultural goods (through import restrictions) 
for any commod~ty for which a marketing board was in existence, or 
plannea. The 1933 Act also foreshadowed legislation to encourage 
vertical organisation between farmers and processors/distributors; 
it was planned that a central body would eventually have 'extensive 
authority over decision making in a specific industry' (p. 168). 
65 ibid., p. 169. The examination and discussion of proposed schemes 
largely took place outside Parliament, and plans were confirmed by 
a ballot of the relevant producers. 
66 ibid., p. 170. 
67 ibid., p. 171. 
68 ibid., ~. 172. The issue of agricultural marketing is discussed in 
detail ~n Chapter V. 
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Elliot's policies increasingly began to be questioned by other members of the Cabinet, 
and Elliot himself moved away from 'full blown' corporatism on practical grounds.69 
No new marketing schemes were introduced after 1934; the proposals for the 
reorganisation of the sugar industry envisaged a move away from self-regulation. The 
whole question of agricultural marketing, and the industry's capacity to organise and 
regulate itself, was to re-emerge as a key policy issue in the years after 1945. As later 
chapters will show, the Labour Party retreated from the radical proposals contained 
in the 1947 Lucas Report on agricultural marketing, preferring to introduce legislation 
to simply amend the existing Marketing Acts. This move was prompted, at least in 
part, by fears that NFU opposition to marketing reform would jeopardize the 
expansIOn programme. 
The 1930's saw British farming become accepted as an important element of the 
national economy, protected by a variety of legislative measures. The NFU became 
the official 'Mouthpiece' of the industry, and was drawn into the formulation and 
implementation of government policy.70 Cotton and iron and steel were other 
industries which benefitted from government legislation and developed close links 
with the government in the 1930's. In the case of agriculture and cotton their strong 
links with the government, and their importance to the nation's post-war recovery, 
helped to prevent prevented any moves towards nationalization in the years after 1945. 
69 ibid., p. 179. 
70 ibid., p. 216-17. 
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While the marketing boards could not have functioned without NFU involvement, the 
collaboration between the government and the Union was also designed to encourage 
a more 'far-sighted' approach to policy within the industry.71 For its part the Labour 
Party, although opposed to marketing boards, began to acknowledge the importance 
of gaining the farmers' support for its own agricultural policies.72 Labour Party 
policy rested on the national planning of land use and the fixing of stable prices as a 
solution to the industry's ills, a policy which gained considerable support amongst 
agricultural experts in this period. By 1945 even the NFU had accepted the 
continuation of the CW AECS and the Ministry of Food as a corollary to the 
continuation of guaranteed prices in peacetime. In the inter-war period, Labour had 
advocated the nationalisation of the land; in the post-war period the need to secure 
increased production at almost any cost and NFU's role in the policy process pushed 
nationalisation of the land out of the policy arena. 
By the late 1930's British agriculture had begun to recover from the hardships of the 
1920's, although it was to take six years of war to restore the industry to prosperity. 
The War, as later chapters will show, also saw further efforts to lift farming out of the 
'cockpit of politics and assign it to the realm of administration',73 efforts which were 
to culminate in the APR process. 
In the years immediately preceding WWII British agriculture supplied approximately 
30% of the UKs annual food requirements (by wholesale value) leaving the bulk to 
71 ibid., p. 217. 
72 See Chapter II. 
73 Cooper, Ope cit., p. 216. 
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be obtained from overseas sources. In addition, large quantities of animal feedstuffs 
were imported.74 The proportions of the various commodities produced at home 
varied considerably; domestic production accounted for 100% of the market of liquid 
milk, meat 50%, wheat 12% and butter 9%. Approximately 25% of the UKs annual 
output of livestock products was dependent on supplies of imported feedstuffs. The 
impact of the war on British agriculture can be seen in Tables Five and Six. Table 
Three illustrated the impact of inter-war economic trends on agricultural production. 
The main emphasis in wartime production programmes was on the production of crops 
for direct human consumption, and this involved both the ploughing up of large areas 
of grassland and the diversion of grain from animal to direct human consumption. 
Between 1939 and 1945 the total arable acreage increased by six million acres and the 
area under grain by four million acres. The total supply of animal feeds fell by 25% 
over the same period, in starch equivalent terms, with supplies of imported feeds 
falling to 16% of their pre-war level by 1943.75 The effect of these factors can be 
traced in the trend in livestock numbers after 1939. 
The maintenance of milk production was given the highest priority in view of the high 
nutritional value of liquid milk and the cow's efficiency in converting feedstuffs. The 
whole impact of the reduction in feed supplies was felt by pig and poultry producers, 
who could not feed their animals on grass and fed them instead on grain that was 
required for human consumption. The war years also saw considerable growth in the 
mechanisation of British agriculture. The number of tractors in use on British farms 
74 ibid., p. 39. 
75 ibid., p. 373 and p. 385. 
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TABLE FIVE Crop Acreages on Farms in the UK 1939 - 1945 
thousands 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Wheat 1,766 1,809 2,265 2,516 3,464 3,270 2,274 
Barley 1,013 1,339 1,475 1,528 1,788 1,973 2,215 
Oats 2,427 3,400 3,951 4,133 3,680 3,656 3,753 
Potatoes 704 832 1,123 1,304 1,391 1,417 1,397 
Sugar Beet 344 329 351 425 417 431 417 
Total crops 
other than 
grass 8,781 10,433 12,686 13,656 14,509 14,548 13,849 
Temporary grass 4,125 3,891 3,553 3,863 4,219 4,725 5,334 
Total arable 12,906 14,346 16,239 17,498 18,728 19,273 19,183 




area 31,679 31,430 31,353 31,204 31,038 31,008 
Rough 
grazings 16,539 16,639 17,003 16,959 17,119 17,034 17,229 
Source: Murray, Agriculture (1955) 
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TABLE SIX Livestock Numbers on Farms in the UK, 1939 - 1945 
Thousand 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Cattle, dairy 3,885 3,957 3,988 4,199 4,323 4,373 4,343 
Others 4,987 5,136 4,952 4,876 4,936 5,128 5,273 
Sheep, breeding10,975 10,687 9,228 8,852 8,201 8,120 8,211 
ewes 
Others 15,912 15,632 13,029 12,645 12,182 11,987 11,939 
Pigs, breeding 542 468 245 250 186 253 246 
sows 
Others 3,832 3,638 2,313 1,893 1,643 1,614 1,906 
Poultry 74,357 71,243 62,059 57,813 50,729 55,127 62,136 
Source: Murray, Agriculture (1955) 
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Source : D.K. Britton and I.P. Keith 'A Note on the statistics 
of Farm Power Supplies in GB', The Farm Economist, Vol. VI, No.6 (1950) 
increased from 116,830 in May 1942 to 203,420 in January 1946, while over the same 
period the number of combine harvesters in use increased from 1,000 to 3,460, and 
the number of milking machines from 29,510 to 48,290.76 These developments, 
which as Murray points out might have taken decades to occur in peacetime, played 
an important part in the expansion of output. Table Seven gives figures for the 
number of workers employed on agricultural holdings; labour had left the countryside 
at the rate of 15,000 workers per annum in the inter-war period, and this trend had 
continued in the early months of the war until the industry became a reserved 
occupation under the Undertakings (Restrictions on Engagement) Order in 1940. 
In 1939 the Government announced that farmers would have guaranteed prices and 
markets for the total production of the principal products from the 1940 harvest; the 
prices of most agricultural commodities had been stabilised on or shortly after the 
outbreak of the war and maximum selling prices had been fixed for imported 
feedstuffs and fertilizers. The Agriculture Departments emphasized that the key to 
increased production was the confidence of the industry in the Government and in the 
future of their industry, and in November 1940 the Cabinet agreed that guaranteed 
prices and markets should be maintained for the duration of the war and for at least 
one year after the end of hostilities. The public announcement of this policy was 
accompanied by a pledge that all the major parties recognised the importance of a 
'healthy and well-balanced' agriculture as an 'essential feature' of post-war policy.77 
76 
77 
ibid., p. 276. 
H. of C. Deb. (5th Series) Vol. 367 Col. 92, November 26, 1940. See 
also WP (G) (40) 302 and 303, october 16, 1940, 'Home Food 
Production', memoranda by the Agriculture Ministers and. the Food 
Policy committee, PRO CAB WM (40) 291, November 19, 1940, ~n PRO CAB 
85/10. 
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The Minister of Agriculture was empowered to give directions as to the cultivation 
and use of agricultural land, to enter upon and inspect farm land, and to take 
possession of land where his directions had been ignored and the land was not being 
farmed according to the rules of good husbandry. In the main these powers would be 
delegated to the County War Agricultural Executive Committees (CW AEC's), who 
would act as the Minister's agents. There were 61 CW AEC's each one consisting of 
seven local residents appointed by the Minister of Agriculture or where appropriate 
the Secretary of State for Scotland. The Committees also operated labour and 
machinery pools and could also undertake contract work for local farmers or farm land 
themselves.78 
The Ministry of Food, established in September 1939, was given control over all 
stages of the food distribution and processing process, acting as the sole purchaser of 
agricultural produce at the farm gate, either directly or through authorised buyers. All 
food production was licensed by the Ministry of Food. April 1941 saw the formal 
beginning of the Government's policy of price stabilization through food subsidies in 
an attempt to hold down the cost of living, although subsidies had been introduced on 
a more ad hoc basis in the early months of the war. Towards the end of 1940 the 
Cabinet had committed itself to subsidizing 'essential' foods and to 'restraining' any 
increase in the cost of living. 'Luxury' goods were to be left to find their own level. 
In the 1941 budget the Government declared that it would maintain the cost of living 
78 For a fuller account of the wartime powers of the CWAEC's see A. 
Hurd, op.cit., p. 124-127. 
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index with the then current level of 125-130 (1936-38 = 100), a policy that was to be 
continued after the war. 79 
Before the war British farmers produced foodstuffs to the value of 18. 7 billion 
calories, a figure that had increased to some 29.0 billion calories by 1943/44. These 
figures underestimate British producers' efforts, however, for if account is taken of that 
quantum of output dependent on imported animal feeds then the figures for the same 
period are 14.7 billion and 28.1 billion, an increase of 91% rather than 55%.80 
Before 1939 British agriculture provided 30% of the UK's annual calorie requirements, 
while at the peak of the war effort it was providing 40% of the country's calorie 
needs, and in a very different form compared to pre-war; during the war the 
production of cereals and vegetables had taken precedence over meat production, the 
latter being of more calorific value than grain and root crops. 
Using MAP's definition of net output the index for the war years shows an increase 
of 25%, although on a wider definition of net output, one which includes the products 
of other industries, net output increased by 15% between 1938/39 and 1943/44. This 
last calculation gives an indication of the unassisted efforts of the industry over a 
period when almost 800,000 acres of often very good farmland were lost to 
79 See Murray, op.cit., P.284 and Rollings 'British Budgetary Policy, 
1945-54: a "Keynesian Revolution"? in EHR (2nd Series), Vol. XLI (May 
1988) No.2, P.285 















80 Murray, op.cit., P.242. Murray also gives the following figures for 
average calorie consumption per head per day. 
calories per 
head per day 
Post War 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
2,984 2,772 2,795 2,864 2,827 2,923 
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agricultural production. As Murray argues, however, even MAF's figures for net 
output underestimate the increase in food production, as wartime production 
programmes required an increase in the production of lower value foods such as grain, 
potatoes and a reduction in relatively more expensive food stuffs such as eggs, meat 
and butter. 81 The fanners themselves did extremely well out of the war, with 
aggregate net income increasing from £59 million to £230.5 million between 1937/38 
and 1943/44, although it fell back to £188 million in 1944/45 as a result of poor crop 
yields. This represents an increase of more than 300% (1937/38-1938/39 = 100), from 
an index of 103 in 1937/38 to 403 in 1943/44, a rate of increase greater than that of 
national income as a whole. During the war the industry's share of the national 
income rose from 1.2% to 2.4%, and MAF expenditure increased from £11.6 million 
between 1938/39 and 1944/45.82 
The demands of wartime production had a considerable impact on the scale and 
pattern of agricultural production in the UK, and on the evolution of British 
agricultural policy as a whole. The impact of wartime policy on the development of 
post-war legislation will be traced in subsequent chapters. 
What later chapters will show is that the development of policy after 1939 was 
influenced by the need to reassure producers that there would be no return to inter-war 
conditions once the hostilities were over. The 'Great Betrayal', occasioned by the 
repeal of the Com Production Act in May 1920, was to colour the industry's attitude 
81 
82 
ibid., p. 224. 
Figures for net income are taken from Murray, op. cit p. 379. Data 
for National Income is taken from HMSO, statistical Digest of the 
War (1946), p. 200. 
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to government policy some 19 years later. The farmers were haunted by the prospect 
of a second great betrayal, and so sought the strongest possible guarantees of security 
for their industry. The promise of future stability as a means of securing increased 
output was to prove as important in the Second World War as it had between 1914 
and 1918. The pledges made by the government and the major political parties during 
the war, the distress the industry had suffered in the inter-war period, and the NFU's 
growing role in the administration made another post-war betrayal extremely unlikely. 
The need to reassure farmers as to the future of their industry was therefore a crucial 
factor in the development of both wartime policy and the policy for the transition from 
war to peace. The guarantees of stability for the transitional period were embodied 
in the APR mechanism. As later chapters will show, the price review process was not 
a sudden creation, but evolved from the changing relationship between the government 
and the industry. The APR was a response to depression, war and the increased 
economic importance of the producers. The APR mechanism remained in operation 
beyond the transitional period, as the industry'S vital role in the nation's post-war 
recovery reinforced the importance of stability for the industry and a good working 
relationship between the government and the farmers. 
This thesis will examine the relationship between the government and the NFU, and 
its impact on agricultural policy in the post-war period. It will be argued that the 
Price Review acted as a closure on the discussion of agricultural policy, and failed to 
tackle the wide variation in standards and incomes between producers, and that the 
weaknesses in the review mechanism were revealed once the level of support for the 
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industry was reduced. It will also be argued that while the APR had corporatist 
features, it was not a fully corporatist relationship. 
Although both Labour and Conservative governments recognised the economIC 
importance of British agriculture, party political considerations increasingly began to 
inf1uence policy making. This thesis will examine the pursuit of the rural vote by the 
major parties, and the political importance of the industry in the post war period. It 
will be argued that both parties attributed an over-inflated importance to the farming 
vote, and that Labour ultimately made few inroads into rural Britain. Labour's 
attempts to win the farmers' economic and political support resulted in a deterioration 
in the Party's relationship with the Agricultural Workers Union, one of its strongest 
supporters in the inter-war period. The NUA W seemingly had most to gain from 
Labours' victory in 1945, but the Union were unable to secure either the end of the 
tied cottage or wage parity with industrial workers under Labour. 
The NUAW could only hope to secure their policy objectives under a Labour 
government but Labour, certain of the farm workers support, had little incentive to 
give those objectives priority once they achieved office. The farmers' economic, and 
later their potential political, importance secured their role in the policy process, and 
Labour were too concerned to gain the support of the farmers to risk a conflict with 
them over issues such as the abolition of tied cottage. Here, as elsewhere in Labour's 
post-war policy making, pragmatism triumphed over ideology. As this thesis will 
show however, the conflict between organisation and ideology continued to emerge 
in Labours' agricultural policy discussions throughout the post-war period. 
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(I) 
'THE GROWTH OF POLICY 1940-44' 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the impact of the war on British agriculture and gave 
a broad outline of the key elements of wartime production policy. This chapter will 
examine the development of policy between 1939 and 1945 in greater detail and will 
also trace the evolution of Government thinking on what direction policy should take 
in the post-war period. What this chapter and chapter III will show is that a study of 
post-war policy cannot be divorced from a study of wartime policy. To take the most 
important example, the annual and special price review (APR and SPR) system created 
by the Agriculture Act 1947 made permanent a mechanism intended to bridge the 
transition from war to peace. This mechanism had, in turn, developed from a number 
of ad hoc general price reviews conducted by the Government and the NFU between 
1940 and 1945. This chapter will also reveal that a key factor in the development of 
both wartime policy and reconstruction policy was the importance of retaining the 
confidence of the farmers in the future of their industry and in the Government's 
intentions towards producers. Memories of the 'Great Betrayal' of 1920 were still 
fresh in the minds of many farmers and the industry, in the form of the National 
Farmers Union (NFU), tried to obtain the strongest guarantees it could from the 
wartime Government. 
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For their part the War Cabinet recognised the importance to the war effort of gaining 
the farmers confidence, and so in November 1940 the Government pledged that 
producers would have guaranteed prices and markets for their produce for the duration 
of the war and for at least one year afterwards. It is the Government's attempts to 
convert its pledges into concrete proposals that form the basis of this chapter. The 
first section will deal with price policy in the early wartime period, a period which 
saw the Government take the first steps towards general price reviews, and make use 
of a system of differentiated incentives to secure the desired pattern of production. 
The use of the price mechanism to secure the desired level of production was initially 
opposed by the Treasury, who regarded the Government's guarantees as offering an 
adequate degree of incentive. Section (ii) will trace the evolution of MAF's policy on 
British agriculture over the period from March 1941 to April 1944, and will examine 
the changing assumptions which underpinned the various sets of proposals. Section 
(iii) will focus on the discussions between the Government and the NFU which laid 
the foundations of the APR system. 
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(i) 
In his Budget address to the House in April 1940 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
John Simon, told Parliament that the Government's objective was to maintain 'a level 
economy in which prices and profits and renumerations are kept as steady as war 
conditions will allow, and in which the flow of such goods, as are available for 
civilian consumption, is kept in regulated supply'. 1 In a memorandum published in 
1929, 'The Course of Prices in a Great War', the Treasury, reviewing the events of the 
First World War, had warned of the dangers of wartime inflation, and had advocated 
a drastic taxation policy, rationing and the control of wages, prices and profits as ways 
of preventing the sorts of price and cost of living increases that had occurred between 
1914 and 1918.2 The controls on agricultural produce introduced at the outbreak of 
the war stabilized prices at their pre-war levels, the overall aim being to delay any 
increase for as long as possible. This policy soon came under attack from the 
Treasury, who argued that a 'price-freeze' would tend to depress supplies while 
inflating demand, and from October 1939 Government departments were authorised 
to increase prices to cover replacement costs, although Government trading was to 
avoid making a loss, and to make a profit wherever possible.3 
However, not all foodstuffs and raw materials were subject to price control orders. 
The prices of home-grown oats and barley were not controlled by the Ministry of 
Food, with the result that by January 1940 the prices of both commodities had reached 
1 H.C. Deb., (5th series), Vol. 360, Col. 84, 23rd April 1940. 
2 See: Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy (HMSO, 1949), p.1S1. 
3 ibid., p.1S7. 
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more than double their August 1939 level. Price control for home-grown oats was 
introduced in January 1940, the price of barley coming under the Ministry of Food's 
jurisdiction in the summer of 1940.4 A number of factors were responsible for these 
price increases. The Ministry of Food's initial optimism about the levels of food 
imports evaporated quickly in the early months of the war; in 1939 officials had 
worked on the assumption that imports of food and feedings tuffs in the first year of 
the war would only be slightly less than their pre-war levels, 21 million tons instead 
of an average of 22.5 million tons.s However, in the first two months of the war dry 
cargo arrivals were less than two-thirds their normal level. Cereal imports were 
particularly badly hit, and the Country's wheat stocks began to run down at an 
alarming rate, with the result that more shipping space was allocated to wheat at the 
expense of cereal feeds. 
The Ministry of Food had assumed that there would only be a negligible cut in feed 
imports in the first year of the war, but in the November 1939 import programme for 
the year 1939/40. The Ministry was allocated 7.66 million tons of feedstuffs, as 
compared with a pre-war average of 8.75 million tons.6 From December 1939 
farmers were prohibited from feeding more than one-third of their output of millable 
wheat to their livestock, and they were also required to sell the rest of their wheat 
4 The price of oats was fixed at lIs. per cwt, below the open ~rket 
~rice, but 47% higher than the average pre-war price. The pr~ce of 
.unported feed oats had been fixed 7s. 9d. a cwt, but was later 
increased in the ligh.t of the di.ffi.cult.ies involved ~n. charging 
different prices for v~rtually und~st~ngu~shable commod~t~es. D.N. 
Chester, Lessons of the British War Economy (Cambridge, 1951), 
p.207. 
5 See : R.J. Hammond, Food, Volume I : The Growth of Policy (HMSO, 
1951), p.62-77. 
6 Lord Murray, Agriculture (HMSO, 1951), p.70. 
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harvest for milling. This served to increase the demand for oats and barley as 
alternative sources of animal feed. The Ministry of Food also controlled the price, 
distribution and allocation of imported feedstuffs, but in the absence of a subsidy, and 
in the face of mounting freight costs and falling supplies, prices increased considerably 
in the first months of the war. The possibility of introducing a subsidy on imported 
animal feeds had been discussed before the war, but had been rejected. However, in 
July 1940 it was decided that feedstuff prices would be frozen at their prevailing level 
for a year.7 
Predictably, the increases in feed prices led to calls from producers for higher prices, 
together with the more general complaint that output could not be increased while 
prices remained frozen at their pre-war levels. Farmers complained that they could 
not afford to purchase the equipment necessary for increased crop production, to buy 
more fertilizers or to undertake the repair of ditches and field drainage systems.8 In 
reply, the Government attempted to reassure producers by guaranteeing them a market 
for all the staple crops from the 1940 harvest at prices 'to be fixed in the light of 
prevailing circumstances', and by increasing the prices paid for fat sheep and pigs.9 
By January 1940 the Ministry of Food had assumed full control of livestock 
marketing, introducing meat rationing the following month; prior to this the Ministry 
7 ibid., p.130. 
8 ibid., p.89. 
9 H.C. Deb. (5th series), Vol. 352, Col. 7, 9th october 1939. The 
standard prices of wheat and oats were also increased in November 
1939. Under the Wheat Act 1932, producers of wheat were paid a 
deficienc¥ payment e~uivalent to the difference between the average 
market pr~ce and a f~xed standard price. 
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only enjoyed partial control through Maximum Price Orders which prohibited direct 
sales of cattle and sheep, and restricted sales of animals to livestock markets. 
In November 1939 the Ministry of Food increased feedstuff prices, in the light of 
increasing freight charges and the impossibility of distinguishing between home-
produced and imported feeds and these adjustments were accompanied by an increase 
in the prices paid by the Ministry for fat cattle and sheep. However, by December 
producers were complaining that the November price schedule was already out of date, 
given increases in the cost of feeds, supply problems and past and prospective wage 
increases. lO The Minister of Agriculture, Dorman-Smith, asked for an increase in the 
price paid for fat cattle which covered any increase in producers' costs and also 
contained an element of incentive to encourage production. 11 Despite the opposition 
of the Ministry of Food the new prices for fat cattle and also for fat pigs, announced 
in December 1939, both contained a degree of price incentive for producers. The 
Ministry of Food was concerned that an increase in the price paid for fat cattle would 
endanger milk supplies unless the price paid to dairy producers was also increased. 
The Ministry of Food was also concerned at the likely effects of feed shortages on 
milk production, and the December price schedule increased the pool price to be paid 
to the producer in January, February and March 1940.12 A further increase was 
agreed, despite Treasury objections, in February 1940 to cover the period from April 
to September, the price increase containing an degree of incentive. The Treasury had 
also objected to the increase in fatstock prices. During the pre-war discussions on 
10 Murray, op.cit., p.90-9l. 
11 ibid., p.9l. 
12 Murray, op.cit., p.92. 
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price-fixing it had been generally agreed that compulsory powers might have to be 
'sweetened' by financial incentives.13 MAF had gone further, arguing that the scale 
of domestic production would be largely determined by price inducements. In 
December 1939 the Treasury's view was that the Governments guarantees were 
incentive enough for producers.14 
As Hammond argues, the production policy which influenced these price adjustments, 
the overall aim of which was to maintain British agriculture on a 'properly balanced 
system which will not collapse at the end of the war,/5 had considerable common 
sense appeal at the time, and it also had the general approval of the Ministry of Food. 
However the decisions on prices had not been co-ordinated and were widely seen as 
having been 'haphazard and irrational'; as 1940 wore on they were to prove, as 
Hancock and Gowing suggest, an unfortunate legacy for the Govemment.16 The 
worsening import situation forced the Government to reconsider the basis of its 
production policy, to shift production away from meat towards the production of crops 
for direct human consumption and milk, a trend which stood in almost complete 
opposition to the trend in production in the first nine months of the war, which had 
favoured feedstuff and meat production at the expense of milk, wheat, and potatoes. 
An increase of 8s. in the national minimum wage paid to agricultural workers in the 
spring of 1940 gave renewed prominence to the whole issue of agricultural price 
13 ibid., p. 88. The issue had been discussed by the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Price-Fixing. 
14 Hancock and Gowing, Ope cit., p.160. 
15 Hammond, Ope cit., p.88. 
16 Hancock and Gowing, Ope cit., p.160. 
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levels. Two issues occupied the minds of Ministers and Officials : The need to secure 
as large an increase in production as possible, and the need to establish, for the first 
time, a definite order of priority for agricultural production.1? Opinion within the 
Government diverged considerably on the size of any price increase and on its 
division between different commodities. These questions were referred to the Inter-
Departmental Committee on Food Prices, which consisted of officials from the 
Treasury, the Ministry of Food and the Agricultural Departments. The Committee 
agreed that the increased returns per annum farmers already enjoyed would meet their 
increased costs and the forthcoming increase in their wages bill. However, the 
Government was committed to increasing producers' prices to meet any increases in 
their costs, and so the Committee concluded that there would have to be some 
adjustment in prices. 18 The Committee also concluded that the Government should 
use the occasion of the price settlement to impose an order of priority on agricultural 
production. It would, the committee continued, be 'impolitic' if the Government left 
any commodities out of the settlement, and so they suggested an overall increase of 
£20 million; £14.9 would cover the cost of the wage increases, while the remaining 




In the early months of the war it had been assumed that cuts in the 
Ministry of Food's import programme would fall almost entirely on 
animal feeds, and so the princi~le of agricultural policy was to 
encourage a general increase ~n production, with empliasis on 
expanding the domestic production of animal feeds. Hancock and 
Gowing, Ope cit., p.159. 
ibid., p.160. In announcing the increase in minimum wages in June 
1940 Hudson was authorised to give a 'firm undertaking' that the 
prices of staple agricultural products would be adjusted 'so as to 
take full account of the increased costs resulting not only from 
this change but from other relevant factors'. Quoted in Murray, ~ 
cit., p.SS. 
43 
In May 1940 the Food Policy Committee had laid down a scale of priorities for 
livestock production with milk given the highest priority. The overall aim of policy 
should be to avoid 'any appreciable diminution' in the output of milk, and, subject to 
this, to maintain fat cattle and sheep production. Any cuts in feed imports were to be 
made at the expense of pigs and poultry, the largest consumers of imported cereals, 
although steps would be taken 'to mitigate as far as possible the very serious hardships 
involved to large numbers of specialist producers,.19 The Food Policy Committee's 
Report concluded that livestock prices should be adjusted so as to vary the incentive 
between commodities and thus achieve the desired pattern of production. 
The Interdepartmental Committee on Food Prices was subsequently assigned the task 
of establishing 'the proper relationship between the prices of different products'. 
Although the Committee were able to agree on the need for a set of rational price 
incentives they were unable to reach agreement on how the £5.1 million should be 
distributed between the various commodities.20 The view of the Agricultural 
Departments was that the Government could not afford to create what they saw as an 
atmosphere of 'recrimination, uneasiness and discomfort on the home food front', and 
the Agricultural Departments also felt that the Committee's approach had been too 
'academic'.21 The Departments argued that the most important thing was to gain the 
active support of the farmers and: 
19 Quoted in Hammond Ope cit., p.SS. 
20 ibid., p.S9. 
21 Hancock and Gowing, Ope cit., p.160-61 and Murray Ope cit., p.96. 
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Iff there is any serious doubt in the minds of the farmers as to their 
ability to pay the increased wages on the new schedule of prices they 
will undoubtedly attempt to economise in labour and the whole policy 
of improved efficiency and increased production will be stultified ...... 
The situation is far too serious to permit of carefully balanced 
calculations,.22 
The Agricultural Departments suggested a scale of prices which involved an increase 
of £34.5 million in farmers' returns as opposed to the Interdepartmental Committee's 
figure of £20 million, which had been approved by the Treasury. They argued that 
the actual wage increase was likely to be more than 8s., that agriculture had been 
chronically depressed in the years the Committee had used as the base for its 
calculations, and that the proposed increase in returns was the only way of securing 
the desired increase in output. 23 The recent decision on wages, they continued, had 
left the industry in a state of 'nervous apprehension', and if an appropriate price 
settlement was not achieved then the whole production drive might collapse.24 Both 
the Ministry of Food and the Treasury rejected the Agricultural Departments' 
proposals, arguing that they had produced no evidence to suggest that the industry's 
condition in the inter-war period justified the level of renumeration they had proposed. 
The Treasury also argued that the level of incentive in the Agricultural Departments' 
price schedule was excessive, given that the increase in farmers' returns since the 
22 Quoted in Murray, Ope cit., p. 96. 
23 ibid., p.96. 
24 Hammond, op.cit., p.89. 
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outbreak of the war had already exceeded the increase in costs by £27 million.2S 
From the Ministry of Food's point of view the most disturbing aspect of the 
Agricultural Departments' proposals was that they perpetuated the existing pattern of 
priorities in agricultural production,26 despite the conclusions of the Food Policy 
Committee, and the demands of the food situation. The Food Policy Committee were 
unable to reach agreement and so the issue was referred to the Lord President's 
Committee.27 
The Lord President's Committee accepted the Agriculture Ministers' figures but 
concluded that they should only apply to the 1939-1940 season, and that for the 1940-
1941 season a new schedule of prices should be drawn up in conformity with the 
conclusions of the Food Policy Committee.28 The interim price schedule was 
announced on June 29th in a statement which also made clear that the Government 
reserved the right to vary prices for 1941 up or down as the food situation required 
and that the main aim of the Government's livestock policy was to maintain milk 
production.29 As the total sum to be distributed remained the same, a reordering of 
production on a more rational basis would require some prices to be reduced from the 
2S Murray, Ope cit., p.9S. 
26 i.e. oats, eggs, pigs, fat cattle, wheat, sheep, milk, sugar beet 
and potatoes. 
27 Hammond, Ope cit. p.90. 
28 Hancock and Gowing, Ope cit., p.161. The 1940-1941 season covered 
the livestock products sold in 1940-1941, and crops from the 1940 
harvest. 
29 Quoted in Murray, OPe cit., p.97. It was also announced that 
farmers making an unspecified level of profit would no longer be 
eligible to be assessed for income tax under Schedule B, and would 
be assessed on Schedule D, i.e. on their profits, rather. than on 
their rent. schedule B, assumed that a farmer s prof~ts were 
equivalent to his rent. Under the Finance Act 1941 th~s new method 
of assessment was applied to all farmers except those occupying ~and 
with a rental value of not more than #300. chester, Ope c~t., 
p.212. 
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levels set in the June schedule, a measure that was opposed by the Agricultural 
Departments. In repay, the Treasury accused them of trying to 'fix' the prevailing 
pattern of British farming.30 It is clear that the Agricultural Departments proposals 
were prompted, at least in part, by the belief that the Ministry of Food's 
recommendations would be seen as discriminating between different groups of 
producers, and would leave the Government open to accusations of unfairness. Any 
loss of goodwill, it was argued, would have serious implications for the Government's 
production drive, and MAF et al clearly believed that the Ministry of Food's proposals 
would provoke just such a loss of goodwil1.31 This was the argument the Agriculture 
Ministers used when the issue was discussed by the Lord President's Committee in 
August 1940. After prolonged discussions agreement was eventually reached on a 
schedule of prices for the 1940-1941 season, and the new schedule was announced on 
the 30th August. The new schedule reduced the prevailing prices for fat cattle and 
pigs, and 'tilted the balance' of production away from oats, barley and livestock and 
towards milk and potatoes; however, as Hammond points out the adjustments 
represented a compromise between the Agricultural Departments and the Ministry of 
Food, adjusting the pattern of price incentives to a certain extent but not as far as the 
Ministry of Food and the nutritionists would have liked.32 
The NFU reacted angrily to the new price schedule, despite Churchill's claim that the 
new prices reconciled 'just treatment for the producer with the wide requirements of 
30 Murray, Ope cit., p.212. 
31 See R.J. Hammond, Food and Agriculture in Britain. 1939-1945 
(stanford, 1954), p.37. 
32 R.J. Hammond, Food Volume I 
p.90. 
The Growth of Policy (HMSO, 1951), 
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the nation,.33 The Union's main complaint was that the adjustments had been made 
without prior consultation. When announcing the increase in agricultural wage rates 
from 40s. to 48s. per week, Hudson had stated that any decisions on price adjustments 
would be reached in consultation with producers' representatives. 34 This pledge was, 
however, honoured at the next general price review, which took place in December 
1941. In November 1940 Hudson had assured producers that prices would be 'subject 
to adjustment to the extent of any substantial changes in cost of production',35 and 
a further increase in the agricultural minimum wage in December 1941 forced the 
Government to honour this earlier pledge. It was estimated that the rise in the 
national minimum wage would increase producers' costs by £20 million, and after 
prolonged discussions between MAP and the NFU agreement was reached on a 
aggregate increase of £25 million pounds spread over all the principal farm products. 
MAP's initial settlement had made no provision for adjusting pig and poultry prices 
and had been rejected on these grounds by the NFU, who claimed that the 
Government had not honored their November 1940 pledge. The price schedule 
eventually agreed upon increased the prices paid for fat pigs and eggs, although the 
overall bias of the settlement was still towards milk, potatoes, sugar beet and wheat. 
Another general review, again provoked by an increase in wages, was conducted in 
December 1943 and, as is discussed below, provoked a bitter disagreement between 
the NFU and the Government. 36 
33 Quoted in Murray, o~. cit., p.99. 
Farmer and stockbree ere 
34 Murray, Ope cit., p.S5. 
Letter from Churchill to The 
35 H.C. Deb. (5th Series), Vol. 367, Col. 92, 26th November 1940. 
36 Murray, Ope cit., p.163-167. 
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As D.N. Chester argues the 1940 price review marked 'a definite stage both in the 
wartime history of prices and in the evolution of price-fixing procedure for agricultural 
products,.37 The decisions or agricultural prices taken in the summer of 1940 
destroyed all vestige of a 'price-freeze' policy, ushering in food subsidies and a policy 
of price stabilization that found its formal expression in the 1941 Budget. The 
Treasury had been opposed to the introduction of permanent food subsidies on the 
grounds that they would involve a considerable financial burden. Their objections 
were also based, at least in part, on the belief that subsidies were not an effective way 
of controlling inflation as they would only serve to stimulate consumption thereby 
increasing the inflationary pressures within the economy.38 Despite these objections, 
in August 1940 the War Cabinet decided to subsidise the prices of 'essential' foods in 
an effort to restrain a rise in the cost of living index and to prevent wages rising.39 
By the end of 1940 the cost of fertilizers and animal feeds had also been subsidised. 
In the 1941 Budget the Government committed itself to maintaining the Cost of 
Living index, which included food, clothing, rent, and rates, within the then prevailing 
range of 125-130 (Base year 1939 = 100).40 
The 1940 price discussions were the first steps towards the policy of general price 
reviews enshrined in the 1947 Agriculture Act, and this period also saw the NFU start 
to assume its important role in the policy making process. The year 1940 saw the 
Government impose a definite order of priority on agricultural production, despite 
37 D.N. Chester, Ope cit., p.209. 
38 ibid. 
39 See Murray, Ope cit., p.284. 
40 H.C. Deb., (5th Series), Vol. 370, Col. 1320-22, 7th April 1941. 
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MAF's efforts to the contrary, and the use of differentiated incentives to achieve the 
desired pattern of production. There factors alone make the events of 1939-41 worthy 
of close examination, but a study of this period also reveals the tensions that existed 
between the Agricultural Departments, the Ministry of Food, and the Treasury, 
tensions which were to characterise the policy-making process throughout the war 
years and on into the post-war period. The Ministry of Food's aim was to secure a 
production policy based on nutritional considerations, and the Agricultural 
Departments were seen as trying to 'fix' the existing pattern of British farming. As 
will be shown in the next section, during the early stages of the discussions on the 
future of British agriculture after the war MAF was again criticised by other 
departments for ignoring nutritional issues, and for advocating policies which ran 
contrary to the inter-war trends in domestic food production, trends which were seen 
as holding the key to the industry's future. The Treasury was also very critical of the 
degree of price 'incentive' contained in the 1940 price settlement. Given the pre-war 
condition of British agriculture farmers memories of the First World War and its 
aftermath, and the importance of agricultural expansion to the Country's survival, some 
measure of price incentive was justified and necessary, and did secure a considerable 
increase in production.41 However, as Hancock and Gowing suggest in their study of 
the war economy, had all the other sectors of the economy of real importance been 
given the same degree of financial incentive to increased production as was given to 
agriculture the economy would have quickly become unmanageable.42 These issues 
are explored in Chapter III. 
41 Br 1941, for example, the area under crops had increased by over 3~ 
~llion acres compared with 1939. 
42 Hancock and Gowing, Ope cit., p.161. 
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On November 19th 1940 the War Cabinet, acting on the advice of the Home Policy 
Committee's Food Sub-Committee, agreed that the existing system of guaranteed 
prices and markets would remain in operation for the duration of the war and for at 
least one year after. 43 The Food Policy Committee had concluded that the worsening 
shipping situation, and the resulting decline in food imports, required a determined 
effort to expand agricultural production at home, and that an official statement on the 
above lines would play an important part in securing the necessary increase in home-
grown food. In their submissions to the Committee the Agriculture Ministers had 
placed particular emphasis on the need to retain the confidence of the farmers in the 
future of their industry, a consideration that had been given particular relevance by the 
NFU's strong reaction to the Government's 1940/41 price schedule, and by Union 
complaints that they had not been consulted.44 The announcement of the Cabinet's 
decision was accompanied by the further assurance that all the major parties 
recognised the importance of maintaining a 'healthy and well-balanced' agriculture 
after the war, and that this would form Ian essential and permanent feature of national 
pOlicy'.4S The problem now facing the Government was how to tum these promises 




WM(40)291, 19th November 1940, in PRO CAB 65/10. 
WP ( G) ( 40 ) 302, 16 th November 1940, 'Home Food Production' , memorandum 
by the Minister of Agriculture, Secretary of state for Scotland and 
the Home Secretary, in PRO CAB 67/8. wp(G)(40) 303, ~6th Nov~er 
1940 'Home Food Production', Minutes of the Food Pol~cy Co~ttee 
meeting, 13th November 1940, in PRO CAB 67/8. 
H.C. Deb. (5th Series), Vol. 367, Col. 92, 26th November 1940. 
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(ii) 
MAP's first thoughts on the future of British agriculture were contained in a 
memorandum circulated in March 1941.46 The proposals rested on a number of basic 
assumptions about the long-term economic and financial effects the war would have 
on the British economy. The memorandum held that after the war Britain's ability to 
import and export would be diminished, and that the demands of the war would have 
depleted the country's reserves of foreign exchange and foreign investments. Against 
all of the problems, it was argued, a prosperous and healthy agriculture would provide 
some measure of relief. The memorandum was largely the work of the Permanent 
Secretary Donald Fergusson, and in his words 'reflected the best opinion in the 
industry,.47 Fergusson's view was that the impact of the war on the British economy 
and the generally unstable world situation would require post-war agricultural policy 
to move away from purely economic and nutritional considerations to take more 
account of 'strategic' considerations. 
The primary consideration, he argued, should be to keep as much land as possible in 
as healthy a condition as possible, with a post-war arable acreage of between 12 and 
16 million acres, and the only way of achieving this was through mixed farming. 
Livestock numbers would be restored to their pre-war levels, but on mixed rather than 
specialised farms, and the latter would be actively discouraged. Home production of 
animal fodder crops would be increased, as would the amount of land put down to 
46 
47 
PRO T230/1, March 1941, 'Memorandum on Problems for Consideration 
in connection with Post-War Policy'. 
PRO T230/1, 14th october 1941, Note of the Prelimi~ary Meeting of 
the Official committee on Post-War Internal Econo~c Problems. 
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temporary grass, and his proposals also envisaged 'modest' increases in wheat and 
potato production. In support of his arguments Fergusson could point to the results 
of the early wartime surveys, and the dangers that low soil fertility and the poor state 
of repair of farms in general had posed to the UK in the early months of war. The 
potentially unstable world situation after the war revealed, in Fergusson's view, the 
importance of a prosperous agriculture for the nation's future security. For this reason 
the maintenance of soil fertility, and with it a healthy industry, was the central 
objective of his proposals. 
The County War Agricultural Executive Committees (CWAECs) would be retained 
after the war to encourage efficient production and proper standards of husbandry, and 
to regulate imports and home production and prices thereby ensuring the stability of 
the industry and a 'fair' renumeration for the efficient farmer. 48 There was to be no 
return to the conditions of the inter-war period, a period of 'piecemeal policy and an 
unbalanced agriculture'. Fergusson acknowledged that British producers would have 
to be protected from specialist producers, and that the cost of the policy he had 
outlined would be 'considerable'. This cost would, however, be justified given the 
important role agriculture would play in Britain's post-war recovery. The County 
Executives, and an increase in the provisions made for agricultural research and 
education, would ensure low cost, efficient production. The memorandum also 
envisaged the national control, but not nationalization, of agricultural land, with the 
creation of a 'Central Tribunal' to oversee land use and the setting up of a Land 
Commission to acquire and run holdings for the State. 
48 ibid., p.22. 
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In a note to the Lord President on Fergusson's proposals Lionel Robbins, the Director 
of the Economic Section, criticised the memorandum as being 'actively destructive of 
the most hopeful tendencies in recent agricultural developments,.49 The line of 
evolution in British agriculture, he continued, had been towards specialised production 
while MAF's proposals advocated reversing this trend, and so the Government was 
faced with 'a flat choice between going forward or backward'. In a letter to Sir 
William Eady Robbins acknowledged that there was a political argument for giving 
a 'dole to the agricultural interest',50 but went on to argue that there was no economic 
rationale for the sort of costly, protective policy Fergusson had advocated. Robbins' 
view was that economic considerations could only be over-ridden by nutritional 
considerations, and that any financial support should be given to 'protective' foods, and 
in particular to milk. MAF would object to such a policy on the grounds that it would 
foster dairy production at the expense of mixed farming in general, which would in 
tum affect soil fertility. 
'But ought such objections to weigh with those of us who are more 
interested in the welfare of the people than in the welfare of the 
SOil?'.51 




PRO CAB 124/567, 9th November 1941. 
ibid. Later in the same letter, Robbins wrote : 'I just cannot 
believe that a policy which seeks so violently to reverse the 
secular trend has surviv~l value in the ~on9-run ~ .•..•. It c~ts 
so obviously across the ~nterest of spec~al~sed l~vestock f~ng 
and the interest of some of our best export markets'. 
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Fergusson's proposals would also involve a restriction of feed imports into the UK, 
a policy Robbins believed would cause unrest amongst a large section of the 
agricultural community. 
Fergusson's proposals were also heavily criticised by the Treasury. MAF had argued 
that the ultimate aim of agricultural policy should be 'the proper care and use of the 
land itself,52 while the Treasury emphasised that the ultimate objective of any policy 
should be the welfare of the community as a whole. Soil fertility was only a means 
to this ultimate end and it was 'irrational to use labour and other resources for this 
purpose if their yield elsewhere is greater,.53 The Treasury also argued that the 
proposals would involve a net loss to the nation, as the economy would not be using 
it's resources at the level of maximum return if British Farmers were encouraged to 
produce commodities that could be obtained more cheaply from abroad. The 'security' 
arguments for MAF's proposals were also dismissed, with officials arguing that the 
money would be better spent on ships and storage facilities than on subsidies and 
protection. In the inter-war period UK production had moved away from staple crops 
towards commodities with a higher nutritional value, and which enjoyed a naturally 
protected market. The Treasury view was that this trend should be allowed to 
continue in the post-war period. 54 MAF was proposing to organise agricultural 
production on the lines least in accordance with the process of economic and technical 
evolution; in the words of one Treasury official the memorandum represented 'a very 
52 PRO T230/1, March 1941, 'Memorandum on Problems for Consideration 
in Connection with Post-War Policy', p.6. 




good working out of what the farmers would conceive a healthy and well-balanced 
agriculture to be'.55 It was also felt that MAP weakened the arguments for their 
proposals by arguing that the UK's ability to import would be reduced after the war 
and that it would be necessary to protect British farmers from overseas competition. 
Despite these objections some Treasury Officials were inclined to be sympathetic to 
Fergusson's aims, with one official expressing the view that there was 'much solid 
sense in their radical principle that our land is a primary asset which must be 
husbanded'.56 In a memorandum to Sir Alan Barlow, joint Third Secretary to the 
Treasury, H. D. Henderson argued that MAPs arguments were 'perfectly logical', 
given that there was 'little doubt' that the balance of payments would be a key problem 
for a 'long period' after the end of the war.57 However Henderson went on to 
question whether MAP's proposals, which rested on a considerable increase III 
domestic fodder crop production, would in fact help to remedy this situation. The 
expansion of domestic production at the expense of imports could directly effect the 
country's exports, and if such a policy led to an increase in production costs the 
competitive position of UK products could be indirectly affected. If foreign exchange 
considerations demanded it, supplies of a number of commodities (e.g. oil seeds) could 
be obtained from Empire sources. 
55 PRO T161/1165 S.48830/1, 9th June 1941, memorandum from Dunnett 
(Treasury) to Proctor (Treasury). 
56 ibid., 9th June 1941, memorandum from Proctor to Sir Alan Barlow 
(Proctor was an Assistant Secretary to the Treasury). 
57 ibid., 22nd June 1941, memorandum from H. D. Henderson to Sir Alan 
Barlow. 
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MAP's proposals, Henderson continued, did not simply involve securing renumerative 
prices for producers, but securing those prices when the production of milk, meat, and 
eggs was being carried out in an extremely expensive way.58 In Henderson's opinion 
the MAF memorandum contemplated 'a level of agricultural prices that will give 
extravagant profits to the majority of farmers in order to make it possible for a 
minority to pursue the system of farming which it is desired to encourage'. The 
demand for subsidies would almost certainly eventually exceed the sum the Exchequer 
could, or would, be prepared to support, and the net effect of passing the whole 
burden of agricultural support onto the consumer would be to depress real wages and 
increase industry's costs of production. This in tum could adversely effect the balance 
of payments. Henderson's view was that the Government could not afford to ignore 
nutritional considerations and the general benefits of specialisation, or to place all its 
eggs in the 'mixed farming basket'. 59 
In a note to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Financial Secretary, Horace 
Wilson, the Treasury's Permanent Secretary, advised that if MAF tried to take their 
proposals any further he would have to recommend the circulation of a very critical 




MAF I S proposals argued that fodder crop production must be made 
profitable on land that it had not been profitable to plough up 
during the inter-war period. 
In a note to Sir Richard Hopkins, Second Secretary to the Treasury, 
Barlow argued that if it was accepted that agriculture had to be 
kept in a reasonably renumerative condition after the war, then this 
would involve either large Exchequer subsidies or a consi~erable 
increase in retail prices, and machinery for the regulat~on and 
control of the industry by the State.. The ovez:all cost of. ~ IS 
proposals was likely to be somewhere ~n the reg~on of £?5 ~ll~on 
(current prices), and left the Government to face the appall~ng 
dilemma I Henderson had described. Barlow was himself opposed to the 
maintenance of a large arable acreage, and to MAF's ban on 
specialist production. T161/1165 S.48830/1., 29th July 1941. 
ibid., 8th August 1941. 
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Secretary to the Treasury, met Sir Donald Fergusson, to discuss the policy proposals, 
and it was eventually agreed that the Treasury would produce a redraft of the 
memorandum on what they regarded as more acceptable lines.61 The responsibility 
for this task fell largely to Hopkins himself, but a number of his colleagues felt that 
the finished memorandum still displayed too much sympathy for MAF's arguments, 
and that his version of the proposals retained the anti-specialist bias present in the 
original memorandum.62 Hopkins was also criticised for expressing doubts about the 
degree of regulation, 'State Socialism', implied in MAF's memorandum. Henderson, 
for example, argued that 'All Hearts bleed nowadays for the primary producer at the 
mercy of unregulated market forces'. More importantly, these proposals were likely 
to appeal to the Labour members of Government, and in Henderson's view it would 
be unwise for the Treasury to put itself in opposition to Ministers on this issue.63 
In October 1941 the Minister Without Portfolio, Arthur Greenwood, appointed an 
official committee to look into post-war internal economic problems, under the 
Chairmanship of Sir George Chrystal. The Committee was to formulate the chief 
problems that would need to be addressed in domestic policies, prepare memoranda 
on these problems, and formulate for Ministers the considerations that should be borne 





ibid., 27th August 1941, Note of A Meeting Between R.V.N. Hopkins 
and D. Fergusson. 
For example, ibid., 5th September 1941, memorandum from H. Henderson 
to R.V.N. Hopkins. 
ibid. 
The committee was known as the Official committee on Internal 
Economic Problems (IEP). See: IEP(41), 1st November .1941, 
'Composition and Terms of Reference', Note by the Secretary, ~n PRO 
CAB 87/54, IEP (41)2, 1st November 1941, 'Plan of Work', memorandum 
by the Chairman, in PRO CAB 87/54. 
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10 the Committee's remit, and MAP were subsequently asked to submit a 
memorandum for consideration.65 However, a serious difference of opinion arose, 
both within the Committee and between Ministers, on the 'guiding assumptions' under 
which the Official Committee should examine the Agriculture Departments'proposals. 
In a letter to Sir Richard Hopkins Fergusson had argued that post-war policy could not 
be discussed by officials until Ministers had taken decisions on the wider political 
aspects of post-war agriculture,66 and MAF's proposed submission to the Official 
Committee laid down a number of 'broad principles' to act as guidelines in the 
formulation of policy.67 
The Agricultural Departments wanted to lay down the broad outline of policy in 
advance, leaving the Committee to 'clothe their bones with fiesh',68 while within the 
Committee it was felt that such an approach would severely limit the scope of their 
discussions. They were supported in this by both Greenwood and the Chancellor, 
Kingsley Wood.69 Within the Treasury Hudson was seen as trying to 'jump not only 





Hopkins suggested that MAF should submit a memorandum for 
consideration by the departments concerned in a note to the 
Financial Secretary and the Chancellor on 9th october 1941. The 
memorandum would be submitted to Greenwood's Economic Policy 
Committee, and subsequently to the Official Committee under 
Chrystal, who would arrange inter-depa~tmental discussio~s on ~he 
proposals. These suggestions were sub~tted to the Econo~c Pol~cy 
Committee and were agreed to. PRO T161/1165 S.48830/1., 9th october 
1941, Note from R.V.N. Hopkins to Sir Horace Wilson/Capt. H. 
Crookshank/Sir Kingsley Wood. 
PRO T161/1165 S.48830/1., 13th November 1941, Letter from Sir D. 
Fergusson to R.V.N. Hopkins. 
The draft of the MAF/Department of Agriculture for scotland 
memorandum, dated 11th March 1942, can be found in PRO CAB 127/170 
(Jowi tt Papers). 
PRO CAB 127/170, 11st March 1942, Letter from R.S. Hudson to Sir 
William Jowitt. 
69 ibid., January 1943, 'Aide-Memoire' for Sir William Jowitt. 
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importance'/O MAPs 'broad principles' clashed with the terms of reference under 
which the Committee had been established, which charged the Committee with 
forming for Ministers the considerations to be borne in mind when framing policy. 
The matter was eventually referred to William Jowitt, then the Paymaster-General. 
Jowitt's view was that it was not the job of Civil Servants to take decisions on major 
questions of policy; in his view 'the officials should collect all the available bones; the 
Ministers should then wire up the skeleton and officials would then clothe the skeleton 
with flesh'.71 Jowitt's solution to the controversy was to suggest an alternative set 
of principles to guide the Official Committee in their deliberations.72 Feeling that 
the affair had dragged on for too long Hudson, Greenwood and Kingsley Wood 
accepted Jowitt's proposals.73 
The MAF memorandum was eventually submitted to the Official Committee on 
Internal Economic Problems in September 1942 and set out a long-term policy for 
British agriculture based on the assumptions Jowitt had suggested six months 
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In a ~emorandum to Wilson-smith, Hopkins argued that even Jow~tts 
revised 'guidelines' clashed with the Official committees terms of 
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IEP ~ 42140, 16th September 1942, 'Post-War Policy' , memorandum by the 
Agr~cu ture Departments, in PRO CAB 87/55. 
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maintained in a condition of fertility and productivity; and that any policy should aim 
at securing, to the utmost extent practicable, economic stability for the industry 
together with good standards of husbandry. MAF's initial set of 'guiding principles' 
had included definite commitments to mixed farming at the expense of specialised 
production, to a permanent increase in the peace-time arable acreage, and to a 
permanent system of guaranteed prices and markets. In their submission to the 
Official Committee these proposals appeared as recommendations rather than as a 
framework within which policy decisions were to be made, and the proposals 
themselves had been amended in the light of the criticism aimed at MAF's first policy 
proposals. 
The memorandum still argued that mixed farming should form the basis of the post-
war industry, but acknowledged that British farming was complementary to an 
economic system which would continue to rely on the large-scale importation of 
agricultural produce. Domestic production would continue to be largely devoted to 
livestock production, with grass the predominant crop in much of England and Wales. 
MAF argued that the bulk of the country's farm land could be maintained in a state 
of productivity and fertility if production was undertaken on a scale and character 
which entailed a 10% cut in imports over their pre-war level, by volume and value. 
It was argued that such a reduction would be necessary in any case given the country's 
prospective balance of payments in peacetime. Economic stability would be secured 
through the continuation of the Ministry of the Food, or the creation of Import Boards 
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responsible for the wholesale purchase of food and with some degree of control over 
internal distribution.75 
In general MAP's memorandum elicited a more positive response than had been given 
to its first thoughts on post-war agriculture,76 the main dissenting voice being that 
of the Board of Trade, Hugh Dalton's department in the wartime coalition. In a 
memorandum to the Internal Economic Problems Committee the Board of Trade 
complained that MAP had given no indication of the likely cost of their proposals, and 
argued that as mixed farming was generally a more expensive method of production 
than intensive systems, a policy which encouraged the farmer at the expense of the 
latter would unnecessarily increase the cost of maintaining agriculture in peacetime.77 
In reply Fergusson stressed that MAP had no desire to create a 'pampered' industry, 
simply one that was stable enough to allow farmers to plan ahead with a 'reasonable 
degree of confidence'.78 The industry, he continued, would emerge from the war in 
a far more competitive position, and this would help to offset what Fergusson regarded 
as being potentially the most expensive aspect of post-war policy, the production of 
'unsheltered products' at levels higher than those dictated by market conditions. 
75 In discussion this section was amended to indicate that these 
proposals were simply one method of guaranteeing stability, and in 
the revised version of the memorandum a system of subsidies, import 
levies and tariffs was put forward as an alternative to November 
1942, in PRO CAB 87/55. 
76 For example, in a note from Henderson to Bernard Gilbert, an under-
Secretary to the Treasury, the former opined that the Treasury 
should offer 'no departmental objection' to MAF's proposals. PRO 
T161/1165.548830/2., 23rd June 1942. 
77 IEP(42)50, 6th October 1942, 'Post-War Agricultural Policy', 
memorandum by the Board of Trade, in PRO CAB 87/55. 
78 IEP(42) 58, 14th october 1942, Note by Sir Donald Fergusson; in PRO 
CAB 87/55. Fer~usson also argued tliat it would be impo~sible to 
provide a real~stic estimate of the cost of the Agr~cultural 
Department's proposals without figures for the peacetime levels of 
wages and prices. 
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In discussion the Agricultural Departments, while stressing that the memorandum was 
only intended to give an outline of their proposed policy, emphasised that their 
proposals were designed to make the best use of the country's natural advantages in 
agriculture, and that they would increase the efficiency of farm management. 
Speaking on behalf of the Board of Trade the Permanent Secretary, Sir Arnold 
Overton, argued that while the case for the special treatment of British agriculture 
after the war had been accepted, the question remained as to what would be the most 
appropriate method of implementing this guarantee. Overton questioned whether a 
system of guaranteed prices would make it an 'easy matter' to reduce prices to ensure 
efficient production after the war. The Ministry of Food was in agreement with the 
general objectives outlined in the memorandum, although they believed that the main 
problem facing the Government was how to convert approved policy into 
administrative action. The Secretary to the Ministry of Food, Sir Henry French, also 
felt that some effort should be made to produce an estimate of the cost of the 
proposals.79 It was eventually agreed that talks would be arranged between the 
relevant departments with a view to producing an estimate of the total cost of the 
Agricultural Department's proposals, and that all discussion of the memorandum would 
be suspended until an estimate had been produced. so 
In a letter to Fergusson in October 1942 Keynes raised the question of the cost of 
post-war policy. He felt that the memorandum's proposals were 'sensible and 
79 
80 
IEP(42) 20th, 16th October 1942, in PRO CAB 87/55. 
IEP(42) 21st, 6th November 1942, in PRO CAB 87/55. The departments 
concerned were the Agricultural Departments, the Ministry of F?od, 
the Treasury, the Economic Section, and the Central statist~cal 
Office. 
63 
moderate', and that there was no reason why they should not be put into effect.81 He 
was more concerned, however, with the financial aspects of MAF's proposals, and 
gave Fergusson his own estimates of the expenditure that would be required. Keynes 
estimated that, at current prices, agricultural aggregate net income would be £225 
million, with Keynes estimating that the prevailing level of subsidies was somewhere 
in the region of £125. In Keynes view the crucial question was : What should the 
level of aggregate income be after the war? The existing high level of profits could 
be justified by wartime conditions and demands,82 while in peacetime an aggregate 
net income of between £100-125 million would, in Keynes' view, be sufficient; on 
Keynes estimate based on current prices, post-war net income would be somewhere 
around £250 million. Thus the gap between the industry's prospective profits and 
what was required for a healthy agriculture was approximately the same order of 
magnitude as the prevailing level of subsidies. 
However, Keynes was quick to stress that he did not envisage a return to any sort of 
'laissez-faire'policy, emphasising that the fixing of prices at least a season in advance 
was 'indispensable'. The point he was trying to make was that 'any continuing 
subsidies that may be required are not on a scale to frighten anyone'. Keynes told 
Fergusson that he believed that after the war it would be possible to have a prosperous 
agricultural industry, 'without involving the taxpayer in any expenditure that he is 
likely to grudge'. The issue was subsequently discussed more formally at a meeting 
81 PRO MAF 38/325, 8th October 1942. 
82 In peacetime, for example, marginal land could be allowed to go out 
of production. 
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at the Treasury towards the end of October, presided over by Keynes. 83 The purpose 
of the meeting was to agree an estimate for the cost of the Agricultural Departments' 
proposals to present to the Official Committee. Keynes led the discussion, basing his 
calculations on the assumption that international c.i.f. prices and wages would remain 
at their existing level, and that the cost of living index would be maintained at 30%, 
or less, above it's pre-war level. If farmers received prices for their produce 
corresponding to the prevailing level of retail food prices, then after the war aggregate 
net income would be at least £250 million. This could be compared to a pre-war 
figure of £60 million. In Keynes view an aggregate figure of between £100 and £150 
was a 'reasonable' figure. Keynes conclusion was that some Exchequer expenditure 
would be required to secure a reasonable level of aggregate net income, but that this 
expenditure would only be in the region of £25 million. 
In January 1943 the MAF memorandum, amended to include some paragraphs dealing 
with the cost of the proposals, was submitted to the Ministerial Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems, which was chaired by Sir William Jowitt and included 
Bevin, R.A. Butler, Attlee and Sir Kingsley Wood.84 At the suggestion of Sir Henry 
French, the Secretary to the Ministry of Food, the memorandum had also been 
amended to indicate that during the transitional period from war to peace it would be 
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Barlow, Joint Third Secretary to the Treas~ry, R.R .. Enf~eld, an 
Assistant Secretary to MAF, and Professor L~onel Robb~ns from the 
War Cabinet Office. 
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envisaged a 'not ungenerous' figure for post-war aggregate net income of £145 million, 
and subsidies of £50 million, although this figure might be increased if it was found 
necessary to stimulate the production of certain foods, milk for example.86 
The Committee, with the notable exceptions of Attlee, Bevin, and the Secretary to the 
Oversea Trade Department, Harcourt Johnstone, agreed that the proposals should be 
sent forward to the Cabinet as giving a 'general picture' of the direction agricultural 
policy should take in peacetime.87 The Committee also agreed that the Cabinet 
should be invited to open talks with the industry, although no financial commitments 
should be entered into, and that the Agricultural Departments should collaborate with 
the Ministry of Food in drawing up proposals designed to increase agricultural 
efficiency. Attlee's view, expressed in a memorandum to the Reconstruction Problems 
Committee, was that MAPs proposals still gave the welfare of the land precedence 
over the welfare of the people, and he called for the whole question of post-war policy 
to be based on a new objective, namely providing food for the people with fair 
conditions for producers.88 Although Attlee and Bevin were not able to prevent 
MAP proposals being sent forward to the Cabinet, their arguments were more 
sympathetically received by their Cabinet colleagues. 
86 
87 
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After considering MAP's proposals it was decided that it would be 'premature' to 
initiate policy discussions with farmers' representatives, as the Cabinet felt that the 
Agricultural Departments should give more thought to their proposals.89 Ministers 
felt that MAF et al had to provide a greater justification for their proposals than was 
contained in their memorandum, and in particular they should give more thought to 
nutritional issues. The Agricultural Departments were therefore asked to re-examine 
their proposals and to re-submit them to the Cabinet. 
In a memorandum to the Lord President, Sir John Anderson, Lionel Robbins argued 
that there were 'grave objections of principle against the whole conception on which 
these proposals rest'.90 The Agricultural Departments' proposals would involve a 
substantial reduction in the import of cheap animal feedstuffs, and as home-grown 
feeds would be relatively more expensive, this would hit specialist livestock producers. 
Reducing feed imports would also adversely affect UK exports. MAF's arguments 
rested, at least in part, on considerations of security, but Robbins argued that a 
peacetime cattle industry based on the import of feedstuffs was doubly advantageous 
from a security perspective. Such a policy would create a reserve of meat 'on the 
hoof, and would help to maintain the country's merchant marine in peacetime. 
Robbins was also afraid that the retention of the wartime powers of the Ministry of 
89 
90 
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Food and the apparatus of bulk purchase would act as a smokescreen for producer 
subsidies and would be a 'complication' in international relations. 91 
Robbins complained that the Agricultural Departments' submission laid down a more 
or less fixed production plan, one which took no account of changes in international 
trade. This policy, he continued, raised 'very fundamental difficulties': 
'Production to a fixed quantitative plan, regardless of external 
conditions, means production regardless of cost, in the ultimate sense 
of the word'. 
Did the advantages of stability, he continued, outweigh the question of the cost of 
agricultural support?92 Robbins' view was that MAF's emphasis on soil fertility as 
the ultimate object of any policy was fundamentally misconceived; on the sole 
criterion of national income, the best policy would be to allow the area under 
cultivation to be determined by the conditions of international supply and demand, 
with no restrictions on imports. Robbins acknowledged, however, that such a view 
was not 'practical', given the political pressure for 'something to be done for 
91 
92 
During the Official committee on Internal Economic Problem's 
discussions Leith-Ross had ar~ued that the bulk purchase of im~orts 
would create tension in the ~nternational field, as it was s~ply 
'a disguised system of regulating imports'. Robbins had argued that 
it would be an 'embarrassment' in international negotiations if the 
British Government were to state that it was committed to 
maintaining a given level of production regardless of the Terms of 
Trade or the degree of ~rotection necessary. In reply Fergusson 
argued that other countr~es would follow this course, and that MAF's 
proposals were 'not extreme'. 
'Why should the changing pattern of agricultural production have 
suddenly reached such a point of perfection, that the MAF can say 
with Faust "Verweile doch, du bist so schon". (stay Thou art so 
fair~, and ask that it should be thus petrified and preserved from 
the ~pact of external change forever?' 
68 
agriculture'. The payment of subsidies to British farmers was, he argued, essentially 
a political question. 
The Agricultural Departments' restatement of the principles of post-war policy was 
submitted to the War Cabinet in October 1943.93 Their earlier efforts had been 
haunted by, in the words of Lord Murray, 'the spectre of a depressing flood of food 
imports,94 at the end of the war, and MAP's policy had aimed at sheltering British 
agriculture and at preventing a return to inter-war conditions. The new proposals, 
however, reflected the growing doubts over food supplies in the immediate post-war 
period, a concern which was embodied in the conclusions of the World Food and 
Agriculture (the 'Hot Springs') Conference held in May and June of 1943. The 
Agricultural Departments had reacted with caution to the idea of a world food 
conference, fearing that 'the enthusiasms of the nutritionists would be unchecked, and 
that issues would be raised that would cut across the lines of the policy they were 
espousing.95 The Ministry of Food saw the conference as an opportunity to warn the 
Allies that victory might be accompanied by even greater stringency in food supplies, 
and to argue that some system of allocation would be necessary if a runaway 
commodity boom, followed by a disastrous slump, was to be avoided. In the post-war 
period, Britain, faced with a shortage of both foreign exchange and shipping, might 
find its food supplies in jeopardy, and other countries might find themselves in an 
even worse situation. The Ministry urged the Government to ensure that the 
93 WP(43)422" 28th September 1943, 'Post-war Agricultural Policy', 
memorandum by the M~nister of Agriculture, Secretary of Sta~e for 
Scotland, and the Secretary of State for the Bome Department, ~n PRO 
CAB 66/41. 
94 Murray, Ope cit., p.348. 
95 ibid., p.349. 
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conference accepted the prospect of scarcity, and the need to initiate a world-wide 
production drive.96 The Ministry's concern over prospective food shortages was 
reflected in the amendment it suggested during the Internal Economic Problems 
Committee's discussions of the Agricultural Departments proposals, that the wartime 
character and the scale of production would have to be maintained in the transition 
period from war to peace. 97 
The Conference accepted the British delegations arguments that the prospect of a 
general world food shortage called for the expansion of production and the 
continuation of international allocation schemes covering food and shipping.98 The 
Conference called upon the Allies to increase the acreage of crops intended for direct 
human consumption, even if this was at the expense of increases in livestock numbers, 
even though a shortage of cereals was 'at most a contingency that might have to be 
faced', and a shortage of livestock products and oils 'a virtual certainty,.99 As R.J. 
Hammond notes in his study of wartime food policy, the Ministry of Food's view that 
there would be a post-war shortage of bread grain unless production was increased 
was based on seemingly insubstantial evidence. Hammond finds little evidence of the 
influence of wider considerations, for example the political future of Europe, framing 
official conclusions, and traces the arguments for a shortage of bread grains to the 
'informed guessing of one or two individuals in the Ministry of Food' .100 
96 Hammond (1951), p.361. 
97 See above. 
98 Hammond (1951), p.361. 
99 ibid. , p.361. 
100 ibid. , p.362 n. 
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The changing assumptions about the post-war food situation were reflected in the 
Agricultural Departments' submission to the War Cabinet. As before the memorandum 
argued that after the war Britain would face balance of payments problems, and that 
Britain's standing as a world power would be greatly reduced. However, the 
memorandum also argued that in the light of the Hot Springs report, which envisaged 
increased competition for the world's exportable surpluses of food after the war, the 
maintenance of a 'healthy and well balanced agriculture and a 'modest' degree of 
expansion would be necessary to ensure adequate food supplies. To this end, the 
wartime scale and character of production would have to be maintained for two years 
after the war, although thereafter the emphasis could be switched to livestock 
production. 101 The memorandum envisaged that the shortage of cereals would last 
for two years, while livestock products would remain in short supply for nearer five 
years. The Agricultural Departments emphasised that in the long-term, the scale and 
character of production would be largely determined by economic and financial 
considerations, and asked that they be given permission to open discussions of an 
'exploratory' nature with the industry on the principles of future policy. In subsequent 
submissions to the Cabinet both R.S. Hudson and the Minister of Food, 1.1. Llwellin, 
called for the extension of the existing guarantees to the end of 1947, and covering 
produce from the 1947 harvest. Llwellin argued that such a pledge would be essential 
in obtaining needed food, although he was not in favour of talks on longer-term policy 
101 WP(43)422, 28th Sep~ember .1943. The m~mo~andum also argued th~t 
agricul ture was st~ll, d~rectly and ~nd~rec~ly, the cc:>untry s 
largest industry, and stressed the important soc~al role agr~culture 
played in national life. 
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with the industry until the nature of post-war conditions became clearer, to avoid 
'letting the farmers down again'. 102 
In a second memorandum to the Cabinet Hudson, and the Secretary of State for 
Scotland Thomas Johnstone, drew their colleagues attention to the tensions that had 
arisen over the Government's decision not to increase producers prices to compensate 
for an increase in labour costS. 103 As maximum food production would be required 
for a further four to five years, Fergusson argued that the Government's immediate 
problems with the industry could be solved if farmers could be shown that the 
industry had a future. This could be achieved by extending the industry'S guarantees 
to cover production from the 1947 harvest. The memorandum again asked for Cabinet 
approval for talks with the industry on post-war policy. The Cabinet met on October 
15th to consider the memoranda. 104 Ministers agreed that there should be some 
extension of the guarantees, although this was limited to a pledge that the guarantees 
would remain in force for two years after the end of the war and was not tied to a 
specific time period as Hudson, Llewellin and Johnstone had suggested. The 
Agriculture Ministers were also authorised to open discussions with the industry on 
long-term policy, on the understanding that no commitments would be made without 
reference to the Cabinet. The Cabinet appointed a committee consisting of the Lord 
President, the Lord Privy Seal, Hudson, Johnstone and Lord Cherwell to draw up a 




WP(43)432, 4th October 1943, 'Post-War Agricultural Policy', 
memorandum by the Ministry of Food, in PRO CAB 66/41. 
WP(43)455, 13th october 1943, 'Agricultural Prices and post-War 
Policy' , memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture and the Secretary 
of state for scotland, in PRO CAB66/41. 
WM(43)141, 15th October 1943, in PRO CAB 65/36. 
72 
submitted to the Cabinet and approved at the end of October 1943 and the Agricultural 
Ministers were invited to begin negotiations with the industry on the lines 
suggested. 105 
The directive instructed MAF to link the farmers' acceptance of the Government's 
recent price settlement to the continuation of price and market guarantees for their 
produce. The farmers' wages bill had been increased by £15 million, and the 
Government had announced that in view of the general financial condition of the 
industry it was not prepared to grant a general increase in agricultural prices; increases 
in the prices paid for liquid milk and dairy cows were offset by reductions in the 
prices of barley and early potatoes.106 The Government's decision brought forth 
howls of disapproval from the industry, and accusations that the Government had 
broken it's pledge that agricultural prices would be 'subject to adjustment to the extent 
of any substantial changes in the costs of production'.107 The farmers interpreted 
this pledge as meaning that there would be an automatic increase in all prices to 
compensate for an increase in their production costs; however, in February 1942 the 
Lord President had told NFU representatives that this was not part of the 
Government's pledge. The price mechanism, he continued, could be used to encourage 
or discourage the production of a particular commodity, and the Government saw 
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production. l08 In September 1943 Hudson met NFU representatives and the Union's 
General Purposes Committee to explain the Government's position. 109 Hudson 
stressed that previous Government statements had made it clear that there would be 
no automatic general price increase in the event of a increase in agricultural wages, 
and suggested that any pressure for such an increase might prejudice the position of 
the industry in the eyes of the public. The Minister of Agriculture also warned that 
the NFU could jeopardise any agreement between Ministers on a sound post-war 
agricultural policy if they continued to argue for a general increase in agricultural 
pnces. 
Hudson met representatives of the NFU, the County Landowners Asociation (CIA), 
and the agricultural workers in November 1943, reiterating the arguments he had used 
the previous month, and emphasising that the Government had now to concern itself 
with the transitional and post-war periods. 110 The losses that had accrued on the 
Ministry of Food's trading account, he continued, could not be contemplated as being 
permanent, and it would be better if the Government acted now, rather than allow 
problems to build up and so cause a more serious disturbance when action was finally 
taken. In reply, the NFU representatives argued that Hudson's statement would come 




Murray, op.cit., p.167. 
PRO MAF 38/234, 13th september 1943, Note of a Meeting between the 
Agriculture Minister and NFU Representatives~ 22nd september 1943, 
Note of a Meeting between the Agriculture Minister ana the General 
Purposes committee of the NFU. 
PRO MAF 38/234, 4th November 1943, Note of a Meeting between the 
Agriculture Minister and the NFU, CLA, NUAW and TCWU. 
74 
Hudson that the Government's decisions on prices would lead to 'great despondency' 
within the industry.lli 
Further conflict with the NFU was defused by Hudson's speech to the Commons in 
January 1944 in which he offered to discuss three issues with the industry; the 
collection of data acceptable to both sides as a basis for future price fixing, the 
procedure for using this data, and the means of relating fixed prices and assured 
markets to production in the period up to and including the 1947 harvest. 1l2 A few 
days before Hudson's speech Donald Fergusson had written to Sir Edward Bridges, the 
Cabinet Secretary, suggesting that there was 'a strong case for some extension of the 
present pledge in point of time'. The Government had pledged that the existing 
system of guarantees would remain in operation for two years after the end of the war. 
British farmers were working to a four-year production plan and, Fergusson argued, 
their faith in the Government would be restored if the pledge was extended to cover 
the period up to the end of 1947. Fergusson also suggested that the actual prices of 
livestock products should be fixed for the same period.1l3 
These proposals were submitted to the Cabinet a few days later. The Minister of 
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although it was agreed that he could discuss the possibility of extending the existing 
guarantees to the end of the 1947.114 The following day Hudson made his speech 
to Parliament, in which he offered to begin negotiations with the industry to secure 
a 'satisfactory post-war policy for agriculture'.us In April 1944 the Lord President's 
Committee agreed that milk, cattle, and sheep producers would be offered guaranteed 
prices and an assured market for their produce for the period up to the summer of 
1948, with the prevailing prices as minima. Hudson, Llwellin and Johnston had 
argued that if milk and meat production were to be increased in the post-war period 
producers must be given some guarantee of future stability. They had also suggested 
that the Government should offer a guaranteed market for all the eggs and pigmeat 
produced over the same period at 'appropriate' prices. For nutritional reasons milk 
was to be given the highest priority, followed by beef and mutton, and finally pigmeat 
and poultry. The Committee approved the proposals relating to cattle and sheep, but 
agreed that similar commitments could not be made with regard to pigs and poultry. 
The Committee also instructed MAF to make it clear to the NFU that such guarantees 
would not be extended to cover other commodities.1l6 The War Cabinet 
subsequently endorsed the Lord Presidents Committees conclusions, and also approved 






WM(44) 11, 25th January 1944, in PRO CAB 65/41. 
H.C. Deb. (5th Series), vol. 396, Col. 727, 26th January 1944. 
LP(44)62, 3rd April 1944, 'Livestock and Milk Prices', memorandum 
br the Minister of Agriculture, Secretary of State for scotland, the 
M~nister of Food and the Secretary of state for the Howe Department, 
in PRO CAB 124/825. LP(44)17, 12th April 1944, in PRO CAB 71/15. 
WP(44)218, 22nd April 1944, in PRO CAB 66/39. WM(44) 59, 28th April 
1944, in PRO CAB 65/41. 
76 
(iii) 
The Agricultural Departments began their discussions with representatives of the NFU 
in February 1944.118 In a speech to the House in December 1942 Jowitt had 
announced that the Government hoped to begin discussions with the farmers early in 
the New year. 1l9 However, in April 1943 the Cabinet concluded that it would be 
'premature' to begin policy discussions on the basis of the Agricultural Departments' 
proposals. In May 1943 the Agriculture Ministers asked the Cabinet for guidance on 
the line to be taken when replying to Parliamentary questions on the progress being 
made in the planning of post-war agriculture. It was stressed that the failure to 
announce any progress would be received with 'deep dissatisfaction' by Parliament, 
and would make the farmers increasingly suspicious of the Government's intentions 
towards their industry. It was finally agreed that a statement would be made 
reaffirming the Government's commitment to a stable and healthy agriculture, but 
stressing that the stage had not yet been reached where Ministers could begin to 
discuss policy issues with the industry. The Agriculture Ministers were told that this 
formula was to be strictly adhered to, and that no new commitments were to be 
entered into.120 
While the Cabinet debated these issues, the calls for the discussion of post-war 
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of the NFU, led by Sir Cleveland Fyfe, who expressed their concern at the likelihood 
of a 'first class row' if the Government did not take any positive action to reassure the 
farmers. Farmers, the NFU continued, would be content if the Government would just 
start talking to them. They did not expect to be given any firm commitments or 
promises at this stage. In reply Attlee outlined some of the issues Ministers had to 
consider in regard to any future policy, including 'the widespread belief that the 
farming community has received over generous treatment'.121 
When talks began five months later the first issue to be discussed was how data on 
farm accounts could best be used in the construction of a system of price and market 
guarantees. If an agreement could be reached, then the Government indicated that it 
would be prepared to offer guarantees for the period up to, and including, the 1947 
harvest. The first round of talks ended at the beginning of March; both sides were to 
give further consideration to the question of the starting point or 'datum line' for any 
price-fixing arrangements. In the first round of talks the 1941/42 figure for net 
income, some three times the pre-war level, had been suggested as a suitable 'datum 
line', but the issue had not been settled. Provisional agreement had been reached on 
the data to be used in any future price negotiations; estimates of net income on a 
country-wide basis, financial accounts for different types and sizes of farm, and 
enterprize cost studies. When agreement was reached on the basis for future price-
fixing arrangements, the NFU were to consider an 'Annual Price Review' procedure, 
a mechanism which would be used to make any adjustments to prices necessary to 
ensure a fair level of renumeration for farmers. Reviews would be held in February 
121 PRO CAB 124/567, 8th September 1943, Note of a Meeting between the 
Lord President and Sir Cleveland Fyfe. 
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of every year and would assess the general financial position of the industry. The 
prices agreed at the review in a particular year would apply to the crops from the 
following year's harvest, to milk prices from the October of the review year, and to 
livestock from the July of the review year. There would be 'Special Reviews' in the 
event of important and 'substantial' changes in costs that had not been covered by the 
annual review. The then Vice-President of the English Farmer's Union, James Turner, 
approved of this system, and told MAF that he was prepared to support them when 
they went before the General Council of the NFU. 122 
The next round of talks began in May 1944, and in his opening statement Fergusson 
outlined to the NFU representatives the Government's proposals for livestock prices, 
stressing that similar offers could not be made in respect of other agricultural 
commodities. The Government could also not commit itself to maintaining a given 
level of profitability for the farming sector.123 Fergusson moved on from this to 
raise once again the question of the 'datum line'. The MAF view was that a price 
datum line should be used as a basis for calculations rather than one which was based 
on a figure for net income. It would be too difficult, Fergusson argued, to translate 
changes in global net income into changes in individual commodity prices; net income 
figures would be used as a back ground to price calculations, to give MAP an idea of 
the general financial condition of the industry, MAP's proposals would give farmers 
price and market guarantees for the period up to the summer of 1948, guaranteed 
122 
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minimum prices for milk, beef and mutton, an undertaking that pnces would be 
adjusted in the event of a substantial change in costs, the full disclosure of statistical 
information, and consultation according to an agreed procedure before any price 
adjustments were made. Fergusson saw the proposals as; 
, ..... not merely a guarantee of prices of certain commodities for four 
years ahead. They would constitute a procedure of price-fixing which 
might form a very useful model for the future, and be a phase in the 
evolution of a long-term policy of stability,.I24 
The talks were resumed in June, after the NFU had submitted MAF's proposals to 
their General Purposes Committee. l25 The Union welcomed the Goverment's 
proposals for milk, cattle and sheep, but felt that they could not be regarded as being 
sufficient in themselves. Firmer assurances were needed for the other important 
commodities, 'so that a general picture could be obtained of the four-year farming plan 
as a whole'. British farmers wanted their industry to playa fitting role in the national 
economy and were willing to make every effort to improve the general standard of 
efficiency of the industry. 126 
Farmers felt, however, that the proposals Fergusson had outlined did not give the 
industry firm enough guarantees, and would in fact leave the industry in a state of 
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'deplorable insecurity'. A datum line related to only one or two commodities would 
have little value and the Unions' argued that if the Government really wanted to gain 
the support of the farmers, they should take the 1941/42 net income level as a basis 
for future price fixing. In reply, MAF argued that a price datum line would be easier 
to understand, and preferable to referring back to a level of profitability achieved 
under very different conditions. It was appreciated that the Government's refusal to 
make firmer guarantees for certain foodstuffs might cause farmers some misgivings, 
but the Government could not offer specific guaranteed prices for wheat, barley and 
potatoes now, when it was impossible to force market conditions that far ahead. For 
example, a large increase in world wheat production could make it impossible for the 
Government to guarantee the market for domestically produced wheat at the present 
high level. Any minimum prices fixed now for the period up to summer 1948 would 
have to be fixed with regard to possible future price trends, and would have to be set 
so low that it would not give the farmers much satisfaction. The NFU, in reply, 
claimed that it was likely that all the main agricultural commodities would be in short 
supply after the war, and so MAF could set minimum prices for cereals and potatoes 
with more confidence than they claimed was justified. l27 
The discussions were continued the following day, and Fergusson opened the meeting 
by suggesting that agricultural production could be divided into three groups, arranged 
in order of priority, milk, beef and mutton in the first group, cereals, potatoes and 
sugar beet in the second, and pigs and poultry in the third. Products in the second 
group were to have guaranteed prices and markets until summer 1948, but no specific 
127 PRO MAF 38/234, 13th June 1944, Note of a Meeting •.•. 
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price guaranteed for the whole period. It might, however, be possible to guarantee 
maintenance of the current market prices of cereals, sugar beet and potatoes for the 
1945 and 1946 harvests. The prices of pigs and eggs would be largely determined by 
feed prices, and while it was the Government's declared policy to restore production 
to pre-war levels it would be very difficult at this stage to say what a fair price would 
be. the Government would consult with the farmers when the position became clearer. 
Fergusson concluded by saying that the 'uncertainties' of the next four years made it 
impossible for the Government to commit itself any further on the question of 
agricultural prices. The proposals he had outlined were, in his opinion. 'The strongest 
guarantee for agricultural prices that it was feasible to ask the Government to accept'. 
The Second Secretary, Sir Donald Vandepeer, stressed that the principle behind these 
proposals was an attempt to underpin the position where prices were reduced, and to 
facilitate with the minimum of hardship possible the elimination of unnecessary and 
uneconomic production on marginal land. In discussion, the possibility of a minimum 
price for crops was linked by MAF to an understanding that if such a guarantee were 
implemented, acreage payments would be reduced if there was any easing of cropping 
directions. The NFU reacted strongly to these suggestions, with Sir Cleveland Fyfe, 
for the English and Welsh Farmers Union, arguing that agreement on such specific 
proposals would tie the farmers' hands in any future discussions of agricultural policy. 
The meeting concluded with both sides agreeing that further thought should be given 
to working out a general formula on the lines suggested, which would be interpreted 
at price reviews in the light of prevailing circumstances. l28 
128 PRO MAF 38/234, 14th June 1944, Note of a Meeting •..• 
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A 'Draft Statement of Principles' was prepared by the MAF Statistics and Economics 
Division, and sent to the Ministry of Food. The paper gave details of the data to be 
used in price fixing, the guarantees to be given for the next four years, and of the 
APR and SPR mechanism.129 The MAF paper also stressed that there would have 
to be changes in the character of production over the four years, with a greater 
emphasis on livestock production, and a reduction in the acreage of crops for direct 
human consumption. On the understanding that the paper was to be treated on a 
'tentative and informal document',130 and that it would be submitted to Ministers 
before any action was taken, the Ministry of Food agreed that it could be used on a 
basis for further talks with the NFU. These talks were subsequently held in October 
1944, with the NFU agreeing to the Agricultural Departments' proposals. 131 The 
document was subsequently presented to the Lord President's Committee in November, 
with a covering memorandum by Hudson, Johnston and Herbert Morrison.132 
The proposals for the continuation of Government guarantees were framed so as to 
allow for any changes that might be required in the character of agricultural output 
over the proceeding four years. As the pressure to maintain the maximum possible 
acreage of cereals and potatoes eased, the prices producers received could be reduced, 
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that adequate notice would be given of any planned reductions. If, for example, it 
proved possible to reduce the production of wheat and potatoes from the 1946 harvest, 
then that factor would be taken into account in the prices fixed at the 1945 review. 
Any adjustments in prices would be announced before the CW AECs began to make 
cropping plans for the 1946 harvest. The proposals for pigs and poultry were ' the 
minimum possible having regard to the need for reviving home production of pigmeat 
and eggs as rapidly as conditions permit'. This revival was required to improve the 
national diet, to reduce the Country's dependence on foreign supplies, particularly from 
the USA, and to restore to a large number of small farmers a more appropriate source 
of income than the wheat and potatoes they had been forced to grow during the war. 
There were to be no guaranteed minimum prices for cereals and potatoes. 
It was also stressed that there could be no question of prices being automatically 
adjusted in response to increases in wage rates, and that this point had been made to 
the NFU during their meetings. Any such pledge would be inconsistent with the 
proposals to reduce prices in the light of the changing demands on the industry. 
However, it was also 'essential and reasonable' that the Government should make 
provision for reviewing prices in the event of 'sudden and substantial' changes in costs, 
changes that had not been taken into account at the preceding price review. Minimum 
prices would not be adjusted at these 'Special Reviews'. 
Any Government statement on the lines suggested by there proposals would give 'a 
reasonable and balanced recognition of a prima facie case'. It would be unwise to say 
anything more, but the Agriculture Ministers argued that if their proposals were not 
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implemented it would be impossible to win the farmers' confidence and co-operation. 
The Ministry of Food agreed with the proposals, on the understanding that they were 
not precluded from relaxing or amending the existing controls on home production and 
marketing, and that a paragraph on these lines be included in any Government 
Statement on prices. In their conclusion, Hudson and his colleagues reminded the 
Committee that the industry would be called upon to make exceptional efforts for 
some years to come. In the light of this, and in the absence of an established long-
term policy for British agriculture, it was of the utmost importance to establish a basis 
of confidence and mutual trust between the Government and the farmers. 
The Lord President's Committee approved the Agriculture Departments proposals, 
subject to certain amendments. 133 The Government statement on prices was finally 
made public in December, with the first annual review to be held in February 
1945.134 The memorandum presented to the Lord President's Committee had also 
contained proposals for crop prices for the 1945 harvest as the forthcoming review 
would fix them for the following year. There had been some increases in costs since 
prices had been fixed for the 1944 harvest, but MAF concluded that they were not 
large enough to require any alteration of the prevailing price schedule. Ministers 
therefore recommended a 'no change' policy for the prices of the main crops from the 
133 
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1945 harvest. These proposals, which had been 'tacitly if somewhat glumly accepted 
by the NFU',135 were also approved by the Committee. 




By the spring of 1944 the Cabinet had agreed that the existing system of guarantees 
would be extended to cover the crops produced from the 1947 harvest, and milk, 
cattle, and sheep production to the summer of 1948. The wartime character and scale 
of production would have to be maintained for a transitional period of approximately 
two years after the end of the war; thereafter the emphasis would be shifted back onto 
milk and livestock production. The proposals contained in MAF's September 1943 
memorandum contrasted considerably with the proposals Donald Fergusson had 
circulated some 2 1/2 years earlier. This first memorandum had treated a healthy 
agriculture as an end in itself and had tried to divorce agricultural policy from both 
economic and nutritional considerations. Fergusson's proposals attempted to reverse 
the developments that had occurred in British farming in the inter-war period, and 
advocated a considerable expansion of domestic production over its pre-war level. As 
one Treasury official accurately observed, Fergusson's memorandum gave a farmer's 
interpretation of what a healthy and well-balanced agriculture should be. However, 
by the autumn of 1943 MAF's policy proposals acknowledged that agricultural policy 
would be largely determined by economic considerations, and only advocated a 
'modest' expansion of domestic production. 
The preceding sections have attempted to show that MAF's final statement of the 
principles of post-war policy rested on very different assumptions to those which 
underpinned its earlier efforts. By the end of 1943 the 'spectre of a depressing flood 
of food imports' at the end of the war had been exorcised, and replaced by the spectre 
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of post-war food shortages; a shortage of grain in the short-term and a far more 
prolonged shortage of supplies of meat and animal fats. MAF had initially been 
concerned to protect British farmers from the harsh winds of international competition 
and specialised production, using the country's potential balance of payments problems 
as the economic basis for its arguments. By the end of 1943, however, MAF could 
alsopoint to the conclusions of the Hot Springs conference and the Ministry of Food's 
gloomy predictions as to post-war food supplies to support it's arguments. At least 
in the transitional period British agriculture would not require too much protection 
from floods of imported foods, and British farmers had the extra assurance provided 
by the Government's guarantees. These guarantees were, however, only intended to 
cover the transitional period and there had been no working out of a detailed long-
term policy for the industry. The main objective of the Government's extension of its 
price guarantees was to ensure that a high level of production was maintained in the 
short-term by reassuring the farmers that their industry had a secure future. l36 The 
annual price review was to become a cornerstone of post-war agricultural policy, but 
in 1944 it was essentially a means of underpinning a reduction in agricultural 
aggregate net income from its high wartime level to a more reasonable figure. A cut 
in net income would also ensure that uneconomic production on marginal land, 
necessary in wartime, was gradually eliminated the APR would also be used to shift 
the emphasis in agricultural production away from crops for direct human 
consumption towards livestock products. Thus the policy to be pursued was basically 
136 An extension of the Government's ~ledges was also seen as a way of 
solving it's immediate problems w~th the farmers, problems arising 
out of the 1943 price review. 
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one of retrenchment after the expansion of production, Incomes and Government 
support occasioned by the demands of the war. 
As was shown in section (i), throughout the war the Treasury were eager to rein in 
Government expenditure on agriculture, with varying degrees of success, and were 
highly critical of the use of price 'incentives' to encourage increased production. As 
early as 1942 the Treasury were arguing that the prevailing level of agricultural net 
income could only be justified by wartime conditions, and would have to be 
substantially reduced in peacetime. Given these objectives it is not surprising that 
Fergusson's memorandum met with such a hostile response from the Treasury, with 
its disregard for economic considerations, and in view of the 'considerable' cost of the 
proposals. MAF envisaged a return to a farming system that had been all but 
destroyed in the inter-war period when the pressures of international competition had 
forced British farming to evolve towards more specialised production. MAF felt that 
this trend had served to create an 'unbalanced' agriculture, and so sought to recreate 
an ideal agricultural industry, one that would be protected from the pressures of the 
market. Fergusson's memorandum embodied, as he put it, 'the best opinion within the 
industry', and farmers' leaders naturally advocated an expanded, protected industry 
based on mixed rather than specialised production; the latter would have benefitted 
some producers at the expense of others. In this regard MAF's 1941 proposals did 
represent a step backward for British agriculture. 
Both the Treasury and the Economic Section criticised the Agricultural Departments 
for ignoring nutritional and economic considerations, the Ministry of Food having also 
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expressed its concern at their apparent disregard for dietary considerations. In MAF's 
eyes allowance for nutritional considerations would have implied the sort of 
specialised production they were specifically seeking to avoid. The Treasury 
emphasised that agriculture could not be treated in isolation from wider considerations, 
and that Fergusson's proposals would involve a net loss to the nation. MAF were 
suggesting that the industry be re-organised on the lines least in accordance with 
economic and technical trends. The production dictated by these trends would also 
enjoy a naturally protected market. The Economic Section argued that any financial 
support for the industry should be used to foster production of 'protective' foods. On 
the assumption that the food supply would not be a problem after the war, the 
criticisms of the Treasury and the Economic Section carry a great deal of weight. Had 
such a policy been implemented it is likely that the financial burden would have 
eventually proved too much for the Exchequer, leaving the Government facing the 
possibility of being forced to pass the cost onto the consumer. The end result of this 
policy would have been to adversely affect the balance of payments, thereby undoing 
any of the financial benefits of Fergusson's proposals. The other option, drastic 
reductions in the level of Exchequer support for the industry, would have left the 
Government open to accusations of a second 'Great Betrayal'. However, both the 
Treasury and the Economic Section acknowledged that political considerations could 
not be ignored, and that some sort of support would have to be given to the industry. 
It is clear that MAP's thinking on agricultural policy was greatly influenced by the 
criticism levelled at its first policy proposals; the memorandum submitted to the 
Official Committee on Internal Economic Problems acknowledged that agriculture 
90 
could not be considered in isolation from wider economic considerations, and that the 
large-scale importation of produce into the UK would continue. MAP clearly over-
estimated the Government's commitment to a healthy and well-balanced agriculture. 
MAF's somewhat 'blinkered' view of post-war policy can, at least in part, be explained 
by the relative neglect the industry had received in the inter-war period and the long-
term effects of this neglect. MAF's later policy proposals envisaged a more modest 
degree of expansion than had been suggested previously, the expansion once again 
being justified by balance of payments considerations. As was argued above these 
proposals were better received by the other departments, even the Board of Trade, the 
department which voiced the most criticism, acknowledged that there was a case for 
agriculture receiving 'special treatment'. The Treasury, in the person of Keynes, were 
quick to emphasise that they were not seeking a return to the 'laissez-faire' policies of 
the 1920's, rather a policy of retrenchment to suit peacetime conditions. Given the 
numerous pledges made by the Government and by individual politicians, the stated 
views of the major political parties, and the general perception of the industry's war 
effort, it would have been politically unthinkable for any post-war Government to have 
returned whole-heartedly to such policies. As was argued in the Introductory Chapter, 
by 1945 a broad consensus existed with regard to agricultural policy, with experts and 
politicians from both sides of the political fence arguing that there could be no return 
to pre-war conditions, and that the state should play a greater role in the running of 
the industry. Lionel Robbins recognised the political pressure for 'something to be 
done' for British farmers, although from the point of view of both national income and 
national security he argued that the best policy would be to allow production to be 
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wholly determined by international supply and demand with no restrictions on imports. 
The payment of subsidies, he continued, was essentially a political issue. 
As was argued above, all these conclusions were underpinned by the assumption that 
there would be adequate or more than adequate supplies of food after the war. The 
country would face balance of payments problems, and MAPs proposals were seen 
as being only one way of using agricultural production to help ease the UK's financial 
problems. However, as these assumptions about world food supplies began to be 
challenged MAP found an increasingly receptive audience for its proposals. By the 
end of 1942 the Ministry of Food was arguing that production would have to be 
maintained at wartime levels for a period after the war, before being reduced and re-
orientated back onto livestock. It was envisaged that the most serious shortages would 
be in supplies of meat, and that there would only be a relatively short-term disruption 
in supplies of grain. These changing assumptions were assimilated into MAP's policy 
proposals, and the need to maintain, at least in the short-term, maximum levels of 
production was used by MAP to support its arguments for the extension of the 
Government's pledges on guaranteed prices and markets. It is clear that the opening 
of the discussions on the extension of these guarantees, and on future policy, was also 
intended to solve a more immediately practical purpose, to prevent an escalation in 
the conflict over the Government's 1943 price settlement. 
This chapter has discussed the evolution of MAP and Government thinking on post-
war agricultural policy in some detail, to illustrate the changing assumptions that 
underpinned this policy and the factors which, in tum, influenced the assumptions 
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themselves. An examination of those wartime policy discussions is important because 
the assumptions which underlay MAF's October 1943 policy statement were to form 
the basis of Labour's agricultural policy in the early post-war period, until a 
deterioration in both the balance of payments and the world food situation forced the 
Government to drastically rethink its agricultural policy. It is this process which 
forms the basis of Chapter n. 
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(II) 
'THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF THE LABOUR PARTY' 
INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter chartered the course of the proposals for the post-war 
reconstruction of British agriculture, a process which culminated in the introduction 
in February 1945 of a system of annual price reviews to cover the transitional period 
from war to peace. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the evolution of Labour's 
agricultural policy between 1918 and 1945, to trace both the evolution of that policy 
and the various factors which influenced the course of its development. Particular 
attention will be given to the issue of the nationalization of agricultural land. It will 
be argued that while Labour's policies after 1945 were largely a continuation or a 
development of the policies initiated in R. S. Hudson's Wartime Ministry, the latter 
embodied certain basic principles that had formed a crucial part of Labour's 
programme in the 1930's, namely the comprehensive national planning of land use and 
the fixing of stable prices for agricultural produce. This chapter will also trace the 
origins of the broad wartime consensus that advocated greater state involvement in the 
running of British agriculture, ideas that had their roots in Labour thinking in the 
inter-war years. 
In the inter-war period the rapid and wholesale nationalization of the land was a key 
element in Labour's farming programme, but by 1945 the commitment to public 
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ownership remained intact, but the realization of this policy had become a long-term 
goal, one it would be necessary to work towards. Although the issue was debated at 
subsequent party conferences the nationalization of the land was effectively a dead 
issue after 1945; by the early 1950's Tom Williams and his colleagues were 
questioning the need for such a policy given the powers available to the Agriculture 
Minister under the 1947 Agriculture Act.1 In the 1945 manifesto, Let Us Face The 
Future, Labour emphasised the sheer scale of the task, which would prohibit the rapid 
acquisition of land by the state. By 1949, Ministers were emphasising the detrimental 
effects that a scheme for public ownership would have on the progress of the 
expansion programme, arguing that their existing powers were sufficient for the time 
being.2 In later years the issue of land nationalization was increasingly linked to 
political considerations, and in particular to Labour's pursuit of the farming vote. 
Proposals for State ownership of the land were seen as being a 'ball of discord' that 
would wreck the Party's chances of making electoral gains in the countryside.3 As 
a later chapter will show, however, Labour failed in it's attempt to wrest rural England 
from the grip of the Conservative Party, and Labour also placed a value on the 





The 'making' of the 1947 Act will form the basis of Chapter III. 
See The Labour Party Report on the 44th Annual Conference, p.133-
134 and F.W.S. craig,' British General Election Manifestos 1900-1974 
(1975), p.129. 
Tom Williams, quoted in The Labour Party, Report of the 52nd Annual 
Conference, p.143. 
See Chapter VII. 
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(i) 
In 1918 the Labour Party produced it's first comprehensive policy statement, Labour 
and the New Social Order, a document which formed the basis of the majority of the 
resolutions agreed at the June 1918 Party Conference. Among the resolutions passed 
at the Conference was one calling for the 'Common Ownership of the Nation's land', 
and delegates called on the Government to: 
'Resume control of the nation's agricultural land .... with a view to the 
production of the largest possible proportion of the foodstuffs required 
by the population of these islands under conditions allowing of a good 
life to the rural population and at a price not exceeding that for which 
foodstuffs can be bought from other lands'.5 
The resolution envisaged a combination of Government farms, small holdings, 
municipal agricultural enterprises, and farms rented out to co-operative societies and 
other tenants, under directions as to the crops they could grow. It was also argued 
that the distribution of agricultural produce in urban areas should be taken out of 
public hands and given over to local authorities and consumer co-operative societies. 
The Conference also called for improved housing for rural workers, an increase in the 
provision of smallholdings, and an adequate minimum wage for agricultural workers. 
5 Quoted in G. 0 • H. Cole, A His tory of the Labour Party from, 1918 
(1948), p.72. The policy statement was largely the work of s~~ney 
Webb, and Webb, together with Arthur ~end~rson, was also r~sp~ns1ble 
for drawing up the Party's new const1tut~on, and for co~tt~ng t~e 
Party to explicitly Socialist aims. These aims were embodied ~n 
Clause IV of the new constitution. (ibid., p.54-56). 
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The year 1926 saw the publication of Labour's first comprehensive statement of it's 
agricultural policy, Labour's Policy on Agriculture, which was approved by both the 
Party Conference and the TUC. The statement had been prepared by a committee 
under the chairmanship of Christopher Addison, which had been assigned the task of 
working out 'a considered scheme for the development of agriculture on sound lines'.6 
Labour's Policy on Agriculture reaffirmed the Party's commitment to the public 
ownership of the land, arguing that British agriculture had reached a stage in its 
development where further progress could only be made through changes in system 
of land ownership and tenure, as the existing tenancy system was breaking down. 
There was another reason for the State to acquire the ownership of the land; whatever 
assistance was given to the industry, under the existing tenancy system it would be 
impossible to prevent at least a part of it finding it's way into the pockets of the 
landlords.7 
The need for public ownership, the Committee argued, was too urgent to permit a 
'gradual and piecemeal' process of nationalization, and so the agricultural holdings in 
all rural areas should be transferred into new ownership on the passing of an Act to 
grant freehold to the State, as soon as arrangements for the payment of compensation 




See Viscount Addison, How the Labour Party has saved Agriculture 
(1951), p.4. The invitation to set up the committee came from 
Arthur Henderson, on behalf of the N~C, and its.m~ers.included Tom 
Williams who was later to become Agr1culture M1n1ster 1n the Attlee 
government. 
The Labour Party, Labour's Policy on Agriculture (1926), p.5. 
ibid., p.6. owner - Occupiers might be left in temporary ownership 
or-their holdings until the land was required on the grounds of 
public policy, al though the committee belieyed that many own~r­
occupiers would be eager to exchange ownersh1p for tenanc~, wh1ch 
woula provide them with the capital they needed to run the1r farms 
efficiently. 
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maintained under State ownership until new conditions required changes to be made, 
and any proposed changes would be discussed in advance by the tenants and the 
County Agricultural Committees. Under the Ministry of Agriculture Act 1919 the 
wartime County Agricultural Executive Committees (CAECs) had been reconstituted 
as permanent agricultural sub-committee's of the County Councils, and from the spring 
of 1919 had been relieved of their responsibilities for the control of cropping and land 
use, and for the operation of labour and machinery pools.9 Under the Agriculture Act 
1920 the Committees were made the courts of appeal for farmers seeking possession 
of a tied cottage, or a landowner wishing to remove a tenant on the grounds of poor 
husbandry. The Committees themselves were left with little power to enforce 
efficiency under the 1920 Act; any orders issued by the County Agricultural 
Committees were made subject to arbitration and would be rendered invalid if they 
'injuriously affected any person with an interest in the land, or altered the general 
character of a holding' .10 Thus the Committees could not attempt to increase the 
efficiency of land use against the wishes of the tenant or the owner. 
At the 1924 Labour Party conference a resolution had been passed calling on the 
Government to re-organise the industry through re-constituted County Agricultural 




The evolution of the CAEC system will be discu~sed more full~ in 
Chapter VI. Under the 1919 Act the Co~ttees ,were 9~ven 
responsibilities for County Councils' smallholdings, ~lk hyg~ene, 
and the control of weeds, pests, and diseases. 
E.H. Whetham, The Agrarian History of England & Wales VII, 1914-1939 
(1978), p.121. 
The existing Committees were partly appointed by the county councils 
from their agricultural sub-committees and partly by the Board o~ 
Agriculture. The Committees did contain farmers and workers 
representatives, but the majority of committee, members were 
representatives of the County Counc~l. The new co~ttees would ~e 
constructed on a far more representative bas~s than the~r 
predecessors. 
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powers to ensure that full use was made of the land for food production, and they 
would also be responsible for promoting good husbandry and for encouraging 
increased co-operation between smallholders. The Conference saw the Committees 
as helping to pave the way for the nationalization of the land.12 In Labour's Policy 
on Agriculture it was argued that the County Agricultural Committees should be made 
more representative of the industry and invested with the power to enforce proper 
standards of cultivation of land 'on a considerable scale', as they had been empowered 
to do during the war. However, it was not intended that public farming would entirely 
supersede tenant farming, 'which will long continue to be the normal method of tenure 
and cultivation'. 13 
Public ownership, Labour argued, would allow agriculture to function as 'a great 
public service', and the Party's objective was to secure the fullest possible use of the 
land by and for the community as a whole by the most effective and economic 
methods possible. 'Temporary panaceas' such as subsidies and protective duties would 




'The Labour movement believes that all agricultural land should be 
equipped for its proper use. So long as land remains in private hands 
the community can do little' .14 
The Labour Party, Report of the 24th Annual conference, p.172. 
Labour's Policy on Agriculture, p.7. In some areas, however, it was 
envisaged that it might be both possible and advantageous to set up 
public utility companies in some areas, or to encourage so~e f?rm 
of co-operative or collective farming. In some areas cult~vat~on 
could be undertaken by the public authority itself. 
ibid., p.S. 
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A National Agricultural Commission would be established to act as a link between 
MAP and the County Committees, and the Commission's primary task would be the 
planning of the orderly development of the industry, and to encourage improvements 
in the existing standard of husbandry. In the aftermath of the 1926 Conference it was 
decided that steps should be taken to make Labour's agricultural policy more widely 
known, through a series of rural conferences, and Noel Buxton, Earl de la Warr, and 
George Dallas were put in charge of the campaign. Speaking at the 1927 Party 
Conference George Dallas was keen to stress the long-term importance of Labour's 
activities in rural areas. Even if the Party was to win every urban constituency, he 
argued, without the rural constituencies Labour would still be in a minority in the 
Commons. IS 
The year 1932 saw Labour publish a restatement of its agricultural policy, which 
amended its 1926 policy proposals in the light of the events of 1929 to 1931. The 
new proposals were prepared by a special NEC policy committee, and were approved 
at the 1932 Party Conference. 16 The proposals were published as The Land and the 
National Planning of Agriculture in November of that year, as part of the Socialism 
In Action series. The foundation of Labour's policies remained the nationalization of 
the land, and both land use and agricultural production were to be planned on a 
nationwide basis to ensure the fullest possible use of the land for food production and 
for the provision of employment, consistent with sound methods and the needs of the 
15 The Labour Party, Report of the 27th Annual conference, p.179. 
16 The Labour Party, Report of the 32nd Annual Conference. 
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consumer.
17 The National Agricultural Commission would work through National 
Commodity Boards which would be charged with promoting the efficient production, 
processing and marketing of agricultural produce. The Boards would be under the 
general control of the Commission and would, where necessary, delegate their powers 
to local Commodity Boards. Labour accepted that there was a 'strong case' for 
defending farmers against short-term price fluctuations and for the proper planning of 
imports, and to this end suggested that the National Commodity Boards should be 
empowered to purchase and/or control the flow of agricultural imports into the UK, 
and also to control prices in the interests of the consumer.18 Producers, workers, and 
consumers would all be represented on the Commission, and both the National and 
Local Commodity Boards. Farmers' and workers' representatives would sit on the 
County Agricultural Committees.19 The central aim of Labour's policy was to 
increase the standard of life and the status of the agricultural worker, and one way of 
achieving this would be to give the authority to determine minimum wages to a 
National Wages Board, with the aim of securing a progressive increase in wages over 
a period of years. Labour would also introduce a special scheme of unemployment 
insurance for agricultural workers and would also abolish the 'tied' cottage, while 





The Labour Party, The Land and the National Planning of Agriculture 
(1932), p.6-7. 
ibid., p.1l. 
At the 1931 conference Addison had moved a resolution in whi9h, 
amon9st other things, he had called for some fo~ of pr~ce stab~lization to help arable producers, so a~ to foster ~he 
development of a more secure agricultural system. The resolut~on 
had been carried unanimously. The Labour Party, Report of the 31st 
Annual Conference, p.209. 
The Land and the National Planning of Agriculture (1932), p.13-16. 
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Labour's 1932 policy document formed the basis of all the Party's statements on 
agriculture during the 1930's.21 Even in 1943, in Our Land: The Future of Britain's 
Agriculture, Labour referred back to the decisions of the 1932 Conference when it 
attempted to outline the basic principles of its policy for the industry, although the 
machinery through which these principles were to become practical policy was 
somewhat different. Labour still advocated the rapid and large-scale acquisition of 
agricultural land under a general enabling Act, the necessity for State Control making 
it 'too urgent to leave it to a very gradual and piecemeal procedure over a long period 
of years,.22 Labour would continue to operate the CWAEC system after the war, 
with provision for NFU and NUA W representatives on the Committees, which would 
continue to function as MAF's local agents in rural areas. The Ministry of Food was 
also to continue as a peacetime department, with responsibility for national food 
supplies as a whole, including the bulk purchase of imports, and for the formulation 
of a home food production programme. Labour would also create a National Land 
Commission to hold all the Government's agricultural land and to be responsible to 
the Agriculture Minister for its administration, equipment, and use.23 The Party also 
proposed the setting up of a Rural Development Board, under the general authority of 




See, for example, Tom Williams, Labour's Way to Use the ~and (1936) 
and Viscount Addison, Labour's Policy for the countrys~de (1932) 
The Labour Party, Our Land: The Future of Britain's Agriculture 
(1943), p.4. 
ibid., ~.5. Labour also expressed its support in Our Land for the conclus~ons of the uthwatt and Scott Reports. The latter document 
had dealt with the loss to the nation arising out of th~ waste,of 
good agricultural land and the damage done by unregulated ~ndustr~al 
enterprise and building. Amongst the proposals made by' the Scott 
Report was that the control of the development ~nd Pfann~ng ?f ~and 
use should be placed in the hands of an author~tat~ve.c?~~s~o~. 
Cmd 6378 (1942), Report of the Committee on Land ut~l~zat~on ~n 
Rural Areas. 
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pledged that it would increase agricultural wages to at least the level enjoyed by 
skilled workers in other industries.24 
Thus the years after 1926 saw the Labour Party develop its proposals for the 
development of British farming, ideas that were to gain a growing measure of 
acceptance amongst agricultural writers and journalists, creating a broad consensus that 
cut across traditional Party allegiances. Writers in the 1930's and 1940's focused on 
the condition of the industry in the inter-war years, arguing that British farming should 
not be allowed to remain in, or return to, such a state of disrepair, and advocated ways 
in which this could be prevented. Common to virtually all these works was a belief 
that the traditional landlord and tenant system had broken down and that the State 
must now assume the role and responsibilities of a landlord. This new role was to be 
accompanied by a range of other responsibilities, ranging from the implementation of 
a policy of rural reconstruction to guaranteeing farmers stable prices for their produce, 
all of which required a considerable degree of State involvement in the planning and 
running of the industry. 
Astor and Rowntree's British Agriculture, published in 1938, advocated the 'cautious 
and tentative' nationalization of farm land, in the first instance where it was clear that 
private ownership was incapable of providing the long-term capital improvements that 
the land needed.25 The purchase of any such land would be undertaken by land 
24 
25 
Our Land (1943), p.8-9. 
Viscount Astor and B. Seebohm Rowntree, British Agriculture : The 
Principles of Future Policy. (1939), p.270. Astor had served as 
Parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Food in WW1 and bet~een 
1936 and 1937 had served as Chairman of the League of Nat~ons 
Committee on Nutrition. seehohm Rowntree was the author of poverty 
: A study of Town Life and How the Labourer Lives, a study of the 
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improvement commissions funded by the State. Astor and Rowntree argued that the 
increased production of 'health protective' foods, and in particular of liquid milk, 
offered British producers the best hope for the future, as the increased production of 
staple agricultural commodities could not be reconciled with either the national interest 
or a sound international and commercial policy. 26 
In Mixed Farming and Muddled Thinking, published seven years later, Astor and 
Rowntree once again advocated specialised farming at the expense of traditional mixed 
farming, which the NFU saw as the basis of any future policy for the industry.27 The 
inter-war period, they argued, had clearly shown the short-comings of mixed farming 
and they dismissed the farmers' claims that the problem did not lie with the system 
as a whole. The two authors acknowledged that post-war agriculture would require 
some degree of price support, but 'the subsidies that are necessary to put mixed 
farming on it's feet are so astronomic that, apart from any other argument, it is most 
unlikely that a mainly non-agricultural electorate would continue them, even if it could 
be persuaded to accept them now under the temporary stress of war'. 28 
The role of the State would be to 'facilitate and expedite the process of natural change 
that technical and economic influences have already initiated', to shift production 
towards greater specialisation, with particular emphasis on milk, eggs, vegetables and 
fruit as part of a policy of improved nutrition. Astor and Rowntree acknowledged that 
conditions of English agricultural labourers. 
26 ibid., p.266. 
27 Astor and Rowntree, Mixed Farming and Muddled Thinking (1946), 
p.10S-109. 
28 ibid., 107. 
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such a policy would involve a considerable degree of risk for producers, and to this 
end they argued that the State should 'mitigate where it cannot eliminate the 
uncertainties of farming', advocating the use of guaranteed prices, consumer subsidies 
and marketing boards.29 
In Reconstruction and the Land (1941) Sir Daniel Hall argued that the long-term 
prosperity of the industry depended on structural changes; British farms, he argued, 
were generally small uneconomic units, too small to make full use of advances in 
mechanisation and agricultural science.3o Private landlords were either unable or 
unwilling to undertake this process of reconstruction and reconditioning of the land, 
and so Hall concluded that the government must assume the burden of responsibility. 
In so doing it should, he continued, assume ownership of the land, which would be 
administered by the Commissioners of the Crown Lands, although the task of 
reorganising farms into more viable economic units would be entrusted to a public 
utility corporation. The corporation would be autonomous in its day to day business, 
but ultimately responsible to the Treasury. The corporation would lease land from the 
Commissioners, divide it into units suitable for the application of modern farming 
techniques and then return it to the Commissioners for renting out. 
C.S. Orwin's Speed The Plough, published in 1942, argued that the position of the 
private landlord had become untenable, and like Hall he argued that the source of 
British agriculture's 'backwardness' lay in the existing system of land tenure and the 
29 ibid., p.119. 
30 A. Daniel Hall, Reconstruction and the Land (1941), p.257. until 
1936 Hall had been MAFis Chief scientific Advisor. 
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general layout of British farms?1 Orwin, again like Hall, believed that the answer 
was the unified control of land use, and a policy of rural reconstruction under public 
ownership. The task of transferring ownership from private individuals to the State, 
and of administering the land subsequently, would be undertaken by a National Lands 
Commission, functioning as a department of a new Ministry of Lands. Orwin 
envisaged the State's acquisition of the land as a slow and gradual process. Any 
landowners unwilling to sell their land would, under the Government's Land Purchase 
Act, be required to produce evidence of expenditure on the maintenance of their 
holding equal to an agreed percentage of the rent accruing from the property. 32 The 
day to day administration of this national land policy would include the re-
organisation of farming units, the selection of tenants, and the provision of new capital 
equipment, and would be entrusted to professional land agents, each in charge of an 
area of between 30,000 and 50,000 acres and supported by teams of district agents. 
In A Programme for Agriculture, a collection of essays which originally appeared in 
The Field between October 1940 and February 1941, a number of agricultural experts 
including Sir Daniel Hall and Lord Addison, the former Labour Agriculture Minister, 
put forward their views on the principles of any future policy for the industry. Hall's 
contribution attacked inter-war policies for putting money in farmers' pockets whilst 
failing to put the industry as a whole onto a footing where it could deal with 'the new 
31 
32 
C.S. Orwin Speed the Plo~qh (1942), p~25-~9. orwin had been the 
editor of the Royal Agr~cultural Soc~ety s Journ~l an~ was the 
director of the Agricultural Economics Research Inst~tute ~n Oxford. 
orwin envisaged the acquisition of all land by the State and,not just agricultural land, to prevent unchecked urban expans~on. 
~bid., p.79-99. 
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conditions of a changing world'.33 However, subsidies often accounted for the whole 
of a farmer's income, with milk producers providing the only exception to the rule. 
Hall and Addison both agreed that the problem was the system within which farmers 
worked and not the farmers themselves. Under Hall's system the best farmers would 
be employed to run the new farming units, some would be given subordinate positions, 
while others would be pensioned off. Hall also argued for the introduction of some 
form of price regulation.34 
Addison's essay was based on his A Policy for British Agriculture, which had been 
published in 1938 and in which he expanded upon and discussed Labour's plans for 
the industry.35 Addison advocated the creation of a National Land Commission 
under the general authority of MAF and assigned the task of organising the purchase 
of the land, it's development and re-equipment, and the provision of short-term credits 
to tenants. The Commission would in turn be served by County Committees 
consisting of producers, farmworkers and estate managers, who would act as the 
Minister's local agents. The County Committees would be concerned with the 
provision and maintenance of a proper standard of capital equipment, advice on the 
letting of farms, and the consideration of proposals to amalgamate small farms. 36 





B. Vesey - Fitzgerald (ed.), A Programme for Agriculture (1941), 
p.143. 
ibid. 150. 
Viscount Addison, A Policy for British Agriculture (1939). Addison 
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and Addison believed that price stability would be a vital part of any sound future 
policy. Changes in the distribution and marketing of agricultural produce were also 
a vital part of any policy of stability. Producer marketing boards would be given 
powers to control the sale of agricultural produce, although they would have no say 
over distribution or retail prices, and would not have the final say over commodity 
prices. Import boards would work in conjunction with the corresponding home-
producer board, controlling imports to ensure a stable price for the home-produced 
commodity. The ultimate aim of this policy of price stabilisation was to secure the 
fullest possible use of the land. Addison was also aware of nutritional issues, arguing 
the industry's two lines of development should be the increased production of health 
protective foods and an increase in the output of animal feedstuffs. 37 
A.G. Street, who was later to become an often vitriolic critic of Labour policy, also 
argued that the landlord-tenant system was breaking down and that only some form 
of national ownership could help remedy the 'shameful' condition the industry found 
itself in.38 Street argued for the setting up of a 'Ministry of Land Utlization' which 
would delegate the functions of landlords to county committees, who would in turn 
control all forms of land use. The committees would, for example, ensure the fertility 
of the soil was maintained by enforcing proper systems of crop rotation.39 Although 




Addison's views on this subject are more fully expressed in A Policy 
for Agriculture, p.193-209. 
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that rural Britain's most valuable asset was the farmers themselves, and that 'this 
industrial nation cannot thrive without that background of sturdy individualism and 
natural faith which small-scale farming produces,.4o Street clearly envisaged little 
fundamental change in the structure of the industry under public ownership. 
In 1946 the Fabian Society, under the editorship of F.W. Bateson, published a volume 
of essays which attempted to argue the case for a Socialist agriculture on technical 
rather than political or social grounds. This was in response to comments by Sir 
Daniel Hall in Reconstruction and the Land that Labour's policies were not sufficiently 
appreciative of the technical points at issue, of the land and of farming itself as 
distinct from their social repecussions'. 41 Towards a Socialist Agriculture considered 
British agriculture's place within the world economy, the produce that British farmers 
should concentrate on producing, the appropriate size(s) of individual farm units, and 
the mechanisms needed to ensure that development proceeded in the right lines. 
Bateson et al concluded that the long-term objective of any policy should be to 
increase the output of milk, vegetables, eggs and fruit, restore meat production to it's 
pre-war level, and to reduce cereal production from its high wartime leve1.42 This 
programme, it was argued, would not require any drastic alteration in the size of 
British farms if specialisation within individual units was combined with greater co-
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Government should take possession of the holdings of 'C' landlords,43 reorganise 
them into units of between 150 and 400 acres each, re-equip them and let them to 
suitable tenants. 
The necessary changes could also be brought about, at least in part, by economic 
pressure; for example by guaranteed prices which bore no relation to consumer prices 
and also by continuing the wartime powers of the County Executive Committees. 
Whilst acknowledging that wholesale nationalisation might be the most effective 
course of action, Bateson and his colleagues recognised the opposition that such a 
policy would provoke amongst producers, and doubted that the electorate as a whole 
would see the need for such a course of action as long as landlords who misused their 
land were dispossessed. 
'If [private ownership under public control] will work as well - or very 
nearly as well - as [full public ownership], it will be difficult to 
persuade the electorate that anything can be gained by taking the more 
drastic step of nationalisation. In English politics the pragmatic 
sanction is normally decisive'. 44 
This last sentence could stand as a description of Labour's approach to agricultural 
policy issues after 1945. 
43 ibid., p.l77. 
44 ibid., p.l74. 
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Towards a Socialist A~iculture did, however, envisage a time when private ownership 
would 'pass naturally into total inanition', and land ownership would be transferred to 
the State to be administered by the CAEC'S.45 The proposals made by Bateson et al 
contained many of the arguments against the wholesale nationalisation of the land that 
the Labour government was to use to explain and justify its move away from its 
original position on the question of land ownership. Labour's agricultural policy, as 
expressed in the 1945 manifesto,46 with its emphasis on the need for the greater 
control and planning of the industry, and on nationalisation as a long-term objective, 
formed part of a broad consensus on the future of the industry, one which 
encompassed a wide range of approaches and perspectives but which rested on a 
number of common principles. In turn, Labour's advocacy of national ownership and 
control from the mid 1920's clearly played an important part in creating this 
consensus. 
By 1945 even the NFU had accepted the need for the continuation of the wartime 
powers of the CAEC's and the Ministry of Food as a corollary of the continuation of 
the wartime system of price guarantees, a view taken by a number of other agricultural 
organisations.47 The Conservative manifesto pledged that producers would have 
guaranteed prices and markets and in return would be expected to maintain a good 
standard of husbandry. Wartime controls and directions would be continued for as 
long as the food situation required it, although thereafter they would be progressively 
45 ibid., p.174. 
46 See F.W.S. Craig (ed.), British Election Manifestos 1900-74 (1975), 
p.128. 
47 See the NFU, The Basis of Economic Security (1945). 
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reduced, until the role of the CAECs was simply that of offering 'leadership, help and 
advice,.48 Whatever their views on wartime controls, and leaving aside any economic 
or financial aspects, no party could sensibly contemplate allowing agriculture to slide 
back into it's depressed inter-war condition after so much promise had been heaped 
on the industry's war effort, and after so many promises had been made as to what 
would happen after the war.49 
48 F.W.S. Craig, Ope cit., p.116-117. 
49 See, for example, The Farmer and stockbreeder March 30th, 1943 and 
August 10th, 1945. 
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(ii) 
Labour's 1945 Manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, reaffirmed the Party's commitment 
to land nationalisation but 'no immediate promise was made to achieve it'.50 Instead, 
land would be purchased by the Government as or when it was required, in other 
words in just the 'gradual and piecemeal' fashion that had been rejected in Our Land. 
In contrast to Labour's earlier policy statements the 1945 manifesto stressed the 
practical problems a wholesale nationalisation programme would pose for a Labour 
Government. 51 Only the grossly inefficient landlord or farmer faced the prospect of 
having his land compulsorily purchased by the State in the short-term. Labour 
remained committed to the continuation of the CAEC system and the Ministry of Food 
in peacetime, however, and so if nationalisation was not a part of Labour's first five-
year programme, then the Party was at least still committed to the control of the land 
in the national interest. In the words of the 1945 manifesto: 
'Our agriculture should be planned to give us the food we can best 
produce at home and large enough to give us as much of these foods 
as possible,.52 
Our Land had been prepared by the Land and Agricultural Reorganisation Sub-
Committee of the NEC's Policy Committee, and was formally adopted at the 1944 
50 See G.D.H. Cole, Ope cit., p.425 and craig, Ope cit., p.126. 
51 See also The Labour Party, Report of the 44th Annual conference, 
p.89-92. 
52 craig, op.cit., p.128. 
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Conference.53 Our Land had itself grown out of an earlier policy document, The Old 
World and the New Society, which had been endorsed, although not debated, at the 
1942 Conference. 54 The latter was a broad statement of Labour Party aims, 
advocating planned production for full employment, and arguing that this would entail 
national ownership of the 'essential instruments of production'. There would also have 
to be the 'organised import of staple commodities and their orderly marketing'.55 In 
the resolution moved by George Dallas at the 1942 Conference the NEC called for the 
public ownership of the land, the development of a national food and agriculture plan, 
and the unification of MAP and the Ministry of Food into one department. The 
national plan, it was argued, should be designed to achieve an adequate and varied diet 
for the population as a whole, with a large contribution from British farmers and a 
high standard of living for all those engaged in food production. Prices would be 
controlled to ensure fair prices for consumers and a fair return to producers. 56 
Our Land echoed these earlier calls for the acquisition of all agricultural land by the 
State, and in addition to approving these proposals the 1944 Party Conference also 
passed a resolution calling for the transfer into public ownership of the land, large-
scale building, heavy industry, and all forms of banking, transport and fuel and 
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principle of public ownership, and had advocated Government control of the Bank of 
England, but had not made any other specific commitments. However, a large number 
of Conference delegates were unhappy with what they regarded as the NEC's 'caution' 
on this issue, and so the resolution listing specific targets for the Party's 
nationalization programme was put to and agreed by Conference. A number of 
delegates at the following year's Conference were equally critical of what they saw as 
the inadequacy of Labour's policy on the land, as presented in Let Us Face the Future, 
although this section of the manifesto was eventually approved by the Conference as 
a whole.58 
Delegates were quick to point out the extent to which Our Land and the Manifesto 
were at odds with each other, arguing that the latter 'smacked too much of the "This 
Year, next year, sometime never".'59 In reply to these criticisms Herbert Morrison, 
the chairman of the NEC Policy Committee, told delegates that the programme 
outlined in the manifesto was intended to be one that would be realisable in the first 
five years of a Labour Government's life, and he stressed, echoing a point made by 
Stafford Cripps, that Labour would have to work very hard to fully implement all it's 
election pledges.60 Morrison went on to give three reasons why it was proposed that 
the Party would not proceed with a policy of wholesale land nationalisation, although 
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be achieved 'in time,.61 Firstly, Morrison emphasized the immense administrative and 
legislative task involved in implementing such a policy. Secondly he stressed the 
large financial considerations that would be involved, and that financial issues had to 
be considered in some order of priority. In finance, he continued, 'first things must 
come first', and in his speech on 'The Land' Morrison referred to the important 
financial considerations involved in other sections of the manifesto, 'Jobs for All' and 
'Industry in the service of the Nation', and in the provision of education and social 
services, the implication being that these considerations had priority over the public 
ownership of the land.62 
Finally, Morrison argued that the most important thing was that a Labour Government 
could obtain land for specific purposes in relation to its programme and Let Us Face 
the Future, he continued, contained everything Labour needed in this respect during 
it's first five years in office. Inefficient landlords would be relieved of their holdings 
at a fair valuation, but where a landowner or owner-occupier was farming efficiently 
the NEe felt that there was 'no urgency' in taking the land into public ownership.63 
The election manifesto, Morrison emphasised, was a 'programme of action', and as 
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relation to the probable and practicable work of a Labour Government 
with a Labour majority over five years,.64 
This was the approach that the NEC had adopted in drawing up the agriculture section 
of Let Us Face the Future.65 
The treatment of land nationalization in the 1945 manifesto reflected the 'triumph' of 
practicalities over ideology in Labour's agricultural policy, although the issue was to 
be raised again at subsequent Party Conferences. As later chapters will show, 
however, after 1945 the practical arguments against wholesale nationalization gained 
in strength, and these, together with the unrelenting opposition of the NFU, sounded 
the death knell for the nationalization of the land by a Labour Government. As this 
and later chapters will show, however, this tension remained unresolved and emerged 
in Labour's agricultural policy discussions throughout the post-war years. 
As was mentioned above, by the mid 1920's Labour had begun to recognise that if it 
remained a solely urban party it could only hope to form a minority Government, and 
with this in mind a rural campaign was launched in an attempt to increase public 
awareness of Labour's agricultural policy.66 At the 1931 Party Conference, however, 
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at the extent of Labour's progress in rural areas.67 Labour, he argued, had 'attempted 
something for the farmers, but the picture is not so bright when you come to talk of 
the agricultural workers'. Christopher Addison had earlier moved a resolution calling 
on the Party to make full use of Labour's legislation, together with import boards and 
co-operative marketing, to secure an adequate standard of life for all workers in the 
industry. This would involve some form of price stabilization to help arable 
producers, and the conditions of the farm worker would be improved by the provision 
of unemployment insurance, a national wages board, and the abolition of the tied 
cottage. 68 
In reply Gooch, while acknowledging the pledges to improve the farmworkers' lot, 
stressed that unless Labour had something 'real and concrete' to present to the 
agricultural workers, Labour would not secure a majority in the Commons. In 
Gooch's view the most important issue was the tied cottage and he urged the Party, 
in the run-up to the General Election, to express 'a determination of heart and mind' 
to put its promises into practice once in office.69 Gooch had made a similar point 
at the 1930 Party Conference, arguing that the NFU was almost wholly opposed to 
Labour's agricultural policy. The farmers, he continued, only wanted 'full-blooded 
protection', and Gooch had urged the Party to ignore farmers' criticisms and to press 
on with its stated policy. 70 
67 The Labour Party, Report of the 31st Annual Conference, p.211-12. 
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The 1933 Party Conference saw Gooch move a resolution calling for all future 
agricultural legislation to contain provisions designed to ensure that a definite share 
of the benefits accruing from that legislation would be passed on to the agricultural 
workers. Both Addison and Tom Williams lent their support to Gooch's resolution, 
and once again Labour's electoral prospects were linked to improvements in the 
agricultural workers' standard of living. Labour, Gooch argued, must remain the 
workers' party, and should not be afraid of offending the farmers. 
'Whatever we say to the farmers, and we put before them a lovely 
policy, a most helpful policy, they will not listen to us, and when the 
General Election comes round there will not be one farmer in a 
hundred who will vote Labour'. 71 
The improvements, albeit 'artificial ones', in the farmers' position under the National 
Government's policy of duties and tariffs had not been accompanied by any 
improvement in the agricultural workers' lot, while benefits had filtered upwards to 
the landlords. There had, Gooch continued, in fact been increasing pressure on the 
economic and financial position of workers in the industry. Tom Williams made the 
links between Labour's campaign in the rural areas and its potential political impact 
explicit : 'There are at this moment in the House of Commons ... about 135 
landowners. If we could win 135 rural seats the Socialism you have been talking 
about would become a possibility. t72 
71 The Labour Party, Report of the 33rd Annual Conference, p.212. 
72 ibid., p.213. 
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This point was reiterated by Addison, who argued that while state action would 
stabilize or increase the prosperity of the industry as a whole, an essential part of this 
action should be the guaranteeing of a decent standard of life for the agricultural 
worker. This guarantee, he continued, had to form an 'organic part of any national 
plan for British agriculture'. 73 Labour's commitment to the agricultural worker as 
having 'first call' on the Party's attentions was reaffirmed at the 1937 Party 
Conference, in a resolution which also called for the public ownership of the land to 
ensure that it was farmed in the interests of the nation as a whole, rather than simply 
in the interests of the landowners and the farmers.74 A number of speakers once 
again emphasized the political importance of the 'agricultural vote', which meant 
effectively the farmworkers' vote, to the Party's electoral hopes. There were, however, 
signs of a change, or at least the beginnings of a change, in Labour's attitude towards 
the farmers, and to the Party's potential appeal to this section of the agricultural 
community. 
Addison, the chairman of Labour's Rural Campaigns Committee, told delegates that 
farmers were beginning to come to Labour Party meetings, and that they were 
beginning to believe that there was 'something in' Labour's policy for their industry.75 
George Dallas, a member of the NEC, even went so far as to suggest that both 
farm workers and farmers had suffered under the Conservatives. The Conservative 
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'A landlord's party and their first principle is to safeguard the interest 
of the landowner and not the interest of the farmer or the farm 
worker'.76 
Chamberlain's 'Kettering speech' in July 1938 gave a further boost to Labour's belief 
that it could secure the farmers' vote. In a speech to an audience of farmers the Prime 
Minister had declared that as Britain would not face the threat of starvation in time 
of war, there was no need to encourage increased production at home. 77 In the 
words of one speaker at the 1939 Conference, since the Prime Minister's speech: 
'Farmers have been at a loose end. Many of them have been really 
detached from the Conservative Party for the first time, and we have 
this large body of detached opinion looking round for help,.78 
Labour, it was argued, had a right to the farmers' vote, as they were the only Party 
with a 'suitable and solid' programme for agriculture. Even E.G. Gooch, who at 
previous Party Conferences had told the Party to abandon any hopes it had of 
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continued to campaign actively in rural areas. Labour's message, he opined, should 
be that the Party would provide a future for both the farm worker and the farmer. 79 
Labour regarded its inter-war rural campaigning as having been a success, one 
measure of the achievement being an increase in NUAW membership amongst 
agricultural workers. In Labour's Policy on Agriculture, published in 1926, the Party 
had stressed that the key to any improvement in the position of farmworkers lay in 
better organisation, and Labour's rural campaign had aimed to encourage both Party 
and trade union membership. To quote from Labour's Policy on Agriculture; 
'The position of farmworkers cannot be improved effectively until they 
are organised and assisted to exercise their full influence on local 
government in rural areas'.80 
Between 1919 and 1924 NUAW membership declined from 126,911 to 28,916, 
although by 1939 membership had increased to 50,000. The war years saw the 
greatest expansion in NUAW numbers, from 53,709 in 1940 to 128,678 by 1945.81 
The success of this first campaign prompted Labour to launch a fresh campaign 
immediately after the end of the war. In the autumn of 1945 the NEC set up the 
Rural Areas Advisory Committee, which was to deal with 'methods of propaganda and 
persuasion in rural areas', under the chairmanship ofP.T. Hardy and with E.G. Gooch, 
79 ibid., p.3l7. 
80 The Labour Party, Labour's Policy on Agriculture, p.ll. 
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a member of the NEC as well as President of the NUA W, as one of it's members. 82 
NUA W membership continued to grow in the immediate post-war period and at its 
peak stood at 160,000, although by 1959 this figure had declined to 147, 938, roughly 
30% of the total agricultural labour force.83 
The NUA W's relationship with Labour will be examined in more detail in Chapter 
VITI, but one factor which may have prevented further increases in NUA W 
membership was the Union's failure to make any real headway on key issues such as 
wages and the 'tied' cottage. What emerges from a study of the NUAW's house 
journal, The Landworker, is the Union's mounting frustration at Labour's agricultural 
policies. In the July 1945 issue of the Journal the Union's Executive Committee urged 
its members to 'Work and Vote for Labour', telling them that: 
'Labour has the one practical solution to the rural problem, its 
programme going right down to the roots of the question,.84 
By the end of the year, however, The Landworker was voicing the Union's 
disappointment at Labour's policy as it had been outlined in Tom Williams December 
1945 speech to the Commons. The Union was especially critical of the lack of any 
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agricultural and industrial workers as policy objectives.85 Perhaps the most 
contentious issue between Labour and the NUA W in the post-war period was the 
question of tied cottages, the Government's policy on this subject prompting the Union 
to ask 'Is this what we fought for?'.86 The Union's support for land nationalisation 
and for the Lucas Report on agricultural marketing also found little sympathy within 
the Government, although the NUA W's stance on the former was to change somewhat 
after 1945.87 The Union complained that they had expected Labour Ministers to 
behave differently from Conservative Ministers, and in February 1946 the NUA W's 
Executive Committee passed a resolution expressing their deep concern at the 'failure 
of the Labour Government and the Minister of Agriculture to implement the Labour 
policy of improving the standards of workers on the land'.88 The NUAW were also 
very critical of what they regarded as the Government's over-generous treatment of the 
farmers at the annual price review, and also accused Labour of failing to stand up to 
the NFU on issues such as the reform of agricultural marketing.89 
The agricultural workers languished in the shadow of the NFU in the years after 1945. 
As Self and Storing argue, the NUA W could only hope to achieve it's stated objectives 
under a Labour Government but Labour, certain of the agricultural workers' political 
support, had less incentive to give these objectives priority once in office, particularly 
in the light of Labour's emphasis on the importance of the farmers' practical, and later 
85 The Landworker, December 1945. 
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their political support.90 The demands of the wartime production effort brought the 
farmers, in the shape of the NFU, into an increasingly close relationship with central 
Government; regular consultations between the NFU and MAF had begun in 1939, 
and the evolution of this process reached it's apotheosis in the annual price review 
system, which was to form the basis of Labour's post-war agricultural policy. The 
NFU came to be regarded as the farmers' 'mouthpiece' in their dealings with central 
Government, and the expansion of the NFU's role in the policy making process was 
accompanied by the largest increase in Union membership since its foundation, from 
125,000 in 1939 to 210,000 in 1953, although membership did fall after 1953, a period 
of more troubled times for the NFU in its relationship with Whitehall.91 Neither the 
NUA W or the County Landowners Association (CLA) enjoyed such a close 
relationship with the Government, neither occupying as important an economic role 
within the industry as the NFU, or later as potentially as important a political role. 
The NFU also had the advantage of representing the majority of British farmers. 
The war also brought with it changes in the NFU itself. In the inter-war period the 
union had enjoyed a somewhat uneasy relationship with the Conservative Party. The 
NFU hierarchy professed political neutrality, justifying their endorsement of 
Conservative candidates on the grounds that there was no other way for the Union to 
gain a voice in Parliament. Many county branches, however, allied themselves more 
openly to the Conservative cause. The war years saw the Union finally move away 
from the stance it had adopted at the time of its foundation in 1908, that 'It is not the 
90 
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farmers' business to tell the nation what our agricultural policy should be'.92 The 
NFU's attempt to secure the industry a direct voice in Parliament had failed but the 
war gave the Union a privileged consultative position within Whitehall, and the 
expansion in its membership allowed the Union to expand its professional staff. This 
new found role also resulted in a change in the NFU's political strategy. The Union 
remained strictly impartial during the 1945 and subsequent elections, maintaining that 
agriculture had to be kept out of party politics and that the Union would as far as 
possible work with the Government of the day.93 The success with which the price 
review machinery had operated during the war, and Labour's commitment to planned 
production, assured the continuation of the industry's guarantees in peacetime, and the 
NFU's role in the post-war policy process. The importance of agriculture to the 
British economy after 1945 added to the Union's sense of security and gave the NFU 
considerable power in it's dealings with Labour, as will be shown in later chapters. 
Subsequent chapters will show that the agricultural policy Labour pursued between 
1945 and 1951 was shaped largely by economic considerations, and within this by the 
need to retain the confidence and active support of the industry for the Government's 
expansion programme. The importance of agricultural expansion to Britain's post-war 
economic recovery was used by MAF to counter Treasury arguments for cuts in 
Government expenditure on agriculture, and to justify the Government's weakening 
commitment to land nationalisation. Increasingly, however, Labour policy also came 
to be influenced by the belief that the Party could make inroads into the formerly 
92 The National Farmers' Union, Yearbook (1926), p.99. 
93 See Chapter VII. 
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staunchly Conservative countryside. However, later chapters will show that this belief 
proved to be a chimera, and that the farmers' obvious respect for Tom Williams and 
their support, often qualified, for Labour policy was not translated into political 
support. It will also be argued that both Labour and the Conservatives greatly 
exaggerated the importance of the agricultural vote.94 
94 See Chapter VII. 
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(iii) 
As was shown in Section (ii) in the early 1930's the Labour Party advocated the 
national planning of land use and the fixing of stable prices as a solution to the 
agricultural industry's ills. The years after the publication of The Land and the 
National Planning of Agriculture saw the Party's agricultural policy gain a growing 
measure of acceptance and agreement amongst agricultural experts, and the growth of 
a broad consensus on the 'way forward' for the industry.95 The war years had seen 
these two principles put into very successful operation, and the state of the industry 
in 1945, as compared with the inter-war period, highlighted the benefits of planned 
agricultural production. 
Although by 1945 the Party's commitment to outright nationalisation had diminished 
somewhat, the 1945 manifesto still committed Labour to the control and planning of 
the land and land use in the national interest. Agriculture had formed an important 
part of wartime economic planning and in Let Us Face the Future Labour argued for 
the continuation of planning and controls, including the control of 'rents and prices of 
the necessities of life',96 to ensure fair shares for all and to prevent profiteering. In 
contrast to both the Conservatives and the Liberals, Labour argued that such controls 
would be necessary in the long-term, as an 'instrument of economic management'. 
Unless the Government undertook a greater role in the management of the economy 
95 See the Introduction. 
96 Craig, op.cit, p.9S. 
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slumps would be 'too severe to be balanced by public action'. The Labour Party, the 
manifesto argued, stood for: 
'Order as against the chaos which would follow the end of all public 
controL ... The chaos of do-as-they-please anarchy,.97 
Whatever their VIew of economic planning, for political reasons no party could 
contemplate allowing the industry to lapse back into it's pre-war condition, or 
advocating a return to the sort of policies pursued in the inter-war period. Too much 
praise had been heaped on the industry's war effort, and too many pledges made 
guaranteeing the future security of British farmers to admit the possibility of such a 
course of action. For example, in March 1943 Lord Woolton had told farmers in a 
radio broadcast that 'We shall not forget when the struggle is over. Your part, in 
peacetime, of maintaining our people in health will be no less important than your part 
in the war' .98 In a speech made in April of the same year, Tom Williams, then R.S. 
Hudson's Parliamentary Secretary, took up this theme. 
'We must not, after the war, forget the farmers' contribution and go 
back to the idea of buying our food ..... whenever it is cheap and allow 
our industry to languish. We must make use of our own soil, 
providing stability for producers along with efficiency and a reasonable 
wage for workers'.99 
97 ibid., p.99 and 98. 
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In A Background For Agriculture, published in June 1945, the Conservative Party 
argued that wartime controls would have to remain in operation in the immediate post-
war period, although thereafter they would be gradually replaced by a looser and more 
flexible system. Producers would be offered stable prices with efficient service to the 
nation the corollary of this guarantee. Efficient production would be secured through 
the continuation of the CAECs in peacetime, albeit on a more representative basis. 
A Background For Agriculture acknowledged that for a variety of reasons, economic, 
social, and political, there could be no return to the inter-war view of British 
agriculture. 
'It is idle to suppose that, with the return of peace ..... there can ever 
again to be a complete return to the nineteenth century conception 
which regarded England exclusively as a workshop, and the Dominions 
exclusively as a farm'.loo 
The Conservative Party, the Report argued, would be prepared to consider, on it's 
merits, an extension of the principle of public ownership 'if nationalisers could prove 
that their panacea was indispensable to efficiency,' although they had as yet been 
unable to do this. IOI Under the Conservatives the industry could look forward to a 
return to greater freedom, 'though not, let us hope, the old anarchy'. 102 The Liberal 
Party's 1945 manifesto included pledges to maintain stable prices and assured markets 
100 The Conservative Party, A Background For Agriculture (1945), p.3-4. 
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for home producers, with the continuation of the Ministry of Food and the CAECs, 
although the Party remained committed to the principle of free trade. 
The NFU naturally emphasised the importance of stability for the industry in the post-
war period, and to this end advocated the continued use of the existing wartime price-
fixing machinery. In return for guaranteed prices and assured markets the industry 
was prepared to accept its responsibility for promoting efficiency amongst producers. 
The NFU were prepared to agree to the continuation of the CAEC system in 
peacetime and to the continuation of the wartime powers, in some form, of the 
Ministry of Food. The NFU were, however, opposed to the nationalisation of the 
land.103 The success of Labour's agricultural policies after 1945 rested on the active 
support of the NFU, farmers forming the most important section of the industry in 
economic terms. Had Labour attempted to introduce land nationalisation the 
Government would have lost this support at a time when agriculture was being called 
on to make a vital contribution to Britain's economic recovery. Such a course of 
action would also have forced the NFU to ally themselves with the Conservatives 
against Labour, thereby ending the latter's hopes of making political gains in the 
countryside. 
While the scale and the character of agricultural production after 1945 was determined 
by world food shortages and by Britain's financial and economic problems, the 
framework within which this policy developed owed a great deal to the wartime 
experiences of the industry, and to the role the industry was seen to have played in 
103 See the NFU, The Basis of E (1945) and the report 
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the war effort. Labour's agricultural policy was essentially a continuation of wartime 
policies, albeit in somewhat adapted forms; in Tom Williams' view wartime methods 
of guaranteeing stability and efficient production had 'worked well and proved flexible 
in operation'. He also believed that the wartime guarantees were the best way of 
giving effect to a 'positive and progressive' food and agriculture policy.104 In turn 
the policies pursued during the war had themselves embodied the principles at the 
heart of Labour's inter-war agricultural policies, the guaranteeing of stable prices and 
the control of land use, and had shown the effectiveness of these proposals. 
Agriculture was mentioned briefly in the Kings Speech in August 1945. Under 
Labour home production of good food was to be developed to the 'fullest possible 
extent' through the continuation of wartime policies, adjusted where necessary to suit 
peacetime conditions. 105 Labour soon found themselves under increasing pressure 
to expand on these initial statements, from within Parliament and the industry itself. 
At the end of October 1945 Williams, J. Westwood, and Chuter Ede submitted a 
memorandum to the Lord President's Committee in which they sought Ministerial 
authority for a statement in the Commons on the Party's 'broad intentions' towards the 
industry, and for talks with representatives of all branches of the industry.l06 The 
memorandum declared that the first essential of any policy was stability, and this was 
to be provided by the continuation of the system of market and price guarantees and 
the annual price review procedure. As a corollary to the promise of economic stability 
104 
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the memorandum argued that the Government should take steps to ensure that land 
was efficiently farmed and managed, and to promote greater efficiency. 
Powers would be sought to allow the Government to exercise the necessary control 
over farmers and landowners, including powers of supervision and, if necessary, of 
dispossession. A CAEC - like system was to be established to aid the Minister in the 
execution of these powers and an Agricultural Land Commission was to be created 
to manage any land acquired by the Government. The overall aim of Government 
policy, Ministers argued, should be the promotion of a 'healthy and efficient' industry 
capable of producing the food which the nation required from home sources, and of 
providing adequate renumeration and decent living conditions for farmers and workers, 
and a reasonable return on capital invested. The memorandum, and the draft 
statement attached to it were approved by the Lord President's Committee at the 
beginning of November, and by the Cabinet on November 13th.107 Two days later 
Tom Williams made the long-awaited announcement in the Commons, leaving the way 
open for discussions with the industry on the future of British farming. 
107 CM( 45) 52, November 13th 1945, in PRO CAB 128/2. LP (4~) 216 was 




'THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY, 1945-47' 
INTRODUCTION 
British agriculture emerged from the war with a system of price and market guarantees 
which would on the one hand ensure the stability of the industry, but on the other 
would facilitate what were seen as being necessary adjustments in the scale and 
character of agricultural production. 1 This system of guarantees was only intended 
to cover the period up to the summer of 1948, and the mechanism for guaranteeing 
the stability of the industry after this 'transitional' period had still to be devised. The 
subject of this chapter is the evolution of Labour's long-term policy for the industry 
over the period from 1945 to 1947, an process which culminated in the Agriculture 
Act 1947 and the launch of the £100 million expansion programme in August 1947. 
Later chapters will deal with the implementation of these policies. 
Agricultural policy in this period has to be seen against a background of world food 
shortages and the UK's seriously weakened position in the world economy. Poor 
harvests, both at home and abroad, balance of payments problems, and the 
convertibility crisis of July-August 1947 all played a crucial part in determining the 
direction agricultural policy took after 1945. More generally, the depressed condition 
1 See Chapter I. 
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of the industry in the inter-war period and the obvious improvements made under the 
wartime guarantees highlighted the benefits of planned production, and in the inter-war 
years Labour had been the strongest advocate of both the national planning of 
agriculture and the fixing of stable prices. In their 1945 manifesto Labour argued for 
the continuation of planning and controls in peacetime as "an instrument of economic 
management".2 As a corollary of the maintenance of guaranteed markets and fixed 
prices, and the promise of long-term stability for the industry, the NFU accepted the 
obligation to maintain standards of husbandry, and the creation of a peacetime 
counterpart to the CW ABC system.3 These factors formed the framework within 
which Labour's agricultural policy was to develop in the post-war period. 
This chapter is divided into three sections; sections (i) and (ii) will deal with the 
events which lead up to the launch of the expansion programme, while section (iii) 
will examine the evolution of the 1947 Act. 
2 
3 
See Chapter II. 
See The National Farmers' Union, The Basis of Economic security 
A Permanent Policy for the Nation's Greatest Industry (1945). 
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(i) 
When presenting their views on the principles of post-war policy MAF had given as 
one of the reasons for maintaining a 'healthy and well-balanced' agriculture after the 
war it's potential as a source of savings in foreign exchange.4 In the summer of 1944 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson, submitted a series of memoranda 
to the Cabinet, in which he drew attention to the serious financial problems the UK 
would face at the end of the war. 5 Anderson argued that there would have to be 
'determined and continuous efforts' to apply productive capacity in such a way as to 
enable the country to deal with a problem of an 'unprecedented magnitude' 
'The question of our overseas resources and liabilities as they stand 
today and as they will stand at the end of the war with Germany is fast 
becoming so critical that I must ask my colleagues to take serious note 
of it, and to consider important and far-reaching lines of policy to save 
themselves from plunging into a morass'.6 
In a note attached to one of Anderson's memoranda, Keynes argued that the 
assumption that the UK would be able to import all the food and raw materials 
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at that time 'an act of blind faith', and he urged Ministers to 'support faith with 
works'.7 Anderson believed that agricultural production might be a source of relief 
from these problems. During the war the emphasis had been on producing those 
commodities which cost most in shipping terms. If, when shipping was no longer a 
deciding factor, British agriculture produced those commodities expensive in foreign 
exchange terms, then within three to four years Anderson believed that large savings 
could be made. 
The Cabinet decided that, when the shipping situation allowed, agricultural production 
was to be adjusted with a view to saving the maximum amount of foreign exchange.8 
In the light of the fears the Chancellor had expressed the Treasury invited MAF and 
the Ministry of Food to consider as 'a matter of urgency' the expenditure, and ways 
in which the efficiency of farming could be increased.9 The results of these 
investigations were finally presented to the Cabinet in January 1945. By 1950/51, 
given adequate supplies of capital, labour and housing, guaranteed prices and markets, 
and a substantial degree of Government control, British agriculture could make a 
positive contribution of £80 million towards the saving of foreign exchange (at pre-
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At an inter-departmental meeting to discuss the Ministry of Food's requirements for 
1946/47 and 1947/48 in February 1945 George Dunnett, the Assistant Secretary to the 
Treasury, suggested that it was essential to work on the assumption of shortages of 
foreign exchange after the war.ll The Ministry of Food emphasised the importance 
of maintaining a high level of crop production in the short-term, as future supplies of 
both food and feed grains remained uncertain. In the long-term, however, the 
principal objective should be the rapid expansion of livestock production and a steady 
reduction in the arable acreage from it's high wartime level. Shortages of animal 
products were going to be more serious and persistent than world shortages of cereals, 
and livestock imports cost more in foreign exchange than grain imports. The Ministry 
also believed that feed grains would be in reasonable world supply by 1946/47.12 
The main problem would be deciding when to begin reducing the acreage of crops for 
direct human consumption. 
MAF officials agreed with the Ministry of Food's general outlook, although the 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Donald Fergusson, doubted that animal feeds would be so 
readily available by 1946/47. In February and March 1945 John Llewellin, the 
Minister of Food submitted two memoranda to the Cabinet on world food supplies, , 
stressing the seriousness of the supply position in 1945, and the likelihood of there 
being little change in 1946. There could, therefore, be no let up in food production 
in the UK in 1945 and 1946, and Llewellin called on MAF to make sure that output 
11 
12 
PRO MAF 38/235 February 2nd 1945, Note of a Meeting between the 
Treasury, MAF ~nd the M~nistry of Food. 
PRO MAF 38/235 January 30th 1945, 'Agricultural Production and 
Marketing prog!ammes', Ministry of Food memorandum. 
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· . d13 Th was mamtame . ese memoranda, and the joint MAP !Food memorandum on 
agriculture's potential contribution to the saving of foreign exchange, were considered 
by Ministers in March 1945; R.S. Hudson was authorised to communicate the main 
facts of the situation to the CW ABC's and to emphasize the importance of maintaining 
a high level of food production.14 
The results of the first APR were presented to the Lord President's Committee in 
March 1945 in a memorandum covering a report prepared by the MAP officials 
involved in the price negotiations. IS The memorandum stressed the difficult 
conditions under which this first review had been carried out. The serious world food 
situation, and the need to maintain 'exceptional' levels of production, had required 
special price adjustments to be made, but there had also been the need to establish 
certain principles at the first review; the need to return in the long-term to an 
essentially pre-war pattern of production. The Committee subsequently approved the 
proposals in the Official Report,16 and they were made public a few days later. 
Fatstock and milk prices were increased for the period from July 1945 to June 1946, 
as were the prices of sugar-beet and potatoes. There was to be no change in the 
prices paid for cereals from the 1945 harvest, on the understanding that no cropping 
directions regarding cereal acreages would be enforced. At the 1946 harvest the 
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price reduced, and the acreage payment for wheat withdrawn. 17 The pnce 
adjustments were intended to reaffirm the Government's stated intention to shift from 
cereals to livestock production as soon as possible. 
In July 1945 MAF gave further consideration to the level of production that would be 
required from the 1946 harvest in the form of a memorandum for the Cabinet. MAP's 
paper dealt with sugar beet, potato and wheat production in the light of the changes 
that had occurred in the world food situation since Ministers had agreed to the price 
adjustments arising out of the APR. IS Since that decision had been taken the food 
supply situation had deteriorated, bring with it a change in the Ministry of Food's 
requirements from the 1946 harvest. They had requested that the 1945 sugar beet 
acreage by maintained in 1946 and that the potato acreage be held at not more than 
10% below it's 1945 level, almost double the average pre-war acreage. The Ministry 
of Food also wanted 2~ million acres of wheat to be sown for the 1946 harvest, but 
in view of the general expectation of a relaxation in cropping directions, it was 
acknowledged that it would not be easy to obtain this acreage. MAF argued for the 
continuation of directions to help maintain the required potato and sugar-beet acreages. 
With regard to wheat, in view of the aims of long-term policy and the likelihood of 
world supplies improving considerably by 1946/47, MAF argued that acreage 
payments should be cut and directions relaxed, but that every effort should be made 
to persuade farmers to grow the required wheat acreage in 1946. At the Cabinet 
17 
18 
See the of f icial Report on the APR an~exed to LP ( 4.5 ) 55 and PRO MAF 
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meeting Florence Horsbrugh, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, 
stated that while her Ministry agreed that it was desirable to begin to adjust prices, it 
was hoped that a minimum of 2Y4 million acres would be sown to wheat, a figure still 
Y4 million acres higher than the average pre-war acreage. 19 In September 1945 Tom 
Williams wrote to Alfred Dann and Thomas Hodgson20 on the subject of the role of 
the CW AEC's in peacetime. Both men wanted the Committees to retain the full range 
of their wartime powers. The industry, they argued, must put the national interest 
first, but Dann and Hodgson believed that this would only be achieved by the 
'considerable direction and control' of cropping.21 In reply Williams argued that there 
had to be a change of emphasis after six years of emergency cropping and that the 
'policy of the future' must be to allow the farmer freedom of cropping, consistent with 
two main principles. Firstly, the farmer must grow sufficient amounts of the crops 
required by the nation, even if this clashed with his own interests, and secondly he 
must be prepared to maintain unimpaired the fertility of his land. In 1946 
reconstituted CAECs were empowered to issue directions for the growing of sugar 
beet and potatoes, the ploughing-up of inferior grassland, and for the maintenance of 
the total tillage acreage. To try and dictate specific acreages to farmers, Williams 
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Another aspect of post-war policy was decided at this time. In October 1945 the 
Ministry of Food submitted proposals regarding the continuation of the Ministry in 
peacetime.23 The world food situation, the recommendations of the 'Hot Springs' 
Conference, and the Government's commitment to planning, it was argued, imposed 
upon the Government 'a far greater responsibility for intervention in the procurement, 
distribution and sale of food than existed in 1938'. The objectives of any long-term 
food policy, the Ministry argued, should be to ensure the desired quantity and quality 
of home production, the control of imports in line with BOP considerations, and the 
protection of the home consumer. The Government should also seek to promote 
greater efficiency in marketing and distribution, to prescribe standards of quality, and 
to secure supplies of food at prices all classes could afford. The Food Minister, Ben 
Smith, argued that the retention of the existing organisation and controls would be the 
most effective method of achieving these different objectives. The Ministry was 
regarded as having made an 'unanswerable case' for its continued existence. A 
permanent, separate Ministry of Food could, it was argued, playa further important 
role, that of a 'counter-poise' to MAF, ensuring that agricultural policy was 'not unduly 
restrictive from the consumers' point of view'?4 Both the Lord President's 
Committee and the Cabinet approved the establishment of a permanent, peacetime 
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In November 1945 Tom Williams was finally given Cabinet approval for a statement 
on Labour's policy for the industry and for talks with representatives of all branches 
of the industry, 26 and he gave an outline of this policy in a speech to the Commons 
on November 15th.27 Williams' speech also dealt with the world food situation; in 
view of the supply situation compulsory directions would be still issued for potatoes 
and sugar-beet, and the laying down of land to grass would be supervised to ensure 
that the process kept in step with livestock numbers, the requirements of domestic feed 
grain production, and with the need to ensure, at least in the short-term, a large tillage 
acreage. As the food supply situation eased, Williams continued, the Government 
intended to allow farmers to grow the crops they felt were best suited to their land. 
The Government did intend, however, to seek permanent powers to serve directions 
if and when they were required in the national interest. 
The 'first essential' of any policy, it was argued, was the prOVISIOn of stable 
conditions, and during the war this had been achieved through fixed prices and 
guaranteed markets for the principal agricultural commodities. Just as the Ministry 
of Food had argued that the wartime system of Government purchase was the most 
effective method of achieving the objectives of post-war food policy, MAF argued that 
the wartime guarantees, which had 'worked well and proved flexible in operation' were 
the best method of giving effect to a 'positive and progressive' food policy. Indeed, 
MAF saw the continuation of the guarantees as being complementary to the 
establishment of a permanent Ministry of Food. At this stage there was to be no 
26 
27 
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attempt to define the size of the industry or the precise character of production in the 
long-term, but Williams argued that the system would be flexible enough to allow 
production to be adjusted in the light of changing economic conditions. The 
production process itself required a reasonable degree of stability if farmers were to 
plan on an efficient and economical basis, and MAF believed that the best way of 
providing this stability was through the APR procedure. 
The guaranteed minimum prices fixed in 1944 for milk, fat cattle and fat sheep would 
apply up to June 1948, and MAF proposed that in 1946 minimum prices would be 
fixed for the period from June 1948 to June 1950, and in 1948 for 1950 to 1952 and 
so on. Minimum prices for eggs and fat pigs would also be fixed at this time to help 
encourage increased production. Uncertainties as to the future supplies of feeds had 
prevented any such commitment being made in the past. Now that it was hoped that 
feed ration scales could be progressively increased a revival in pig and egg production 
could be contemplated more seriously, especially as this would help save foreign 
exchange by reducing the UK's dependence on North American supplies. MAF saw 
this course of action as reconciling the basic needs of the livestock producer with the 
Government's need to maintain a flexible approach to agricultural production. MAF 
also stressed that it might be necessary to apply quantitative limitations to the 
guaranteed markets for particular commodities, something that had been a feature of 
pre-war policy. Producers would be given between eighteen months and two years' 
notice of the Government's intention to impose such limits. 
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As a counterpart to the continuation of the wartime guarantee system, amendments 
would be made in the machinery for fixing agricultural wage rates. In 1942 the 
powers of the County Agricultural Wages Committees had been transferred to the 
Central Wages Boards, together with the power to determine hours of employment and 
overtime. Legislation was to be introduced to amend the statutory provisions 
regarding wage regulation permanently.28 The necessary corollary of these 
guarantees was, MAP believed, a duty on the part of the industry to ensure that the 
best possible use was made of the land, and that it was farmed according to the rules 
of good husbandry. The main method of ensuring this would be the continuation, in 
some form, of the County Committee network. 
By January 1946 the world food situation was becoming increasingly serious,29 
prompting further debate as to the amount of production required from British farms. 
Towards the end of January the Ministry of Food circulated a departmental 
memorandum on the food required from home production.30 The memorandum 
argued that the world food problem would continue until the end of the decade, and 
that the highest practicable level of domestic production would be necessary for the 
following two to three years. At the same time, however, the Ministry argued that the 
Government should avoid committing itself to costly production after 1950. The 
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maintenance of a high tillage acreage and a reduction in the acreage of crops for direct 
human consumption after the 1946 harvest. The wheat acreage at the 1947 harvest 
would, however, have to be at least two million acres if the UK's minimum milling 
needs were to be met. Officials also hoped that animal feeds would become more 
plentiful after 1947/48 and that meat production could be restored to its pre-war level 
by 1950 at the latest. The Ministry of Food also suggested the introduction of a 
special acreage bonus for spring wheat and an increase in the flour extraction rate as 
a way of increasing the supply of home-production cereals. The crisis had been 
prompted by poor harvests in Australia and Argentina in the 1944/45 season, and in 
Africa and India in the 1945/46 season. It was estimated there would be a world-wide 
wheat delict of more than five million tons in the first six months of 1946, and the 
Government had agreed to playa part in aiding less fortunate countries by reducing 
her wheat imports in the first six months of 1946 by 250,000 tons. 
At a departmental meeting chaired by Sir Donald Vandepeer, Fergusson's replacement 
as Permanent Secretary, MAF officials discussed the Ministry of Food's proposals.31 
The meeting criticised both of the Ministry's suggestions; any sort of financial 
incentive to grow more wheat would only increase production at the expense of other 
cereals, and would be seen as the reversal of a 'carefully considered and firmly 
maintained line of policy'. MAF suggested that more effort should be put into 
persuasion and propaganda. Any increase in the flour extraction rate would deprive 
the industry of feedstuffs and prevent the honouring of promises to increase feed 
ration scales, thus retarding the recovery of livestock production. MAF feared that it 
31 PRO MAF 38/480, January 30th 1946, Note of meeting of MAF officials. 
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might even prove necessary to cut pig and poultry rations, and emphasized that the 
psychological effects of such a policy would have grave consequences for agricultural 
production. 
MAF submitted their response to the Ministry of Food's proposals to the Cabinet at 
the end of January.32 At the meeting Williams stressed the possible impact of any 
reduction in feed rations, but it was eventually decided that in view of the seriousness 
of the situation the flour extraction rate should be increased, although there was to be 
no bonus payment for Spring wheat. The Cabinet also decided that a 'vigourous 
campaign' of food economy should be launched, with special attention to be given to 
the consumption of bread and cereals. The campaign was to be carried out under the 
guidance of the Lord President, Herbert Morrison.33 Cuts in feed rations were 
announced at the beginning of February; the coupons issued for the period up to the 
end of April would be honoured, and the cuts would effect the rations issued for the 
period from May to September. Pig and poultry production would be most effected 
by the ration cuts, and Williams emphasized that when the supply position improved 
they would have a strong claim on any additional supplies. Williams then turned to 
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'They must continue a high level of tillage so as to make the maximum 
contribution to the nation's granary while at the same time redoubling 
their efforts at self-sufficiency'. 34 
The Cabinet also invited Attlee to consider what special machinery could be 
established to co-ordinate Departmental responses to problems arising from the food 
supply situation. The Prime Minister subsequently proposed a series of Ministerial 
meetings to concert and direct the executive action required from different 
Departments. The World Food Supplies Committee, as it was to be known, was to 
be chaired by Attlee and would include Morrison, Bevin, Addison, Williams and 
Bames.35 At the second meeting the Committee considered a MAF memorandum 
on grain production at the 1947 harvest. With the prospect that 'the world will again 
be faced with empty storehouses' seeming increasingly likely, MAF sought a decision 
on whether it would be prudent to aim for a higher level of cereal and particularly 
wheat production in 1947 than would be secured at the 1946 harvest. The meeting 
was informed that Dalton did not want to commit himself to such proposals at that 
time, and that he would have preferred an increase in livestock production, as this 
would have had a greater effect on the balance of payments. 
In reply, Williams stressed that there could be no increase in livestock production 
without an increase in the available supplies of feedstuffs. The meeting concluded 
with Williams being invited to conduct discussions with other Departments on this 
34 Quoted in the Farmers Weekly February lOth 1946. 
35 WFS(46) 1, February 2nd 1946, memorandum by the Prime Minister, in 
PRO CAB 134/730. 
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question.36 The Agriculture Minister reported back to the Committee at the next 
meeting. In consultation with the Treasury and the Ministry of Food it had been 
decided that the best course of action would be to plan for the highest possible tillage 
acreage in 1946 and 1947, and this would involve the ploughing up of a large acreage 
of temporary grass. To encourage this process it had been agreed that the ploughing-
up grant established under the Agricultural Development Act 1939 would be extended 
to land sown down to grass for three or more years.37 The CAECs would give 
directions where necessary to secure the desired tillage acreage but would not, as a 
general rule, give directions for the growing of specific crops. 38 
In view of the 'far from reassuring' prospects for 1947 the World Food Supplies 
Committee approved MAP's proposals. It was feared that between 1945/46 and 
1946/47 the USA's exportable surplus of wheat might be reduced from ten million to 
two million tons with similar reductions in the other major exporting countries.39 
The CAECs were instructed to advise farmers to lay down to tillage in 1946 at least 
the same area as they had in 1945.40 Wheat production was to be encouraged by 
price incentives at the APR and by the use of cropping directions to obtain a 
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short of the 2 1/4 million acre target. 41 Although he agreed to the price increase, 
Dalton only did so grudgingly and regarded the increase as being rather too generous. 
As Chancellor he reserved the right to insist that wheat receive 'less generous I 
treatment in the future. However, in a letter to Attlee, Douglas Jay argued that lin the 
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(ii) 
As 1946 wore on the food supply position remained critical, with a world-wide wheat 
deficit of eight million tons for the crop year 1945/46. Wheat shipments to the UK 
fell short of the amount expected and the Government was also called upon to make 
a contribution towards alleviating famine in Europe, India and South Mrica, by 
diverting supplies and running down UK stocks. Wheat and flour imports into the UK 
were reduced by 200,000 tons between May and September 1946. At the beginning 
of May the Ministry of Food proposed a further increase in the flour extraction rate, 
arguing that a 90% extraction rate was necessary to ensure that wheat and flour stocks 
did not fall to dangerously low levels.43 Ministers agreed that even if Smith's worst 
fears were not realised, 'the outlook for UK stocks was so unpromising that there were 
strong arguments for every possible measure of economy'. The Cabinet therefore 
agreed to the proposed increase, despite MAF protests that it would 'seriously 
aggravate' the already serious feedstuffs supply situation.44 MAF were instructed to 
inform producers that their plans for livestock production should not be based on the 
assumption that this rate would be maintained indefinitely. In discussion MAF had 
suggested the introduction of bread and flour rationing as an alternative to an increase 
in the extraction rate and by the end of May, with the Ministry of Food pressing for 
further savings in wheat and flour consumption, it was agreed that a rationing scheme 
43 
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should be drawn up and the general public warned of the likelihood of rationing being 
introduced.45 
Estimates of the supply of feeds for the coming winter were also circulated at the end 
of May.46 On the most optimistic assumptions there would be deficit of almost 1/2 
million tons of feeds, while on the most pessimistic assumptions the deficit would be 
nearer 3/4 million tons. The eventual size of the deficit would depend on the flour 
extraction rate and on the arrival of grain purchased from the Argentine. If the 
Ministry of Food's optimism proved well founded dairy cow rations would have to be 
cut by 25% and pig and poultry rations by 40%. If the more pessimistic assumptions 
proved to be correct, pig and poultry rations would have to be reduced still further, 
to levels based on a population of less than 1/8 the numbers of pigs and poultry in 
1939. MAF believed that the effects on milk production would not be particularly 
serious, as there was considerable scope for greater self-sufficiency in cattle feeds. 
However, ration cuts were likely to have a far more serious effect on pig and poultry 
production. Despite this, both MAF and the Ministry of Food believed that the 
Government should proceed on the basis of the most pessimistic assumptions. The 
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In a speech to the Council of Agriculture in June 1946 on the subject of ration cuts, 
Tom Williams outlined his opposition to calls for a long-term plan for British 
agriculture.49 In a rapidly changing world, he argued, the Government had above all 
to remain flexible. The summer of 1946 was a difficult period for MAF in other 
ways, with the collapse of the SPR negotiations, the imposition of a settlement and 
growing complaints from the CAEC's over compulsory directions. At a conference 
of CAEC liason officers Williams was told that County and District Committee 
members were 'naturally most reluctant' to serve directions which might cause a direct 
financial loss to their neighbours or friends.50 In reply Williams stated that he had 
to be certain of the required minimum wheat acreage being reached, and that while 
small adjustments could be made in individual targets the overall 2~ million acre 
target could not be reduced. 51 
The 1946 harvest was plagued by bad weather and the condition of the land after the 
harvest was so poor that the County Committees argued that they would have great 
difficulty enforcing cropping directions for the 1947 harvest. In the hope of ensuring 
adequate supplies for the winter the price of wheat was increased in December 1946, 
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press home to farmers the need for the highest possible wheat acreage in 1947, 
although they were also empowered to modify directions to take account of any 
extenuating circumstances. 53 
The harsh winter of 1946/47 was a portent of the hardships to come; in Dalton's eyes 
1947 was the 'annus horrendus' a year of 'almost unrelieved disaster,.54 The bad 
weather created a severe fuel shortage, which in turn affected industrial production, 
with what had initially appeared to be a temporary crisis quickly developing into one 
of a more serious and permanent nature. Shortages of manpower, raw materials and 
machinery reduced industrial output and increased production costs, which in turn 
adversely effected the balance of trade, and 'In relation to the USA, the consequences 
were critical in the extreme,.55 In the first half of 1947 the UK was sending 14% of 
her exports to the USA whilst importing 42% of her total imports from the United 
States. Dollar expenditure had previously been restrained by an inability to obtain 
supplies and by the unexpected recovery of exports to their pre-war level in the 
summer of 1946. The period from April to June 1947 saw the volume of UK exports 
fall sharply and imports increase and by July the dollar deficit was running at $500 
million a month. There was also the introduction of sterling convertibility to face in 
the summer of 1947, one of the conditions imposed by the American Government 
when granting the UK loan. 
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Dalton remained optimistic about convertibility, arguing that a moderate programme 
of phased import reductions would deal with any problems. However, from the end 
of July capital began to pour out of the country and the drain on the dollar reserves 
was enormous; in the six weeks to August 16th it averaged $115 million a week. 56 
After a long series of negotiations with the Americans it was agreed that convertibility 
should be suspended on a 'temporary and emergency basis' and once this had been 
announced the Stock Exchange returned to something approaching normality.57 
Convertibility was finally laid to rest altogether in December 1947, but if this spectre 
was finally banished, other spectres continued to haunt the Government. The dollar 
drain continued, the BOP situation remained critical, and the trade deficit continued 
to grow, and it is against this background that the policies introduced after 1946 have 
to be considered. 
In January 1947 the Ministers of Agriculture and Food submitted a memorandum on 
future food production to the Lord President's Committee. Their submission contained 
a 'tentative programme of home food production for the next three or four years', and 
represented a considerable change in attitude on the part of Tom Williams, given his 
earlier pronouncements on the problems of 'four year plans'. The Conservatives were 
likely to press for more precise indications of the Government's intentions regarding 
Clause One of the Agriculture Bill, as would the farmers themselves. While it would 
be 'folly' to give precise quantitative objectives, it would be necessary to give a 
56 PRO PREM 8/489, August 14th 1946, memorandum by Dalton. 
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'general indication of the lines along which we expect home agriculture to develop,.58 
In the immediate future the supply position would not permit any sizable reduction in 
the home production of bread grains, potatoes and sugar beet. However, in the longer-
term production would be re-orientated towards the r~pid recovery of bacon, meat and 
egg production, on the grounds of both increased efficiency and dollar saving. There 
would also be a reduction in the total tillage acreage. This was to begin with the 1948 
harvest, with the target wheat acreage being reduced from 2Y2 to 2 million acres. 
Domestic production of animal feedstuffs would have to be maintained, as there was 
little chance of any increase in the available supplies of oil cakes or protein feeds in 
1947.59 
The production targets were announced by MAF at the beginning of March : the 
Treasury had supported the proposals for their hard currency saving potential and 
Ministers, while viewing the proposals as 'risky', felt that any such risks were worth 
taking.60 In its instructions to CAEC Executive Officers MAF stated that it had no 
intention of obtaining the 1948 targets through the use of cropping directions, and 
would rely instead on voluntary agreement and persuasion. Williams wanted to avoid 
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to retain a significant proportion of their millable wheat and barley production for 
feeding to their own livestock. 61 
The harsh winter of 1946/47 also took its toll on domestic agricultural production; 
MAF estimated that the losses in total production for the year 1947/48 would amount 
to somewhere between £16 and £38 million.62 The Cabinet approved the setting up 
of an Agricultural Distress Fund, to which the Government made a lump sum 
contribution.63 Williams also suggested the payment of an additional £7 million from 
the Exchequer, to be passed down to farmers either through price increases or acreage 
payments, to help secure MAP targets. He also wanted a definite commitment from 
the Government that producers would be allowed to keep 20% of their millable wheat 
and barley from the 1948 harvest to feed livestock. Dalton supported the proposals, 
in the face of criticism that the money would not be used to it's best advantage if 
MAF's proposals were introduced. The over-riding aim, he argued, should be to 
increase domestic production to reduce dollar expenditure, and Dalton believed that 
MAP's proposals would achieve this aim. The Cabinet as a whole agreed with Dalton, 
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The MAFlMinistry of Food memorandum on the possible contribution the industry 
could make to the saving of foreign exchange was published in March 1947,65 and 
MAF increasingly begun to feel that this had led to the industry being assigned an 
exaggerated importance as a dollar saver. At an inter-departmental meeting to discuss 
the BOP situation Donald Fergusson had called agriculture 'Britain's chief dollar 
saver'. The Treasury view was that as the financial situation was likely to remain a 
serious problem for years to come, with little hope of any real recovery in exports, it 
was essential to switch men and materials to indigenous production such as coal 
mining and agriculture. However, MAF's view was that: 
'All the propagandists quote the estimated possible Increase In 
agricultural production and blandly Ignore the fundamental 
requirements of such an increase and .... that it could only save dollars 
if food consumption is kept down to the level of 1944'.66 
The 'tentative programme of home food production' presented to the Cabinet in 
January was intended to increase net output by £42 million, and Vandepeer believed 
that it would not be possible to make any further savings without severe rationing. 
The £80 million target would also require an input of capital which he believed would 
not be available to the industry, at least not in the medium term. 
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In July 1947 MAF produced a memorandum on the requirements of the agricultural 
production programme up to 1951 for the Lord President's Committee.67 The 
memorandum once again stressed the importance of increasing output to save dollars 
and the importance of the UK being seen to make a 'convincing' contribution to the 
Marshall Plan. It also contained a number of proposals designed to help the industry 
reach the Government's production targets; an increase in the number of foreign 
workers, the continued use of volunteer labour (including soldiers and school 
children), an increase in the allocation of iron and steel for the production of 
machinery for home use, and the giving of priority to the building of houses in rural 
areas. MAF's proposals were initially considered by the London Committee at their 
July 24th meeting. The Committee concluded that the economic crisis required 
concerted action to increase exports and to increase production in import-saving 
industries, and that agriculture was by far the most important of this latter group.68 
The Committee went on to question the adequacy of MAF's proposals and suggested 
that the Lord President's Committee should invite MAF, together with the Treasury, 
CEPS, the Economic Section and the Ministry of Food, to carry out an examination 
into the possibility of increasing net output by £100 million by 1951/52. Within the 
London Committee the Treasury and CEPS were by far the strongest advocates of this 
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London Committee's suggestion and an inter-departmental committee was established 
under the chairmanship of Sir Donald Vandepeer. 70 
In a memorandum on the BOP situation circulated at the end of July Dalton called 
agriculture 'the outstanding example' of an import-saving industry and pressed for the 
£100 million target to be adopted. In reply Williams emphasized that such a 
programme would only be possible if the industry could be sure of adequate supplies 
of labour, feedstuffs, and other essential requisites.71 Dalton himself gave an 
indication of the size of the task; between 1947 and 1951 the industry would require 
170,000 extra workers, 35,000 extra houses, and a capital injection of around £70 
million.72 Doubts were expressed as to the wisdom of the Government committing 
itself to such a programme of expansion, and many Ministers felt that it would absorb 
more resources than the country could afford. In reply the importance of the industry 
as a saver of foreign exchange was emphasized, and the point was made that the 
industry would not co-operate with the Government on a smaller, short-term 
programme. It was eventually decided that steps should be taken to increase net 
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The inter-departmental committee presented its report to Ministers at the beginning of 
August 1947.74 In a covering memorandum Tom Williams once again emphasized 
the importance of adequate supplies of labour, housing and raw materials, and in 
particular animal feeds, to the success of the proposed expansion programme. The 
proposed programme would require an intensification of output over the whole range 
of agricultural production and Williams believed that this would cause problems for 
both the individual farmer and for the industry as a whole.75 The success or failure 
of the expansion programme would depend on the co-operation of the industry and: 
'It will be impossible to secure the full co-operation of farmers in this 
all-out effort for five years unless they can be fully satisfied that the 
level of output secured at the end of it will be maintained'. 
Williams argued that farmers had to be reassured that there would be no reversal in 
Government policy. MAP's first expansion proposals would, when the 'slack' had been 
taken up in the calculations, have yielded an additional £57.5 million worth of 
increased net output. The bulk of the extra production needed to secure the £100 
million target was to come from the expansion of grain production. 
The official report made a number of suggestions regarding the possible sources of the 
extra manpower that would be required, including a reduction in the housing 
programme outside agricultural and mining areas, and the diversion of men from local 
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construction work into agriculture. The report also advocated the intensification of the 
recruiting drive, and stressed the importance of adequate rural housing to the success 
of their proposals. The Committee argued that the industry should be given equal 
priority with the coal industry in the allocation of labour and raw materials, and that 
the Government should ensure that new building contracts were distributed in favour 
of needy rural areas.76 
The Lord President's Committee approved the expansion proposals, although a number 
of Ministers reserved their position on particular issues. Bevan doubted that the 
housing targets could be reached, while Shinwell suggested increasing the number of 
foreign agricultural workers, as this would reduce the housing problem and help 
prevent further increases in wages. Foreign workers could be given dormitory 
accommodation rather than their own cottage, for example. He was supported in this 
by the Minister of Labour, George Isaacs, who argued that it would not be possible 
to recruit the required number of British farmworkers; the total labour requirement for 
the expansion programme was estimated to be an additional 140,000 workers by 1951, 
together with a further 30,000 foreign workers. Ministers instructed MAF to take up 
these issues with the relevant departments.77 
A meeting was arranged with officials from CEPS and the Ministry of Labour on 
August 13th, to discuss the issue of the agricultural labour force. MAF were 
unwilling to agree to an increase in the recruitment of foreign labour beyond the 
76 'Report of the sub-committee on Labour and Homes', annexed to 
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30,000 figure and were supported in this view by CEPS. The CEPS officials argued 
that such a policy could create serious accommodation problems and might not have 
much positive effect on output. MAP felt that the industry could simply not assimilate 
more than 30,000 foreign workers, and CEPS suggested a large-scale recruitment drive 
for agricultural labour, coupling appeals to patriotism with warnings that the 
compulsory registration of able-bodied men might have to be introduced. MAF would 
be in charge of recruitment, operating through the County and District Committees. 
CEPS also approved the general diversion of resources into agriculture and suggested 
three possible ways of accomplishing this. Agriculture was to be given priority in the 
provision of raw materials, the needs of domestic agriculture were to be kept 
'continuously in mind' when the resource levels of other industries were being 
determined, and the industry was to be allocated more resources in absolute terms.78 
By the middle of August 'appreciable progress' had been made towards resolving the 
issues outstanding from the Lord President's Committee's consideration of the 
expansion proposals, enough to secure the Treasury's agreement to the launch of the 
programme. The expansion programme was launched on August 21st 1947 and was 
accompanied by an increase in prices designed to act as a direct incentive to increased 
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80 
'The aim (of the expansion programme) is high, but not beyond our 
reach. The plan is bold, as bold as it must be to match our needs. I 
am confident ..... our agricultural industry will be equal to the 
challenge' .80 




In November 1945 Tom Williams was given Cabinet approval for an announcement 
of Labour's broad intentions' towards the industry, and shortly after his speech to the 
Commons a working party on agricultural policy was set up under the Chief 
Agricultural Advisor to the Minister, Sir William Gavin. By the end of November it 
had been agreed that talks should be initiated with all branches of the industry on a 
number of issues arising from the policy statement; the proposed powers of control 
and the mechanism for applying them, the constitution of post-war CABC's, powers 
of land acquisition and the functions of the Agricultural Land Commission.81 The 
first meeting between MAF and the various branches of the industry took place on 
December 18th 1945.82 The first issue to be discussed was the reconstruction of the 
old CW ABC's on a temporary basis until the necessary permanent legislation could 
be introduced. This would give the Committees a 'new lease of life' and would 
encourage them to maintain their efforts. The reconstituted Committees would consist 
of a chairman and between two and four members directly appointed by the Minister, 
and two members each to be chosen from lists submitted by the NFU, CLA, the 
NUA Wand the TGWU. Only the NFU expressed any strong objections to the 
proposals on the grounds that they should have a greater degree of representation on 
the new Committees. The NFU President, Sir James Turner, did, however, agree to 
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MAP met the NFU again in February 1946, to consider a departmental memorandum 
on the measures MAF proposed to introduce to ensure efficient estate management 
and good husbandry.84 The memorandum dealt with the constitution and functions 
of the CAEC's and the measures intended to secure good standards of farming. The 
State's commitment to providing guarantees for the industry created, it was argued, an 
obligation on the part of the industry, and any future policy must begin by defining 
the nature of the relationship between the Government and agriculture. MAF argued 
that the State should be empowered to enforce reasonable standards of husbandry, 
including the provision of capital equipment, where necessary by the use of 
supervision and in extreme cases by dispossession. The NFU broadly accepted these 
proposals, but continued to press for greater representation on the CAEC's on the 
grounds that its members constituted the largest proportion of the industry, and that 
they would be the group most effected by the Committees' operations. In reply MAF 
stressed that this might cause problems with the other representative organisations on 
the Committees, and a further meeting brought little progress. The NFU's General 
Purposes Committee had given 'clear and definite' instructions to it's members not to 
proceed with any negotiations except on the basis of a 3 : 2: 2 (NFU : CLA : NUA W) 
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Faced with a break-down in the policy discussions, MAF yielded to the NFU's 
arguments regarding the CAEC's. The problem MAF now faced was how to convince 
the other branches to accept the NFU's right to greater representation. Predictably, 
both the CLA and the NUA W opposed any such concession, despite MAF's arguments 
that the farmers had an 'unanswerable case' for greater representation. 86 The 
Workers' Union also wanted Williams to assume unlimited powers to given directions, 
to be used whenever it was deemed necessary. The TGWU, who also represented 
farmworkers, was prepared to accept the Governments proposals, however, and the 
CLA were not prepared to take their opposition to the point of non-cooperation, 
effectively leaving the NUA W alone in their opposition to the Government and the 
NFU.87 MAF eventually decided to press ahead with the reconstitution of the 
CAEC's on the proposed 3 : 2 : 2 basis, stressing the greater impact their operations 
would have on farmers, as opposed to any other group and appealed for a continuation 
of the wartime 'team spirit' of the Committees. 
The working party was also very critical of the NUA W's proposals regarding powers 
of direction, arguing, that 'there is no point exercising control just for control's sake' 
In a memorandum on farming standards it was proposed that under normal conditions 
only farmers already under supervision would be served cropping directions, although 
the Minister would reserve the right to serve directions on all producers in the event 
of a national emergency. Both the NFU and the CLA argued that this reserve power 
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should only be exercised after the Minister had obtained an affirmative resolution from 
Parliament. MAP felt that this was a 'reasonable safeguard' and one that could be 
accepted. 88 
In May 1946 MAF produced another policy document covering proposed powers for 
the acquisition of land and the constitution of the Agricultural Land Commission.89 
In cases where a farmer or a landowner was not farming or managing his land in 
accordance with the rules of good husbandry, the Minister would be empowered to 
take possession of that land. MAF would also be empowered to acquire land 
requiring large-scale reclamation work, or where productive efficiency could be 
increased by the grouping together of small farms or pieces of land. In any such cases 
the State would be able to acquire the land through voluntary negotiations. Any 
legislation would therefore provide for both the compulsory purchase and the 
voluntary acquisition of land. Any land acquired by the Government would be 
managed for the Ministry by the Agricultural Land Commission, a body comparable 
to the Livestock Commission created under the Livestock Industry Act, 1939. All the 
members would be Ministerially appointed and would all have experience of the 
industry and of land agency work in particular. 
The CLA pressed for their members to be allowed the opportunity to 'put their house 
in order' before any dispossession order was served, arguing that the Minister should 
allow them to submit a management scheme as an alternative to dispossession. MAF 
88 
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recognised that this would commend the Bill to the landowners, but that it would also 
attract a good deal of criticism from the NUA Wand the NFU and from outside the 
industry. On these grounds MAF decided that no such provision could be made, 
although during the Bill's Second Reading the Minister could give a verbal pledge that 
he would be prepared to give individual landowners a second chance if there were 
sufficient mitigating circumstances.9o 
Both the NFU and the CLA criticised the financial basis of the compulsory purchase 
proposals. The price of any land bought in this way would be determined under the 
provisions of the Town and County Planning Act, 1944, which meant that landlords 
and owner-occupiers would only receive their land's 1939 value. However, MAF felt 
it was unlikely that the Treasury would agree to agricultural land being made a 
'special case'. The CLA also argued that the decisions of regional appeals tribunals 
in cases of dispossession should be regarded as final, and they reserved the right to 
press the issue in Parliament. Both the NFU and MAF argued that the final say on 
issues such as dispossession should rest with the Minister. In 1946 Williams had 
created a number of Dispossession Appeals Tribunals to hear appeals arising from a 
proposal by the Minister of Agriculture to take possession of land or terminate a 
tenancy under emergency powers. The Tribunals consisted of a legal chairman and 
two members each from lists drawn up by the industry and the Clerks of the Peace. 
The Tribunals had no power to make decisions and although the Minister was not 
bound by their recommendations, in practice they were always accepted. In view of 
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the Minister's powers under the 1947 Act, the Dispossession Appeals Tribunals were 
replaced in 1948 by independent Agricultural Land Tribunals under provisions 
contained in the Agriculture Act. The new Tribunals were concerned with a much 
wider range of issues and their decisions were final. In cases concerning proposals 
of the Minister to take action they were binding on the Government. 91 
Tom Williams met with the policy working party at the end of May, with a view to 
preparing a draft policy document for submission to the Lord President's Committee. 
It was agreed that no provisions relating to the CLA's 'putting the house in order' 
arguments could be included, and it was also agreed that the statutory provisions of 
any Bill should not go beyond the power to serve directions on a farmer or landowner 
under supervision. There was no possibility of making the compensation for 
compulsorily - purchased land payable on a more generous basis.92 At a second 
meeting in June it was decided that, subject to the approval of Ministers, powers 
would be taken in the Agriculture Bill to allow MAF to sell land that it acquired. The 
Agricultural Land Commission would not be constituted on a representative basis, and 
the obligation to offer back for sale any land acquired under the Agriculture 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1941 would not be strictly adhered to. On 'tactical 
grounds', however, there would be provision for appeals to a Tribunal in such cases, 
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although in general appeals would be limited to terminations of tenancies, the 
dispossession of owners, and directions to carry out major improvements.93 
These 'questions of principle', and a summary of the provisions of the proposed Bill, 
were submitted to Ministers at the end of June 1946. MAPs proposals were approved 
and Williams was invited to proceed with the drawing up of legislation for submission 
to the Cabinet.94 In July Williams submitted another memorandum to the Lord 
President's Committee in which he sought Ministerial approval for provisions in the 
Bill dealing with security of tenure. MAF wanted to guarantee tenant farmers greater 
security of tenure by making a 'Notice To Quit' inoperable without the consent of the 
Minister. In discussion it was agreed that in principle there should be greater security 
of tenure, but it was also felt that such issues would be better dealt with by an 
independent tribunal, who would also make decisions on 'Notices To Quit' and related 
issues. The Committee invited Williams to discuss this issue with the Lord Chancellor 
with a view to their jointly appointing a tribunal to deal with such cases in England 
and Wales. The Secretary of State for Scotland was to consider a similar series of 
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The draft policy document was presented to the Cabinet in November 1946.96 
Williams was satisfied that the Bill would obtain the general support of the industry, 
although the CLA had objected to the provisions relating to security of tenure and to 
the acquisition of land by MAF. Williams stressed that MAP's proposals were 
necessary to give effect to the Government's policy for the industry as it had been 
announced in November 1945. He was also satisfied that two workers' representatives 
on the CAEC's was enough. Subject to a number of minor amendments, the Cabinet 
invited Williams to submit the draft Bill to the Legislation Committee.97 The Bill 
was subsequently passed with little discussion and Williams was invited to present it 
to Parliament.98 
The edifice of Labour's post-war agricultural policy was to rest on the 'twin pillars' of 
stability and efficiency, with the former being provided through a system of 
guaranteed markets and prices for the main agricultural commodities. Farmers and 
agricultural workers were to be assured a proper level of renumeration and adequate 
living conditions, although the guarantees were to be restricted to 'such part of the 
nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is desirable 
to produce in the UK'.99 The Bill did not have an easy passage through Parliament, 
with the Conservatives giving only 'qualified support'. The opposition were 
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arguing that Labour was not offering the industry an sufficient degree of security. The 
NFU were also aware of the possible implications of this section of the Bill but 
remained silent, believing that it would not be possible to amend this section of the 
Bill and preferring to avoid an unnecessary clash with the Government.1OO The 
Agriculture Bill finally gained the Royal Assent on August 6th 1947. 
Part One of the Act dealt with the machinery required to enable Ministers to carry out 
reviews of the general economic prospects and performance of the industry, to fix 
prices to enable farmers to plan ahead, and in conjunction with the Minister of Food 
to promote measures to provide a guaranteed market. The measures intended to 
ensure the strength of the other pillar were contained in Part Two : The provisions 
included both the promotion of agricultural research and the wider dissemination of 
technical advice, and powers to ensure that the land was farmed and managed 
efficiently. The Government set out in necessarily broad terms the rules of good 
husbandry and estate management.101 If these rules were broken or ignored then the 
farmer or landowner would be placed under the supervision of his local CAEC and 
directions would be issued to ensure he fulfilled his responsibility to the land. If after 
12 months satisfactory improvements had not been made the Minister of Agriculture 
was empowered to remove the recalcitrant farmer. Landowners and owner-occupiers 
were to be disposed by means of compulsory purchase and tenants by the termination 
of their tenancies. 
100 
101 
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Part Three made substantial changes to the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings 
Act, 1923, mainly to those sections which dealt with the nature of the relationship 
between landlord and tenant. The broad aim of this section of the Act was to 
strengthen the provisions dealing with the tenant farmer's security of tenure, and to lay 
down a comprehensive compensation code to encourage landlords and tenants to fulfill 
their responsibilities to each other and to ensure that the land was managed properly. 
A healthy and prosperous agriculture would require an adequate supply of labour and 
if men and women were to be drawn into the industry there had to be satisfactory 
wages and living conditions, and the promise of a career on the land. Part Four was 
intended to provide the latter through the provision of smallholdings, to allow people 
with previous agricultural experience to become farmers in their own right. 
Part Five dealt with the administrative machinery required to carry out the general 
policy. This section covered the creation of an Agricultural Land Commission to 
manage land acquired by MAP, the constitution of CAECs and the constitution of 
Agricultural Land Tribunals. The CAECs would continue to act as the Minister's 
agents, with the responsibility for carrying out the day-to-day administration of 
agricultural policy. Williams and the other Ministers responsible for agriculture were 
also empowered to acquire land through negotiation or compulsory purchase, and if 
necessary to serve directions on producers, although such powers would only be used 
in an emergency and would be subject to an affirmative resolution by Parliament. 102 
102 scottish agriculture was only covered by Part One and the 19~7 Act 
was followed by the Agriculture (Scotland) Act 1948~ where~n the 
Secretary of state was empowered to acqu~re land e~ ther through 
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Agr icul ture (Scotland) Bill : Explanatory Memorandum, Cmd 7175 
174 
The Agriculture Act 1947 was intended to give legislative effect to the Government's 
agricultural policy as announced by Tom Williams in November 1945. The Act 
outlined the basic principles that underpinned this policy, the mechanisms through 
which it was to be implemented, and the powers to be taken to ensure that the 
Government's objectives were achieved. The Act contained the 'bare bones' of post-
war policy and the August 1947 expansion programme was the flesh which clothed 
the skeleton. Later chapters will deal with the workings of the APR system and with 
the progress of the expansion programme after August 1947. 
The aim of this chapter has been to analyse the economic and financial factors that 
lay behind the policies pursued after 1945 and to trace the evolution of Government 
policy towards the industry and the desired level of production from domestic 
agriculture. Within two years Government policy changed from one based on 
retrenchment and a return to an essentially pre-war pattern of production to one based 
on the wholesale expansion of domestic production across the whole range of 
commodities grown on British farms. As we have seen, Britain's worsening economic 
and financial position, and the role agriculture was assigned in helping to solve these 
problems brought with it a considerable change in the Treasury's attitude to Exchequer 
expenditure on the industry. 
Labour's policies were, to a large extent, based on a continuation of wartime 
mechanisms and in the case of the APR a mechanism that was originally intended to 
(1947). Clause 71 of the 1947 Act prov~de~ t~at th~ ~ecisions of 
the Land Tribunals would be 'final and b~nd~ng on M~n~sters. See 
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175 
facilitate the scaling down and restructuring of agricultural production in the transition 
from war to peace. These mechanisms were perceived, in Tom Williams' words, to 
have 'worked well and proved flexible in operation'. As nationalization had become 
a long-term policy objective for Labour by 1945, as indicated in Let Us Face The 
Future, they represented in the Government's eyes the most effective and well-tried 
method of securing the quantity and character of output required from home 
production. They also had the advantage of having been accepted by the NFU as a 
part of any future policy; as a corollary of the continuation of guaranteed prices and 
markets in peacetime the Union was prepared to accept the continuation of the CAEC 
system. The fact that the Government were prepared to impose the NFU's wishes on 
the NUAW (and not vice-versa) when dealing with the new constitution of the 
CAEC's reflects the importance that Labour, at this time for practical reasons, placed 
on maintaining a good working relationship with the farmers. 103 As Chapter II 
showed, political considerations were later to play a part in determining Labour's 
attitude towards the industry. In the inter-war period the agricultural workers had 
occupied first place in Labour's attentions, but in the post-war period the NFU 
increasingly occupied centre stage in Labour's policy discussions, a trend encouraged 
both by the economic situation and by the relationship fostered by the APR system 
itself. 
By continuing the existing system of guarantees and controls and by stepping back 
from any policy of nationalization of the land, Labour left the structure of the industry 
largely unchanged, despite the fact that in the inter-war period the structure of British 
103 This theme will be developed in later chapters. 
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agriculture had been identified as one of the main constraints on the long-term 
stability and prosperity of the industry.104 As Chapter IV will argue the failure of 
both the Labour and Conservative Governments to tackle this problem was to cause 
considerable difficulties for both the industry and the Government in the 1950's. 
104 See chapter II. 
177 
(IV) 
'THE QUEST FOR STABILITY : 
THE ANNUAL PRICE REVIEW 1945-51' 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter III the economic and financial factors which influenced the scale and 
character of agricultural output after 1945 were examined. The key factors were 
identified as being the worldwide food crisis and the UK's critical peacetime balance 
of payments problems. The price mechanism, rather than cropping directions and 
supervision, was to be used to steer production onto the right lines, MAF's view being 
that there was no value in 'exercising control just for controls sake'.l Any account 
of policy making and production planning in this period has, therefore, to examine the 
ways in which the annual price review (APR) was used to influence production, and 
the Government's attempts to reconcile stability for the industry with the other 
demands being made on the British economy. After 1949 Labour's main problem was 
how to find a balance between the 'national requirements of Exchequer economy on 
the one hand and of expanded food production on the other',2 and so the APR has to 
be seen within the broader context of Labour's economic and financial policy in this 
period. The first section will discuss the framework within which APR decisions were 
taken, while section (ii) will deal with the APR itself and with the factors that 
1 
2 
See Chapter II. 
CP(50) 24 March 2nd 1950, 'The 1950 Farm Price Review', memorandum 
by the Agriculture Ministers, in PRO CAB 129/38. 
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determined Government decisions on prices and incomes for agriculture. Section (iii) 
will assess the long-term implications of Labour's policy: was stability achieved and, 
if so, at what cost? 
The 1947 expansion programme was accompanied by a sharp increase in prices and 
aggregate farm income, gains that were largely retained by producers. However, the 
prosperity of British agriculture in the 1950's rested on subsidies of between £240 and 
£280 million I!&; without this degree of financial support, and given the prevailing 
trends in world food prices, the industry would have found itself in severe financial 
difficulties. Although aggregate income showed little variation after 1951 many 
groups of producers found themselves enjoying considerably less financial security. 
The cuts in Exchequer support for milk, pig and egg production hit the small farmer 
particularly severely. In 1956 E.H. Lloyd estimated that as many as 100,000 
producers faced bankruptcy or being forced on to a subsistence level of income as the 
profitability of milk, pig and egg production continued to dedine.3 In a white paper 
published in 1958 MAF estimated that out of a total of 300,000 full-time agricultural 
holdings there were 65,000 farms where, even with subsidies, producers received an 
income which was less than the wage received by an agricultural worker.4 Such 
figures revealed that the industry's structural problems, which had been identified in 
the inter-war period as the main block to the long-term stability of British agriculture, 
had still to be addressed. 
3 E.B. Lloyd, 'Some thoughts on Agricultural Policy', JAE, Vol. XII 
No.2, February 1957, p.138. 
4 Assistance for small Farmers, Cmd. 553 (1958), p.6. 
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The reduction of Exchequer expenditure on agriculture was a key element in the 
Conservative Party's agricultural policy, their main objective being the abolition of 
rationing and controls, and the return to a free market in foodstuffs. The Government 
initially needed to generate a sufficient level of food output to enable derationing to 
take place, but thereafter the Government's interest lay in restricting the production of 
any commodity which entailed heavy Exchequer expenditure. Pigs, eggs and milk 
production were the most obvious offenders. The production of these commodities 
had been encouraged by relatively high levels of prices between 1945 and 1951, and 
in the case of pigmeat up to 1953, but the cost to the Exchequer proved insupportable 
after decontrol. This led to sharp cuts in subsidies, which in tum provoked serious 
clashes between the Government and the NFU.5 
The 1950's were a period of painful retrenchment for British agriculture: even those 
farmers who were doing comparatively well complained that they were not sharing in 
the general rise in prosperity, although the gains made before 1951/52 were, in 
general, retained. The policies pursued between 1945 and 1951/52 must bear some 
degree of the blame for the problems producers faced in the 1950's. The expansion 
programme was launched on the back of a considerable increase in prices, specifically 
designed to reverse the downward trend in agricultural net income, with no thought 
being given to the problems that any future policy of retrenchment would produce. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the trends in commodity prices that prevailed in 
the 1950's could not have been foreseen when Labour launched the expansion 
programme in August 1947. The NFU resisted any attempt to reduce agricultural 
5 See Self and Storing, The State and the Farmer (1962), p.72. 
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incomes during Labour's period in office, thereby exacerbating the problems its 
members had to face after 1951. Too much emphasis was placed on the APR system 
as the engine of increased production, and MAF were ultimately unwilling to hard-
bargain with the industry for fear of jeopardising the expansion programme and their 
relationship with the industry. The Treasury and the Ministry of Food fought hard to 
reduce expenditure but had only limited success, Ministers in general being swayed 
by MAF's warnings of the dangers of any conflict with the farmers. 
The initial object of the APR procedure was to make, in conformity with Section One 
of the 1947 Act, a provisional assessment of the total increase or decrease that should 
be made in farmers' gross receipts, treating the UK as one large farm. The aim was 
to allow the industry to achieve, with the 'highest possible level of efficiency', the 
Government's production objectives.6 In making this assessment 'broad considerations 
of national economic policy' had to be borne in mind. When agreement had been 
reached on the appropriate total adjustment, the next step was to translate this global 
figure into adjustments in individual commodity prices.7 The three main sets of data 
used were estimates of aggregate net income, figures for aggregate cost increases since 
the last review and figures relating to farm incomes and outgoings for different types 
of farming.8 
6 Annual Review and Fixing of Farm Prices, 1951, Cmd 8239 (1951), p. 3-
4. 
7 The prices fixed at the APR covered the whole of the UK. 
8 Cmd. 8239 (1951), p.5. 
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For the purposes of the APR MAF defined net income as the difference between 
receipts and expenses for a given year, in other words 'spendable income', to which 
an estimate of any increase or decrease in the value of farm stocks and 'work in 
progress' was added or deducted. Any income directly derived from land ownership 
was excluded and net income as calculated above was to provide for the renumeration 
of the farmer and his wife for their labour, and for a return on the farmer's capital 
investment.9 Aggregate net income was defined as the total net income of the whole 
industry, and this was calculated by multiplying the total sales off the 'national farm' 
for each commodity by the average market price realised. Collective expenditure on 
fertilizers, rents, and depreciation formed the other side of the calculation. The 
difference between the two, together with any direct subsidies and changes in the 
value of farm stocks was taken as aggregate net income.1o 
As MAF admitted, however, there was no body of 'ready made' information available 
on farm incomes and so any calculations could not give a precise figure for aggregate 
net income, although such calculations were of 'some value' in indicating broad 
trends. ll Under Section Two of the 1947 Act provision was made for special price 
reviews (SPR's) to be held, either between two APR's or concurrently, on the occasion 
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in costs, up or down, which justified an SPR would be met by a corresponding change 
in prices, with no change in emphasis between commodities.12 
12 ibid., p.16. 
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(i) 
In his April 1946 Budget Hugh Dalton committed Labour to holding the cost of living 
index at 31 % above it's pre-war level, continuing a policy of stabilisation through food 
subsidies that had been introduced during the war and given formal expression in the 
April 1941 Budget.13 By 1947, however, Treasury concern at the growth of 
Exchequer expenditure on subsidies led to attempts to curb the rising cost of 
Government's stabilisation policy. Initially Dalton suggested a 'ceiling' on expenditure 
of £300 million for food subsidies, but eventually reached agreement with John 
Strachey on a figure of £392 for the 1947/48 financial year. The Treasury had 
estimated that the prospective level of expenditure, if Government policy remained 
unchanged, would be £491 million in 1947/48, and the savings were to come from the 
removal of subsidies on non-index items and the switching of subsidies to items with 
a higher points value on the index. 14 The convertibility crisis of July/August 1947 
brought renewed calls from the Treasury for cuts in subsidies, with Bridges viewing 
them as 'the pivot of the whole autumn budget. 15 
Despite Treasury attempts to reduce expenditure by £240 million the November 1947 
Budget merely confirmed the £392 million ceiling. In practice, however, the price 
increases necessary to keep subsidy expenditure within the ceiling were not 




See Price stabilisation and Industrial Policy, Cmd 6294 (1941). 
Neil Rollings, 'British Budgetary Policy 1945-54 : a "Keynesian 
Revolution"?', EHR, Vol. XL1 No.2, May 1988, p.287. 
Bridges to Dalton, September 23rd 1947, quoted in Rollings, ~ 
cit., p.289. 
184 
restraint policies.16 The Statement on Personal Incomes. Costs and Prices white 
paper, published in February 1948, was the formal expression of Labour's policy of 
voluntary wage restraint and called for increases in income to be kept in line with 
increases in productivity Y The April Budget 1949 put a ceiling of £465 million on 
subsidies to cope with the effects of an increase in the supply of basic subsidised 
foodstuffs, although devaluation in September 1949 brought with it a lowering of the 
ceiling to £410 million in the November budget, as part of a larger package of cuts 
in investment and public expenditure.18 Retail prices were increased in the 1950/51 
financial year to keep expenditure within the ceiling, with increases in the price of 
butter and bacon. In February 1951 the Budget Committee, faced with the mounting 
cost of rearmament, suggested cuts of £200 million in food subsidies with 
compensation payments of £150 million in the form of extra family allowances and 
national insurance benefits, but the proposals were rejected by Gaitskell, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Douglas Jay, then the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury. 19 
In a paper prepared in January 1946 MAF considered the implications of Dalton's 
November 1945 Budget. Dalton had suggested stabilizing the cost of living at a lower 
overall cost in subsidies, and had discussed the possibility of discovering economies 
16 cmd 7321 (1948). 
17 Rollings, op. cit., p.290. 
18 ibid., p.290. 
19 ibid., p.291. 
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in the administration of subsidy expenditure.2o As there could be no increase in 
retail prices, and the possibility of buying imports on more favourable terms was 
uncertain, the only source of potential savings lay in cuts in agricultural incomes.21 
Although the 1946 APR settlement was intended, at least in part, to offset the 
prevailing downward movement in agricultural incomes, Dalton reserved the right to 
insist that farmers be treated 'less generously' in the future. In a letter to Attlee in 
March 1946 Douglas Jay, at that time the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, was 
more forthright in his criticisms, questioning the Government's whole policy on food 
subsidies and agricultural incomes.22 Farm incomes had increased in aggregate terms 
from a pre-war level of around £56 million to £200 million in 1945/46 and the 
Government, in Jay's eyes, was pursuing a policy of unlimited food subsidies. Where, 
he asked, was this policy of ever-increasing agricultural prices and expanding 
subsidies leading Labour? Jay argued that a state of affairs was being created that 
would be unsupportable in the long-term and 'a great outcry from the farming 
community must be expected when the time of reckoning comes'. Jay's words were 
to prove prophetic. 
Jay wrote to Attlee again in May, shortly before the SPR, to express his concern at 
the financing of wage increases through increases in prices and subsidies, rather than 
through the squeezing of farm profits. He suggested that the Agriculture Ministers be 
asked to consider whether the whole cost of the wage increase had to be added to the 
20 H. of c. Deb (5th Series), vol. 414 Col. 1877, october 23rd 1945. 
21 PRO MAF 38/480, January 1946 'A Note on the General considerations 
Affecting Agricultural Prices'. 
22 PRO PREM 8/1311 (i), March 16th 1946, Jay to Attlee. 
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price schedule and whether at least some part of it could be met by reducing the high 
level of farmers' profits.23 However, in the face of widespread dissatisfaction within 
the industry over the Government's SPR proposals the Government was eventually 
forced to accept the principle of full recoupment for cost increases at SPRs, and to 
agree not to alter the emphasis between commodities when adjusting prices.24 By 
January 1947 the Treasury were beginning to express their concern at the overall cost 
of the Government's stabilisation policy. However, in a note to Sir Herbert Britain, 
then a Third Secretary to the Treasury, W.M. Fisher argued that the forthcoming APR 
did not offer the Government many opportunities to reduce Exchequer expenditure.25 
The only possible source of savings for the 1947/48 financial year was a reduction in 
livestock prices, and Fisher doubted that such a course of action was either practicable 
or expedient, given the need to shift domestic production back to livestock rearing.26 
August 1947 saw the launch of the £100 million expanSIOn programme. The 
Agricultural Output Committee estimated that the programme would require a capital 
investment of £250 million over four years, £200 million if landlords' expenditure was 
excluded. They argued that £70 million should be injected into the industry straight 
away, mainly through increased prices, to enable farmers to meet their capital needs 
and cover any cost increases, with further annual injections of £40 million. The 
Committee believed that if adequate provision was made for meeting the industry's 
capital needs, this would act as a 'powerful stimulus and incentive' to increased 
23 PRO PREM 8/1311 (i), May 29th 1946, Jay to Attlee. 
24 See Chapter III. 
25 PRO T223/132, January 16th 1947, Fisher to Britain. 
26 Fisher felt that crop ~rices for the 1948 harvest were the only 
source of potential sav~ngs. 
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production?7 In a memorandum to the Cabinet Dalton stressed that the Government 
would have to take 'exceptional and dramatic' action to ensure farmers had the labour , 
materials and financial aid necessary for the success of the expansion programme, as 
the industry could not be expected to incur the whole of the additional outlay itself. 
The Committee's proposals were approved by the Cabinet and the Lord President's 
Committee and were made public on August 21st 1947.28 
During the inter-departmental discussions on the 1948 APR the Treasury argued that 
any settlement should be made in strict adherence with the terms of the white paper 
on personal incomes, which precluded price increases except in 'exceptional cases' and 
demanded reductions in prices wherever possible.29 The Treasury also maintained 
that, because farmers had failed to increase production in line with the programmed 
targets, the August 1947 price schedule should be revised. W.H. Fisher told Donald 
Vandepeer that MAF's 1946 agreement with the NFU over the SPR procedure might 
have to be revoked or renegotiated in view of the Prime Minister's statement on 
incomes, costs and wages. In reply Vandepeer stressed the potentially serious 
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issue with Attlee in February 1948. In Williams view, APR procedure was not 
affected by the proposals outlined in the white paper, and in the Attlee's speech to 
Parliament on February 4th 1948, but the SPR was affected.31 Williams hoped that 
in interpreting the proposals the integrity of the Government assurances to the industry 
would be fully preserved.32 The Government had emphasised that in order to reduce 
the danger of inflation there could be no general increase in the level of personal 
incomes without a corresponding increase in the volume of production. Paragraph ten 
of the white paper stated that if wages in any industry were increased there could be 
no assumption that the resulting costs would be taken into account when prices or 
margins were set, and each case would be considered on its merits.33 
Williams expressed similar VIews III a memorandum to the Cabinet. However, 
Ministers agreed that the 'general presumption' should be against any allowance for 
wage increases, and that in every case the Government should consider whether the 
extra cost could not be met out of either increased productivity or reduced profits.34 
It was also agreed that, in general, the rules suggested by the Minister of Labour for 
applying paragraph ten should be adopted. Isaacs argued that one of the results of the 
white paper would be that employers dealing with a wage claim would seek 
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accepted for the purposes of adjusting prices.35 This, he continued, was just the sort 
of calculation the white paper was designed to discourage. Wage claims were to be 
settled according to the white paper principles with no prior indication of the scale of 
any pnce lllcrease. 
The Treasury tried to impose white paper principles on the 1948 APR, but the final 
settlement simply confirmed without alteration the price schedules announced the 
previous August. Cripps argued that as the price increases had been given to help 
farmers meet the demands of the expansion programme, the fact that producers had 
not incurred the anticipated expenditure suggested that prices should not be confirmed 
without the Government first examining the extent to which production had fallen 
short of the programmed targets, and adjusting prices accordingly.36 Williams 
reminded his Cabinet colleagues that prices had been increased in August 1947 on the 
understanding that they would not be changed at the 1948 APR unless they were 
found to be 'grossly extravagent'. With the exception of milk and beef production, 
which had been hit by the severe winter weather, the expansion of livestock 
production had fulfilled expectations. There could be no reduction in the pressure on 
producers to achieve the targets set for milk and beef production, and in the light of 
these factors Williams argued that the August 1947 price schedule should be 
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This issue was raised again in March 1948 in a report on the Agricultural Wages 
Boards prepared by the Official Committee on Economic Development (the 
OCED).38 The Agricultural Wages Boards resembled other wages boards except in 
one important aspect, namely that they were empowered to promulgate their own 
decisions and did not have to submit them to Ministers for confirmation. MAF argued 
that Wages Boards' decisions should be regarded as being equivalent to those taken 
by Arbitration Tribunals, and therefore as being in accordance with Government 
guidelines when consideration was given to whether an increase in wages merited an 
increase in prices. The Ministry of Labour felt that no such distinction should be 
made, and was supported by the OCED and by Cripps, who argued that Agricultural 
Wages Boards should be treated like other wages boards and their decisions examined 
to see if they conformed with the white paper's principles. This was the view taken 
by the Economic Policy Committee when they discussed the OCED report in May 
1948.39 
Towards the end of 1948 the Agricultural Output Committee were invited to consider 
whether the subsidy on animal feeds should be ended.40 The question was 
subsequently discussed by an inter-departmental working party, who concluded that 
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encourage grassland conservation and production, by bringing cereal feed prices into 
a proper relationship with the cost of silage and dried grass production.41 Both the 
Committee and the Economic Planning Board supported the proposals, which would 
yield the Treasury a net saving of £8 million, a £30 million reduction in subsidy 
expenditure being offset by an increase of £22 million in commodity prices. 42 
Although feedstuffs rationing encouraged farmers to become more self-sufficient, there 
was still considerable scope for improvement and a reduction in feed subsidies would 
give greater emphasis to the importance of increasing self-sufficiency and developing 
grassland production. It was recognised that an increase in the retail price of feed 
grain might have an adverse effect on production, but it was hoped that this could be 
offset by increased commodity prices. The Production Committee approved the 
working party's proposals in December 1948.43 
In March 1949 Cripps wrote to Tom Williams suggesting that there was a need for 
a thorough review of subsidies by the Agricultural Output Committee, Williams agreed 
with Cripps and the Committee began their work at the end of the month.44 In a 
submission to the Committee MAF argued for the continued use of direct subsidies 
on the grounds that in many cases it would be uneconomic to attempt to increase 
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production on marginal or hill land. MAF also argued that subsidies or grants would 
be needed if certain improvements were to be made at all. 45 The Treasury were 
divided on the issue; in a letter to W.L. Atkinson, W.H. Fisher complained that: 
'Our difficulty is that our masters (Cripps and Sir Bernard Gilbert) feel 
that those subsidies are bad in principle and that it is better to put all 
the eggs in the one basket of end product prices ..... this prejudice ..... 
is, I'm sure, wrong'. 46 
The Committee's review soon broadened out into a consideration of the cost of the 
expansion programme as a whole, a reflection of the Treasury's growing concern at 
the cost of Labour's agricultural policy. 47 
In August 1949 Attlee circulated a memorandum to Ministers in which he stressed 
that, in the prevailing economic climate, any increases in Government expenditure 
were to be avoided and policies of retrenchment pursued wherever possible.48 Attlee 
called for a 'searching scrutiny' of Government spending with the overall aim of 
reducing supply expenditure by 5%. John Strachey wrote to Cripps in September 
1949 to suggest that the time had come for the Government to drop the remaining 
45 PRO MAF 38/622, March 22nd 1949, AD(49) 'Agricultural subsidies', 
MAF memorandum. 
46 PRO T229/255, March 27th 1949, W.H. Fisher to W.L. Atkinson. 
47 See Chapter VI. 
48 CP(49)170, AU<;Just 4th 1949, 'Government Expenditure', memorandum by 
the Prime Min~ster, in PRO CAB 129/36. 
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subsidy on animal feeds,49 and in October Ministers agreed that the subsidy would 
be discontinued after the 1950 APR. The increase in producers' costs resulting from 
this decision would be taken into account at the APR.50 The abolition of the subsidy 
was part of a package of investment and expenditure cuts totalling £256.5 million, 
approved by the Cabinet in October 1949.51 Cripps initially tried to end the subsidy 
before the APR something Tom Williams viewed as a 'breach of faith' on the 
Government's part and as being contrary both to the spirit and the provisions of the 
1947 Act. Williams won the support of his colleagues on this issue although it was 
agreed that the subsidy would be ended after the 1950 APR.52 Cripps hoped to 
secure a saving of £20 million in Exchequer expenditure on agriculture at the APR.53 
Williams agreed that the industry 'might reasonably be expected' to accept a reduction 
in income on this scale, and it was agreed that every effort should be made to reduce 
expenditure by this amount at the forthcoming price review. 54 
An inter-departmental committee was set up to consider the practical implications of 
the decision to end the feedstuffs subsidy, under the chairmanship of C.H.M. Wilcox 
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Agricultural Departments.55 At the first meeting the Ministry of Food emphasised 
the potentially serious implications of the decision which would involve an increase 
of at least £30 million in producers' costs for the coming year. The Treasury 
representatives emphasised that it was not necessary to sell all individual feedstuffs 
at their market price, as losses on the sale of some could be offset by the profits made 
on the sale of other feedstuffs.56 Such a course of action was seen as being 
'politically untenable' by some members of the Committee and as being likely to cause 
complaints from farmers. It was also felt by some that action on the lines suggested 
by the Treasury would cause problems for the Government's overseas buyers in their 
negotiations with foreign feedstuffs suppliers. 57 
Both MAF and the Ministry of Food argued that Ministers had not realised the impact 
that the removal of the subsidy would have on livestock production, particularly pig 
production, and stressed the long-term implications of any failure to maintain the 
progress of the expansion programme.58 The Committee's interim report was 
presented to the Agricultural Output Committee in December 1949. The Treasury and 
CEPS dissented from the main conclusion, which was that a complete removal of the 
feeds subsidy could not be reconciled with the expansion programme as it stood. The 
new prices paid for animal feed would affect grain production as a whole, making it 
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Ministry of Food, and would reduce the existing price differential which favoured 
wheat as opposed to barley production. Any increase in feed prices would also have 
adverse effects on the quality and quantity of livestock production in the UK. 59 In 
discussion the Treasury emphasised that the difficulties arising from the Government's 
decision had been recognised, and that the removal of the subsidy was an essential 
part of the Government's economy drive. The CEPS representatives on the Committee 
stressed that it was not within the competence of the Committee to question the 
removal of the subsidy, which was a major policy decision, and that they should limit 
themselves to producing proposals that would enable the spirit of the Government's 
decisions to be carried out. 60 
The results of the Agricultural Output Committee's deliberations were finally 
submitted to Ministers in January 1950 together with a memorandum by the 
Agriculture Ministers which emphasised that the increase in costs the industry faced 
was so large that there would be 'substantial interference' with the expansion 
programme unless 'suitable action' was taken at the APR. The Committee's final 
report followed the Treasury's line in recommending that subsidies be eliminated on 
an overall basis, a method of approach which met with Ministerial approva1.61 In 
discussion Williams, amongst others, pressed his colleagues to reverse their earlier 
decision to withdraw the fertilizer subsidy in the light of possible effects on the 
59 Presented to the Agricultural output committee as AD(49) 14, 
November 1949, in PRO MAF 38/622. 
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expansion programme, and particularly on grassland development. In reply Cripps 
maintained that the abolition of the subsidy was an important part of the Government's 
anti-inflation programme, and stressed that he could not agree to a continuation of the 
subsidy in its existing form. He was, however, prepared to agree to the continuation 
of the subsidy on a restricted basis as part of a scheme to encourage grassland 
development. MAF eventually agreed upon a scheme which entailed cutting the 
existing fertilizer subsidy by 50%, and the introduction of new payments designed to 
encourage the application of fertilizers to grassland and marginal land, and the 
ploughing up of old grassland. These proposals were approved as part of the final 
APR settlement in March 1950.62 
62 . CAB 128/7 CP(50)45 March See CM(50)14, March 23rd 1950, ~n PRO b· the Agriculture 21st 1950, 'The Farm Price Review', memorandum y 
Ministers, in PRO CAB 129/38. 
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(ii) 
The first formal APR was conducted in February 1945 and was held concurrently with 
an SPR, occasioned by an increase in the minimum wages paid to agricultural 
workers. The NFU argued that farmers were being called upon to maintain wartime 
levels of production in the face of the cumulative effects of adverse wartime 
conditions. Labour and agricultural machinery were still in short supply and the land 
had suffered under the heavy wartime cropping patterns.63 Farmers, the NFU 
maintained, needed incentives to maintain their efforts and to give them confidence 
for the future; in the words of the NFU General-Secretary John Knowles 'everything 
depends on the outcome of the price review so far as farmers' confidence is concerned. 
This review will be the test'.64 The NFU saw the restoration of British agriculture 
to the peak of its wartime prosperity as being the best test of the Government's 
sincerity, and pressed for an aggregate price increase of £12 million, production costs 
having risen by £7.6 million.65 
During the inter-departmental discussions pnor to the APR both MAF and the 
Ministry of Food had argued that, at the very least, full allowance should be made for 
the wage increase when fixing prices, with the Ministry of Food expressing doubts 
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maximum possible level of food production for the next two or three years. 66 The 
Treasury was prepared to except an APR settlement in excess of £7.6 million, and 
Vandepeer believed that 'justice would be done' if the farmers were offered 
recoupment of around £10 million. 
Vandepeer was, however, keen to emphasize to the NFU that the Government could 
not agree to prices being automatically adjusted to cover increases in producers' costs, 
and that the Government was not prepared to work to a rigid definition of what 
constituted a 'reasonable' level of income. This, he continued, was something that 
would have to be decided at each price review.67 The NFU did not regard £10 
million as a 'reasonable and just figure', arguing that the wartime increases in farming 
income were not comparable with increases in factory workers' wages, as a large 
percentage of farmers' incomes were reinvested back into the land. The NFU were 
also keen to stress that producers were 'not primarily concerned with maintaining 
incomes as such, but with maintaining a high level of productivity'. After further 
discussion the two sides eventually agreed on an overall figure of £11.8 million, a 
figure that was subsequently approved by Ministers in March 1945.68 
At both the 1946 and 1947 APR's price adjustments were made which more than 
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moderate the decline in aggregate net income from its wartime leve1. 69 At an inter-
departmental meeting in January 1946 Vandepeer emphasized that when dealing with 
the question of world food prices the Government had to consider them in the context 
of the world supply situation.70 It was, he continued, inconsistent to attempt to 
maintain a high level of production while at the same time to insist, as the Treasury 
was, on a general reduction in agricultural incomes: 
'If efforts similar to those of the war years are required from the 
agricultural community, then almost by inference the Government is 
committed to maintaining agricultural incomes'. 
Vandepeer argued that the Government would also have to consider compensating pig 
and poultry producers for the effects of cuts in their feed rations, after they had been 
encouraged to expand production on the promise of increased feed supplies. He felt 
that producers would have a 'strong claim' for compensation and that the Government 
should give serious consideration to their claims even though, as Vandepeer himself 
recognised, it was not 'economically sound' to compensate producers by increasing 
commodity prices. 
MAF's report to Ministers on the 1946 APR emphasized the special and difficult 
circumstances under which the review had been conducted. The return to a high level 
69 
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The data collected for the APR showed a downward movement in farm 
incomes across all types of production, although the largest fall 
had occurred amongst arable producers. 
PRO MAF 38/480, February 11.th 1946, Mi~utes of the second Inter-
Departmental Meeting on Agr~cultural Pr~ces. 
200 
of cereal production had involved the modification of the Government's production 
targets and had adversely effected many producers.71 The Ministry of Foodls main 
objectives at the APR were to keep the Government's production drive in a reasonable 
relationship to its net results and to ensure that any price adjustment would be made, 
so far as was possible, to secure the greatest possible increase in production. 
However, the Ministry of Food also wanted to ensure that the pnce award was 
recognised as a special award to meet special circumstances.72 To this end an 
extension of the principle underlying ploughing-up grants was proposed, with 
producers being paid by results through a new acreage payment payable on any 
increases in the tillage acreage over its June 1945 level. Although this proposal was 
not taken up, the existing ploughing-up grant of £2 per acre was extended from land 
sown down to grass for seven or more years to land sown down to grass for three or 
more years. 
During the inter-departmental discussions on the APR the Treasury, whilst agreeing 
that it was not feasible to make further reductions in agricultural incomes, had stressed 
that farmers should be warned that they could not expect to maintain their existing 
level of income in the long-term and that they should not consider the prevailing level 
of income as 'a norm around which incomes should fluctuate'. In reply MAF had 
71 
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emphasized that they had never implied that any particular figure constituted a 
satisfactory level of income and that there was no case for a return to a wartime level 
of net income.73 During the price review itself MAF had warned the NFU not to 
become complacent or over-confident, making it clear that increases in costs would 
not always be reflected in increased prices.74 Dalton felt that the proposed 
settlement, an aggregate increase of £15.5 million as against an increase in costs of 
£13 million in a full year, was 'generous', and while he was not prepared to oppose 
it in the prevailing circumstances, he reserved the right to insist that agriculture 
receive less generous treatment in the future. The proposed price increases were likely 
to provoke further demands for wage increases and Dalton emphasized that any such 
demands should not be accompanied by automatic adjustments in producers' prices.75 
The 1947 APR was conducted against a backdrop of Labour's first four-year 
production programme and the passage through Parliament of the Agriculture Bill. 
Tom Williams was keen to stress that the 1947 settlement would be seen as an 'index' 
of the Government's intentions towards the industry. The Bill's passage through 
Parliament would also be influenced by the reception given to the Government's price 
award. Figures produced for the APR revealed that aggregate net income had 
continued to decline between 1945/46 and 1946/47, and the NFU argued that this was 
'fundamentally inequitable', given that other groups within the rural community had 
seen their incomes increase. MAF had dismissed the Union's arguments but felt 
73 PRO MAF 38/480, February 14th 1946. 
74 PRO MAF 38/480, February 14th 1946. 
75 LP(46) 9th mtg., March 8th 1946, in PRO CAB 132/1. 
202 
privately that there was a strong case for reducing the steepness of the decline. 76 
prices were increased by just over £7 million, costs having risen by £5.67 million in 
a full year. The bulk of the global increase was made up of increases in livestock and 
milk prices in line with Labour's production programme, although there was a small 
increase in crop prices for the 1947/48 harvest. 77 
As mentioned above, Dalton was strongly opposed to any automatic adjustment of 
prices to recoup increased production costs, and the issue was raised again in May 
1946 when a wage increase prompted NFU calls for an SPR. MAF believed that the 
producers were likely to argue that if the 1946 APR had produced a fair settlement, 
then they were entitled to be fully recouped for the increases in their costs, which 
MAP estimated to be £25 million in total, of which £20 million represented the 
increase in agricultural wages.78 Privately MAF felt that it was 'difficult to see how 
this argument could be withstood" although they recognised that the Treasury would 
be opposed to any suggestion of full recoupment.79 The Agriculture Ministers raised 
the issue at the end of May, and the Lord President's Committee gave MAF the 
authority to agree a global figure which would, at most, recoup producers for the 






LP(47)34, Februarr 24th 1947, 'Agricultural Prices' memorandum by 
the Agriculture M~nisters, in PRO CAB 132/7. 
LP(47) 7th mtg., February 28th 1947, in PRO CAB 132/6. The increase 
in cereal prices was a one-off measure to compensa~e p~o~ucers for under-recou~ment at the 1946 SPR, which had been Just~f~ed at the 
time in the light of a number of prospective econo~cs wh~ch had not 
in fact occurred. 
LP(46)129, May 28th 1946, 'Agricultural Prices and Wages', 
memorandum by the Agriculture Ministers, in PRO CAB 132/3. 
PRO MAF 38/479, May 21st 1946, Note of a Meeting of the Agricultural 
Departments. 
LP(46) 19th mtg., May 31st 1946, in PRO CAB 132/1. 
203 
June 21st to discuss the initial offer they would make at the SPR Vandepeer argued 
that while the NFU should, as a matter of principle, be told that the SPR could only 
be concerned with wage increases, the Government had to take a 'general note' of the 
changes in farming conditions.8! 
The Ministry of Food pressed for a global recoupment of £12.5 million, with greater 
emphasis within this figure to be placed on wheat and milk at the expense of cattle 
and sheep, in line with national production needs. Vandepeer felt that such a figure 
would not be regarded as a reasonable level of recoupment by the NFU, and he argued 
against any attempt to change the price relationship between commodities.82 
Vandepeer suggested that the minimum level of recoupment acceptable to the farmers 
would be £14 million, and that a figure of £16 million should be regarded as a 
reasonable final settlement. Predictably the NFU pressed for full recoupment, arguing 
that other controlled industries were fully recouped for cost increases and that unless 
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Ministers eventually agreed on a figure for recoupment of £17 million, to be 
distributed between commodities according to national production requirements.84 
In contrast to the APR settlement most of this sum was to be given in the form of 
increased arable prices, although a number of special grants were given to compensate 
producers for shortages of animal feedstuffs.85 The settlement was eventually 
imposed on the industry and the NFU continued to press for full recoupment. Tom 
Williams had told his colleagues that although he though that the settlement was 'fair 
and reasonable in all the circumstances', he doubted that the price increases would 
'strengthen the hands' of the Agricultural Departments in securing the output required 
from British farms.86 
The NFU pressed for an independent review of the whole issue and the principles 
upon which the conflict rested, criticising the Government for trying to 'interfere in 
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justice had been done, and resist Union calls for an independent investigation. 
Williams also stressed that it was an essential feature of Government policy that prices 
were fixed in relation to the nation's food needs and the world supply situation,88 
William's words had little effect, however, and by August 1946 Labour was facing 
what the Press described as a 'farmers' revolt'. A withdrawal of farmers' 
representatives from the CAEC's had been threatened and in a few areas District 
Committees had already suspended their activities. A number of farmers had even 
suggested withholding grain from the market if the NFU gave their approval. 89 On 
August 16th Williams wrote to Attlee seeking his approval to re-open the SPR 
negotiations, with the possibility of the Government granting the industry a further 
increase in prices. The Cabinet was too busy with other issues to allow Williams' 
suggestion to be discussed fully and so Attlee gave Williams his personal authority 
to re-open the SPR, and to discuss with the NFU any 'anomolies' arising from the 
APR procedure.90 
The results of these discussions were submitted to Ministers in November 1946.91 
Williams emphasized that the Government had only just avoided 'a crisis of major 
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only be forthcoming if they were satisfied that they had a bona fide guarantee of 
economic stability. The APR, he continued, was designed to provide a reasonable 
level of profitability and stability for the ensuing year, and implicit in this was the 
assumption that there should be no change before the next APR. Therefore the 
principle of automatic recoupment at SPR's was, in his view, 'both logical and just'. 
The Lord President's Committee approved the MAF proposals, although the 
Agricultural Departments were instructed to emphasize the differences in principle 
between the APR and the SPR.92 
Dalton argued that full recoupment would not increase the efficiency of the industry, 
a point taken up by Bevan who argued that the best tests of efficiency were price cuts 
rather than the 'policing' functions of the CAEC's, and both men warned of the 
dangers of the principle of automatic adjustment spreading to the APR. They also 
suggested that MAF should follow the Board of Trade's example in only granting a 
maximum of 80% recoupment. Williams could not accept this principle but agreed 
to participate in an inter-departmental review of price-fixing machinery. 
The report on price-fixing was finally presented to Ministers in January 1947 and 
compared the price-fixing machinery operating in agriculture with that in other 
industries, supporting the principle of full recoupment at the SPR.93 Cripps, at that 
time President of the Board of Trade, felt that there was no reason why increases in 
agricultural wages should necessarily be followed by corresponding increases in 
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agricultural income, and added that he hoped that the wartime practice of generous 
financial inducements for the production of particular crops would not be continued 
indiscriminately. Williams emphasized that not every wage increase would be 
followed by an SPR. While acknowledging that there was no desire to challenge APR 
principles, Dalton told Williams that MAF would be expected to do its utmost to fix 
agricultural prices at reasonable levels. Subject to these points the report was 
approved.94 
After the 1948 APR the Agricultural Departments argued that the prices that had been 
fixed at the time of the launch of the expansion programme should be reaffirmed, 
covering crops from the 1948/49 harvest and livestock products to March 31st 1949. 
The NFU had accepted the settlement as meeting the requirements of the 1947 Act for 
that year. The Treasury view was that these prices should not be reaffirmed without 
some consideration being given as to how far production, and particularly livestock 
production, had fallen short of the August 1947 targets. As was indicated in Section 
(i), the Treasury were concerned that Government decisions should be in keeping with 
the white paper on incomes, costs and prices. In reply, MAF argued that the price 
increases had been given on the understanding that they would not be adjusted at the 
next APR, unless they were found to be grossly extravagant. Production had been hit 
by the 1947 drought, and MAF believed there was no evidence that prices were 
94 LP(47) 3rd and 4th mtgs., January 24th and February 4th 1946, in PRO 
CAB 132/6. 
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excesSIve. This was the view taken by Ministers, who agreed that the August 1947 
price schedule should be reaffirmed.95 
The 1949 APR was intended to secure an aggregate net income of £250 million in 
1949/50, with a £10 million reduction from the level reached in 1948/49. This figure 
was made up of the aggregate net income in the base year of the expansion 
programme, £204.5 million, the £40 million capital injection which accompanied the 
launch of the programme and £5.5 million representing the profit accruing to farmers' 
from their increased output. Ministers had initially authorised MAF to negotiate a £15 
million reduction in aggregate net income, but the NFU would only accept a figure 
of £10 million. The Agriculture Ministers argued that the APR had to be seen in the 
context of the 'difficult task' the Government had set the industry, a task that was a 
vital feature of the long-term programme submitted to the OEEC.96 This APR was 
also the first to be conducted since Part One of the 1947 Act had come into operation 
and so would be regarded as a test of Government's sincerity by the industry. The 
Agriculture Ministers argued that: 
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also PC(49) 4th mtg., February 2nd 1949, 1n PRO CAB . 
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However, in February 1950 it was estimated that aggregate net income for 1949/50 
was likely to be at least £280 million and the Treasury began to express it's 
dissatisfaction with both the methods of calculation used at the APR and the growth 
in agricultural incomes. 97 In the words of one Treasury official it was 'a waste of 
time to fix the global net income on any pseudo-scientific basis, for the simple reason 
that all the basic data are unreliable'. Whether the high level of aggregate net income 
in 1949/50 was due to a miscalculation or to considerable increases in efficiency, the 
Treasury argued that farm incomes should be substantially reduced and it was finally 
agreed that the APR should be opened on the basis of a target net income for 1950/51 
of £250 million.98 This figure was grudgingly accepted by the Agricultural 
Departments as a starting point for the negotiations. This was satisfactory to the 
Treasury although they felt that MAF should be made to realise that they would be 
expected to make a serious attempt to reach an agreement on the suggested basis.99 
MAF had suggested a figure for net income for 1950/51 of £261 million, which would 
still have left farmers to bear almost half of the estimated increase in costs. In 
suggesting this figure the Agriculture Ministers had emphasized the importance of 
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During the APR negotiations MAF outlined to the NFU the factors that would 'vitally 
effect' the eventual outcome of the review. The Government was nearing the end of 
Marshall Aid with the 'dollar gap' still to be filled, and so there was a need for the 
utmost economy in Government expenditure. The aim, MAF emphasised, was to keep 
the cost of living stabilised and to pursue the policy laid down in the white paper on 
personal incomes, which applied to farmers' incomes no less than to the incomes of 
other sections of the community, a fact that the NFU itself had recognised. Good 
progress had been made with the expansion programme and this suggested to MAF 
that the prevailing level of profitability was sufficient to achieve the desired 
results. 101 The point had been reached, R.H. Franklin told the NFU, where the 
Exchequer could no longer countenance any increase in subsidy expenditure and this 
implied a need to curb agricultural prices, particularly as from as economic and 
financial standpoint the country was in a worse position than it had been in 1949. 
This fact had to be recognised by all responsible sections of the community, and MAF 
believed that the process had to begin as soon as possible or else a 'sharp and 
substantial' reduction in incomes would be unavoidable. 
Not surprisingly the NFU rejected a £250 million settlement but agreement was 
eventually reached on a aggregate net income figure of £261 million, the figure MAF 
had suggested in the discussions prior to the APR. The settlement for 1950/51 
involved price increases totalling £12.25 million and the payment of various short-term 
grants and subsidies totalling £7 million; the latter were intended to encourage the use 
101 PRO T223/16, March 1st 1950, Minutes of a Meeting between the 
Agricultural Departments and the NFU. 
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of fertilizers on grass or marginal land. 102 The settlement still left the farmers to 
bear almost 2/3 of the estimated increases on costs themselves. The Treasury had 
hoped for a reduction in aggregate net income of between £35 and £40 million 103 , 
while the NFU had initially pressed for price increases totalling some £30 million. 104 
The Agriculture Ministers advised their colleagues to accept the proposed settlement 
and R.F. Bretherton, speaking for the Economic Section, suggested that it was the best 
that could be hoped for in the circumstances. lOS The NFU had made it clear that a 
lower figure would not be acceptable and Bretherton suggested that the Government 
should avoid imposing a settlement on the industry. The settlement was subsequently 
approved by the Cabinet on March 23rd 1950.106 In 1951 the Cabinet approved 
agricultural price increases totalling £32 million, including an £11.25 increase in the 
price of wool, against an increase in costs of £53.5 million.107 The Ministry of Food 
had initially held out for a settlement totalling at most £21.5 million. MAF had, 
however, regarded this figure as only providing a starting point for the APR 
negotiations, and had argued that the review negotiations would break down if the 
Ministry of Food's figure was presented as the upper limit of the Government's 
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was made there was no way of avoiding a break with the NFU. In reply the Minister 
of Food, Maurice Webb, argued that the disadvantage of such a break could be over-
estimated, and emphasised that any increase above £25 million would have to be 
added to retail prices. Gaitskell felt that Webb was right in principle but felt that if 
negotiations were to break down he would prefer to justify the Government's case by 
pointing to a settlement of £30 rather than £25 million. 
Substantial increases in production had been secured and it would be foolish, Gaitskell 
believed, to jeopardise further progress by a serious dispute with the farmers. Some 
Ministers, however, felt that production had not increased commensurately with 
profits; Bevin, for example, felt that the increase in production had 'not been as great 
as the country might reasonably have expected,.l09 The Cabinet authorised the 
Agriculture Ministers to offer a £30 million price increase as a 'last resort', but MAF 
were unable to secure an agreement with the NFU on this basis. 'Every effort' had 
been made but to no avail, although Sir James Turner had given Williams his personal 
assurance that his members would accept £32 million, and Williams argued that unless 
this small adjustment was made a breakdown in the SPR was inevitable. Despite 
opposition from the Ministry of Food the Cabinet improved the increase in the APR 
settlement. 110 
Tables One and Two gIve figures for the estimated annual output, income and 
expenditure of UK agriculture, white Table Three gives data for the estimated 
Scotland, in PRO CAB 134/229. 
109 CM(51)21, March 19th 1951, in PRO CAB 128/19. 
110 CM(51)22, March 22nd 1931, in PRO CAB 128/19. 
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increases in annual output. The total cost of Exchequer grants and subsidies increased 
from £324 million in 1946/47 to £400 million in 1950/51, although at it's peak in 
1948/49 subsidy expenditure reached £484 million. Concern at this high level of 
expenditure led to a ceiling being placed on subsidy expenditure, and at the suggestion 
of the Agricultural Output Committee a number of adjustments were made in the 
expansion programmeYl By the early 1950's increased supplies of a number of 
commodities were becoming available from soft currency sources, and devaluation had 
altered the price relationship between home-produced and imported agricultural 
produce; the latter provided a good opportunity for relative prices to be allowed to 
determine the pattern of domestic production. This would, in turn, free resources that 
could be used to increase the production of dollar saving commodities or those in 
which the UK enjoyed a comparative advantage. 
Writing in 1948 Peter Self argued that as the world was quite liable to 'collapse into 
conditions of economic insanity', it was a 'necessary prudence' to reduce the country's 
economic vulnerability by growing increased quantities of food at home. 112 Full 
employment and social security provision would increase the potential demand for 
food in the UK to a level much higher than had existed before the war. However, 
Self also believed that such a policy could not be pursued without any regard to its 
cost. 
III See Chapter VI. 
112 Peter Self, 'A Policy for Agriculture', The political Quarterly, 
Vol. 19 (1948), p.143. 
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'There may come a point when the rising cost of British in relation to 
imported food, and the consequential sacrifice involved on the taxpayer 
or consumer (or both), puts a heavy strain on the export trades .... and 
threatens the very stability of the economy which the programme is 
designed to support.' 
When the launch of the expansion programme was being discussed by the Lord 
President's Committee a number of Ministers questioned the wisdom of the 
Government committing itself to such an extensive programme, which it was argued 
might absorb more resources than the country could afford. As we have seen, as early 
as March 1946 Douglas Jay was questioning what he regarded as the Government's 
policy of unlimited price and subsidy increases. The Agricultural Output Committee's 
1950 report was a recognition of the fact that in the case of certain commodities at 
least, the cost of UK production and of any further expansion was excessive in 
relation to import price levels. Although the Treasury, together with CEPS, were the 
strongest advocates of the launch of the £100 million expansion programme,1l3 from 
the very outset they were determined to keep as tight a rein as possible on Exchequer 
expenditure, as was demonstrated at the 1948 APR. 
In an article published in the Three Banks Review in December 1953, J.R. Raeburn 
argued that, on the basis of the data contained in Tables One, Two and Three, the 
expansion of output under the programme had been worthwhile up to 1951/52, as had 
113 See Chapter III. 
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the industry's performance as a dollar saver in the post-war period. 114 At August 
1953 c.i.f. values and 1953/54 UK prices £117 million more foreign exchange was 
being saved in 1952/53 than at the end of the war. The expansion programme was, 
as figures produced by E.H. Whetham suggest, successful in generating physical 
investment in the industry. 115 Table Four gives data on farmers' expenditure, and 
reveals the changes in costs and the cost structure that occurred in the post-war period. 
Figures for bank advances to the industry reveal that in the post-war period 13% of 
'tenant's capital' was borrowed from banks, as compared with 17% in the pre-war 
period.116 Raeburn, however, also believed that further expansion on the lines of the 
August 1947 programme would not be economic, and that changes in supply 
conditions and consumer demand required substantial alterations in the composition 
of domestic output, both in the national interest and in the long-term interest of the 
industry itself.1l7 
Raeburn's assessment of the value of the expansion programme has to be set against 
the programme's own shortcomings,118 the problems the Government and the 
industry faced after 1951, and the failure of successive Governments to deal with the 
industry's underlying structural problems. MAF, and ultimately the Government as 
a whole, were largely unwilling to 'hard-bargain' with the NFU, with Williams at pains 
114 
115 
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to stress the importance of gaining Union recognition of any price settlement and the 
dangers that any serious disagreement would pose to the success of the expansion 
programme. Williams was also clearly unwilling to do anything that would have 
jeopardised his standing as the 'farmers' friend'. Ministers were generally swayed by 
Williams' arguments and also, particularly after 1949, by the belief that Labour could 
make considerable and perhaps crucial gains in rural constituencies. 
Increased efficiency and reduced costs were the key to the problems outlined in the 
Agricultural Output Committee's report,119 but the structure of the industry, with a 
large number of small and relatively inefficient and under-capitalised farms, acted as 
a brake to any attempt to increase the overall cost-efficiency of British agriculture, a 
problem the APR system did nothing to alleviate. The NFU were unwilling to see 
their industry absorb more than a small proportion of the increase in its costs, 120 
with the Government giving in to the Union on the question of SPR adjustments, 
although the pressure on the industry to absorb an increasing proportion of its costs 
did increase over the post-war period. The NFU fought hard to retain the gains their 
members made after August 1947 and were largely successful; in aggregate terms the 
gains made under Labour were retained by producers in 1950's, although in real terms 
the total value of farmers' earnings probably declined, if changes in the value of 
money are taken into account. 121 Although in general the industry enjoyed a degree 
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The freeing of the industry from controls and rationing served to reveal the dependent 
state of British agriculture when forced to compete with imported produce, and the 
prosperity of the industry could only be maintained by direct subsidies. As mentioned 
in the introduction decontrol brought with it measures designed to curb the production 
of any commodity which incurred a heavy subsidy, and the products most effected by 
this policy were pigs, milk and eggs, where over-production stemmed, at least in part, 
from the policies pursued by Labour. 122 The price of eggs had been an issue at the 
1949 APR. The MAP report on the price review had recommended a price increase 
of 1d per dozen, the full amount asked for by the NFU. l23 This was opposed by 
both Cripps and Strachey, with the latter arguing that the money should be used to 
ensure that the 1949/50 pig and potato targets were met. It was likely that the output 
of eggs in 1949/50 would be in excess of the target figure and so the national interest, 
Strachey argued, would be best served by increases in the prices of the other 
commodities. 124 
The matter was subsequently taken up by the Production Committee. Tom Williams 
stressed that the NFU had only agreed to the proposed global settlement on the 
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at the price review, and he argued that it was preferable to accept the one penny 
increase rather than risk jeopardising the agreement which would force the 
Government to impose a settlement. l25 In reply Strachey argued that a point of 
principle was involved. If the Government's policy was to stimulate production 
through the price mechanism, then surely the Government had a right to change the 
emphasis on particular commodities to meet national production requirements. There 
was already a considerable gap between the prices of home produced and imported 
eggs, and any price increase would widen this gap still further, and would not be in 
the long-term interests of producers in the industry as a whole. 126 However, it was 
eventually agreed that it was 'not unreasonable' to increase prices for 1949/50, 
although producers were to be warned that in the long-term prices would have to be 
substantially reduced. MAF pressed for a further increase of one penny per dozen at 
the 1950 APR, arguing that it would be difficult to avoid making some increase. Both 
the Treasury and the Ministry of Food opposed the increase, a stance that was 
supported by the Cabinet.127 
MAF and the Ministry of Food clashed over egg and milk prices at the 1951 APR. 
The Ministry of Food's proposed settlement made no provision for the recoupment of 
the increased costs of milk producers and only provided for the recoupment of a small 




PC(49) 7th mtg., March 11th 1949, PRO CAB 134/640. 
ibid. 
. h . PRO See for example, a memorandum on CP(50)24 by W.H. ~~S er ~n 
T223/61, March 4th 1950; ibid., February 28th 1~5~, M~nutes ofw;~: 
First Inter-Departmental meeting: BY, 1950 :th~ M~n~stry'l£ F~~~ egg 
beginning to press for quant~tat~ve l~ts on ~. . es 
production as well as reductions in the schedule of ~n~um fF ~c . 
See PRO T223/61, March 3rd 1950, Feavearyear to R.H. Frank ~n. 
220 
a growing surplus of production and an increasing financial burden, and the Ministry 
of Food felt that any further expansion should be checked, even if this meant running 
the risk of a fall in outpUt.128 The Agricultural Departments could not accept the 
Ministry of Food's suggestions, arguing that the industry paid more attention to 
individual commodity prices than to the global figure for recoupment. If it was felt 
that certain important commodities had been treated 'unfairly' production would be 
affected out of all proportion to the actual level of under-recoupment. 129 The 
treatment afforded milk and eggs would also be taken as a symbol of the Governments 
attitude to other commodities in the future. 
The failure to give milk producers any recoupment would, MAF argued, be the cause 
of a definite setback in milk production, rather than simply a check to expansion, and 
there were signs that this had already occurred with egg production. MAF wanted 
milk and egg producers to be recouped by £12.5 million, as opposed to the Ministry 
of Food's suggested figure of £1.6 million, with £8 million for milk producers and 
£4.5 million for egg producers. The Cabinet eventually approved the MAF proposals, 
although the Government also recommended a 'damping down' of milk 
production. l30 The NFU expressed disappointment at the treatment afforded eggs 
and milk at the APR, as milk producers were left to deal with half of the increase in 
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When milk had been discussed at the inter-departmental talks prior to the 1950 APR 
the Treasury had suggested a reduction in prices, but MAF had felt that such a course 
of action would be unrealistic and that further expansion could be prevented by under-
recoupment. Vandepeer argued that there had to be some adjustment of prices to 
encourage the production of milk in winter, although the overall trend in production 
suggested a figure for recoupment of at most 3/4<1. per gallon, compared to an increase 
of 2d. in production costs.132 It was eventually agreed that MAF would begin their 
talks with the NFU on the basis of an increase of 1/2d., with the possibility of 
increasing this to 3/4<1. An increase of 7/8d. per gallon was finally agreed upon, with 
a winter bonus for small producers.133 
As was mentioned in the introduction, the cuts in Exchequer expenditure on 
agriculture that followed decontrol hit the small producer particularly severely; while 
prices and subsidies were increasing small farmers were assured of a reasonable level 
of income, without having to be particularly efficient. When these trends were 
reversed, however, they were unable to make the sorts of economies and technical 
improvements available to larger producers, and so found themselves in an 
increasingly difficult financial position. The APR system was constructed on a basis 
of 'undiscriminating aid to farmers generally'l34 and no consideration was given to 
the special problems facing small producers or to the structure of the industry as a 
whole, an issue which had occupied the thoughts of agriculturists in the inter-war 
132 See PRO T223/61, February 28th 1950, Minutes of the First Inter-
Departmental meeting. 
133 See CP(50)45, March 21st 1950, in PRO CAB 129/39; CM(50)14, March 
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'd 135 Th fi d' d . peno . e lrst measures eSlgne to gIve special assistance to small producers 
were introduced in 1959 under the Small Farmer Scheme, which offered financial 
assistance to producers whose holdings had the potential to become economic 
concerns. However, only £9 million, 3% of total agricultural expenditure in that year, 
was allocated to the scheme,136 and those producers whose holdings did not have 
this potential were left to muddle along as best they could, or to go out of business 
altogether. 
After decontrol an increasing proportion of Exchequer expenditure was given in the 
form of direct subsidies on fertilizers, field drainage and the ploughing-up of 
grassland. While this was more likely to be conducive to increasing efficiency than 
a reliance on the price mechanism, it did little to reduce the wide divergences in 
incomes and standards between producers, as the larger, more successful farmers 
would use more fertilizer and plough up more grassland than their smaller colleagues. 
The wide divergences in producers' incomes can be seen in Table Five. A similar 
state of affairs exists in British farming today, in the wake of attempts to reduce the 
cost of the Common Agricultural Policy and over-production within the EEe. Dairy 
farmers, particularly those in the Welsh hills and the South-West, have suffered 
particularly severely under the milk quota scheme. Once again small producers lack 
the financial resources and the scope to introduce modem management techniques and 
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Thus the wide divergence in incomes and standards remains a central problem for 
British agriculture. The heterogenaiety of agricultural producers in the UK was 
identified in the 1930's as one of the factors inhibiting the growth of progressive 
marketing techniques, as compared to Holland or Denmark. 138 In this period a 
number of agricultural economists advocated the reconstruction of British farming on 
a large scale and more efficient basis. In The Future of Farming, published in 1930, 
C.S. Orwin argued against legislation which simply, in his words, 'patched up an old 
garment', and instead advocated policies which he believed would 'clothe the 
countryside in a new vestment'. 139 These included the aggregation of small farms 
into single, large scale units, which would allow greater scope for the use of 
machinery and opportunities for economics of scale. A Daniel Hall recommended that 
the State assume ownership of all agricultural land and divide it up into units of a size 
suitable for the application of modern farming methods.140 In British Agriculture 
Astor and Rowntree argued that while wholesale structural change would be both 
impracticable and uneconomic the industry would benefit from the 'gradual regrouping 
of farms into larger units'. They argued for the setting up of 'Land Improvement 
Commissions' to acquire land which required major capital improvements, as a 
precaution to wider state control of the industry .141 
countryside. 
138 See Chapter V. 
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Without some form of State action any structural change within the industry was 
likely to be, in the words of Peter Self, 'piecemeal and faltering'.142 As Lloyd's 
figures show a large number of producers were forced out of the industry through 
bankruptcy in the 1950's, and so Conservative policies, albeit indirectly, brought about 
a degree of restructuring. Nationalisation was a key element in Labour's inter-war 
agricultural policy, and in the early 1940's Attlee was still arguing that 'without 
common ownership of the land there can be neither efficient planning nor an efficient 
agricultural industry'. 143 Labour envisaged the creation of a central planning 
authority, the 'National Agricultural Commission', which would draw up a national 
plan for the industry. The new Commission's powers would largely be delegated to 
County Agricultural Committees, and the latter would encourage experiments with 
large scale and collective farming enterprises. 144 In Let Us Face the Future the 
Party could still claim that Labour believed in nationalisation and would work towards 
it, but by the early 1950's it was clearly a dead issue. At the 1945 Party Conference, 
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By 1953, however, George Brown, formerly Williams' Parliamentary Secretary, was 
arguing that Labour no longer needed the powers that nationalisation would bring, as 
adequate powers were already available under the 1947 Act. l46 
Even without nationalisation Labour had another tool for structural change in the 
Agricultural Land Commission, which could have been used to purchase land and 
reorganise the individual units therein onto a more efficient, large-scale basis. 
However Labour made little real use of the Commision; by 1955 it had only acquired 
1/4 million acres of land, the majority of which had suffered long-standing neglect and 
so required a large amount of capital expenditure simply to return it to good health. 
Much of the land acquired did not yield an economic return. 147 Greater increases 
in both output and productivity could have been achieved if, rather than concentrating 
on marginal and derelict land, Labour had used the Commission as an instrument of 
structural change within the industry. The CAECs could have been used to encourage 
greater co-operation between farmers through an extension of the principles behind the 
Committees own machinery and labour pools. 
However, it is likely that if Labour had attempted to use the Commission for this 
purpose, the NFU would have accused the Government of trying to introduce 
nationalisation through the back door, and this would almost certainly have provoked 
a serious argument with the NFU, at a time when Williams was keen to retain the 




industry's support and confidence. In the immediate post-war period other more 
pressing issues, and in particular the need to maintain production on a wartime 
footing, forced nationalisation to the bottom of Labour's political agenda. The need 
for maximum levels of food production could not have been squared with a policy 
likely to both physically disrupt food production and, given the NFU's opposition to 
State ownership, lead Labour into a potentially damaging political battle with the 
industry. By the early 1950's the political considerations attached to the whole issue 
of nationalisation had become the deciding factor in Labour's attitude to state 
ownership of the land. 
This chapter has set out to detail both the general economic and specifically 
agricultural factors that influenced Labour policy at the price reviews, and to show the 
extent to which the Treasury, a supporter of the principle of the expansion programme, 
fought to restrain the cost to the Government of increased production. Once a ceiling 
had been placed on subsidy expenditure, the Ministry of Food also became concerned 
with the mounting cost of the programme to the Exchequer. As was argued above, 
MAF were unwilling to hard-bargain with the NFU or to impose a settlement on the 
industry, and the Cabinet were in general swayed by Williams' arguments, and by the 
spectre of the failure of the expansion programme. It was only when expansion 
ceased to be the overriding aim of agricultural policy that the Treasury could begin 
to exert any real pressure on agricultural expenditure. As this chapter has shown, the 
price discussions within the Cabinet were often as, if not more, heated than those 
between the NFU and MAF. Even if we accept J.R. Raeburn's assessment of the 
value of the expansion programme, this and later chapters show that the achievements 
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of the programme have to be set against the problems the Government and the 
industry faced after 1951, and the inability of both Labour and Conservative 




ESTIMATED OUTPUTS AND TOTAL INCOME 
Agricultural holdings: United Kingdom 
End-of-
ITEM Pre-war 1951- Pre-war war 1951- 1952-
period 1952 period period 1952 1953* 
£ million at pre-war prices £ million at 1951-52 prices 
Wheat and rye 8.4 14.8 23.7 49.3 42.5 39.4 
Barley 5.4 12.0 21.6 44.9 47.9 49.3 
Oats, mixed corn 3.3 2.2 11.2 12.7 7.7 7.7 
Potatoes 14.8 24.3 37.2 73.7 61.1 62.3 
Sugar beet 5.1 7.7 16.3 19.7 24.6 23.4 
Fruit, vegetables 25.3 36.1 69.3 96.1 93.6 90.2 
Other crops, 
sundry 15.8 15.2 49.3 40.6 47.1 45.4 
Total crops 78.1 112.3 228.6 337.0 324.5 317.7 
Beef, veal 41.5 44.0 112.7 99.0 119.3 111.9 
Mutton, lamb 16.7 12.4 55.2 39.3 41.0 47.8 
Pig meat, stores 28.6 29.2 118.0 42.8 123.4 153.8 
Eggs and poultry 38.8 45.1 124.4 77.8 144.3 145.0 
Milk and milk 
products 80.3 108.9 219.3 242.3 299.5 305.1 
Other stock 
products 5.1 3.4 28.6 20.3 21.6 21.6 
Total stock 
products 211.0 243.0 658.2 521.5 749.1 785.2 
Total current 
output 289.1 355.3 886.8 858.5 1073.6 1102.9 
Inventory changes, 
+14.1 crops, stock -0.2 +4.6 -0.5 -10.5 +14.3 
Total income 288.9 359.9 886.3 848.0 1087.9 1117.0 
229 
Table Two 
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Source: J.R. Raeburn, 
Three Banks Review 
(December 1953) 
Table Three 
ESTIMATED INCREASES IN ANNUAL OUTPUTS AND 
TOTAL INCOME 
Agricultural holdings: United Kingdom 
Pre-war to End-of-war 1951-52 
end-of-war period to to 
period 1951-52 1952-53 
£ million at 1951-52 prices 
Grains 50 -9 -2 
Potatoes -13 1 24 
Fruit, 
vegetables 27 -2 -3 
Beef, veal, 
mutton, lamb -30 2 -1 
Pig meat 81 30 36 
Eggs, poultry -46 67 1 
Milk and milk 
products 23 57 6 
Other Products -13 12 -3 
Inventory 
changes -10 25 0 















Source: J.R. Raeburn 
Three Banks Review 
(December 1953) 
Table Four 
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE FOR AGRICULTURE 
United Kingdom 
Pre-war 1951-
Item period 1952 
£ million at 
pre-war prices 
Labour 66 67 
Machinery 15 54 
Feedingstuffs 71 44 
Fertilisers 8 25 
Seeds, imported 4 8 
Livestock imported 15 12 
Other 23 33 
Total paid by 
farmers 202 243 
Subsidies on goods and 
services used for 
production: 
Paid to farmers 3 16 




























Source: J.R. Raeburn, 
Three Banks Review 
(December 1953) 
Table Five 
DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY SIZE OF NET INCOME, 
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Source: E.F. Nash, 
Uoyds Bank Review 
No. 41, July 1956. 
(V) 
'AGRICULTURAL MARKETING, 1945-51' 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural marketing, the presentation, handling, and distribution of agricultural 
produce, proved to be a highly problematic issue for Labour after 1945. Having 
instigated an investigation into the workings of the pre-war Marketing Acts the 
Government shied away from implementing the radical proposals put forward by the 
investigating committee, in the face of strong opposition to reform from both the 
Conservatives and the industry itself. The farmers were concerned to regain and 
extend the control over the marketing of agricultural produce they had enjoyed in the 
inter-war period. The eventual outcome was the 1949 Marketing Act which simply 
amended the existing legislation in the light of the changes that had taken place in 
agricultural policy since 1939. No action was taken on the Lucas Committee's main 
policy recommendations, although once in power the Conservatives took a more 
pragmatic line on marketing policy than had been suggested by their Agricultural 
Charter. 
The Lucas Report, published in 1947, argued that inefficient and ineffective marketing 
was one of the main reasons for the 'continuously depressed' condition of the industry 
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in the inter-war period'.! An earlier, contemporary report had argued that British 
farmers lacked a full developed 'marketing sense' and that this put them at a 
disadvantage compared to their foreign competitors, who had secured the efficient 
standardization, grading, and bulk handling of their produce.2 Voluntary co-operation 
had made little headway in the inter-war period and this was due, in part, to what the 
Lucas Report identified as the 'ingrained individualism of the British farmer'.3 This 
individualism stemmed in turn from the economic and social heterogeneity of British 
farmers compared to their rivals in New Zealand or Denmark. Any moves towards 
greater voluntary co-operation were also hampered by the pressures of the inter-war 
economic climate which served to increase competition between producers. The 
Linlithgow Report, published in 1924, also concluded that the farmers' position in the 
distribution chain, 'alone at the end of a long line of distributive agencies', and the 
large number of individual farming units placed producers in an unfavorable position 
in relation to the processors and other middlemen they had to deal with. 4 Certainly 
many farmers in the 1920's felt that the monopsonistic position of many processing 
concerns was being used against the interests of producers, by pushing producers' 






ointed to Review the Workin of the (Lucas Report), Econo~c Ser~es No.48 
Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Distribu,tio,n and 
Prices (Linlithgow Report), Cmd 2008 (1924). The L~nl~thgow 
Committee had been appointed to investigate the methods a~d costs 
of selling and distributing agricultural produce ~nd to. cons~der hbw 
the gap between the 'farm gate' and the reta~l pr~ce could e 
reduced. 
Lucas Report, p.S. 
Linlithgow Report, p.28. 
See J.R. Raeburn 'Agricultural Production and Marketin9." i~ r· 
Burn (ed.), The structure of British Industry: A Sympos~um, o. 
I (1961), p.13-14. 
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could provide producers with a business and sales organisation through which they 
could improve their production and marketing techniques, they could do little to 
improve their bargaining power in what was essentially a buyer's market for 
agricultural produce. British farmers had no control over imports or over domestic 
producers who chose to sell their produce outside the co-operative. 
The failure of the Government's 'National Mark' scheme revealed that a stronger form 
of organisation was needed to bolster producers' bargaining power and to improve the 
overall efficiency of agricultural marketing and grading.6 The aim of the 1931 
Marketing Act was 'to equip the British farmer for the first time with a machine that 
will enable him to be master of his own market', a machine that would also compel 
a reluctant minority to 'play the game'.? The Act empowered a 2/3 majority of 
producers to set up a producer elected marketing board and, subject to certain 
safeguards, to compel a dissenting minority to co-operate with the marketing board. 
There was, however, no compulsion to initiate a marketing scheme; MAP could 
appoint a Reorganization Committee to assist in the setting-up of a board but the 
decision to organise was taken by the producers alone. Marketing boards could 
regulate production and sales off farms, dispose of any surpluses, and enforce 
minimum standards of grading and packaging. The Act also made provision for the 
creation of Consumers' Committees to monitor the activities of the boards and MAF 
6 
7 
Under the Agricultural Produce (Grading ~n~ Marketing) Act 19?8 MAF 
could prescribe quality grades for Br~t~sh produce and l~cense 
producers and dealers to use a 'National Mark on graded pr~duce. 
Schemes were introduced for apples, pears, eggs and beef sold ~n the 
London and Birmingham wholesale markets. ov~ra+l, however, the 
progress made was disaPl?ointing, with the maJ~r~ty of producers 
sticking to their tradit~onal methods and pract~ces. 
Chr istopher Addison, Labour's Agr icul ture Minister, in H. of C. 
Deb., (5th Series) vol. 248, Col. 67, February 9th 1931. 
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was empowered to revoke a scheme and to order producers to amend a marketing 
scheme. 
However, both the 1931 Marketing Act and Labour's other important pIece of 
agricultural legislation, the Agricultural Land (Utilization) Act 1931, were 'designed 
for calmer days than those which saw them placed on the Statute book'.8 While 
imported produce could still enter the country unhindered producers regarded the 1931 
Act as being virtually useless and only one board, for hops, was set up under the 
terms of the 1931 Act. Reviewing the progress of marketing reform in the inter-war 
years the Lucas Report highlighted what the Committee saw as being the 'fatal 
weakness' of the first Marketing Act. 
'It called upon the home producer to undertake the new and difficult 
task of marketing reconstruction, involving an abatement of his 
cherished liberty as an individual trader, but gave no assurance that 
steps would be taken to prevent the market as a whole from being 
swamped by the uncontrolled flow of cheap imports,.9 
This weakness was remedied by the onset of 'National' Government in the autumn of 
1931. Whilst the 1932 Wheat Act was designed to deal with the industry's immediate 
problems, the promotion of marketing schemes under the existing legislation, with 
8 
9 
E.H. Whetharn, The Agrarian Histor& of England and Wales: VOte VIII 
1914-1939 (1978), p.241. Under t e 1931 Land Act a corporat~on w~s 
to be established to buy, equip, and oper~te a n~~r.o~ farms !~ 
order to test and demonstrate the commerc~al poss~b~l~t~es of n 
strains of seed new machinery and so on. The Act was subsequently 
repealed by the' National Government in 1931. 
Lucas report, p.7. 
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complementary action to be taken with regard to imported produce, was seen as a 
long-term measure, designed to 'facilitate economic development in those branches of 
the agricultural industry which are likely to be most renumerative and particularly 
those which lend themselves to most rapid development,.l0 Part One of the 1933 
Marketing Act empowered the Board of Trade (BOT) to limit the importation of any 
commodity into the UK where a marketing board was in operation, or where such 
action was required before a board could be established. Where the import of a 
particular commodity was being controlled MAF could regulate the sales of home 
produce by determining the amount, type, and grade that could be sold. A Market 
Supply Committee, appointed by the Minister, was created to review the supply 
situation and to make recommendations regarding BOT and MAF Orders. 
Under the 1931 Act marketing boards had been able to control supply by determining 
the grade that could be sold or by prescribing the quantity to be sold at a given price. 
The 1933 Act added to these the power to place direct quantitative limits on a 
producer's sales. The short-term aim of import regulation was to restrict supplies to 
maintain or increase the price of home-produced commodities. In the long-term, 
however, the re-organisation of the industry through marketing schemes was not seen 
as necessarily involving cuts in imports, 'rather a rational sharing among the organised 
national groups of producers - including the home producer - of an expanding 
quantum of demand'. 11 
10 ibid., p.7. 
11 ibid., p.9. 
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Marketing boards were set up for milk, potatoes, hops and bacon pigs. The Milk 
Marketing Board (MMB) for England and Wales began its operations in September 
1935, acting as a 'third party' in all contracts for the sale of milk. The Board 
prescribed the price of milk and the use to which it should be put and collected all the 
payments. The MMB also laid down minimum margins in the distribution of liquid 
milk to prevent wholesalers and retailers from being undercut. 12 The Potato 
Marketing Board (PMB) began its operations in March 1934, the overall aim being 
to reduce the wide swings in price caused by fluctuations in the size of the crop 
coming onto the market from year to year. 13 To reduce these price swings the PMB 
sought to limit changes in the supply of potatoes by imposing a minimum size for the 
market-able crop which varied according to the yield. The PMB could also limit the 
size of the area sown to potatoes and although as a rule the Board did not perform any 
trading functions, it could intervene to support the general level of prices. 
Despite the growing support for the principle of marketing boards within the industry 
no new schemes were implemented after 1934, although proposals for, amongst others, 
eggs and table poultry were submitted. The Government increasingly began to 
consider other approaches to the problem and the main reason for this change 10 
direction was summed up in the Lucas Report, which concluded that: 
12 
13 
The market for liquid milk was se~arated.from the m~ket for m+lk 
for manufacturing the latter be1.ng dOml.nated by l.mpor~ed da1.ry 
produce, and the B~ard could charge different rates accord1.ng to the 
milk's final destination. 
Consumer demand was inelastic in resfonse to a fall. in hrice and so 
a large crop led to a disproportiona ly l~rge fali cint t e whdle~i~~ ~rice and in farmers' incomes, and thus 1.n turn e 0 a re uc 
1.n acreage the following year. 
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'It is apparent that, once producers' price objectives had been in any 
way satisfied, not very much was done towards realising the other 
objectives for the promotion of which the Agricultural Marketing Acts 
were designed'.14 
Producers had made little use of the Marketing Acts to promote more efficient 
production, price amelioration being virtually their sole objective, and little had been 
done to implement the basic recommendations of the Linlithgow Committee.1s The 
Consumers' Committee for milk complained bitterly about the lack of competition and 
rising prices in the retail milk market. The Milk Marketing Board had tried to cut 
distributors' margins which led to disputes which were only settled by arbitration, and 
this had led to a general feeling that a producer-run marketing board was not a 
suitable mechanism for dealing with the problem of milk distribution. Faced with the 
'disappointing progress of re-organisation' under the Marketing Acts the Government 
turned to the independent, Government-appointed Commodity Commission as a 
solution to the problem of agricultural marketing and by 1938 this had become 'in 
principle, if not as yet in practice, the focal point of marketing policy'. 16 
The Commission established under the Wheat Act 1932 had been almost solely 
concerned with the administration of the deficiency payments scheme for wheat and 
the collection of the levy on millers and flour importers from which the payments 
were made. Under the Livestock Industry Act 1937 the Livestock Commission was 
14 Lucas Report, p.12. 
15 E.H. Whetham, British Farming 1939-49 (1952), p.19. 
16 Lucas Report, p.50. 
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made responsible for the 'development and organisation of the livestock and connected 
industries, for the payment of the cattle subsidy, and for regulating the importation, 
sale, and slaughter of livestock'. The BOT was empowered to make orders regulating 
the import of meat and livestock into the UK. The Commission was assisted by an 
advisory committee made up of representatives of the producers, local authorities, and 
auctioneers. A similar organisation was created to deal with sugar but the Milk 
Industry Bill 1938 was withdrawn in the face of fierce opposition from producers and 
distributors. The Commodity Commission legislation also provided for the delegation 
of certain functions to producers when/if a marketing board was established for that 
commodity. However, by 1939 little progress had been made towards establishing the 
most effective division of responsibility between the two types of organisation, and 
it was left to the Lucas Committee to take up this question some years later. 
With the onset of the war the Ministry of Food assumed full responsibility for the 
control of sales off farms and for all subsequent stages of the marketing process. The 
Ministry either acted as the sole buyer itself or appointed buyers who acted under its 
direction, and all food production was carried out under license from the Government. 
Food production was rationalised with, for example, large reductions in the number 
of slaughterhouses and egg packing stations. Although the existing marketing schemes 
were not formally revoked the boards' powers were transferred in toto to the Ministry 
of Food, and the majority of their staffs were subsequently absorbed into the 
MinistryY The MMB, however, did continue to operate, although the control of 
17 'There is no doubt that the nationwide administrative or9anisatio~s 
which the Boards had built up were of great as~~stance .~n 
facilitating the establishment of a more comprehens~ve wart~e 
control'. Lucas Report, p.47. 
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distribution was transferred to the Government. Initially the Ministry was only 
responsible for fixing maximum retail prices and for regulating margins in England 
and Wales. However it soon became apparent that the demand for milk was rapidly 
exceeding the available supplies under the existing marketing arrangements and so in 
October 1942 the Ministry of Food became the sole purchaser of milk through the 
MMB. While this entailed a loss of a number of the Board's existing functions, it 
now became the buyer of milk rather than a third party to contracts between 
distributors and producers. 18 
18 
h to control the movement 
In scotland the MMB alreadY,had t e fow::essary for the Government 
of milk off the farm and so ~~lkas ~h nscottish MMB paid producers 
to become the owner of the ~,' e ent from distributors and 
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(i) 
In the King's Speech in August 1945, Labour pledged that it would 'develop to the 
fullest possible extent the home production of good food' and that to this end the 
Government would continue, 'with suitable adaptations', the wartime measures under 
which the industry had been organised.19 Food was in short supply but Labour 
would endeavour to procure and distribute food at prices people could afford. 
Speaking in November 1945, Ben Smith, Labour's first Minister of Food, outlined 
Labour's long-term food policy. The Government accepted responsibility for ensuring 
adequate supplies of food and, in keeping with Britain's membership of the U.N. Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), for improving nutritional standards?O While 
food remained scarce the wartime system of rationing and controls over food 
procurement, distribution and prices would remain in operation. When the world food 
situation improved, however, it was the Government's aim to remove as rapidly as 
possible those controls on consumers, traders and producers which were not necessary 
for the success of Labour's long-term policy, whilst retaining and adapting those 
controls which were necessary. In the case of the most important agricultural 
commodities the Government would 'undertake such responsibility in respect of 
procurement, distribution and sale as is necessary to ensure that adequate supplies are 
available at reasonable prices and to implement such international agreement on 
commercial and commodity policy as may be concluded'. The position of the home 
producer in producing the goods required by the nation would be protected, and the 
19 H. of C. Deb., (5th Series) Vol. 413, Col. 55-57, August 15th 1945. 
20 H. of C. Deb., (5th Series) vol. 415, Col. 1284-1285, November 7th 
1945. 
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trader who rendered the nation a 'fair service' would be fairly rewarded. However, 
Smith warned that there would not be any automatic return to pre-war conditions and 
that, subject to the general principles he had already mentioned, the methods required 
to achieve Labour's long-term policy would be considered in relation to each 
commodity individually. 
Indeed, Labour's commitment to planned food production, stable markets, and the 
continued presence of the Ministry of Food seemed to suggest that there would not 
be a return to pre-war conditions and that reforms would be undertaken. The reform 
of the distributive trades or of agricultural marketing had not been mentioned 
specifically in the 1945 manifesto, although it was stated that the Ministry of Food 
would continue the bulk purchase of agricultural commodities and would organise the 
efficient distribution of food at home, 'with no vested interests imposing unnecessary 
costs'.21 Labour was also committed to the public supervision of monopolies and 
cartels and to prohibiting all restrictive practices. Under the wartime system of 
controls the Ministry of Food was empowered to licence all dealers and wholesalers, 
and the war years had seen reductions in the number of slaughter houses and egg 
packing stations. 
The future of agricultural marketing had first been discussed in the spring of 1945 by 
an inter-departmental committee set up to 'supervise, co-ordinate, and initiate the 
preparation of plans for agricultural marketing', under the Chairmanship of Donald 
21 From Let Us Face the Future, in FWS craig (ed), British General 
Election Manifestos 1900-1974 (1975), p.128. 
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Vandepeer.22 The Committee published its conclusions in April 1945.23 Overall 
the pre-war marketing boards were seen as having strengthened the industry's 
bargaining position and as having made possible the introduction of improved 
marketing techniques. However, the committee also concluded that the boards had 
failed to formulate bold policies or to introduce radical improvements in marketing 
techniques while ever easier ways of satisfying producers, in themselves 'traditionally 
individualistic and unprogressive in marketing', had been available. The strongest 
resistance to change had in fact come from the distributive trades, and so producers 
had tended to co-operate with them rather than attempt to introduce reforms. 
Reviewing the inter-war experience of marketing reform the Committee concluded that 
'on the whole', producer boards had been less progressive in dealing with long-term 
issues than with the short-term interests of their members. This was due not so much 
to the form of the organisation as to 'considerations of convenience, political 
expediency and immediate producers' interests', and it was these considerations that 
had led to the boards working with the established distributive interests rather than 
attempting to introduce changes in the existing distribution machinery. Marketing 
boards, the Committee concluded, were not inherently incapable of formulating bold 
policies, but required as a necessary basis a determined Government policy to secure 
major reforms. It was, however, too early for the Committee to draw any conclusions 
22 
23 
PRO MAF 34/724, March 17th 1945, letter from Donald Vandepeer to Sir 
Henry French. 
PRO MAF 34/724, rCAM/MC/7, April 27th 1945, 'Agricultural Marketin1 in the UK Before and After the War'. The rnter-Depart;menta 
Committee on the Marketing of Agricultural Produce was co~p~~sed o~ 
representatives of the Agricultural Departments and the M~n~stry 0 
Food. 
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as to the future objectives and structure of post-war marketing organisation from the 
Ministry of Food's wartime experiences. 
Thus the whole problem of post-war marketing had still to be solved, and after 1945 
Labour had to address a whole range of potentially highly controversial issues; should 
the old-style producer boards be revived and, if sO,how would they fit into the APR 
machinery, which was to be made permanent under the Agriculture Act? Did the pre-
war experience of marketing boards in fact justify their revival as a part of post-war 
agricultural policy, and what would be the relationship between any marketing boards 
and the Ministry of Food? In December 1946 these issues were remitted to a 
Committee under the chairmanship of the Labour peer Lord Lucas, appointed to 
review the working of the Marketing Acts up to 1939 and to consider and report on 
any modifications which might be necessary in the light of post-war agriculture and 
food policy.24 
The Lucas Committee Report, whilst applauding the 'moderation and sense of 
responsibility' shown by the inter-war producers' organisations, emphasised that the 
conditions which had justified the restrictionist policies pursued had also imposed 
moderation, as producers were still functioning in a 'buyers' market'. Little had been 
done towards realising the long-term objectives of marketing reform, and the control 
over agricultural marketing by the Ministry of Food had been directed towards 
24 Lucas Report, P.I. other members of the.Commi~tee.inc~uded JO~~ 
Ryan, who was la~er to pre~ide o~er the ~nvest~~~on tn~he~24 
county organisat~on, and S~r Bas~l Mayhew, a m er 0 
Linlithgow committee. 
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immediate wartime objectives.25 There was no guarantee, the Report continued, that 
the power of the marketing boards would be used with such moderation in the 'sellers' 
market' that had existed since the end of the war. Labour's policies on full 
employment, nutrition, and national insurance, combined with a general 'levelling up' 
of incomes, would increase expenditure on food and lead to a greater stability in 
demand. On the supply side, long-term balance of payments problems and a number 
of other factors would mean that imported foodstuffs would be in a far less favourable 
position in relation to home production than was the case before the war. 26 On the 
basis of these trends the Committee made two observations about the necessary 
objectives of any post-war marketing policy. Firstly, there would be no need for any 
form of supply restriction, and secondly: 
'The improvement of efficiency in order to economIse the use of 
manpower in marketing and to offset as far as possible the increased 
prime cost of the produce will be more than ever the imperative duty 
of such marketing authorities as may be set Up'.27 
The Government's food and agriculture policy would also have a bearing on the nature 
and scope of marketing organisation. 
Labour's long-term food policy only served to highlight the crucial weaknesses of the 
inter-war marketing schemes: The failure of the Consumers' Committees to give the 
25 ibid., p.13. 
26 See Chapter III. 
27 Lucas Report, p.sl. 
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general public adequate protection, a defect made all the more serious by the new 
economic climate, and the failure of producer boards to secure any cuts in the cost of 
distribution. Although the issue of food distribution was outside the Committee's 
remit, the Report did emphasize that without the rationalization of the chain of 
distribution the benefits of efficient marketing would be lost. 28 In the light of these 
problems, and the developments that had taken place since 1939, the Lucas Report 
argued that the question of post-war marketing could not be dealt with by simply 
amending the existing legislation; the machinery of marketing had to be considered 
as a whole to discover what type of arrangement would be best-suited to the new 
market conditions. 
The Lucas Report suggested four possible alternatives; a policy of 'laissez-faire', a 
return to old-style producer boards, the retention of Ministry of Food control from the 
farm gate to the consumer, and the creation of independent corporations to manage the 
marketing of agricultural produce on public utility lines. Some form of organisation 
was necessary and the Committee supported the creation of Commodity Commissions 
with control over a given commodity from the point at which the guaranteed price 
operated to the point at which it reached the consumer. Producers would no longer 
be the group most affected by wasteful marketing arrangements and: 
'Taxpayers who have in effect underwritten the price which a producer 
receives cannot acquiesce in a situation which leaves the marketing 
arrangements to the decision of an uncoordinated mass of producers, 
28 ibid., p.52. 
248 
particularly when these no longer have any obvious interest In the 
prices actually realised for their produce'.29 
In their evidence to the Committee the producers' representatives had argued that 
marketing boards should be re-instated on inter-war lines, claiming that producers 
retained an interest in the marketing of their produce up to the point at which it 
reached the consumer. In reply the Committee had argued that this interest was not 
an exclusive one and that a number of other groups were 'parties with the producers 
in the operation of the marketing machine'. Producers did not have a 'prescriptive 
right' which justified the powers of producer boards extending beyond the farm gate. 
It was also clear that this was not the intention of the Marketing Acts themselves, 
which made producers, processors and distributors equally competent to promote 
statutory marketing schemes.3o 
The NFU argued that with the introduction of guaranteed prices and assured markets 
the expansion of production had become the industry's sole objective, and that this 
made producer marketing boards the most socially desireable mechanism for 
supervising the marketing of guaranteed price commodities. The NFU argued that 
producers' interests corresponded so closely to the public interest that they could be 
trusted to secure efficient and economic marketing. In reply the Committee had stated 
that the general public, whether as taxpayers or consumers, had a more direct interest 
than producers in realising market economies. While there was a direct incentive for 
29 ibid., p.53. 
30 ibid., p.54. 
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producers to reduce their costs up to the farm gate, with the onset of fixed guaranteed 
prices there were only 'indirect and somewhat uncertain' advantages to be gained from 
attempts to reduce costs beyond this point.31 Producers would therefore be unwilling 
to spend large sums on increasing demand beyond the point at which the guaranteed 
price operated. If the expenditure proved to be unrenumerative they would suffer an 
unrequited loss, and if it proved to be renumerative most of the benefits would accrue 
to consumers or taxpayers.32 
In conclusion the NFU had argued that producers would not be prepared to cater their 
output to the needs of the market or to deliver it in the most suitable form unless they 
themselves controlled the machinery which handled their produce.33 The Lucas 
Report stressed that in the inter-war period producer boards had done little to increase 
the physical efficiency of marketing and that the most effective way of encouraging 
farmers to undertake such a task was through financial incentives. The Report also 
advanced what it regarded as two conclusive arguments against re-instating old style 
producer boards. Firstly, marketing was a continuous process in which producers, the 
distributive trades, and consumers were all involved, and to give anyone group a 
monopoly was only permissable if that group was economically disadvantaged. In the 
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250 
Secondly, with regard to the guaranteed price commodities the Report argued that it 
was the taxpayer who bought the produce at the farm gate and that thereafter it 
became public property. 34 
The distributive trades had suggested the 'dilution' of the boards' powers by making 
them take representatives of the other interests concerned onto the boards. The 
Committee had rejected this proposal for the same reasons it had dismissed the 
reinstatement of unreconstructed producer boards.35 In their evidence to the 
Committee the MAF representatives argued that 'in general' the Marketing Acts had 
proved 'reasonably satisfactory', despite the misgivings the Department had expressed 
some years earlier. Although MAF claimed that producers had proved that they could 
administer marketing schemes with regard to the interests of their members and the 
general public, it was suggested that in the light of the prevailing circumstances, and 
the need for a planned economy, there was a need to ensure that 'the national interest 
is always at the forefront of the picture in the administration of a board's affairs'.36 
MAF suggested that this could be achieved by increasing the number of independent 
and Government-appointed members on each board and by the drawing up of a set of 
'guiding principles .... which will convey to the agricultural industry the objectives 
which the nation expects from producer organisation and the pitfalls which such 





Lucas report, p.S7. 
ibid., p.S7. 
PRO MAF 120/17, March 4th 1947, 'The Agricultural Marketing Acts'. 
The Agricultural de~artments were against the appointment of 
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departmental committee, appointed by the President of the Board of Trade, to which 
Ministers could go to seek advice before granting a marketing board any powers. 
The MAF proposals were clearly designed to remedy the defects the inter-
departmental committee on marketing had identified in the pre-war operation of the 
marketing boards; the failure of producer-run organisations to introduce bold policies 
or to tackle long-term marketing problems. The committee had concluded that the 
boards were not inherently 'reactionary', but that greater Government guidance was 
needed to secure major reforms. Given the Lucas Committee's terms of reference it 
is not surprising that MAF's evidence was concerned with reforming the existing 
marketing arrangements. However, as section (ii) will show, MAF were prepared to 
consider more drastic reforms and to at least discuss such measures with the 
producers, despite the NFU's obvious support for the principle of producer marketing. 
The NFU was committed to working with the Government of the day and maintaining 
its political neutrality, in order to protect its privileged consultative position. 
However, the dispute surrounding the 1946 SPR revealed that the Government had not 
fully cemented its 'partnership' and that the Union was still prepared to fight the 
Government or individual, albeit non-party political, issues.38 The 1946 SPR also 
served to reveal the tension between the NFU hierarchy's moderation and the relative 
militancy of the County branches. As section (iii) will show the Union leaders saw 
the Lucas Report as raising highly political issues and the NFU in fact made no 
official statement on the Report on its publication, James Turner et al preferring to 
38 See Chapter IV. 
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voice their concerns in private. The producers gave voice to their hostility through 
the MMB. In June 1948 the Board's AGM voted unanimously to oppose both Lucas 
and the Williams Report on milk distribution. Prior to the AGM a private meeting 
of the Board's Regulatory Committees had declared its 'unrelenting opposition' to the 
Lucas Report and its support for the principle of producer marketing boards. The 
producers saw marketing boards as a form of insurance against any future 'U-turn' on 
agricultural policy, and as providing 'an extra string to the NFU bow in fighting the 
farmers' battles in the years to come'.39 
The Lucas Report also rejected the maintenance on a permanent basis of the Ministry 
of Food's existing powers over the sale and distribution of agricultural produce. The 
nature of the Civil Service, the Committee argued, made it unsuitable to operate a 
large commercial undertaking, which required rapid decision making at all levels.40 
The Committee also felt that genuinely efficient marketing would require both a 
'ruthless' cutting of distributive margins and the rationalization of distributive and 
retail facilities, and that a Government department would be a poor instrument for 
carrying out these reforms. The Ministry of Food would 'always be tempted to let 
things go on and have a quiet life'. The Committee felt that the Ministry of Food was 
too 'distributor-minded' and that for this reason no government department should be 
given exclusive control over the marketing process. However, as Edith Whetham 
argued 'the decision to put a man out of an established business is a political one, 
39 
40 
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justified to both the general public and others in the same trade'. 41 Such action 
would require proof of a firm's inefficiency or redundancy, and in the absence of 
accurate costings and a comprehensive understanding of how the trade was organised 
in different areas such proof was not available. The Ministry of Food had the power 
to rationalise the distributive trades but in the absence of the necessary data such 
action would, as Whetham argues, have created a political storm which the 
Government would have had difficulty in weathering.42 
Having rejected 'laissez-faire', producer control, and the continued control of the 
Ministry of Food, the Report concluded that the authority for the planning and 
implementation of marketing policy should be invested in an independent body, a 
Commodity Commission, financed from public funds and functioning like a public 
utility corporation. A Commission would control a particular commodity from the 
moment it left the farm gate until it reached the consumer. The Commodity 
Commissions would possess all of the regulatory and trading powers formerly granted 
to the producer boards and would also undertake the process of reforming the 
distributive and processing trades.43 The Commissions would be jointly appointed 
by MAF and the Ministry of Food. Producers, processors and distributors would form 
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however, envisage a role for the producer board in the new marketing system. One 
of the marketing boards' main functions would be to negotiate contracts with their 
respective Commission and to ensure that all their members adhered to the terms of 
the contract. 44 
The Lucas Committee found support for its conclusions in the recommendations of 
another Government appointed commission. The Williams Committee had been 
appointed by John Strachey in October 1946 to examine the distribution of liquid milk 
from the farm gate to the doorstep and to advise on any changes that were necessary 
to ensure that 'clean safe milk is delivered as efficiently and cheaply as possible'.45 
The Committee's final report recommended the setting up of a single independent Milk 
Commission, to work under the general direction of the relevant departments and with 
a General Manager responsible for the Commission's day to day running. The 
Ministry of Food would continue to fix the general level of subsidies and retail prices, 
and would also determine the overall division of supplies between the liquid and 
manufacturing markets. MAF would continue to negotiate and fix producers' 
prices.46 
The responsibilities of the Commission would include the transport of milk from the 
farm to its final destination, the negotiation of margins for the various stages of 
distribution and processing within the global sum fixed by the Ministry of Food, and 
44 ibid., p.57. 
45 Report of the committee on Milk Distribution (Williams Report) Cmd 
7414 (1948), p.1. 
46 Williams Report, p.49-50. 
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the negotiation of seasonal variations in producers' prices, this time within the global 
figure fixed at the APR. The Williams Report also recommended that the Milk 
Commission be given powers to carry out any of the distributive or processing 
functions involved in milk production itself, including the manufacture of milk 
products and the bottling and retailing of liquid milk. The MMB had argued for the 
restoration of their pre-war powers but the Committee's view was that developments 
in policy since 1939 had removed the main reason for the M:MB's existence, the fixing 
of producers' prices, which was now under-taken at the APR. The Milk Commission 
would pay producers directly leaving the MMB to exercise a limited number of 
functions, although this issue was outside the Committee's remit.47 
As was mentioned above, the NFU made no public statement on the Lucas or 
Williams Reports, although the MMB was quick to voice its objections to the 
proposals. Milk producers had been instrumental in securing the withdrawal of the 
Milk Industry Bill, 1938, which had proposed the setting up of an independent 
regulatory Milk Commission. Not all opinion within the industry was so hostile, 
however, and The Farmer and Stockbreeder and The Farmers' Weekly argued that it 
was 'rather naive' to expect a return to the complete producer control of marketing. 
With the changes that had taken place since 1939, the main one being the continued 
existence of the Ministry of Food, 'to argue for exclusive producer control ..... is to 
cry for the moon'.48 Indeed, in the wake of the publication of the Lucas report the 
NFU sent out a questionnaire on the proposals to all the county branches and the 
47 ibid., p.51-52. 
48 See The Farmer and stockbreeder, December 30th 1947. 
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replies ranged from a complete rejection of the Report to an acceptance of the 
proposals in their entirety, and this made it very difficult for the General Committee 
to formulate a definite policy on the Report.49 As section (ii) will show, however, 
there was also a political dimension to the Union's reticence on the issue. 
In a private conversation with Sir Thomas Dugdale in February 1948 the NFU's 
President Sir James Turner outlined his and his own colleagues' views on the future 
of agricultural marketing. Producer marketing boards, he emphasised, should be the 
basis of future Government policy and in most cases they should deal directly with 
the distributive trades. Turner accepted the need for an independent body concerned 
with agricultural marketing, arguing that it should be responsible for determining the 
point of insertion of the consumer subsidy and for investigating all cases where the 
cost to the consumer of a given product appeared excessive when compared to the 
price paid to the producer. Turner also suggested that this independent body could 
perform the functions previously associated with the Committees of Investigation 
established under the Marketing Acts. This monitoring body would consist of 
members of the agricultural community and representatives of the Treasury and the 
Ministry of Food. Turner was keen to stress that these proposals did not represent 
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The NUA Wand the TUC's Economic Committee approved the Lucas Report in 
principle, viewing it as a 'courageous attempt to solve the complicated problems of 
agricultural marketing and distribution through the introduction of a measure of public 
supervision and control,.51 At the 1946 TUC Conference an NUAW motion calling 
upon the Government to undertake a drastic reorganization of the marketing and 
distribution of agricultural produce had been carried unanimously, and this had led to 
a joint General Council and NUAW deputation being sent to discuss the issue with 
Tom Williams in March 1947.52 The TUC were subsequently invited to give 
evidence before the Lucas Committee and a written statement was submitted in April 
1947. Their submission reiterated a number of the criticisms the TUC had directed 
at marketing boards in the past, but was directed towards reforming the existing 
system rather than a radical reconstruction of marketing organisation. The TUC 
advocated greater representation for workers and consumers on producer boards, the 
widening of such schemes to deal with wholesale and retail distribution, and the 
increased co-ordination of individual marketing schemes for the better planning of the 
industry as a whole. 53 
In the Agricultural Charter the Conservative Party stated its opposition to the Lucas 
Committee proposals, and the Party's attitude to the Report remained unequivocal; 
Phillip Bremridge in his 1951 monograph Agriculture and Politics referred to it as the 
'infamous Lucas Report,.54 In Agricultural Marketing, also published in 1951, the 
51 The TUC, Annual re120rt 1948, p.262-64. 
52 The TUC, Annual Re120rt 1946, p.463; Annual Re120rt 1947, p.274-76. 
53 The TUC, Annual Re120rt 1948, p.262-64. 
54 Phillip Bremridge, Agriculture and Politics (1951), p.46. 
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Conservative MP Richard Nugent argued that producer marketing had shown itself to 
be a practical proposition while other suggested mechanism had not. The Lucas 
Report was attacked for its 'prejudice' against the producer and for the implicit 
assumption that the producer had no right to control the marketing of his produce once 
it had left the farm gate. The Conservatives argued that this was not implied in the 
1947 ACt.55 The Party's Marketing Sub-Committee argued that the basis of all 
agricultural marketing should remain the producer board, the principles of which were 
'now firmly established in the minds of the agricultural community and it would be 
folly to take away many of the boards' most important functions'. 
The Commodity Commissions proposed by the Lucas and Williams Reports were seen 
as being 'extravagant, bureaucratic and inflexible'. The Sub-Committee's report argued 
that the established powers of the marketing boards should be restored and that the 
powers of any new boards should be decided on a commodity by commodity basis. 
The Sub-Committee was not opposed to the principle of Commodity Commissions, 
only to the powers the Lucas Committee had suggested they should be given. They 
were seen by the Conservatives as performing essentially 'policing' and supervisory 
functions and investigating allegations of waste and inefficiency.56 The Sub-
Committee's interim report did, however, acknowledge that the Lucas Report might 
cause 'considerable' differences of opinion within the Party, with the agricultural 
interest keen to see the principle of producer marketing reasserted, and the distributive 
55 
56 
RD/12/Gen/1, December 9th 1947, Meeting of the Parliamentary 
committee for Agriculture, in CRD 2/13/2I. 
RD/12/Gen/1 March 20th 1948, Report of the sub-committee on 
Agricultural Marketing, in CRD 2/13/2I. In the Aqricultur~l cl;larter 
(1949) the Party stated that: 'The basis of good market~ng ~n the 
future should De producers' co-operation both through voluntary 
organisations and through statutory marketing boards'. 
259 
trades and urban interests, who had always disliked producer boards, taking up the 
Lucas proposals.57 
57 CRD/2/13/2I, December 9th 1947. 
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(ii) 
In November 1947 Herbert Broadly, Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Food, wrote 
to Sir Donald Vandepeer on the subject of the Lucas Report and his Department's 
proposed Food Bill, which would have to legislate for the permanent functions of the 
Ministry of Food when the Supplies and Services (Transitional) Powers Act, 1945 
lapsed in 1950. The Bill could also provide an opportunity to establish Commodity 
Commissions and Broadly suggested a meeting between the two departments to 
discuss how far legislative authority should be sought for implementing the Lucas 
Report's recommendations. 58 Broadly argued that despite the fact that many 
producers and distributors would not feel 'very friendly disposed towards the 
recommendations ..... there is a lot to be said for them'. Vandepeer agreed to the 
proposed meeting, echoing Broadly's view of the Lucas proposals. 59 
The joint working party in fact met seven times between December 1947 and March 
1948. The working party concluded that while the 'broad principle' of Commodity 
Commissions should be accepted it would be inadvisable to introduce enabling 
legislation laying down the general functions of such bodies, as this would almost 
certainly provoke strong opposition from within the industry.60 For cereals a 
compromise was suggested between a Commodity Commission and a producer-
controlled marketing board, with provision for producer representation on the 
58 PRO MAF 120/7, November 26th 1947, Broadly to Vandepeer. 
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Commission. The working party had rejected NFU arguments for the creation of a 
cereals marketing board. The Commission would administer subsidies, dispose of 
surpluses, and negotiate seasonal prices but would otherwise simply perform 
regulatory functions. 61 
The working party concluded that neither the Ministry of Food nor a producer board 
was a suitable mechanism to deal with operation of the guaranteed price for potatoes, 
or to dispose of surplus production and rationalise marketing and distribution. Instead, 
it was argued, a Commodity Commission should be set up on the lines suggested in 
the Lucas report. For milk the working party advocated the setting up of a 
Commission to take charge of liquid milk from the farm gate to the doorstep, with the 
MMB acting as the intermediary between the producers and the Commission. In the 
case of meat and livestock it was argued that there were strong arguments for a 'purely 
independent Livestock Commission with trading powers sufficient to implement the 
guaranteed price'. 
In view of the possible effects such reforms would have on the expansion programme 
the Lucas report was remitted to another inter-departmental committee, made up of 
officials from the Treasury, the Board of Trade, MAF and the Ministry of Food and 
chaired by Sir Herbert Brittain. The Brittain Committee published it's final report in 
April 1948; although complete agreement on the recommendations had not been 
reached, it had been agreed that, in principle, the introduction of Commodity 
61 The main function of a commodity commission was to rat~onalise 
distribution and it was argued that in the case o~ wheat ~h1s would 
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262 
Commissions for certain guaranteed pnce commodities was desirable. 62 The 
Committee's report argued that Lucas-style arrangements should be introduced for 
cereals, fatstock and milk, although there would also be provision for fatstock and 
milk producer boards. For potatoes the Treasury and the Ministry of Food advocated 
a Commission without a marketing board and MAP the exact opposite. The Report 
emphasised that the proposed Food Bill should cover the permanent powers of the 
Ministry of Food, statutory legislation for the creation of Commodity Commissions, 
and amendments to the existing Marketing Acts. 
The Ministry of Food, the Report argued, should have permanent powers to buy and 
import home-produced and overseas produce, undertake processing, and to control 
margins and prices other than producers' prices. The Ministry would also be able to 
give directions with regard to the above. Commodity Commissions would be 
established by statutory schemes drawn up by Ministers and subject to an affirmative 
resolution from Parliament. Their main duties would be the procurement, processing 
and distribution of British and imported produce and the Commissions would be 
empowered to determine who would be allowed to handle a particular commodity and 
under what conditions. The Brittain Committee gave the Commissions more wide-
ranging powers than had been envisaged in the Lucas Report, suggesting that they 
should be empowered to regulate imports as well as home production. Brittain and 
his colleagues envisaged a system of food procurement and distribution which lay 
somewhere between free enterprise and the activities of a public corporation. 
Procurement, distribution and processing would still be undertaken by private firms, 
62 PRO T222/60, FP(48)11, April 23rd 1948, 'Report of the Working 
Party' • 
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licensed and regulated by the Commissions who would in turn be under the general 
authority of the Ministry of Food. The Report envisaged a system based on a limited 
number of licensed, non-competitive traders for each commodity working for profit 
but under the control of a Commodity Commission. Ministers would be empowered 
to give general directions in the national interest. 
Each Commission would have an advisory committee representing both producers and 
consumers. Amendments would have to be made to the Marketing Acts to allow 
Ministers to revoke or revise existing schemes to bring them into line with the new 
legislation. Producer boards, where it was considered appropriate, would be given 
powers to undertake reforms designed to increase the efficiency of production and to 
undertake certain processing functions. Under the Brittain recommendations Ministers 
would have the authority to take out injunctions against producer boards if their 
operations were found to be harmful to the public interest. The Report also dealt with 
how the Commissions would fit into the APR system, an issue not dealt with by the 
Lucas Committee. They would play no part in the fixing of overall prices although 
producer organisations would be indirectly involved through the NFU. Once overall 
or average prices had been fixed MAF would meet with the NFU, the appropriate 
Commission and any producer organisation to negotiate seasonal, grade and quality 
differentials. For hops, poultry and wool the Minister of Food would undertake the 
role normally assigned to the Commodity Commission. 
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The Minister of Food, John Strachey, outlined his views on the Brittain proposals in 
a letter to Stafford Cripps in May 1948.63 While Strachey agreed that if the 
Government was to control the purchase and distribution of home-produced and 
imported food on a long-term basis, a system of Commodity Commissions was the 
best mechanism for achieving this, he went on to emphasise the 'magnitude' of any 
decision on this issue. Although the Brittain proposals might represent the best way 
of demarcating the functions of MAP and the Ministry of Food, he continued, the 
economy would stand or fall on the success of the system of food procurement 
adopted by the Government. Any mistake would mean 'goodbye to the progressive 
increase of the standard of life on which the future of British labour depends'. 
Strachey felt that the Brittain working party had dealt with the whole issue as simply 
an administrative problem and that they had given insufficient consideration to the 
economic implications of their proposals. Cheap food was vital to the nation's 
survival and Strachey believed that this would not be achieved under the proposed 
arrangements . 
Although Strachey admitted that Commodity Commissions were 'undoubtedly' better 
than producer boards he was less happy with the extension of their powers to cover 
imports, and his criticisms revealed his wider concerns over Labour's food and 
agriculture policy. Although the world would continue to be short of food for a 
further ten or more years this situation would eventually change, and Strachey 
believed that the underlying aim of the Brittain proposals was to enable the 
Government to subsidise and protect British agriculture by averaging out the prices 
63 PRO BT64/2371, May 7th 1948, strachey to cripps. 
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of home production and relatively cheaper imported produce. This would lead to 
dearer food than was necessary, and the complex nature of the Commission system 
would further add to the cost of distribution. Strachey also believed that the 
'agricultural interests' would be strong enough to prevent the Government importing 
food as cheaply as it could. The Minister of Food was not suggesting that guaranteed 
prices should be scrapped, rather that in some cases prices were already fixed too high 
and that the Commodity Commission system would only serve to intensify this 
problem. While he was not suggesting that the industry should be abandoned to the 
free market Strachey did feel that there was 'a lot to be said' for allowing in cheap 
imported food while openly subsidising British agriculture and slowly re-orientating 
producers onto producing those commodities in which they enjoyed a comparative 
advantage. 64 
The Brittain proposals were discussed at an ad hoc meeting of Ministers and senior 
officials on May 11th 1948, chaired by Herbert Morrison and including Williams, 
Strachey, Cripps and Addison.65 Cripps argued that it would be 'premature' to 
prepare any legislation until the Government had considered the issue of wholesale 
and retail distribution more fully, and suggested that any legislation prepared for the 
1948/49 session should be limited to conferring permanent powers on the Ministry of 
Food. Cripps also suggested that an inter-departmental committee should be set up 
under the chairmanship of Douglas Jay, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, to 
64 
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examine the Brittain proposals. Strachey supported Cripps, while Tom Williams 
pressed for Ministerial authority to begin talks with the industry and for approval of 
the general approach outlined in the Brittain report. The meeting followed the 
Chancellor's line, agreeing that the issue should be remitted to another committee and 
that legislation dealing with the permanent powers of the Ministry of Food, and 
amendments to the Marketing Acts, should be drawn up for submission to 
Ministers.66 
The Food Distribution Committee met throughout June and July under the 
chairmanship of Douglas Jay, and the other Committee members included Robert Hall, 
George Brown and Dr. Edith Summerskill.67 Within the Committee only Brittain 
himself supported his Working Party's recommendations. George Brown described the 
proposals as 'political dynamite' and the Ministry of Food, as Strachey's comments had 
suggested, were 'far from enthusiatic' about the proposals and about the proposed 
permanent powers.68 In a memorandum to the Committee the Board of Trade argued 
that in the light of past Government pronouncements on the subject and the fact that 
the 1945 Manifesto did not include proposals for the 'fundamental alteration of the 
present structure of distribution', the creation of Commodity Commissions would be 
seen as a 'breach of faith' by the industry.69 The memorandum also argued that no 
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efficiency of the distribution process. It was also unlikely that Parliament would agree 
to granting a statutory body the authority to license distributors and processors and 
control over prices and margins, 'over which during the war emergency Parliament had 
itself exercised such a jealous supervision'. 
John Strachey expressed his own personal concern over the proposed permanent 
Ministry of Food powers in a letter to the Lord President, Herbert Morrison, and 
subsequently in a memorandum to the Food Distribution Committee. Writing to 
Morrison Strachey described the problems his Ministry had faced when preparing the 
draft Food Bill.70 In the light of the continuing BOP problems, food shortages, and 
the need to maintain food subsidies the Ministry of Food would need to maintain it's 
existing powers beyond 1950, and any Bill would have to therefore legislate for a 
lengthy 'transitional period', and include the sort of stringent controls that had been in 
operation during the war. However, the Bill had also to represent the Government's 
views on the permanent powers needed in the long-term. There would also be protests 
if Labour could not give a clear indication of the extent to which these powers would 
be used once the 'transitional' period was over. 
In his memorandum to the Jay Committee Strachey repeated his earlier criticisms of 
Commodity Commissions.71 He argued that Brittain's 'half-way house' between 
competition and national ownership gave the consumer the worst of all possible 
70 
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'Food Policy', memorandum by the 
worlds and that the Government should either nationalise the food distribution industry 
or return it to competition, taking steps to ensure that the consumer obtained the full 
benefits of free competition. Strachey was also very critical of producer marketing; 
'statutory cartels' of producers were 'seriously anti-social', and the Minister of Food 
argued that 'surely our job is not to reinforce such cartels but to prohibit them'.72 He 
recommended that the proposed Commissions should be scrapped and the retail 
distribution of food decontrolled as soon as possible and left to competitive free 
enterprise: 'Retail distribution is unsuitable for public monopoly because the demands 
of the public are so varied'. Strachey's comments echoed the Lucas Committee's view 
that the Civil Service was not a suitable mechanism for running a large commercial 
undertaking. Strachey did, however, feel that certain branches of the wholesale trade 
might be more suitable for public ownership, and gave as examples the cold storage 
industry, the meat industry, and flour milling.73 
Strachey did not want any proposed legislation to be hurried and felt that further 
consideration should be given to the question of the Ministry's permanent powers 
before any final decisions were made. In their defence of the marketing boards MAF 
stressed that in the years the Acts had been in operation there had been very few cases 
where complaints against producers had been substantiated by an independent 
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on the boards' operations were more than sufficient and that the nature of these safe-
guards would help to foster a sense of public responsibility in producers. 
The Food Distribution Committee published its interim report for submission to the 
Lord President's Committee in August 1948.75 The Report concluded that the 
Government's policy on food distribution should, in general, be to encourage 
competition in the wholesale and retail trades, although where appropriate certain 
sections of the wholesale and processing trades could be nationalised. In other cases 
public corporations would be established in competition with private firms. The 
Committee also suggested that the restrictive powers available to marketing boards 
under the existing legislation should be subject to close supervision, but saw no 
objections in principle to producer boards for the commodities guaranteed under the 
1947 Act. The proposals in the Lucas and Brittain reports regarding Commodity 
Commissions, the Committee argued, should be rejected and any legislation dealing 
with food policy, including the Ministry of Food's permanent powers, should be 
deferred until the next Parliament. The Committee suggested that a short Bill granting 
the Ministry the authority to enter into long-term contracts beyond 1950 be introduced 
in the 1948/49 session. 
Cripps expressed his general agreement with the Jay Committee's recommendations 
when the Interim Report was presented to Ministers in September 1948/6 and the 
Lord President's Committee as a whole approved the recommendations subject to a 
75 ibid., August 16th 1948, FD(48)19, 'Interim Report'. 
76 LP(48) 14th, september 24th 1948, in PRO CAB 132/9. 
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number of modifications. Firstly, Commodity Commissions were to be regarded as 
'generally unsuitable' rather than definitely rejected. Secondly, the Committee's 
recommendations were to be used as a guide to administrative action, and were not 
to be published as a statement of the Government's long-term policy. Subject to an 
examination on their merits agricultural marketing schemes were to be established or 
re-instated in suitable cases, and the Lord President's Committee endorsed the 
recommendation that legislation should be introduced to amend the existing Marketing 
Acts. 77 In a memorandum to the Lord President's Committee Strachey had argued 
for a 'standstill' on the re-instatement of marketing boards until a commodity-by-
commodity investigation could be carried out. 78 
The legislation amending the 1931 and 1933 Acts was contained in a Bill presented 
to Parliament in January 1949. In his speech moving the Second Reading of the new 
Agricultural Marketing Bill Tom Williams explained that the Lucas Committee's main 
recommendations were still under discussion and that the Bill would not prejudice any 
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LP(48)77, in PRO CAB 132/10. 
H. of C. Debates, (5th Series) Vol. 460 Col. 186, January 19th 1948. 
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Williams stressed that it was not his intention to suggest that producer marketing 
boards were the ultimate solution to the marketing problems of all commodities. They 
were only one method and the extent to which they were used in the future would 
depend on the wishes of producers themselves, and on the Government's final decision 
on the Lucas Report. The pre-war boards, he continued, had shown a considerable 
sense of responsibility in their actions, but the introduction of guaranteed prices and 
markets and changing world conditions required a greater degree of Government 
control than had previously been thought necessary. 80 
Clauses Two and Four of the 1949 Bill increased the range of issues that could be 
referred to a Committee of Investigation, who would subsequently advise the Minister 
of Agriculture on what action, if any, was required. Section 14 of the 1933 Act 
provided that the Minister, after consultation with the promotors of a marketing 
scheme, could appoint two members of the board. The Government now proposed to 
extend this principle to cover 1/5 of the members of marketing boards, and their 
appointees would include representatives of the agricultural workers. Clause Nine of 
the 1931 Act provided for complaints made by Consumers Committees or individuals 
with regard to the operation of any marketing board to an independent Committee of 
Investigation. If a complaint was found to be justified the Minister of Agriculture was 
empowered to order a scheme to be amended or revoked. The provisions of the new 
Bill empowered the Minister to initiate a review of a marketing board's operations 
without having to wait for a formal complaint to be made. In tum, the board 
80 ibid., Col. 188. The Marketing Act~ w~re not 70vered by the 
provisions of the Monopolies and Restr~ct~ve Pract~ces Act, 1948. 
Under the Act all proposals involv~ng the gra?t of .new .or amended 
restrictive powers had to be subnutted for ~nvest~gat~on by the 
Board of Trade. 
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concerned could ask to have a complaint referred to a Committee of Investigation for 
a final judgement. To prevent any possible injury to the public interest while this 
process was underway, Clause Four of the 1949 Bill empowered the Agriculture 
Minister to impose temporary directions.81 Clause Nine of the 1949 Bill also gave 
the boards enabling powers to help farmers improve the quality of their produce, and 
to produce, either by themselves or in co-operation with the existing trades, anything 
producers might require to improve their production or marketing.82 
While the Opposition expressed their relief that the Lucas proposals were not being 
introduced and expressed their support for the general principle of the Bill, they were 
strongly critical of a number of the Bill's provisions, particularly those contained in 
Clause Four. 83 The Conservative's main criticism of this section was that it made no 
provision for the payment of compensation if a Committee of Investigation found in 
favour of the producers, or to the consumers if the board was judged to have been 
operating against the public interest. However, the Conservatives regarded the danger 
to producers from precipitous action by MAF as the most worrying aspect of the Bill. 
During the Committee stage a Conservative amendment was moved to limit the scope 
of the Bill to guaranteed price commodities and to exclude non-guarantee commodities 
for which producers might suffer a 'grievous loss' in the event of an injudicious MAF 
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increases and could not be used to make producers reduce their prices, and that the 
chances of producers suffering serious losses were slight. 84 The amendment was 
defeated and the Bill gained the Royal Assent on May 31st 1949. 
During the preparation of the Bill MAF had pressed for their Minister to be given 
powers to pay compensation in such cases of loss to producers.85 The Treasury 
together with the Ministry of Food and the Board of Trade rejected MAP's proposals, 
arguing that marketing boards had to 'take the rough with the smooth' given their not 
inconsiderable powers, and the safeguard provided by the Committee of 
Investigation.86 MAF raised the issue again in the Lord President's Committee, with 
George Brown arguing that the case for compensation was 'logically incontestable,.87 
MAF's arguments were once again ignored, however, and no provision for 
compensation was made in the Bill.88 
The NFU welcomed what it saw as the removal of the Lucas threat and, somewhat 
immodestly, argued that the Union could 'claim credit if not for completely 
exterminating the Lucas Committee proposals ..... at least for removing them out of 
the realm of serious politics at the present time'.89 The NFU also joined in the 
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criticism of Clause Four of the 1949 Marketing Bill. However, as was mentioned 
above the Union made no official comment on the Lucas Report at the time of its 
publication, and it was not until 1950 that the NFU produced a comprehensive 
statement of its own long-term food and marketing policy. The consumer, the NFU 
argued, should receive the highest quality food at the lowest cost consistent with a 
reasonable return for all those involved in efficient production and distribution. The 
existing channels of distribution should be retained where they had shown themselves 
to be both necessary and efficient. With regard to the guaranteed price commodities 
the NFU felt that the overall aim of marketing boards should be to reduce the gap 
between producer and retail prices, and to secure an adequate and constant supply of 
food. 90 The comer-stone of this policy was, the Union argued, the producer 
marketing board; in James Turner's words: 
'Production policy, no matter how sound, will be incomplete and 
unsatisfactory if it is not linked to progressive marketing for which 
producers themselves take the major share of responsibility' .91 
The TUC had expressed its dissatisfaction with the Government when Tom Williams 
had announced in May 1948 that the Lucas Report was being set aside for further 
examination. The TUC had argued that 'positive action' was required to reduce food 
prices through improved marketing and distribution, 'a necessary contribution towards 
the Government's whole policy of economic stabilization,.92 The provisions made 
90 British Farmer, June 30th 1950. 
91 ibid., December 31st 1950. 
92 The TUe, Annual Report 1948, p.264. 
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for worker and consumer representation on marketing boards in the 1949 Act were 
regarded as being inadequate, and the ruc's Economic Committee felt that 'dangerous' 
powers had been left in the hands of producers. It was also feared that the new Act 
would prejudice the future implementation of the Lucas Proposals.93 
The ruc and the NUAW met Williams in March 1949. Williams was reluctant to 
discuss the Report in detail, arguing that it was primarily the concern of the Ministry 
of Food and he merely re-iterated that the new legislation would not prejudice the 
future implementation of the main Lucas recommendations. With regard to the 
composition of marketing boards Williams argued that to increase the numbers of 
representatives of other interested groups might discourage the adoption of new 
schemes by producers.94 However, the Bill was later amended to allow the Minister 
to appoint 'persons conversant with the interests of consumers of the product' onto the 
boards, and to appoint one member of a Committee of Investigation, after consultation 
with the BOT. In most cases it was expected that this appointment would involve a 
member of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission. 
The NUA W remained committed to both the Lucas and Williams Reports. In April 
1948 the NUAW President E.G. Gooch MP had told a meeting of the Guild of 
Agricultural Journalists that the Lucas Committee had made an 'unanswerable case' for 
the public control of the channels of food distribution. The Union's May Conference 
1948 unanimously passed a resolution calling on the Government to give 'due 
93 The TUe, Annual Report 1949, p.241-42. 
94 The Landworker, May 1948 and August 1948. 
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consideration to the Lucas Committee and to establish public control of agricultural 
marketing; arguing that the system established under the old Marketing Acts was no 
longer appropriate. At the 1950 Conference another resolution was passed calling on 
Labour to take immediate steps to adopt the two Reports' recommendations, and Tom 
Williams was criticised for failing to 'stand up' to the farmers. Delegates argued that 
'on this question, as on many others, the time has arrived to make a stand and impose 
Labour policy on the farmers'.95 
The Lucas Report found further support in the pages of The Economist, which argued 
that the powers possessed by the pre-war boards were impossible to justify, even in 
the light of the conditions prevailing in the early 1930's. The Lucas proposals were 
not perfect, but they offered 'concrete remedies for a half-baked and economically 
vicious policy - or rather lack of policy - into which Britain had drifted as a result of 
the war'.96 Lucas was one way of dislodging producers and distributors from the 
'feather-bed' created by Government policy; farmers and distributors were paid on a 
'cost-plus' basis and this, The Economist argued, meant that there was little impetus 
to increased efficiency and no limit to the taxpayers' liability. Under the new system 
producers would still have a role to play, controlling marketing and distribution up to 
the point at which the guaranteed price came into operation. Farmers already had 
sufficient safeguards against a return to pre-war conditions, and so had 'no business 
to seek further precautions at the expense of marketing efficiency' .97 Under the 
Lucas proposals there would be a fairly ruthless cutting of distributive margins and 
95 The Landworker, August 1950. 
96 The Economist, November 22nd 1947. 
97 ibid., April 3rd 1948. 
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the elimination as redundant of many distributive and processing concerns, a process 
that would not endear the Report to these groups either. Although The Economist 
advised the Government to take steps to implement the Report, it somewhat 
prophetically suggested that it would ultimately be ignored.98 
98 ibid., November 22nd 1947. 
278 
(iii) 
The MMB and the PMB were finally able to resume their operations in 1954, their 
powers having been adjusted to allow them to administer the Government's price 
guarantees; these adjustments included provision for Government control over the 
determination of selling prices and distributors margins.99 Although the 
Conservatives had expressed their support for marketing boards in the 1948 
Agricultural Charter, the Party adopted a far more pragmatic approach to the question 
after 1951. On the question of a cereals marketing board the Government yielded to 
pressure from the National Association of British and Irish Millers, who launched a 
press campaign to demonstrate the undesirability of the producer control of cereal 
marketing.1°O The NFU gave in without a fight on this occasion but the issue of 
fatstock marketing brought the producers into conflict with the Government. The 
NFU argued for the creation of a marketing board to deal with the purchase, slaughter 
and grading of all fatstock but again found their proposals turned down. This was due 
in part to pressure from the Livestock and Home Produced Meat Policy Committee, 
an organisation representing dealers, auctioneers and butchers. However, the 
Government also had its own doubts about the scheme, and particularly about the 
scale of the proposals; in a 1953 White Paper the Government argued that the funding 
of such a board would present considerable problems and that it would be difficult to 
99 
100 
A Wool Marketing Board had been establis~ed in 1950 as one of ~he 
arrangements for adding wool to the l~st of guaranteed pr~ce 
commodities under the 1947 Act. 
See Self and storing, The State and the Farmer (1962), p.97. 
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reconcile a producer board with the powers suggested by the NFU with adequate 
consumer choice. 101 
The eventual outcome of the dispute was that the NFU abandoned its proposals for 
a statutory marketing scheme and established the Fatstock Marketing Corporation, 
having first persuaded the Government to pay to the Corporation the subsidies that 
farmers selling to auctions would have received. Any producer could join the scheme 
for a small fee, and the Corporation was controlled by the NFU and one of its 
subsidiaries, the NFU Development Company. The Corporation was designed to be 
'a commercial competitive version of a producers' board'.102 In the case of eggs the 
Government initially agreed to a statutory marketing scheme, but at the public enquiry 
into the proposals required under the Marketing Acts strong objections to the scheme 
were raised, not on this occasion by the distributive trades but by producers and 
producer-retailers themselves. Their resistance to a marketing board stemmed from 
the restrictions that would be placed on local and private egg sales. A marketing 
board for eggs was eventually established, but only after the NFU had somewhat 
unwillingly agreed to allow producers to sell ungraded eggs. 103 
As the Lucas Report argued, in the inter-war period marketing boards were largely 
seen by producers as being simply 'an instrument of price negotiation and not at all 
as an instrument for the improvement of their own productive and marketing 
101 Decontrol of Food and Marketing of Agricultural Produce, Cmd 8989 
(1953). 
102 British Farmer, May 1954. 
103 See Self and storing, Ope cit. p.100-102. 
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h . 104 In h . tec mques. t e post-war penod the former function was performed by the 
NFU in conjunction with the Government but little progress was made towards 
realising the Marketing Acts other objectives. For example, the MMB introduced a 
number of services for its members, including the provision of grass-drying centres 
and AI Services, but the initial impetus for these schemes and a large measure of 
financial support came from Central Government. The Cook Committee found that 
British milk producers were tending to maximise output through high yields to the 
detriment of the nutritional value of the milk they produced. Although the MMB did 
impose penalties on producers whose butter fat content fell below a certain level it did 
little to encourage producers to increase the nutritional value of their milk. lOS In 
Denmark and Holland producers were paid according to their milk's fat and solid's 
content. In the case of the PMB price stabilization was only achieved at the cost of 
restrictions on the most efficient producers. If producers saw marketing boards as a 
further guarantee of their industry'S economic position, then they failed in this role as 
well. Sir James Turner hoped that the restoration of the MMB would protect 
producers from 'some of the consequences of the wrongful administration of the 
Agriculture Act', but it had little effect against the tide of Conservative policy after 
1951, which culminated in the introduction of production quotas in 1961.106 
Thus the criticisms that the Lucas Report had directed at the pre-war marketing boards 
could also be directed at their post-war counterparts. The introduction of the 
deficiency payments system and the Conservative's 'retrenchment' in expenditure on 
104 Lucas Report, p.13. 
105 Milk composition in the UK (Cook Report), Cmd 1147 (1960). 
106 British Farmer, January 31st 1952. 
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agriculture might have been expected to encourage an improvement in the quality, 
presentation and marketing of agricultural produce, but in practice few improvements 
were made. Producers saw marketing boards as a further source of economic security 
but thereafter had little interest in pursuing any other of the Marketing Acts' other 
objectives. Farmers tended to see their job as being to produce the food, and that 
getting it to the consumer in the right form, at the right grade, and at the right time 
was not their responsibility. Marketing boards were democratically run organisations 
and so given the ingrained individualism of its members, and their lack of a 
'marketing sense', it is perhaps not wholly surprising that boards tended to pursue 
essentially conservative policies. Boards would have been unwilling to upset their 
members by forcing through improvements, preferring to rely on their bargaining and 
regulatory powers. As Self and Storing argue, by allowing producers to maximise 
production without any regard for the quality of their product the MMB 'acquiesced 
in a trend ..... temporarily profitable to a majority of its producers but ..... probably 
short-sighted'. 107 As the MMB's inter-war experience showed however, had the 
Boards attempted to cut distributors' margins or to introduce similarly 'radical' policies, 
they would have faced strong opposition from the distributive trades. 
Would Commodity Commissions as envisaged by the Lucas and Brittain Committees 
have provided a more effective alternative? The limited experience of the more 
circumscribed pre-war Committees gives little clue as to how the proposed 
Commissions would have fared. What is clear, however, is that Labour would have 
faced tremendous resistance to such reorganization, both from the producers and the 
107 Self and storing, Ope cit., p.l06-107. 
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distributive trades and from within the Government itself. Speaking in 1948 John 
Knowles, the NFU's General Secretary, explained why the Union had remained silent 
on the Lucas proposals: 
'In this sphere of marketing there has existed for two years a balance 
so politically delicate that premature action had to be avoided at all 
costs'. 108 
The Union was concerned to remain politically neutral and agricultural marketing was 
a policy issue which threatened to become a political issue. The Conservatives were 
quick to voice their support for the principle of producer marketing while the Co-
operative wing of the Labour Party, traditionally hostile to producer boards, welcomed 
the Lucas Report's recommendations. More generally, Labour's views on public 
enterprise and control, and on planning and the cost of living, seemed to suggest that 
the Party as a whole would favour the proposed reforms. As Section (ii) showed 
MAF and the Ministry of Food were prepared to accept the broad principle of 
Commodity Commissions, although their proposals were not as comprehensive as 
those contained in the Lucas Report. Tom Williams was prepared to accept the 
general approach to marketing outlined in the more far-reaching Brittain Report, and 
to begin discussions with the outside interests. His Department's view, prior to the 
findings of the Brittain Committee, was while as a general principle 'there are certain 
prima facie advantages in the establishment of independent commissions for the main 
agricultural commodities', the Lucas Committee had been 'unduly impressed' by the 
108 British Farmer, December 31st 1948. 
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example of livestock marketing in recommending the general adoption of Commodity 
Commissions. 109 
Given Williams' attitude and that of his Department, Self and Storing are wrong to 
argue that it was the Minister of Agriculture who was mainly responsible for 'killing 
off the Lucas Report. 11o John Strachey proved to be the most implacable critic of 
Commodity Commissions, and the Board of Trade were also less than enthusiastic 
about the implications of the proposed reforms. The BOT argued that the powers the 
Ministry of Food would assume under the new system would be a 'major precedent' 
in the field of peace-time distribution policy, and would be introduced in the absence 
of any general Government policy on wholesale and retail distribution. 111 There was 
the added complication of promises made to the distributive trades; in a speech in 
Cardiff in 1948 Harold Wilson, the President of the Board, had stated that 'the policy 
on which we went to the country for a mandate in 1945 did not include any 
fundamental alteration of the present structure of distribution'. In the Board's view 
this would preclude any attempt being made to implement the Lucas proposals in the 
lifetime of the 1945 Parliament as any attempt to do so would be regarded as a breach 
of faith by the industry.112 The Lucas report had emphasised the need for a 'ruthless' 
cutting of distributive margins and the rationalization of the wholesale and retail 
trades, and the row that such action would almost certainly have caused would have 
109 PRO BT 64/2371, March 4th 1948, 'The Lucas Committee' MAF 
memorandum. 
110 Self and storing, Ope cit., p.92-93. 
111 PRO BT 64/2371, June 21st 1948, Note of a Meeting. 
112 PRO CAB 134/276, June 9th 1948, FD(48)6, 'Distribution Policy and 
Commodity Commissions', BOT memorandum. 
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been exacerbated by the absence of accurate costings and figures on the relationship 
between costs and the sizes of firms, which would have prevented the Government 
making accurate judgements about the relative efficiency of different firms.H3 
Although Ministry of Food officials had been involved in the preparation of the 
Brittain proposals John Strachey, a supporter of Commissions against producer 
marketing, argued that in practice the former would represent the worst of all possible 
worlds for the consumer, and that the economy would stand or fall on the success of 
the Government's system of food procurement. Strachey's criticisms also revealed his 
general concern at the direction Labour's agricultural policy was taking, a concern 
which was to be expressed more vocally in the discussions surrounding the APR's. 
As the Minister with overall responsibility for the proposed Commissions Strachey 
was clearly aware of the political damage the failure of the Commissions would inflict 
on him personally, as well as on the Labour Party and its policies. His own proposals 
for the distributive trades envisaged a 'half-way house' between nationalization and 
competitive free enterprise, and acknowledged that nationalization was too inflexible 
to deal with the retail trade, an echo of the Lucas Reports conclusions. Strachey 
remained a committed critic of the principle of producer marketing. 
Had Labour decided to press ahead with the Lucas recommendations it is clear that 
the Government would have faced strong opposition from both sides of the farm gate. 
Such a course of action would also have placed the NFU in a very difficult position, 
one which would have threatened to compromise its political neutrality. The 1946 
113 See Edith Whetham, Ope cit., p.112. 
285 
SPR dispute had already raised the threat of a mass resignation of producers' 
representatives from the CAEC's, and it is likely that such a threat would have been 
used, and indeed put into action, if the Lucas proposals had been introduced. Such 
a dispute would have been at best embarrassing for the Government, and could also 
have seriously affected the progress of the expansion programme, something Labour 
must clearly have been aware of. In the long-run, however, any such action would 
have been more damaging to the farmers themselves, and a 'farmers' strike' was not 
a realistic course of action. However, faced with the hostility of the farmers and 
distributive trades, and no less importantly the criticisms of Strachey and the Board 
of Trade, it is perhaps not surprising that the Lucas and Brittain proposals were 
allowed to gather dust during Labour's remaining years in office. The Conservative 
victory in 1951 sounded their final death knell. 
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(VI) 
'AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION, 1945-51' 
INTRODUCTION 
Earlier chapters have dealt with the economic and financial background to the launch 
of the expansion programme and with the operation of the APR procedure between 
1945 and 1951. The subject of this chapter is the progress of the expansion 
programme and the problems MAP faced in attempting to secure its production targets 
after August 1947. Section (i) and (ii) will deal with the expansion programme while 
section (iii) will discuss the evolution and operation of the CAEC system after 1945. 
Section (iv) will attempt to assess what had been achieved by 1951, both in terms of 
output and dollars saved, although the issue of the cost of expansion is dealt with 
more comprehensively in Chapter IV. 
The overall aim of the expansion programme was to increase the net output of UK 
agriculture by £100 million by 1951/52, an increase of 20% over 1946/47 and of 50% 
over the immediate pre-war period. The individual production targets are given in 
Table One. Approximately half of this increase was expected to come from increased 
efficiency, and the rest from the additional resources that would be made available to 
the industry. Housing for agricultural workers and steel for farm machinery were to 
be given top priority. Prices, subsidies and acreage payments were all increased and 
a number of new financial inducements to increased production were introduced, 
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including financial assistance to encourage grass conservation and a 'ploughing-up' 
subsidy of £4 per acre, payable on any grassland more than three years old which was 
turned over to an approved crop. The essense of the programme was the expansion 
of livestock production, the maintenance of the already expanded net total output of 
crops, and a further, though comparatively small, increase in the production of animal 
feedstuffs. 1 Wheat production was also to be increased. 
Numerous meetings were held to explain the programme and to spur the industry into 
making every possible effort to achieve the Government's targets. At a meeting of 
500 CAEC and District Chairmen and Executive Officers, Herbert Morrison gave the 
following pledge: 
'I have come to assure you on behalf of the Government as a whole 
that they mean business - that they will insist upon high priority for 
your requirements from all departments - that they realise that you will 
require not merely co-operation but aggressive support,.2 
Speaking at a meeting of the Farmers' Club Tom Williams stressed that the expansion 
programme 'was not a panic measure, undertaken in a moment of crisis in 
contradiction to a previous policy. On the contrary, it is consistent with the soundest 
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Williams continued, was the expansion of feed supplies; although it was hoped that 
after 1949 'considerably increased' supplies would be available from abroad, the 
supplies could not be guaranteed. It was therefore vital that home production be 
increased. There could, Williams stressed, be no question of the country ever 
returning to her pre-war level of food imports, given the UK's financial position and 
the fact that it was unlikely that there would be a large exportable surplus of food 
available in the future. 
The programme was welcomed by the industry, although many were quick to point 
out the need for adequate resources for the industry to draw on. For example, the 
CLA were 'willing and anxious' to give the Government their support, but 'the 
conditions must exist which enable such whole-hearted support to be given'. 4 The 
increase in production the Government hoped to secure from 'new' farming would 
depend 'entirely on how the Government provides the means of production,.5 Outside 
the industry the Government's plans were viewed somewhat more critically; the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (the AERI) estimated that the expansion 
programme would cost some £500 million in higher prices and subsidies over the five-
year period, and warned of the effects that this could have on the cost of British 
export goods.6 The Economist saw the programme as a 'temporary expedient for 
tiding over the foreign exchange problems of the next few years', arguing that if the 
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problems, it should be allowed to expand slowly on a 'sure basis of rising efficiency'. 
Greater attention had also be paid to the overall cost of the programme.7 It was 
further argued that the necessary physical resources would not become available as 
quickly as the Government hoped, with the labour supply the 'crux' of the problem, 
and the expansion of livestock production was seen as presenting a serious problem 
for the Government. 8 
7 The Economist, september 27th 1947. 
8 ibid., and westminster Bank Review, November 1947. 
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(i) 
The fanfares that greeted the launch of the expansion programme were soon silenced 
by fears that shortages of feedstuffs would begin to impede the expansion of livestock 
production. At the suggestion of Sir Edwin Plowden the Agricultural Output 
Committee9 was reassembled to review the wheat and feedstuffs situation, and by the 
end of October 1947 the Committee had set up a working party under F.W. Smith, 
from CEPS, to consider the feedstuffs supply situation.1o The Committee's report 
was submitted to the Economic Policy Committee in November 1947.11 For the year 
beginning September 1947 there was a deficit in the supplies needed to maintain 
existing ration scales of 261,000 tons, with a further deficit of 200,000 tons in 
unrationed feeds. The latter could be made worse by the diversion of 350,000 tons 
of oats to human consumption. The Report estimated that the additional amount of 
cereals needed to increase rations between May and September 1948, in accordance 
with the expansion programme, was 700,000 tons, 200,000 of which would be needed 
to increase stocks. If these deficits could not be made good, livestock would have to 
be slaughtered and, the Report argued, there could be no expansion in pig and poultry 
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this would make them less eager to expand in the future. The farmers I confidence in 
the Government would also be dented if ration scales were not increased in 1948. 
The estimates of the size of the deficit assumed that all the supplies contracted for 
would be delivered, and the Report could only suggest two other immediate sources 
of additional supplies; the purchase of grain from Brazil and Australia and the 
diversion of grain from human and industrial uses, mainly brewing and distilling. 
Taken together these two sources would yield approximately 310,000 tons of grain, 
enough to cover the deficit in rationed feeds. An additional 900,000 tons of barley, 
maize and oats might be available from Russia and Yugoslavia, if negotiations with 
these two countries were successful.12 The Report argued that no increase in feed 
supplies could be announced until, or indeed unless, an agreement was reached with 
the Russians. 
If rations were increased in 1948 it would be assumed that this increase would be 
retained in 1949, and would thus increase future commitments. If rations were 
increased in accordance with the expansion programme, 1.9 million tons of cereals 
would have to be imported in 1948, and this figure would have increased to 2.8 
million tons by 1950. With Marshall Aid and good world harvests in 1948 and 1949 
'no great difficulty need be apprehended', but if harvests were poor and no dollars 
were available to buy wheat, the existing state of affairs would continue into 1949. 
Feed supplies, the Committee's report argued, would only be maintained by the 
diversion of grain and by the ad hoc purchase of coarse grain from marginal sources' 
12 Russia could potentially supply 750,000 tons and Yugoslavia 150,000 
tons of cereals. 
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at high prices or on otherwise onerous conditions'. In anticipation of this situation the 
Working Party recommended that any supplies obtained in 1948 in excess of what was 
needed to meet existing ration scales should be put into reserve for 1949. 
The Ministry of Food had argued that if the 1948 harvest was a poor one, and if 
dollars remained scarce, it would be necessary to revoke the promise that farmers 
would be able to retain 20% of their 1948 wheat and barley crop for stock feed. If 
the wheat supply situation became very serious then it might also become necessary 
to increase the extraction rate, which would reduce the supplies of cereal offals 
available for animal feed. The Agricultural Departments, however, felt that future 
policy should not be based on such pessimistic assumptions, which implied the 
cancellation of the livestock expansion programme and even the slaughtering of 
existing animals. The Agricultural Departments wanted Ministers to reaffirm the 20% 
pledge, unless they felt that the outlook for 1948 was so gloomy as to warrant the 
reversal of the livestock expansion programme.13 
When presenting the Report to their colleagues the Agriculture Ministers reinforced 
this plea, and sought permission to announce that the existing ration scales would be 
maintained until September 1948. Every effort should be made, they continued, to 
obtain all the available supplies of maize and barley, and to reach an agreement with 
Russia and Yugoslavia as soon as possible. If agreement could not be reached, then 
they argued that 'drastic steps' would have to be taken. Grain would have to be 
13 AOC report on 'The Livestock Expansion Programme in Reldhen to the prospective supplies of Feedstuffs', attached to EPC(47)17. 
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diverted from human and industrial uses to animal feed, and farmers would have to 
be told that any further livestock expansion was being postponed for the time being. 
John Strachey viewed the future supply situation with a greater degree of pessimism. 
The existing ration scales could only be maintained if supplies of Russian grain were 
forthcoming, as the supplies available from other sources would be relatively small, 
and Strachey was not prepared to agree to further cuts in human food consumption, 
which he believed had already been reduced to levels where malnutrition was likely. 
The chances of obtaining supplies from Australia and Brazil seemed slim and Strachey 
argued that producers should be told that there was to be no expansion in 1948. If 
agreement was not reached with the Russians ration scales would have to be reduced 
and the 20% pledge revoked.14 Within the Treasury it was felt that everything 
possible should be done to maintain existing animal numbers, including the diversion 
of grain from human and industrial uses, and that the point had not yet been reached 
where the Government should consider breaking its promise regarding wheat and 
barley from the 1948 harvest. The psychological impact on the industry would be too 
great. 15 The two memoranda were considered by the Economic Policy Committee 
in November 1947; it was decided that any announcement on rations should be 
deferred until a clearer picture had emerged of the state of the negotiations with all 
the UK's potential suppliers, particularly the USSR. It was hoped that from September 
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This issue was raised again at the beginning of 1948. The Agricultural Departments 
argued that prospective feed supplies justified an announcement that existing ration 
scales would be maintained until April 1949, and once again emphasized the 
'fundamental and imperative necessity' of honouring the 20% retention pledge if the 
. 17 
expanSIOn programme was to succeed. Strachey was prepared to agree to such an 
announcement, but was 'reluctant' to agree to the honouring of the pledge. On a 
conservative estimate of the supply position it was reasonably certain that enough feed 
grains could be obtained; the supplies already contracted for could be supplemented 
by Russian grain and there was the possibility of further supplies being obtained from 
the Argentine and Slavia. The Ministry of Food did, however, have doubts about the 
future wheat supply, and argued that the highest possible level of domestic production 
would be required. The Government's long-term policy was 'very generous' to the 
industry and so farmers should not, Strachey argued, resent some special appeal now. 
The revoking of the pledge might upset the farmers, but Strachey was more concerned 
about the reactions of consumers if the bread supply was not maintained, particularly 
with a General Election not far away.18 The Ministry of Food found little support 
for their recommendations, however; in a brief prepared for Cripps, CEPS 
recommended that he should not support Strachey, and the Secretary to the Lord 
President, E.M. Nicholson, stressed that: 
17 
18 
EPC(47)36, December 29th 1947, '~h~ Livest~ck Expansion Programme', 
memorandum by the Agriculture M~n~sters, ~n PRO CAB 134/215. 
EPC (47) 35, Decembe~ 27th 1947, 'Feed Rations', memorandum by the 
Min~ster of Food, ~n PRO CAB 134/215. 
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'The farmers' disposition not to play the game would undoubtedly be 
much increased by what they would rightly regard as a swindle by the 
Government in going back on the 20% undertaking'. 19 
The two departments' proposals were considered by Cripps, Morrison and Attlee on 
January 5th 1948. Since Strachey had circulated his memorandum the Anglo-Soviet 
trade agreement had been signed and in the light of this development the Minister of 
Food was prepared to agree to producers being allowed to retain 20% of their barley 
crop for their livestock. It was, he argued, difficult to agree to a similar concession 
for wheat as the supply situation was for more uncertain, and as such a move could 
jeopardize the UK's chances of obtaining supplies of wheat under the European 
Recovery Programme. It was eventually agreed that both pledges would be honoured 
but that farmers would be warned that if there was an acute shortage of wheat for 
human consumption, coarse grain might have to be substituted for wheat. It was also 
agreed that MAP could announce that rations would be maintained at their existing 
level until the end of April 1949.20 
Towards the end of January the Agriculture Ministers and the Minister of Food 
presented the results of an Agricultural Output Committee review of the cereal supply 
situation to the Economic Policy Committee.21 Over the period from May 1948 to 
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existing estimates by 395,000 tons, if the prevailing levels of utilization were 
maintained. It was, however, hoped that additional supplies would be available to 
meet this deficit and Ministers felt that there was no need to reverse the decision to 
maintain rations at their existing levels. The possibility of increasing ration scales 
hinged on the outcome of talks with the Argentine Government. 22 
February and March 1948 saw the launch of the 'Grow More Food' campaign, an 
advertising campaign designed to increase agricultural efficiency and output, and the 
creation of an inter-departmental study group on domestic policy to be chaired by 
MAF's chief economic advisor, Sir Ralph Enfield.23 The group was to report to the 
Agricultural Output Committee on the effects of shortages of feeds and other 
requisites on the expansion programme, and to consider the programme against the 
background of the world grain situation. The Ministry of Food's negotiations with 
both the USSR and the Argentine had proved to be successful and this had led to calls 
for ration increases, particularly from pig and poultry producers?4 A memorandum 
on this question was circulated by Tom Williams at the end of March, based on the 
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If the Russian and Argentine purchases were taken into account, and on the 
assumption there was no increase in human and industrial consumption, there would 
be a surplus of 500,000 tons of feed grain by April 1949. There was, however, a 
possibility that not all the Russian grain contracted for would be delivered if other 
parts of the trade agreement fell through, and if additional wheat supplies could not 
be obtained from Canada 350,000 tons of coarse grain would have to be given to 
producers in exchange for wheat from the 1948 harvest. Williams' memorandum 
argued that while no increase should be made in May 1948, an announcement should 
be made to the effect that the Government had not ruled out an increase in pig and 
poultry rations later in the year. 26 In a note to Cripps Plowden suggested that the 
Chancellor should support the former proposal but that he should press for no 
encouragement to be given to farmers to expect increased ration scales later in the 
year. Pig and poultry stocks had already begun to increase and any continuation of 
this trend, Plowden argued, was dangerous in view of the uncertain grain situation. 
Williams had suggested that it might be possible to buy more maize and barley from 
Argentina, but in view of the probable cost of such purchases and the country's 
continuing BOP problems Plowden believed there was little point in beginning further 
negotiations.27 Williams' memorandum was considered by the Economic Policy 
Committee, who agreed with his proposals regarding rations and authorised him to 
make an early announcement. The Committee also agreed that no further attempts 
should be made to buy grain from Argentina; if these supplies were secured it was 
26 Pigs and poultry were by far the largest consumers of coarse grains. 
27 PRO CAB 124/575, March 22nd 1948, Plowden to cripps. 
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likely that the Americans would make equivalent reductions in allocations to the UK 
under the European Recovery Programme.28 
In April 1948 the Enfield study group began a survey of the prospective feedstuffs 
supply situation for 1949/50. MAP wanted Enfield and his colleagues to consider 
three questions; the supply of feedstuffs needed in 1949/50 to carry out the expansion 
programme, the prospects of obtaining them from both domestic and overseas sources, 
and how much feed grain the Board of Trade should attempt to buy in any future 
negotiations with the Russians. 29 The main question in the minds of Ministers was 
the line to take on cropping plans for the 1949 harvest. The target acreages set for 
wheat in August 1947 for the proceeding three harvests were 2.5, 2.3 and 2.3 million 
acres; in view of the fact that the 1948 harvest acreage would fall short of the target, 
MAF suggested that the wheat acreage for the 1949 harvest should be increased to 2.5 
million acres.30 This would also allow producers to retain 20% of their wheat and 
barley crop. Williams also proposed to take powers under the 1947 Act to give 
directions as to the total area to be maintained under temporary and permanent grass. 
The Proposals were considered by the Production Committee at the end of May 1948. 
Williams supported his proposals by arguing that the producers would assume that the 
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fail unless the Government was seen as pursuing a stable policy. In reply, Cripps 
emphasized that the future supply situation was too uncertain to admit of any such 
assurances while Edith Summerskill, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of 
Food, argued that there was still some doubt as to whether farmers should be able to 
keep wheat and barley from the 1948 harvest. She also stressed the importance of 
reducing dollar expenditure on wheat. 
The dilemma facing Ministers was that, on the one hand, not allowing farmers to 
retain wheat and barley might endanger the whole programme and so disappoint 
consumers. On the other, however, a premature decision might lead to a situation 
where livestock had to be slaughtered, or bread very strictly rationed. The Production 
Committee agreed that any decision on the retention of grain from the 1949 harvest 
should be deferred. Subject to this, the MAP proposals were approved.31 
The NFU raised a number of objections to the use of directions to maintain the tillage 
acreage, arguing that good results had been obtained in 1948 without directions and 
that the Government risked losing the goodwill of the industry. Farmers, the NFU 
argued, knew best how to manage their land. Against this the CAEC's, who had asked 
for these powers, argued that there was mounting evidence of under-sowing, and the 
threat of a large increase in the grassland acreage in 1949. MAF regarded the 1948 
wheat harvest as being disappointing, and the Government had itself come under fire 
for failing to secure the maximum possible level of food production. MAF's view was 
that Ministers would have a better answer to these criticisms if directions were being 
31 PC(48) 11th Mtg., May 28th 1948, in PRO CAB 134/636. 
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issued. In Vandepeer's view the case for taking powers was 'unanswerable', a view 
that was also shared by Tom Williams.32 The NFU's arguments were to no avail and 
on August 24th 1948 the CAEC's were informed that powers to give directions as to 
the maximum acreage of pasture had been delegated to them for the period from July 
1948 to December 1950. The use of directions was to be the exception rather than 
the rule, however, and the tillage acreage was to be kept as it's wartime peak level. 33 
In June 1948 Ministers once again reviewed prospective grain supplies for the coming 
year. John Strachey advocated the end of bread rationing, the maintenance of the 
extraction rate at 85% until June 1949, and the substitution of coarse grain for the 
wheat producers had been promised they could retain from their harvest. 34 In reply, 
Williams argued that although farmers had been warned of the possibility of 
substitution they had been informed that it would only be necessary if there was an 
acute shortage of wheat for human consumption. It would be difficult, he continued, 
to justify such a course of action when bread and flour were being derationed. 
Furthermore, Williams argued, wheat deliveries from the 1948 harvest had in fact 
exceeded Ministry of Food estimates, and there was also the possibility of further 
supplies of wheat being obtained from the USSR. As well as honouring the 20% 
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increase pig and poultry rations. 35 CEPS supported MAF on the former point, but 
recommended no increase in the coarse grain issue. Writing to Attlee, Norman Brook 
expressed the view that 'on the whole' MAF had the better of the argument. The 
Cabinet agreed to the end of bread rationing and to maintaining an 85 % extraction 
rate, but not to breaking the pledge to farmers. 36 
These decisions were reaffirmed by the Cabinet a month later during discussions on 
the programmes to be submitted to the OEEC in connection with the forthcoming ERP 
negotiations. The Cabinet was forced to consider ways of adjusting the dollar 
programme as the amount of Marshall Aid available would fall short of the amount 
allowed for in the budget. The Chancellor argued that reversing the 20% wheat 
retention pledge would be a valuable source of dollar savings, and if savings were not 
made in this way then either the dollar reserves would have to be reduced or cuts 
would have to be made in other parts of the import programme. He was supported 
in this by Strachey. However, the effect on the livestock programme and the wheat 
supply was also discussed, and the Cabinet reaffirmed its earlier pledge, suggesting 
that the Ministers concerned make every effort to persuade farmers to market more 
. I t 37 than 80% of their wheat harvest and to accept coarse gram as a rep ace men . 
The Enfield study group published its first interim report in July 1948; by 1951/52 the 
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(cereals, cereal products and protein feeds) and it was estimated that 6.2 million tons 
(+ or - 1.5 million) would be available from domestic and overseas sources. However, 
the BOP position at the end of Marshall Aid could affect the quantity of feeds 
imported, reducing the total available supply to 5.8 million tons. The Enfield study 
group had considered allowing the whole shortfall to fall on egg production; the 
original expansion programme target of 640 million dozen by 1951/52 would be 
reduced to 440 million dozen, the 1948/49 target level and the pre-war level of 
production.38 
In October 1948 the group submitted a 'progress report' on the expansion programme 
to the Agricultural Output Committee?9 The domestic production of bread grains 
in 1948 had been 252,000 acres below target, although a high acreage and yield of 
potatoes had been achieved. Livestock and milk production had made good, and in 
the case of eggs and poultry rapid, progress. The feed supplies position was 'not 
unsatisfactory'; home-grown supplies had increased considerably when compared with 
1947, but in contrast the supply of imported feeds had been disappointing, 
notwithstanding the trade agreements signed with Russia and the Argentine. The 
programmed increases in ration scales were well behind schedule. The lesson of 1948 
appeared to be that crop targets would be harder to reach than livestock targets; when 
the programme had been launched it had been thought that the reverse would be the 
case. The failure to achieve the programmed acreage targets was due largely to the 
dry autumn, and to labour, machinery and fertilizer shortages. Drawing on the Enfield 
38 PRO MAF 38/654, July 8th 1948, SGAD(48)7. 
39 PRO T223/220, october 1948, AD(48)18, 'Agricultural Progress 
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group's report the Agricultural Output Committee produced it's own survey of the 
expansion programme, which it submitted to the Economic Planning Board in 
November 1948.40 The Agricultural Output Committee argued that, overall, 
agricultural production was 'not unsatisfactory' and that the failure to achieve some of 
the production targets was due to the fact that in some cases targets had been set too 
high. Others could be blamed on external circumstances, mainly shortages of vital 
requisites. The response of the industry itself appeared to be 'ready and even eager' 
but this initial enthusiasm could, the Report argued, easily evaporate in the face of a 
shortage of 'tools for the job'. There had been some improvement, particularly in the 
provision of machinery, buildings and drainage, but a number of other problems had 
still to be solved, such as labour shortages at harvest time and the supply of imported 
feeds, which was hampered by foreign exchange problems. The Report felt that while 
in general fertilizer shortages gave no great cause for concern, the nitrogen situation 
was a growing problem, and a severe shortage of nitrogen-based fertilizers would have 
serious implications for grassland development. 
In general the Agricultural Output Committee felt that the expansion programme had 
been devised on the right lines and that, subject to the various points made, adequate 
steps had been taken to implement the programme. The Economic Planning Board 
endorsed the Report's findings, adding that the increase in output envisaged in the 
expansion programme was still of the greatest importance and recommending that 
MAP 'vigourously pursue' its efforts to increase production. This view was in tum 
40 PRO MAF 38/655, Novembe~ 18th 1948, ~(48)24/EPB(48)30, 'Survey of 
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endorsed by Ministers when the Report was prese t d h . 
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in December 1948.41 
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(ii) 
In May 1949 MAF finally obtained Ministerial approval for an increase in the rations 
issued to pig producers, an increase in pigmeat production being the only way to 
secure a rapid increase in home-produced meat supplies.42 Domestic cereal 
production, it was argued, could not be increased rapidly enough and so Williams also 
sought approval for 1moderate1 increases in cereal and protein imports. Pigs would 
have first call on the additional supplies, with any remainder going to increase rations 
for calves. Additional supplies could also be obtained by reducing the extraction rate. 
Williams reminded his colleagues that in a speech to CAEC Chairman in August 1947 
Herbert Morrison had promised that even scarce dollars would be spent on animal 
feeds for the expansion programme.43 The Minister of Food supported his 
colleague1s proposals, feeling that the improved world grain situation made the risk 
of increasing rations worth taking. Supplies would be available from both dollar and 
non-dollar sources, and Strachey was quick to stress that if extra supplies could be 
obtained he would not accept any attempts by the Treasury to use these purchases as 
an excuse to cut purchases of food for human consumption. The Minister of Food 
also supported a cut in the extraction rate, from 85% to 82 1/2%, a smaller reduction 
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In discussion Williams dropped his proposal for a reduction in the extraction rate but 
both he and Strachey reiterated their calls for increases in the purchase of imported 
feeds. Large exportable surpluses were being offered for sale by the Soviet Union and 
Argentina, but the Treasury view was that it was 'very imprudent' to gamble on the 
successful outcome of foreign negotiations. If the increased rations had to be 
supported by dollar purchases this would necessitate cuts in other items in the import 
programme. The general view amongst Ministers was that while no decision should 
be taken on calf rations at that stage, a delay in the decision on pig rations would 
jeopardize any chance of an increase in pigmeat supplies in 1950, and so the MAF 
proposals were approved.45 By July 1949 a trade agreement had been reached with 
the Argentine Government and a provisional contract had also been signed with the 
Soviet Union, and so additional supplies of grain were available without the need for 
further dollar expenditure. The Cabinet subsequently approved an increase in feed 
rations for pigs, calves and cows due to calve in the autumn. 46 
May 1949 also saw MAF growing increasingly concerned over the progress of the 
crop expansion programme; wheat and potato acreages were the lowest since the end 
of the war and fell a long way short of the programmed targets for 1949. Farmers 
were increasingly seen as being complacent, a condition MAF believed was 
encouraged in part by the increases in pig rations. What was lacking, MAF believed, 
was fa continuous effort by the NFU to tell their members the truth about the 
45 PC(49) 11th Mtg., May 5th 1949, in PRO CAB 134/640. 
46 CM(49)49, July 27th 1949, in PRO CAB 128/16. 
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expansion programme and to implement their 1947 pledge of maximum support,:F 
Farmers were continually pressing for increases in feed imports when in the long-term 
they were expected to be 70% self-sufficient in coarse grains. MAP emphasized that 
farmers had to be made aware of this fact, and that the NFU itself could play an 
important role. Writing to Vandepeer R.H. Franklin suggested that all possible 
measures should be taken to alert farmers to the gravity of the situation, beginning 
with a meeting with NFU leaders. 48 Tom Williams met Sir James Turner and his 
colleagues at the end of June. Williams stressed that cropping trends in 1949 raised 
serious doubts about the future of the programme as a whole, and about the industry's 
contribution to the solving of the UK's BOP problems. Livestock production 
depended on both grassland and tillage production, and Williams reminded the 
meeting that the targets set for 1951/52 would be maintained in subsequent years. 49 
Mer further discussions with the NFU it was decided that conferences on cropping 
targets would be initiated between CABC's and NFU county branches, on the basis of 
an agenda to be drawn up by MAF and the NFU. The Union would report to MAP 
on the outcome of the conferences, and their findings would then be used as a basis 
for 'full-dress' discussions between the Ministry and the NFU on production targets. 50 
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be made as a result of the talks as the Government remained 'deeply committed' to the 
targets. In reply Turner argued that many of the Government's assumptions had 
proved to be unrealistic, and that therefore the Union should not be bound by its 
former acceptance of the programme. Any further impetus to the production drive, 
he continued, would be abortive unless an objective analysis was made of the 
production targets in terms of their long-term maintenance, and unless the Government 
conducted an examination of labour and machinery supplies, grants subsidies, and 
feeding stuffs supplies. The meetings were to be treated as 'merely part of the normal 
machinery of consultation between the Ministry, the Committees and the NFU ..... no 
further press or other publicity is necessary or desireable'.51 The results of the county 
reviews were presented to the Agricultural Output Committee in December 1949.52 
The overall conclusion was that the main deterrents to increased crop production were 
a lack of confidence in the continuity of the pattern of farming inherent in the 
programme, labour shortages (particularly at peak times), and a lack of adequate rural 
facilities. 
While the NFU and the CAECs had been debating these issues, the Economic Section 
and CEPS had been engaged in a more far-reaching review of the expansion 
programme. At a meeting of the Agricultural Output Committee in March 1949 the 
representatives of the two departments had voiced their concern, and that of the 
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cost of home-produced food was getting increasingly out of line with the cost of 
imported food. Home production and subsidy policy, they continued, should be 
examined in the light of changing import price levels, and in the light of what the 
country could now realistically afford. Vandepeer agreed to the proposed review, but 
felt that the provisions of the 1947 Act were 'sacrosanct and fundamental' to the needs 
of the industry and should therefore not be challenged as an instrument of policy. 
Any report, he continued, should confine itself to an examination of the methods of 
applying the Act's principles. 
The report was finally presented to Ministers in January 1950,54 and drew heavily 
on the findings of the joint MAF/NFU review of crop production targets. The main 
aim of the report was to suggest ways of reducing some of the burden of agricultural 
support on the Exchequer by reducing what was seen as excessively costly production. 
The report had also been influenced by the Programmes Committee's review of the 
balance of payments position which indicated that, except in particular cases such as 
meat, the need for substantial increases in home production on the lines of the original 
August 1947 programme was not so urgent as it had originally appeared.55 
The Committee's report emphasized the changes that had taken place since the August 
1947 programme had been launched. In 1947 the country had been facing a severe 
general BOP crisis, but by 1950 there was an approximate overall balance, albeit 
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within certain strong constraints. The dollar position remained critical, however, and 
so the need to expand production to save dollars remained 'paramount'. More and 
more commodities were becoming available from 'soft' currency sources, and 
devaluation had altered the relationship between home and imported prices. The 
Committee felt that the latter provided an ideal opportunity for relative prices to be 
allowed to determine the pattern of home production. An upper limit had been placed 
on the total cost of food subsidies and so unless the additional supplies required from 
home and overseas sources could be obtained at a lower price, the increased total cost 
would be reflected in the cost of living. This could have serious consequences for the 
Government's wages stabilization policy. While there was clearly still a need to 
expand production to save dollars, these altered conditions had to be taken into 
consideration. The Committee's view was that where supplies of a particular 
commodity were available from soft currency sources at a lower price than the home-
produced item, long-term production trends should be adjusted so as to release 
resources for the production of dollar-saving commodities, or of those in which the 
UK. enjoyed a comparative advantage. 
Considerations of cost would, however, also apply to dollar-saving commodities, and 
the Report envisaged a point being reached where the cost of home production might 
make it more economical to buy from dollar sources, or even to do without additional 
supplies altogether. Wheat was included in this category; while there was little 
difference between the prices of home-produced and imported wheat for the 1950/51 
season, it was likely that the future trend in import prices would be downwards. The 
Committee's view was that while no adjustment should be made in the target acreages 
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for 1951 and 1952, there should be no attempt to achieve them 'at all costs', for 
example by introducing substantial price increases.56 This concern over the cost of 
agricultural expansion also made itself felt in the decision to end the fertilizer and 
feedstuffs subsidies, and to reduce the potato acreage at the 1951 harvest. Home-
produced coarse grains were cheaper than imported supplies, and so maximum 
production was in the interest of both the producers and the nation. The main sources 
of imports were the USSR and the Argentine, but neither offered guaranteed supplies. 
If these sources dried up the Government would have to spend dollars to ensure that 
livestock targets were achieved. It was also expected that the competition for soft-
currency supplies would increase as ERP aid was reduced. The outstanding food 
shortage was in carcase meat and it was one that the Committee believed was likely 
to continue for the foreseeable future. In view of this, and the likely trends in prices, 
the continued expansion of home meat production was 'clearly desirable'.57 Beef and 
mutton production was to be encouraged by a vigourous campaign of grassland 
improvement. The output of pigmeat was to be increased to the greatest possible 
extent allowed by feed supplies, although there was to be no change in the 
programmed targets. No steps were to be taken to encourage further increases in milk 
production. 
The eventual outcome of the review of the expansion programme was an adjustment 
of the production targets for the 1951 harvest. At the suggestion of the Economic 
Planning Board the target wheat acreage was reduced from 2.75 to 2.55 million acres 
56 
57 
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and the potato acreage target from 1.3 to 1.25 million. 58 In both cases it was hoped 
that the reductions would be offset in tonnage terms by increased yields. There were 
to be no reductions in feeding grain targets, and no change in the general balance 
between arable and pasture. 59 In September 1950 Williams wrote to the CAEC 
Chairman, reviewing both home production and the international supply situation. 
While the 1950 wheat acreage had been a great improvement over 1949, the acreages 
of other grains were disappointing. Overseas supplies of coarse grain remained 
uncertain and Williams wanted to increase domestic production, although not at the 
expense of wheat. In general, however, Williams felt that the expansion programme 
was proceeding on the right lines.60 At a meeting of CAEC Chairmen in May 1951 
Williams stressed that there could be no 'slacking off' in the efforts to increase output, 
with production increasingly turning towards meat from home-grown feeds, at the 
expense of further increases in milk and egg production. There would be no limit on 
the amount of coarse grain needed and it might be necessary to reduce the wheat 
acreage to make way for barley and oats, if wheat yields could be increased to 
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(iii) 
The 1947 Act reconstituted the County War Agricultural Executive Committees 
(CWAEC's) as permanent bodies, the Minister's agents charged with the administration 
of the provisions of the Act under the direction of the Minister himself.62 The word 
'War' was subsequently dropped from the Committees' title. The Act also provided 
that CAEC staffs should become civil servants employed by MAF, and many of the 
wartime officers were given permanent posts.63 During the war Committee staffs had 
largely been employed by the Committees themselves. The greatest peacetime change, 
however, was in the constitution of the Committees. Although the CW AEC's had 
been intended to represent agricultural interests, amongst others, their ultimate 
responsibility was to the Minister, and to emphasize this they were appointed without 
any consultation with the industry. In peacetime it was felt necessary to make the 
CAEC's more explicitly representative of the industry, whilst continuing to emphasize 
their original role as the Ministers agents in the field.64 The method for achieving 
this was contained in the 1947 Act, with the Minister being empowered to choose 
representatives from lists of nominees provided by the CLA, NFU, NUA Wand the 
TGWU. The Minister would appoint five of the twelve members himself, all of whom 
were to have had some experience of the agricultural industry in their county. One 
of the five appointees would be a member of the County Council, and this was 
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Councils, which were largely centred on agricultural education and the provision of 
smallholdings.65 Most of the County Committees' work was to be carried on through 
Sub-Committees and the District Committees. 
The Sub-Committees were appointed by the County Committees and their 
recommendations had to be confirmed at county level. The various Sub-Committees 
fell into three broad groups. The Husbandry and Estate Management sub-committees 
carried out duties arising from Parts IT and III of the 1947 Act and the Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1923. Other Sub-Committees were concerned with production and 
technical efficiency or with the provision of services for the farmer. The District 
Committees, usually numbering six per county, were also appointed by the CAEC's 
and were generally composed of local farmers who were not members of the CAEC. 
The District Committees were the main points of contract with the farmer and: 
'On their activity largely depends the achievement of production targets 
on the farm and the development of agriculture by the exchange of 
ideas based on practical farming experience ..... their vital part in the 
efforts to attain a high standard of farming throughout the country 
. d,66 cannot be over-estImate . 
The CAEC's were assigned an important role in the administration of post-war policy 
and were also seen as playing an important part in the success of the expansion 
65 cmd 6996 (1947), p.22-23. 
66 Ryan Report, p.7. 
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programme. However, the CAEC system was the subject of increasing criticism after 
1947, both from within Whitehall and from within the industry itself. The President 
of the NFU argued that the CAEC's were too busy with their numerous other duties 
to give their full attention to their 'prime duty', ensuring that land was farmed 
according to the rules of good husbandry.67 Turner also felt that the Committees 
were being prevented from using their own judgement, an argument taken up by many 
CAEC members themselves. 
'The present system of centralization to the last comma from Whitehall 
militates against Committees doing anything useful on their own 
initiative,.68 
A number of Committee members resigned over what they regarded as MAP 
'interference' in their activities. As the expansion programme progressed Whitehall, 
and in particular the Treasury, became increasingly critical of MAF's organisation in 
the field. In 1948, concerned at the growth in the Ministry's field staff, the Treasury 
had undertaken an investigation of the CAEC's in the hope of finding ways of making 
economies in staffing levels. The main recommendation to emerge was a proposal to 
amalgamate a number of the smaller CAEC's, which was rejected by MAF on the 
grounds that it would disturb the county basis of the organisation and would create 




The T~es, october lOth 1949. 
The Farmers' Weekly, December 9th 1949. 
PRO T222/143, october 20th 1949, J.R. s~pson to Sir E. Bridges. 
Between 1939 and 1950 the staff employed b~ MAF gre~ fro~ 2,654,to 
15 567 with the proportion of the staff ~n the f~eld ~ncreas~ng ov~r the same period from 40% to 80%. (See the Ryan Report, p.3-4). 
316 
The Treasury raised this issue again in 1949, and the Select Committee on Estimates 
drew attention to the heavy losses incurred by the CAEC's on their trading services. 
Many Committees were accused of simply operating in their members' interests, 
ignoring those of the agricultural community as a whole.70 These criticisms, 
combined with growing disquiet about the rapid growth of the Ministry and the role 
of the CAEC's in relation to the National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS) led 
to calls for a thorough investigation of MAF's organisation. The strongest voice 
belonged to the Treasury, Cripps having expressed his own concern at the growth of 
MAP's staff while reviewing the Estimates for 1949.71 MAF acknowledged that in 
view of the department's rapid expansion, 'it would be valuable to have the views of 
two or three people with experience of large-scale organisation in business and in 
other departments' on the structure of MAF.72 At a meeting in October 1949 Bridges 
and Vande peer drafted the terms of reference of a Committee to undertake a review 
of MAP, and at the recommendation of Vandepeer John Ryan, the Vice-Chairman of 
Metal Box Ltd, was appointed as the Committee's Chairman.73 The Ryan Committee 
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'To review the development of the organisation of the MAF since 1939, 
with particular reference to the working of the CAEC's, it's 
decentralised activities generally and their relationship to the 
Headquarter's Offices; to consider whether any changes are necessary 
and to make recommendations,.74 
MAF were anxious to avoid publicity and to play down any suggestion of a 'reshuffle' 
of the CAEC's, preferring to announce the appointment of the Ryan Committee 
through a report to the Select Committee rather than through the press as had been the 
case with the reviews of the Inland revenue and the Air Ministry. MAF's view was 
that the CAEC and NAAS system was a new machine which was 'soundly designed' 
but which required some 'running in'.7s 
The Committee met fifty-two times and considered evidence from the Minister, the 
Permanent Secretary and Senior Ministry Officials, as well as from members and staff 
of the CAEC's and all branches of the industry. Visits were also made to three 
CAEC's, and the Committee attended CAEC meetings and meetings of CAEC 
Chairmen. The final draft of the Report was completed in February 1951. The Report 
concluded that the CAEC's were 'carrying a heavy burden of work' and suggested that 
they be relieved of their trading and routine functions, as this would leave them free 
to concentrate on their 'fundamental function' of promoting the development and 
74 
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efficiency of the industry. While the CAEC's and the NAAS would still work closely 
together, the Report argued that there was no need for Advisory Service Officers to 
work under the direction of the CAEC's, and recommended that the NAAS should 
become a separate organisation, independent of the Committees. This would remove 
any potential obstacles to their work amongst farmers, and would also leave staff more 
time to concentrate on their advisory work. As things stood NAAS was often caught 
between the roles of 'policeman' and 'friend' to the farmer. To encourage greater co-
operation between the education and advisory services, the Committee recommended 
the creation of a Joint Committee, drawing it's membership from both services as well 
as from the CAEC's and the industry itself. County offices would be established to 
act as the Ministry's local administrative units, taking over the trading and routine 
functions of the CAEC's and the staffs employed in these functions. These county 
offices would be supervised by a new MAF division, and the majority of MAPs local 
expenditure would be delegated to the county offices.76 
The Report was written in the knowledge that it would be published and that its 
recommendations would have to be carefully presented if they were to win the support 
of the CAEC's. In a confidential letter to Sir Edward Bridges J.R. Simpson, a 
Committee member and the Director of the Treasury's Organisation and Methods 
Division, emphasised that 'In writing the Report care was (therefore) taken to tone 
down, or to avoid, criticism of the workings of the CAEC system,.77 Similar restraint 
was also used when making out a case for the reorganisation of the Ministry's field 
76 Ryan Report, p.49-50. 
77 PRO T222/141, March 29th 1949, simpson to Bridges. 
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organisation; in both cases, Simpson stressed, had the Report been written as a 
confidential document the criticisms made would have been far more 'stringent,.78 
MAF policy in general and the functions of the Ministry had been outside the 
Committees terms of reference, which confined them to considering organisational 
questions within the framework of existing legislation, but Simpson stressed that the 
Committee had felt unease at some of MAF's 'multifarious activities'. The proposals 
made regarding the Committees' trading services should not, he continued, be taken 
to mean that all the members of the Ryan Committee had seen these functions as 
being 'necessary and desirable'. 79 
The County Executives had been a 'necessary evil' in wartime but in peacetime, 
Simpson believed, they had degenerated into an 'extravagant and unnecessary medium 
for carrying out the executive work of the Department. They provide an example of 
"management by Committee" at it's worst'. Large savings in both money and man-
power could be made, he continued, if these functions were taken over by MAF 
directly and operated through the County Offices. The CAEC's would be left with 
certain statutory functions and the responsibility for encouraging better farming 
practice. It was anticipated that the majority of CAEC members would resist any such 
reduction in their power and authority, but Simpson felt that the strength of the 
Committee's case was shown by the fact that they had won the support of the CAEC 
78 
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representative on the Committee.80 Two financial issues had occupied the 
Committee; the lack of independent criticism of expenditure proposals within MAF, 
and the lack of a 'vigorous and imaginative' approach to CAEC spending on their 
trading services. As long as expenditure was kept within the Estimates, Simpson 
complained, 'everyone seemed happy'. He believed this state of affairs could be 
remedied by the appointment of an under-secretary for finance, the delegation of 
control of local expenditure to MAF county offices, the creation of an internal audit, 
and quarterly accounts for the trading services. 
MAF declared that they would defer any final decision on the Ryan Report until they 
had obtained the views of the Committees themselves and of the industry as a whole, 
although the recommendation to create a financial under-secretary was taken up soon 
after the Report was published. The Treasury were prepared to accept this, but were 
eager to avoid any undue delay in implementing the recommendations.81 The 
Treasury's main fear was that Williams would not want to jeopardise the 'fund of 
goodwill' he had built up by upsetting the farmers and that 'the Ministry of 
Agriculture, determined as they are in the present circumstances not to do anything 
rashly, will in fact do nothing at a11'.82 Simpson was, however, confident that MAF 
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MAP officials and Vandepeer, without committing his Minister, had expressed his 
general agreement with the Report's findings.83 
Simpson was soon to find that his confidence in MAF had been misplaced; all 
criticism of the Committees had been omitted to allow MAF to 'sell' the Report to the 
CAEC's, but Simpson quickly came to the conclusion that MAF were not giving the 
Committees a positive 'line' to follow on the Report, and that they were adopting an 
essentially neutral stance on the proposals. It was increasingly felt within the Treasury 
that MAF were not prepared to stand up to the farmers and that they were 'abrogating 
any central responsibility and leaving it to the Divisions and people mostly concerned 
to say whether the recommendations should be adopted or not'.84 The Committee 
had also underestimated the strength of the resistance to the Report from within the 
industry; the CAEC's and NAAS both unanimously rejected the mam 
recommendations of the Report, and the NFU and the CLA both rejected the proposal 
to relieve the Committees of their trading functions. The Ministry's Land Division 
also rejected all the proposals, the only department to do SO.85 As G.S. Dunnett, 
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'The Chairmen are in a pretty formidable entrenchment, and some of 
their shots are very shrewd. Also, what we want is not to defeat them 
but to get them to change sides, which is much more difficult,.86 
By the time Labour left office in the autumn of 1951 virtually no progress had been 
made in implementing the Ryan Report proposals. Some progress was made after 
1951, however; county offices were not introduced but Whitehall began to exert a 
stronger influence on the CAEC's by increasing the number of instructions it issued. 
Committees were only allowed to continue their trading services if they could operate 
them without loss, and this led to a general curtailment in the range of services 
offered.8? It was not until 1956 and the publication of the Arton Wilson Committee 
Report88 that any changes were made in MAPs organisation, and by this time the 
CAEC's, aware of their dwindling importance, put up only token resistance. 
If MAF had attempted to force the Ryan Report conclusions onto the CAEC's it is 
likely that Williams et al would have faced an open revolt by Committee members 
and the breakdown of the CAEC system. Given the important role the CAEC's and 
the District Committees were seen as playing in the future of the expansion 
programme and the continuing need to maintain a high level of dollar-saving 
production, the likely impact of the proposed reforms cannot have encouraged MAF 
to proceed with implementing the Ryan Report. As J.R. Simpson observed at the 
time, Tom Williams was also unlikely to do anything that would prejudice his own 
86 PRO T222/142, september 26th 1951, Dunnett to Simpson. 
87 See Self and storing, Ope cit., p.151-152. 
88 Cmd 9732 (1956). 
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or the Government's relationship with the farmers, and a large number of farmers were 
also members of County or District Committees. As we have seen Labour placed 
considerable importance on winning the industry's political as well as practical support 
for their policies, and so would therefore have wanted to avoid upsetting producers in 
the run-up to a general election. However, it is also clear that any such action would 
also have hit the farmers themselves, as the CAEC's were the source of the numerous 
grants and subsidies available to farmers. It is likely that any such militant action 
would ultimately have been more politically damaging to the Committees, and the 
industry as a whole, than to the Government. While maximum food production 
remained the overriding need, the CAEC's could remain resistant to change and 
'interference' from Whitehall. Mter 1953/54, however, the food supply began to 
improve and so the importance of the Committees began to wane, and the Government 
was able to 'streamline' MAPs organisation in the field. 
How are we to assess the work of the CAEC's in the years up to 1951? As Self and 
Storing emphasize, it was through the Committees that the industry accepted a fairly 
vigourous programme of regulation and contro1.89 Given the traditional distrust of 
'farming from Whitehall' and the deep-rooted individualism of British farmers, it is 
hard to see how else the Government could have attempted to regulate the industry 
in peacetime, and to ensure its production targets were reached, whilst retaining the 
active support and co-operation of the industry. The CAEC system also had the 
advantage of having proved its worth in wartime, and of encouraging the industry to, 
at least in part, administer itself and to take responsibility for ensuring standards of 
89 Self and storing, Ope cit., p.139. 
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good husbandry. Even within the CAEC system there were complaints that 
Committees were not given enough scope to use their own initiative. Without the co-
operation engendered by the CAEC system it is difficult to see how the expansion 
could have succeeded, given the sheer scale of the task and the absence of an 
established county-level MAF organisation. A farmer could lose his livelihood if he 
was judged not to be farming in accordance with the rules of good husbandry. 
'But at least these judgements were made by practical local people who 
could be expected to appreciate the farmer's problems and to apply 
their powers with sympathy and moderation'. 90 
A decision-making body composed of 'outsiders' would have alienated the farmers, and 
this would have had serious implications for the expansion programme. 
Were the CAEC's an example of 'management by committee' at its worst? One 
yardstick which could be used is the expansion programme itself and what was 
achieved in terms of output and efficiency. Another might be the activities of the 
Committees themselves. Between March 1948, when the 1947 Act came into force, 
and the end of 1951 3,000 supervision orders were issued and 157 farmers and ten 
landowners were dispossessed. Over the ten year period (1947-57) Part II of the Act 
was in operation, 5,011 supervision orders were issued and 400 dispossessions carried 
out. 91 Very few instances of the abuse of their powers by Committee members could 
90 self and storing, op. cit., p.114. 
91 ibid., Appendix B, p.238. 
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be found. There were a number of safeguards against such abuse; for example, the 
Minister's approval was required for the transfer of any compulsorily acquired land to 
a member of a CAEC. The independent land tribunals acted as another check on 
Committee decisions. Over the ten years 1,926 appeals were heard, arising from 
decisions made by the Minister, 544 of which were allowed. The majority of the 
appeals concerned landlord and tenant disputes; of the 177 appeals over dispossession 
orders, 42 were allowed. While supervision on its own would only have had a direct 
effect on a comparatively small number of farmers, the 'fear of Committee action 
spread its influence over a wide circ1e',92 and it is impossible to measure the indirect 
effect the activities of the CABC's had on farming standards. 
Inevitably Committee decisions often caused great hardship, but this would have 
occurred whether the decisions were taken by the CABC's or MAF Officers in county 
offices. In fact, Committees often did everything in their power to avoid creating such 
hardship, and often resembled 'over-indulgent parents, saving the rod and spoiling the 
child, far more than some stone hearted rural gestapo trampling down the rights of 
British yeomen,93 While on the one hand this can lead one to question the 
effectiveness of the CAEC's as administrators of Government policy, would a more 
directly centrally-controlled, MAF-run system of controls have been any more 
effective in the long-run? In financial terms the system envisaged by Simpson et al 
in their private discussions might have proved more efficient, but it is doubtful that 
92 ibid., p.134. 
93 ibid., p.134. 
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it would have enjoyed the general day-to-day support the CAEC system continued to 
receive from the industry until the repeal of Part IT of the 1947 Act in 1958. 
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(iv) 
This chapter and an earlier chapter have dealt with the factors behind the launch of 
the expansion programme and the progress of the Government's production drive after 
August 1947. As was mentioned above, by 1950 changing economic and financial 
conditions were beginning to influence Government thinking on agricultural expansion. 
Devaluation had helped to ease Britain's general BOP problems, although the need to 
maintain the impetus of agricultural production per se was not in doubt, in the light 
of the county's more intractable dollar problems.94 Chapter IV dealt with the 
financial costs of Labour's agricultural policies, and of the expansion programme in 
particular. Leaving these issues aside, on what other criteria are we to assess what 
was achieved between 1947 and 1951? 
By 1951/52 the volume of net output had increased by 42% over the average pre-war 
level of production (Base year = average of years 1936/37 to 1938/39 = 100), and the 
programmed target of a 50% increase was finally achieved in the 1952/53 season. 
MAF defined gross output as the total amount of production sold off farms in the UK 
or consumed in farm households. Net output was defined as gross output minus the 
amount of purchased materials used in production. However, only those items which 
represented British indebtedness to foreign agriculture, for example feeds, seeds and 
livestock, were deducted. MAF's calculations took no account of inputs such as 
artificial fertilizers, tractor fuel and the work of agricultural contractors, all of which 
94 'The Balance of payments deficit vanished; but li~e the Cabhishideliat it left it's grin behind in the form of an ~ntract e 0 ar 
deficit'. Sir Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery (1985), p.22. 
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played an important part in expanding production but which represented agriculture's 
indebtedness to non-agricultural production. As Worswick and Ady argue: 
'For this reason it is probable that the official net output index 
somewhat exaggerates the magnitude of the increase which is fairly 
attributable to the efforts of those engaged in the agriculture 
industry,.95 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation estimated that gross output in the UK in 
1949/50 was 21% higher than in the average pre-war year, although to measure what 
was achieved in these terms would be to ignore the increases in crop yield and 
improvements in the utilization of agricultural resources such as grassland and animal 
feeds, the latter being in greatly reduced supply in the post-war period. The years 
after 1947 saw increasing yields for all the main cereal crops and potatoes, with the 
result that by the end of 1951 they were at levels higher than those achieved at the 
peak of the wartime production effort. Between 1947 and 1951 the average yield per 
acre of wheat increased from 15 cwt to 22 cwt, having fallen from 19 cwt to 15 cwt 
between 1945 and 1947, and potato yields increased from 5.75 tons to 8 tons per acre, 
the yield having initially fallen from 7 tons in 1945.96 These increases were due to 
increased mechanization, improved cultivation techniques and new varieties of crops, 
and in particular to the increased use of artificial fertilizers; between 1940 and 1951 
the quantity of phosphates applied to British soil increased from just under 200,000 
95 D.K. Brittan, 'Agriculture', in Worswick and Ady (eds.), The British 
Economy, 1945-1950 (1952), p.467. 
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tons to nearly 450,000 tons, and the usage of nitrogen and potash-based fertilizers also 
increased.97 The mechanisation of British agriculture had been accelerated by the 
demands of the war and this process continued and gained pace in the post-war period, 
encouraged by labour shortages and the rising cost of labour to the producer. In 1939 
there were some 64,000 tractors in UK but by 1944 this figure had risen to 173,000, 
reaching 350,000 by 1950. Between 1944 and 1950 the number of combines in use 
increased from 2,500 to 10,500 and the number of milking machines on British farms 
more than doubled over the same period, increasing from 38,000 to 79,000.98 Milk 
and meat yields also increased, albeit not to the same extent, helped by the 
development of better breeding techniques and the provision of the Artificial 
Insemination (AI) service which made good quality breeding stock available to 
farmers who could not afford to buy their own pedigree bull. 
Another measure of the achievement of the expansion programme might be the change 
in British agricultures contribution to home food supplies. In 1939 British farmers 
provided 30% of the nation's calories, 44% of the protein and 31% of the fats 
required; by 1949/50 these figures were 39%, 53% and 34% respectively.99 The 
figures for civilian calorie intake per day are given below (Pre-War annual average 
= 100).100 






Ope 't 56 and worswick and Ady (eds.) Ope cit., c~ ., p. , 
worswick and Ady, Ope cit., p.467. The population had increased by 
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1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1948/49 
Calories 93 94 96 95 100 98 96 96 96 99 
As compared with the pre-war period, in the years after 1940 the UK population was 
obtaining more of its calories from dairy produce, grains and potatoes, and less from 
meat and oils and fats, a trend that continued into the post-war period, as Table One 
shows. 
Table One 
Pre-war 1945 1946 1947 1948 1948/49 
Dairy products 9 11 11 11 11 11 (ex. butter) 
Meat (inc. bacon! 17 13 13 12 11 10 
canned meat) 
Oils/fats (inc. 17 14 14 13 15 15 
butter) 
Sugar and Syrups 15 11 12 13 13 14 
Potatoes 4 6 7 7 6 6 
Grain products 30 38 35 36 37 36 
Other foods 8 7 8 8 7 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Percentage of total calorie intake derived 
from certain grouRs of Foods 101 
101 ibid., p.3. 
331 
Although rations fell below the wartime average in the immediate post-war period, the 
even distribution of basic foodstuffs and the issuing of supplies of orange juice, milk 
and fish liver oil to children and pregnant women helped to maintain and even 
improve the country's general health in the face of post-war austerity.102 When 
considering net output figures account must be taken of the fact that a larger 
proportion of post-war production was given over to the production of low-value 
commodities, such as grains and potatoes, than was the case before 1939. As Table 
Two shows, although the essence of the expansion programme was a recovery in 
domestic livestock production, it also entailed large increases in arable production over 
its 1936-38 level. John R. Raeburn calculated that at 1953 c.i.f. prices home 
production was saving £117 million more in foreign exchange than at the end of the 
war;103 in 1950/51 the total cost of agricultural support (current prices) was £400 
million, a figure which never fell below £240 million during the 1950's. As Section 
(ii) showed, by 1950 even the expansion of dollar saving production was ultimately 
seen as being dependent on considerations of the overall cost of such production to 
the nation. 104 
How was this increase in output achieved? The Government saw the price mechanism 
as playing a key role in increasing agricultural production, and the expansion 
programme was launched on the back of a considerable increase in producers' prices. 
102 ,. d t . b lations of the British housewife' An account of the t~tals ag f~~nd in s. coo~er, 'snoek Piquante', I;>etw~en 1945 adndFre19nch c(~ds e) Age of Auster~ty (1963). 
~n S~ssons an ., -
. 1 pl' cy . Some Economic Results 
J.R. Raeb~rn, 'Agr~culBtuka Re~i:w N~. 20, December 1943. 
Prospects , The Three an s , 
and 
103 
104 d~scussed in detail in Chapter IV. These issues were • 
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Looking back over the whole period the Agricultural Improvement Council (AlC) 
focussed on the broad effects of wartime and post-war legislation. 
'The fixed prices for agricultural requirements and the guaranteed markets and prices 
for agricultural products reduced the farmer's chance of making a quick profit from 
mere astute buying and selling and greatly enhanced the importance of technical skill 
in the business of farming. It became possible for the first time for the farmer to 
calculate with reasonable accuracy the financial result of applying a new method,.105 
The AlC also emphasized the important role played by the CAEC's and the National 
Agricultural Advisory Service. An adequate supply of labour had been seen as one 
of the essential requirements for the success of the expansion programme and while 
between 1947 and 1950 there was an increase of between 30-40,000 in the numbers 
of men regularly employed in the industry, this was more than offset by a decline in 
the number of women employed and the loss of a large number of POW's. The 'drift 
from the land' resumed again in the 1950's, and the agricultural labour force never 
reached the level thought necessary for the success of the programme, and special 
measures had to be introduced to secure the additional supplies needed at harvest and 
other peak times, with the employment of soldiers and children in the fields and the 
creation of special volunteer camps. 
Labour shortages may bear some of the blame for the relatively poor progress made 
towards increasing arable, and particularly coarse grain, production up to 1951, despite 
105 From the AlC's second report, quoted in E.H. Whetham, British 
Farming 1939-49 (1952), p.163. 
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considerable increases in prices and profits. Figures for post-war production are given 
in Table Three. Even after the Treasury subsidy on animal feedstuffs was removed 
, 
a move which resulted in a large increase in prices, farmers remained more willing 
to continue buying-in feeds than to grow their own. Was it, as Edith Whetham has 
suggested, simply that 'about 12 million acres of crops in the UK represents as much 
worry and risk as farmers are willing (except in wartime) to undertake in this 
form?,l06 One of the main conclusions of the Joint NFU/CAEC review of cropping 
targets was that, despite Government assurances, production was being held back by 
a lack of confidence within the industry as to the long-term future of domestic 
production with memories of the 'Great Betrayal' clearly still fresh in many farmers' 
minds. 
However, there was also a good deal of complacency within the industry, particularly 
with regard to feed supplies; when MAF expressed its concern over shortfalls in the 
programmed coarse grain targets in May 1949 the NFU's initial response was simply 
to suggest that the Government should endeavour to import more cereals.107 The 
fixed prices and guaranteed markets which the AlC saw as allowing the producer to 
plan with greater confidence may also have helped to foster this air of complacency 
within the industry. The tendency of CAEC's to 'spare the rod' in their dealings with 
producers may also have been a factor, but it is also clear that Committees were 
prepared to use the full range of their powers against recalcitrant farmers, and it is 
106 
107 
E.H. Whetham, 'The Agricultural Expansion programme', in the Journal 
of Agricultural Economic, Vol. XI No.3 (1954), p.315. 
See PRO MAF 120/31, May 26th 1949, Note by H.S. Barnes. 
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impossible to assess the indirect impact supervision orders and dispossessions would 
have had on other producers. 
Labour shortages were, to a great extent, offset by the growth of mechanisation within 
the industry, which in turn helped to increase labour productivity. M.C. Matheson's 
index for labour productivity in agriculture for the period from 1939 to 1951, taking 
as a base year an average of the years 1936/37 to 1938/39, shows that productivity 
increased by 31 %, despite the greater amount of time which had to be directed to 
growing stock feed to offset reductions in imported supplies. 108 Increased yields 
also helped to offset shortfalls in acreage targets, and would also have helped to 
increase labour productivity. Figures for the 1950's produced by Sharp and Capstick 
suggest that the average annual growth of labour productivity in agriculture compared 
very favourably with that of other industries; agriculture's annual rate of growth was 
5.1 %, while in oil refining labour productivity was growing at 4.9% and in the 
economy as a whole the rate was 2.5%.109 There was no increase in the total area 
under cultivation in the post-war period, and the acreage of often high quality farm 
land that was lost to urban and industrial uses was not matched by an equivalent 
increase in reclaimed land, although considerable improvements were made in the 
productivity of marginal land, particularly in hill and upland areas, through the 
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As we have seen, by 1950 the whole question of the overall cost of the expansion 
programme was beginning to cause concern within a number of Government 
departments, and by the middle of the decade it had become the one issue which 
dominated Government thinking on agricultural policy. The main problem for the 
Conservatives was the over-production of a number of major commodities, milk, pigs 
and eggs, at levels exceeding those at which these commodities could be sold without 
a heavy subsidy.110 In some respects these problems were an inheritance from the 
policies pursued by Labour, the expansion of production through price schedules 
which proved to be unrealistically high in the changing market conditions of the 
1950's. More generally, the Conservatives were faced with the problem of adjusting 
agricultural production to cope with increasing abundance rather than with scarcity. 
Pigmeat production had recovered to its pre-war level by 1951/52, encouraged by 
increased feed rations and by substantial price incentives, a policy that was initially 
continued by the Conservatives in order to expand meat supplies to a level that would 
facilitate derationing. In three years production increased from 315,000 tons to 
757,000 tons. However, after decontrol the prices offered to farmers proved to be way 
above the market price for pigmeat, the problem being one of excessive U.K. prices 
rather than excessive foreign competition, and the Government's interest lay in 
reducing the production of any commodity which entailed a heavy subsidy. 
Substantial cuts were subsequently made in the level of support for pig production, but 
the pig subsidy still accounted for 1/4 of total Government expenditure in 1955/56. 
110 1951 
;s d; scussed in more detail in 
conservative policy after •• 
Chapter VII. 
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Milk production had been encouraged in the war and post war years for nutritional and 
health reasons, and by 1951 liquid milk consumption was double its pre-war level and 
had exceeded the expansion programme target, accounting for 1/3 of net agricultural 
output. Labour had attempted to damp down production at the 1951 APR but with 
little success. Production continued to expand but the market for liquid milk remained 
static with the result that an increasing quantity of liquid milk had to be diverted into 
manufacturing at a heavy loss to the Government. By 1954 farmers were being told 
to reduce stock numbers, and that any further increase in production would not be 
eligible for subsidy payments. III Cuts in the subsidies paid to egg producers forced 
many small producers out of business although overall production continued to 
increase through the introduction of new production techniques and increasing 
technical efficiency. In Labour's defence it must be emphasized that when the 
expansion programme was launched the recovery of world food production and the 
movement in the terms of trade which occurred in the 1950's could not have been 
foreseen; in the 1940's expert opinion had foreseen a long period of comparative food 
shortage and persistent BOP problems. Milk played a vital part in maintaining the 
nation's diet, helping to offset the deterioration in supplies of fresh meat, and the 
expansion of pig production was the quickest way of increasing the supply of meat 
to the consumer, and had been one of the areas of production most affected by 
wartime cuts in feed supplies. As was mentioned above, the Conservatives themselves 
intially placed renewed emphasis on increasing pig production. However, after 1952 
anxieties over the 'dollar gap' began to recede and the terms of trade increasingly 
111 Edith Whetham has suggested that in the case Oft mi';k t~e :o~l~~; given to production was 'too large at the s ar an 
continued'. Ope cit., p.31S. 
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began to favour manufacturers over primary producers, and cost-effectiveness rather 
than maximum production became the guiding principle of agricultural policy in the 
1950's. 
The Conservative Party's attempts to cut back on the level of agricultural support 
caused a souring in the Government's relationship with the industry and as Chapter IV 
showed the cuts in the subsidies paid for milk, eggs and pigs hit the smaller producer 
particularly heavily. Despite these cuts Government expenditure remained at a level 
somewhere between £240 and £280 million throughout the 1950's, despite Treasury 
complaints that expenditure on this scale was excessive. 112 The farmers, on the 
other hand, complained that they were not sharing on the general prosperity of the 
period, although given the prevailing trends in world food prices this was almost 
inevitable. During Labour's period in office the Treasury had fought, and largely lost, 
a runnmg battle to restrain Government expenditure on agriculture. With the 
improvement in world food supplies and in Britain's BOP position in the 1950's, the 
Treasury began to gain the upper hand, although expenditure was not reduced to the 
extent the Exchequer advocated. One of the main problems for the Government was 
that the deficiency payments system introduced after 1953 was as 'open-ended' as the 
system it had replaced, and the inevitable outcome of Government's efficiency drive 
and the cuts in subsidies was further increases in production. One answer to this 
problem was the imposition of standard quantities, limiting subsidy payments to a 
112 See Chapter IV. 
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given quantum of output. This was the course of action taken with regard to milk but 
was not more widely introduced until the 1960's.113 
How then are we to assess what was achieved under the expansion programme? As 
Table One shows, the progress made towards realising the programmed production 
targets varied from commodity to commodity, with cereal production making 
disappointing progress and milk and meat production making much better progress, 
milk and pigmeat output actually exceeding the August 1947 targets. Improvements 
in grassland management helped to support increases in cattle and sheep numbers, and 
the decline in the number of farm horses freed both grazing and grain supplies. 
Increases in imports of cereals and cereal feeds helped to support the expansion in pig 
and poultry numbers. Had these increased supplies of imports not been forthcoming 
it is doubtful that livestock, and in particular pig and poultry production, would have 
increased to the extent it did, given the poor progress made in expanding domestic 
coarse grain production, despite a considerable degree of price incentive. This chapter 
has explored the various reasons for the poor performance of the cereals expansion 
programme. Up to 1949 most of the increase in agricultural prices was reflected in 
a rising level of food subsidies, rather than in retail prices, with the result that by 
1948/49 the former had reached £500 million. 
Thereafter, however, the annual level of subsidies was reduced through higher retail 
prices. Between 1946/47 and 1951/52 aggregate net income increased from £183 
113 See Chapter VII. 
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million to £324.5 million. 1l4 As Edith Whetham shows, much of this increase in 
income was re-invested back into agriculture, a trend that is reflected in the growth 
in the numbers of tractors, combines, milking machines and grain dryers on British 
farms. 115 This trend also helped to offSet labour shortages, and after 1950 the 
resumption of the drift of agricultural workers away from the land, and also represents 
a reaction to the farmer's growing wages bil1.1l6 Labour's reliance on the price 
mechanism as the 'engine' of agricultural expansion was to have serious consequences 
for the industry in the 1950's, and the Conservative Government's attempts to 'retrench' 
on agricultural expenditure and output in the face of changing economic and financial 
circumstances brought them into conflict with the industry. With all the emphasis on 
the expansion of production, Labour had little opportunity to deal with the industry's 
fundamental structural problems and the wide divergence in incomes and standards, 
with the result that these problems re-emerged in the 1950's,117 Small farmers in 
particular were hit by the cuts in Government support for milk, pigs and eggs. To a 
large extent these structural problems remain unsolved to this day. 
114 ~~nY~!_B~Y~"~\i.~~lli<t~F~i~xQi~n~g~o~f~F~arm~~p~r~i~c~e~s~,~1~9~53, Figures taken from ua. -
Cmd 8798 (1953). 
115 Whetham, Ope cit., p.317. 
. b f increased from £425 million in Aggregate costs ~ncurred Yll ~rme~s 1951/52 mainly through wage 1946/47 to nearly £830 nu ~on ~n , 1952) 
increases. See cmd 8239 (1951) and Cmd 8556 ( . 
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Product Unit Pre- 1946/ 
Percentage of Pre-war 
1951/ 1952/ Target 1951/ 1952/ 
war 47 52 53 52 53 
Wheat '000 1,856 2,062 2,131 2,030 160 115 109 
acres 
Barley " 929 2,211 1,908 2,281 279 205 246 
Oats " 2,403 3,567 2,857 2,882 150 119 120 
Potatoes " 723 1,423 1,050 990 129 145 137 
Sugar " 335 436 425 408 13 127 122 
Beet 
Milk Mill. 1,563 1,665 2,024 2,053 123 129 131 
gals. 
Eggs '00 385 322 464 474 152 121 123 
tons 
Beef/ " 578 537 617 583 110 107 101 
Veal 
Mutton/ " 195 141 147 172 77 75 88 
Lamb 
Pigmeat " 435 145 464 574 92 107 132 
U.K. Agricultural Production Statistics 
Source : Whetham, 0V. cit. 
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(VII) 
'THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE: THE CONSERVATIVE 
PARTY, LABOUR AND THE PURSUIT OF THE RURAL VOTE' 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the development of post-war Conservative 
agricultural policy, and the extent to which political rather than economic 
considerations influenced both Conservative and Labour policy after 1945. 1 Particular 
attention will be given to Labour's pursuit of the 'rural vote' and to the Conservative 
reaction to this strategy. Although there was considerable agreement between the 
major parties on the broad aims of any post-war policy, and on much of the 1947 Act, 
as Andrew Flynn observes 'beneath the surface unity there was substantial 
dis agreement'. 2 As is shown below the Conservatives contemplated opposing the 
Second Reading of the Agriculture Bill, despite the fact that the Bill had the support 
of James Turner and his colleagues, and so 'the putative post-war agreement on 
agriculture almost foundered at the first hurdle'. 3 The NFU in fact shared the 




For Liberal agricultural policy, see Craig, Ope cit., p.134-136. 
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to the size of the guaranteed market, but stopped short of raising the issue with the 
Government. 
The problem for the Conservative Party was that Labour would have made 
considerable political capital out of any serious opposition to the Bill, but 
wholehearted support would have allowed Labour to gain too much of the initiative 
in a crucial area of post-war policy. Had Labour decided to pursue a more radical 
policy after 1945 this problem would have been far less acute. The 1940's saw the 
Conservative Party attempting to keep the issue of agricultural policy within the 
political arena while at the same time keeping within the broad post-war consensus 
on agricultural policy. Conservative criticism rested on doubts about the size of the 
guaranteed market for home produce under the 1947 Act and the extent of the controls 
on farmers proposed in the Bill. However, as J.D. Hoffman argue, the Party was 
unable to point to any fundamental differences between Labour's agricultural policy 
and that outlined in the Agricultural Charter.4 As Chapter II showed, by 1945 a 
broad consensus existed on the need to avoid a repetition of the inter-war period. The 
Conservatives, as subscribers to this consensus, were forced to work within it once in 
opposition. How they attempted to do this will be discussed below. 
Speaking at the 1945 Party Conference Tom Williams told delegates that Labour's 
policies would 'win the countryside' for the Party,S and after 1951 Labour placed great 
importance on the 'farming vote', delegates and politicians arguing that Labour could 
4 J.~. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in opposition, 
(1964), p. 174. 
1945-1951 
5 Report of the 44th Annual Conference (1945), The Labour Party, _ 
p.141. 
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secure the political support of the farming community and that 24 I 
or more rura seats 
were within the Party's grasp. Labour did secure a considerable number of seats in 
the Counties at the 1945 election, an area outside its normal strongholds of support, 
but these constituencies could not in the main be regarded as having been 
predominantly agricultural areas. Certainly Tom Williams enjoyed considerable 
personal popularity amongst farmers, and relations between Labour and the NFU were 
on the whole good, but Labour failed to make any real headway in rural England, 
despite the Party's attempts to mould its policy to the farmers' wishes after 1951. 
Despite the importance placed on it at the time, the political importance of the 
agricultural community was, in fact, slight. 
With the deterioration in Government/NFU relations after 1951 and the Union's desire 
to see a return to the sort of detailed production planning that had characterized 
Labour's period in office, the Labour Party increasing began to believe that they could 
win over the traditionally conservative, and Conservative, farmers, and through them 
rural England as a whole. While in power Labour had devoted most of it's attention 
to the farmers, and the farmworker had seen 'little sustained furthering of his interests 
either in relation to wages or the tied cottage'. 6 In part this was due simply to the 
nature of the APR machinery, but also to the need to retain the goodwill of the 
farmers and their active support for the expansion programme. This need to work in 
partner- ship with the farmers led Labour to compromise on a number of important 
6 Flynn, Ope cit., p.223. In 1946 the NUAW told Labour that they were 
I deeply concerned with the failure of the Labour P~ty a~d the 
Minister of Agriculture to implement the Labour Party s po~~cl o~ 
lifting up the standards of employment o~ the w~rk~rs on t e fan 
to those of the skilled workers in other ~~dustr~e~. Letter ro~ 
the General secretary of the NUAW, NEC Pol~cy co~ttee 21st Marc 
1946, EC 10 27th March 1946. 
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issues, most obviously nationalization, and to make price awards that were regarded 
by the Treasury, amongst others, as being excessive. This concentration on the 
farmers cannot have helped increase Labour1s support amongst the farmworkers, 
particularly when Labour policy often clashed with the demands of the NUA W on 
issues such as the tied cottage and worker representation on the CAEC'S.7 
7 
'th the agricultural workers Labour's relationship w~ 




In A Background for Agriculture, published in June 1945, the Conservative Party gave 
a comprehensive account of its post-war policy for the industry,8 outlining the 
arguments for treating agriculture, in Churchill's words, 'as the first of Britain's 
industries'.9 After the war, the report argued, both cereals and livestock products 
would be in short supply, although it was hoped that in the case of grain the balance 
would 'adjust itself fairly rapidly'. It would, however, be a long time before meat 
supplies returned to even their pre-war level, and before the nutritional standards 
recommended in the 'Hot Springs' report were reached. In addition the report 
emphasized that the UK would emerge from the war a debtor, and that the country's 
limited reserves of foreign exchange would have to be used to purchase industrial raw 
materials and those foodstuffs it was impossible to produce at home. A BackiUound 
for Agriculture also emphasized that as late as 1939 agriculture remained the largest 
single interest in the UK, employing more labour than the cotton, ship building, and 
motor industries combined. A healthy and prosperous agriculture would, it was 




The Party I s first thoughts on post-war pol.icy were contained ~n 
Looking Ahead : Agricultural Reconstruct~on" produced. by t, e 
Conservative committee on Post-War Reconstruct~on and pub~~shed ~n 
April 1943. The report itself had be~n prepare:d by the Agr~cultuhal 
sub-committee under the Chairmansh~p of MaJor R.G. Proby, t en 
Chairman of the Huntingdonshire CWAEC. 
Quoted in The Conservative Party, A Background for Agriculture 
(1945) p.3. 
. is taken from Looking Ahead, p.?3. A Bac~ground,to i~~ic~y~~~;~~nas es~entia~ly an expanded vers~on of tf~s d ead~~er 
policy document, re~ terat~ng n,tany ,o~ the arguments uS,e an a ~ng 
to the list of reasons for ma~nta~n~ng a healthy agr~culture. 
347 
A prosperous agriculture could also play an important social and political role in the 
post-war world. The greatest danger facing modem civilization was an 'excess of 
centralization', and the hallmark of every rural community was that it was local and 
individual. 
'As such it is a sure barrier against the unlimited extension of state 
action which in other lands has led through ever increasing control to 
police rule and the horrors of the concentration camp'Y 
As the wartime controls were gradually phased out they would be replaced by a more 
flexible system which, while it might appear 'piecemeal and irregular', corresponded 
'faithfully to the varying conditions of a varied industry,.12 For example, the report 
envisaged a system of levy subsidies for wheat, butter, and cheese, tariff protection 
for horticultural products, and the quantitative regulation of meat imports, together 
with some form of Treasury assistance for home producers.13 The Conservative Party 
would also revive the pre-war style marketing boards. 
The report emphasised that producers had to give efficient service to the nation in 
return for the promise of stability. The composition of the CABC's had been in 
keeping with the wartime need for 'stark efficiency', but in peacetime it would not 
square with the 'freedom loving British temperament', and the producers would 
demand a greater say in determining who would control them. The CABC's would 
11 The Conservative Party, A Background for Agriculture (1945), p.4. 
12 ibid., p.6-7. 
13 ibid., p.9. 
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therefore be reconstituted on a more representative basis and would be charged with 
three sets of duties. The new CAEC's would be responsible for the destruction of 
pests, the drawing up and implementation of land drainage schemes, and the provision 
of mechanical assistance to farmers on a contract basis. Secondly, they would work 
along side the NAAS to persuade farmers to adopt new methods and to employ new 
machinery. Finally, the new Committees would be empowered to investigate farmers 
charged with neglecting their land and to bring them to book, if necessary by the use 
of compulsory powers. 
The report stressed, however, that producers would have the right to appeal to an 
independent tribunal. 14 On the subject of land nationalization the report argued that 
such a policy would leave the industry constrained by bureaucracy and 'red tape', and 
would in addition be both expensive and a source of hardship for a large number of 
individuals. The Party's 1945 election manifesto drew heavily on A BacklUound for 
AlUiculture, stressing the need to ensure that there was no return to 'the evils of 
recurring scarcity and gluts'Y Output would be maintained at a higher level than 
pre-war and while producers would be expected to maintain minimum standards, the 
best results would be obtained by allowing producers the greatest possible measure of 
freedom within this. The manifesto also envisaged that the functions of the CAEC's 
would eventually be limited to offering farmers leadership, help, and advice. Under 
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'Maintained in a condition to enable the efficient producer to obtain a 
reasonable return on the enterprise and capital invested, and to enable 
wages to be paid to the agricultural worker sufficient to secure him a 
proper standard of living' .16 
In the aftermath of the Conservatives' crushing defeat in the 1945 election pressure 
began to mount within the Party for a restatement of Conservative principles and 
policies.
17 
Churchill, however, was opposed to any restatement of Party policy, 
argumg: 
'When an opposition spells out its policy in detail the Government 
becomes the opposition and attacks the opposition which becomes the 
Government. So, having failed to win the sweets of office, it fails 
equally to enjoy the benefits of being out of office' .18 
Despite Churchill's reluctance the pressure on the Central Office to produce a 'clearly 
defined policy acceptable and understandable to the man in the street,19 increased, 
culminating in a motion moved by Robson Brown at the 1946 Party conference. The 
16 ibid., p.116. 
17 R.A. Butler and Macmillan both argued for some degree of policy 
reformulation, and in The Conservative Future L.S. Amery argued that 
while Disraeli' s principles contained 'by implication' all the 
elements of Conservative policy, there was a need for a 'c~e~r a~d 
comprehensive restatement in the light of present day con~~t~ons : 
Macmillan initially called for a reform of the 'broa~ pr~nc~ples 
of Conservative policy, but eventually became COIl\lJU tt;.ed to the 
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motion called on the Party to counter 'Socialist propaganda' by issuing both a concise 
policy statement and a document giving a more detailed account of both Conservative 
principles and the Party's programme, and was passed by a large majority. 20 The 
publication of the Industrial Charter in 1947 led to calls for further policy statements, 
and in June 1948 the Party published it's Agricultural Charter. The Charter was 
subsequently formally adopted as Party policy at the October 1948 Conference.21 
The Agricultural Charter was drawn up by a Committee comprising of R.A. Butler and 
three members of the Party's Agricultural Committee, Anthony Hurd, Sir Thomas 
Dugdale, and Captain Harry Crookshank. The Committee consulted both a wide range 
of expert opinion and their colleagues within the Party, including R.S. Hudson and 
Walter Elliot. The NFU and the CLA were also invited to give evidence before the 
Committee.22 The Charter was not intended to be a final policy programme but 
stressed the need for a high level of domestic food production, pledging that the 
Conservative Party would secure British farmers a permanent place in the national 
economy.23 The overall aim was to expand production to achieve a level of output 
50% higher than that achieved in 1938/39. The industry's achievements during the 
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but in the post-war world 'this spirit of enthusiasm and high endeavour is in peril'. 24 
Producers, it was argued, had been discouraged by shortages, high taxes, and the bad 
weather, but mainly by a lack of confidence about the future. These fears had not 
been laid to rest by the 1947 Act and the Agricultural Charter repeated the criticisms 
the Party had made during the Bill's passage through Parliament, the main one being 
that Labour's legislation had failed to 'secure agriculture's future position in our 
economy,.25 
Under the Conservatives the home producer would be given 'first place' in the home 
market, with the Empire producer in second place and the 'foreign' producer in third 
place. Within the overall production target a Conservative Government would want 
on 'adaptable agriculture', and price adjustments at the APR would be used to secure 
changes in the character of agricultural production. The Charter contained no definite 
long-term production targets for individual commodities, arguing instead that 
expansion would be based on a 'greatly expanded' livestock population with 'full use' 
being made of the land.26 The Party accepted the system of guaranteed prices and 
assured markets established by the 1947 Act, but pledged that it would improve on 
Labour's policy by guaranteeing a market for all the British farmer could produce up 
to the overall target. 27 The Agricultural Charter also stressed Conservative 
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own land would ultimately lead to the destruction of democracy itself.28 The Party 
also expressed its opposition to the Lucas Committee report and to the permanent 
retention of the trading functions of the Ministry of Food. The Charter dOd h I , owever, 
recognise that the Government had to assume a responsibility for the maintenance of 
adequate standards of nutrition: 
'MAF, as responsible for the level of production, must take its rightful 
place in a balanced partnership with the departments concerned, with 
the consumer, the distributor, and overseas trade'.29 
It was also acknowledged that the State had a duty to promote and encourage efficient 
production but the Party were not happy with the operation of the existing CAEC 
system and were 'fundamentally opposed' to the use of detailed cropping directions. 
The Agricultural Charter advocated a reduction in CAEC staff numbers and the 
replacement of the CAEC's machinery service by commercial enterprizes run on either 
a co-operative or commercial basis. In general the CAEC's were to regard themselves, 
and to be regarded, as tribunals rather than as prosecuting bodies. 3O The Charter also 
contained an 'Agricultural Workers Charter', which promised improvements in wages 
and conditions and more and better housing in rural areas, although the Charter 
emphasized that there was no question of the Conservatives abolishing the 'tied' 
cottage. 
28 ibid., p.4. 
29 ibid., p.42. 
30 ibid., p.46. 
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The Times regarded the Charter as 'a practical policy for farmers', while the Daily 
Express opined that the bulk of the document was simply 'watered-down Socialism'?l 
The Manchester Guardian gave the most comprehensively damning assessment of the 
proposals, arguing that the Charter contained little original thought and no economic 
arguments for expansion, while observing that the proposals regarding guaranteed 
prices and markets were no more definite than Labour's. It was also felt that the 
proposals for ensuring the efficiency of the industry were not sufficiently stringent and 
that, in general, the Agricultural Charter was 'specific in rewriting the Agriculture Act 
almost wholly in favour of producers,.32 In general the industry gave the Charter a 
restrained welcome, focusing on the similarities between Labour and Conservative 
policy.33 
The Agricultural Charter formed the basis of the Agriculture section of the Party's 
1949 policy document The Right Road For Britain, the first full-length policy 
statement to be produced by the Party in the post-war period. The Party's 1950 
election manifesto, This Is The Road, reiterated the Party's support for the principle 
of guaranteed prices and for an expanded agriculture, and its opposition to state 
farming and the public ownership of the land. The manifesto argued that national-
ization would increase the cost of food, and that the Conservative aim was to ensure 
that the housewife obtained her food through the cheapest and most efficient 
31 1948 d the 
Daily Express 26th June 1948. The Times, 26th June an - --
32 The Manchester Guardian, 26th June 1948. 




The 1950 manifesto also argued that the time had come to end 
Government trading in food and to return the business of food purchase to the private 
sector. Labour had themselves begun to dismantle a number of wartime controls and 
, 
the public mood clearly favoured a continuation of this process. 35 The Conservative 
manifesto pointed to the increasing production of food abroad, arguing that the 
experience of other countries had shown that returning food purchasing to private 
hands had led to a reduction in the cost of food. The Conservative Party was pledged 
to reducing the cost of food subsidies, although those most affected by any increase 
in food prices would be compensated by tax cuts or increases in benefit payments,36 
In a memorandum prepared for the Party's Parliamentary Agricultural Committee by 
the Conservative Research Department Phillip Bremridge considered the various ways 
in which the Charter's pledges could be turned into practical policy.37 The Agricul-
tural Charter had argued that the system of price guarantees should be developed in 
such a way as to improve the efficiency of agricultural production, and Bremridge 
suggested that one way of doing this would be to revive the central principle of the 
Wheat Act, deficiency payments.38 Another advantage of this form of price 
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system of guarantees. If a farmer marketed good quality grain at the right time he 
could, with the market price he received and a deficiency payment, get a price for his 
wheat greater than the standard price and this, Bremridge argued, would act as an 
incentive to efficient production. The new payments could be funded by an 
Exchequer grant and standard prices, together with any limits on the quantities 
standard prices would apply to, could be fixed at the APR. This system, Bremridge 
opined, had worked well in the inter-war period and had 'the great merit of being 
simple to operate without a large amount of administration'. 39 
Although in 1951 Phillip Bremridge could claim with reference to the 1947 Act that 
'except for the addition of a slightly Socialist flavour the Act contained little with 
which Conservatives could quarrel',40 the Opposition were in fact quick to cast doubt 
on the stability of the foundations laid down by the provisions of the Bill. As Chapter 
III demonstrated Conservative MP's found a considerable number of points to object 
to. While they did not propose to divide the House on the Second Reading of the 
Bill, Captain Crookshank told MP's that if the Conservatives failed to secure 
appropriate amendments during the Committee stage the Party would have to consider 
its position at the Third Reading.41 In a memorandum to the Parliamentary 
Agricultural Committee circulated in January 1947 Phillip Bremridge identified two 
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and policy discussions it went much further in the extent to which the industry was 
to be placed under Government control. 
'Nor is it clear from the terms of the Bill that the industry is to be put 
in it's rightful place in the life of the nation, or in a position from 
which maximum production can be quickly attained if an emergency 
arises'.42 
Secondly, the Bill made no reference to how the agricultural labour force was to be 
increased, to the question of rural amenities, or to the need to increase the provision 
of farm machinery. Bremridge suggested that the Second Reading debate might 
provide a good opportunity for the Party to question Labour on it's general attitude to 
the industry, to press them 'to state plainly where they stand'. Conservative M.P.'s 
could also raise the issue of nationalization, and the long-term future of the industry 
once post-war scarcities had been banished. While the NFU hierarchy seemed happy 
with the Bill's contents it was, Bremridge argued, the Party's duty to: 
42 
43 
'Scrutinize the Bill meticulously and to bring to the Minister's and the 
public's notice any shortcomings which may appear in it's 
provis ions' .43 
PAC(P) 47 (1), January 17th 1947,. Memor~ndum on the Agriculture Bill 
: Second Reading, Ph~llip Bremr~dge, ~n CRD 2/13/3. 
ibid. 
357 
Although much of the memorandum's criticism was centred on Part One of the Bill 
Bremridge also outlined what he regarded as the shortcomings of other aspects of 
Labour policy. The standards of good husbandry and estate management outlined in 
the Bill were described in very general terms, thus throwing the burden of interpre-
tation, and considerable responsibility, onto the CAEC's and the Land Tribunals. 
Bremridge, however, admitted that it would be difficult to make the definition any 
more precise. The memorandum was, however, more critical of the landlords' limited 
rights under the Bill to appeal against directions as to the provision, improvement and 
maintenance of fixed equipment,44 and of the provisions relating to the compulsory 
purchase of land from a landlord on the grounds of poor estate management. In such 
cases the land would be purchased by MAF at its 1939 price. 
Bremridge's view was that unless Labour were prepared to admit that they were 
beginning a policy of land nationalization they would not object to amending the Bill 
so as to allow the sale or rental of the land to another, Ministerially-approved, 
person.45 The section of the Bill relating to agricultural holdings had been welcomed 
by the NFU but heavily criticised by the CLA. Bremridge argued was that the 
proposed increase in security of tenure was not entirely in the industry's interests, as 
it would make it 'almost impossible' for a landlord to get rid of a tenant. It would 
also be difficult for young men to find holdings for themselves except through the 
44 
45 
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Government's smallholding scheme, which would not by itself satisfy the demand.46 
The NFU's VIews were also communicated to the Parliamentary Committee, in a 
memorandum prepared by the Union's Parliamentary Committee.47 While noting the 
widespread concern within the industry as to the possibility of limits being placed on 
the size of the market for home-produced food, and that this issue was a 'serious 
problem', the NFU had decided that it was an issue which 'could not be dealt with by 
the insertion of particular words in the Bill and ..... too rigid a provision might well 
affect the future of British agriculture adversely'. The Union's view was that the way 
in which Part One of the Bill was interpreted would depend on the 'sincerity of 
purpose' of the Government, the efficiency of the industry, and the strength of the 
NFU itself. Farmers, they continued, would not accept efficiency measures without 
assured markets, guaranteed prices and adequate returns for their labour. With this 
in mind the NFU had decided to ask the Government for another declaration of policy. 
The memorandum also argued that where a dispute arose between the Government and 
the Union over an APR settlement the matter should be referred to an independent 
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Throughout the Second Reading and Committee stages of the Bill, Tom Williams was 
pressed to give the House some indication of the proposed size of the industry and a 
Conservative amendment to Clause One, pledging the Government to making 
agriculture 'fully productive', was moved but subsequently defeated during the 
Committee stage. In a note prepared for the Conservative Parliamentary Agricultural 
Committee it was suggested that while the Bill had secured the public support of the 
NFU hierarchy, this enthusiasm was not shared by many rank-and-file members, and 
that: 
'On these grounds it should not be difficult to establish a sound 
argument for opposing the Bill, should the Party decide to do so' .49 
However, the shadow cabinet ultimately decided not to oppose the Bill's Third 
Reading; as Andrew Flynn argues, Labour would have made considerable political 
capital out of Conservative opposition to a Bill which had the public support of the 
ind us try . 50 
49 
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By the early 1950's many Conservatives were beginning to argue that the Party was 
losing both the confidence and support of the agricultural community. At the 1953 
Party Conference Commander Maitland emphasized the political damage that losing 
the farmer's support could inflict on the Party. The Government, he argued, had not 
put its pledges and promises across clearly enough, with the result that farmers were 
becoming increasingly anxious over their future. In Maitland's words 'you cannot 
possibly have any scheme for greater production unless you have confidence'. 51 
Agriculture's prosperity not only affected people in the industry itself but also the 
'prosperity and the happiness and the tranquillity of vast numbers of people all over 
England, in the villages and the market towns'. These people, he believed, were the 
'heart' of the Conservative Party. If the Government took an appropriate line on 
agricultural policy it would serve to both increase production and encourage the 
farming community, who were '90% Conservative at heart', to give the Party their 
active support and so return the Government with a renewed majority at the next 
election.52 
At the 1952 APR the Conservatives had announced a new target for the expansion 
programme, a 60% increase in total net output over pre-war, with greater emphasis on 
meat and animal feeds. 53 In a memorandum to the CAEC's, Dugdale informed 
Committee Chairmen that 'as long ahead a we can see' the country would, in general, 
51 The Conservative Party, 73rd Annual Conference (1953), p.82. 
52 ibid., p.82. 
53 Annual Review and Fixing of Farm Prices, cmd 8556 (1952), p.4. 
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need all the food that could be produced at home. 54 The Government also launched 
an agricultural efficiency drive, arguing that 'the vigour with which Part II of the 
Agriculture Act 1947 has been used during the last four years has not mitigated the 
need for increasing the general standards of husbandry,.55 In a statement to the 
Commons in April 1952 Dugdale had emphasised that the extent to which the industry 
could respond to calls for increased production would depend on increases in 
efficiency. While the industry would have its share of the nation's resources, the 
Government looked 'with confidence' to a redoubling of the industry's efforts to 
increase the efficiency of production. 56 
The 1952 APR also saw the Conservatives withdrawing from the detailed production 
planning that had characterized price reviews and production policy under Labour, a 
move that was resisted by the NFU.57 The production targets given at the 1952 APR 
were, for the most part, vague and general, with the Government explicitly stating that 
it had no intention of setting detailed production targets.58 The Party's 1945 
manifesto had argued that increases in output could best be secured by allowing 
producers the greatest possible freedom of cropping, and the Agricultural Charter had 
emphasised the Party's fundamental opposition to the use of detailed cropping 
54 PRO MAF 120/48, undated. (June. 1~52?), CAEC 52/40, 
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directions.59 This cha . l' nge III po ICY was also encouraged by Sl'gns of . Improvement 
in the world food supply; R.A. Butler told delegates at the 1953 P t Co-~ 
ar y lllerence that 
the country was passing 'from an age of control and scarcity to an age of greater 
freedom and abundance'. 60 
The Government continued to stress the importance of the 60% target and the other 
objectives outlined in the 1952 White Paper; at the NFU's annual dinner Churchill 
emphasized that: 
'It is just as important for our future now to wring the last ounce of 
food from our acres year by year as it was in the dark days of the 
war'.61 
However, Churchill's words did little to reduce the anxieties of farmers as to the future 
of their industry, fears that had been expressed at the Union's AGM in 1952,62 and 
which made themselves felt, albeit indirectly, at the 1953 Party Conference. A motion 
calling on the Conference to pledge its support for the Government's efforts to 
strengthen production was passed, but with an addendum calling the Party's attention 
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felt in the industry', and urging the Government to promote greater confidence by 
clarifying its policy.63 
Both Dugdale and R.A. Butler, one of the architects of the Agricultural Charter, 
attempted to allay both farmers' and M.P.'s, fears as to the future course of 
Government policy. Butler stressed that the Party was committed to a high level of 
agricultural production at home and to the continuation, in some form, of guaranteed 
prices.
64 
In the debate on the original motion Commander Maitland, moving the 
addendum, argued that this was the first year that the provisions of the 1947 would 
really matter to producers, given the general downturn in world commodity prices. 
Farmers' anxieties, he maintained, stemmed from the fact that the Government had not 
explained its policies clearly enough. 65 Dugdale was keen to emphasize that 
Government policy would come to be more clearly understood in the following 
months, as specific arrangements were made, and reaffirmed the commitment to the 
60% target. Agricultural policy had to be brought into line with national economic 
policy, and this entailed the curtailment of the state purchase of food at fixed prices. 
This, Dugdale suggested, was the source of farmers' anxieties, but it was the policy 
behind the system that was important and not the system itself. The Government was, 
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producers, and to maintaining the value of the industry's guarantees under the 1947 
Act. 66 
By 1954 a new system of guarantees had been introduced based on the principle of 
deficiency payments, administered in the case of milk, potatoes, and bacon pigs 
through producer marketing boards, and in the case of fatstock through an NFU-
backed Fatstock Marketing Corporation.67 The prices fixed for potatoes and eggs 
were 'floor prices', intended to operate only when the market was depressed. A fixed 
price for milk was retained but after 1954 was restricted to a specific quantity of 
output, as Self and Storing point out the use of the very power to limit the size of the 
home market the Conservatives had criticized in the Agricultural Charter and else-
where.68 Arguments over the price of milk were one of the main causes of the 
deterioration in Government - NFU relations in the 1950's, a process which culminated 
in a complete breakdown of negotiations at the 1956 APR, something which was to 
happen again in 1958 and 1960. 
The shift to a deficiency payments system allowed the Conservative Government to 
combine a policy of cheap food, and a free market, with continuing support for British 
farmers. Consumer food subsidies gave way to producer subsidies and cost-effective-
ness increasingly began to replace expansion as the underlying principle behind 
Government policy. The Conservatives made substantial cuts in the subsidies given 
66 
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to milk, egg and pig producers as well as reductions in the general level of support; 
farmers were increasingly expected to meet cost increases through increases in 
efficiency, rather than through increases in prices. This process of retrenchment 
provoked bitter clashes between the Government and the NFU, a situation which 
Labour believed offered the Party the key to winning the agricultural vote. At the 
1954 Conservative Party Conference, fears were expressed that Labour was planning 
to 'ride to victory in a farm cart', and the Party was told that it could no longer take 
the traditional support of the countryside for granted. 69 
In 1955, an election year, the NFU came close to passing a vote of 'no confidence' in 
the Government, and were only diverted from this course of action by the personal 
intervention of the Chancellor, R.A. Butler. The 1955 APR settlement was clearly 
influenced by political considerations. Costs had increased by £25 million and under 
Exchequer guidelines there should have been no increase in the level of support, as 
£25 million represented the estimated annual increase in agricultural efficiency. 70 
However, in the final settlement guarantees and subsidies were increased by £40 
million. There had been a deterioration in the BOP position and production had been 
effected by bad weather, but if the latter had been taken into account when deciding 
the final settlement the Government was still departing from its principles for political 
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generous price award. The Agriculture Act 1957, which placed limits on the extent 
to which the overall level of Government support could be reduced in anyone year, 
was in part a result of the disagreement surrounding the 1956 APR.72 This policy 
did little to restore Government - NFU relations, however, and in both 1958 and 1960 
the Union refused to endorse the final price settlement. 
As Chapter II revealed many Labour MP's argued that winning the agricultural vote 
would be a crucial element in Labour's electoral success, and the policies the Party 
espoused in the 1950's certainly appear to have been tailored to appeal to the NFU. 
Conservative policy after 1952 involved a withdrawal from the detailed production 
planning that had formed part of the policies pursued between 1945 and 1951, much 
to the chagrin of the NFU. Labour, in A Challenge to Britain, argued for more 
comprehensive planning, with the APR governed by five-year production plans and 
annual price adjustments only reflecting changes in costs until the introduction of a 
new five-year plan.73 This sort of production planning had originally been suggested 
to Labour by the NFU while the Party had been in power but rejected on the grounds 
that it would tie the Minister's hands too tightly.74 Full Harvest, published in 1955, 
pledged that Labour would reintroduce a system of fixed guaranteed prices. 
Labour finally issued a policy statement on the question of agricultural marketing in 
1955, a full eight years after the publication of the Lucas Report. The proposals were 
72 
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essentially a compromise between the earlier report and the NFU's policy for 
agricultural marketing, despite the support Lucas enjoyed within the NUAW, the 
distributive trades, and the Co-operative wing of the Party. 75 Producer marketing 
boards would be reintroduced for milk, potatoes, and wool, but independent 
commissions would be set up for livestock, cereals, and eggs. However, by 1959 all 
references to Lucas-style marketing arrangements had been removed, and Labour's 
policy document stated that 'facilities under the Marketing Acts' would be available 
for the promotion of producer boards.76 The treatment afforded the whole issue of 
land nationalization by Tom Williams et al is another indication of the way in which 
Labour tailored it's policies to win the approval of the farmers, although it's efforts 
were to meet with little practical success. 
In the debate on the agriculture section of the Party's policy statement, Labour 
Believes in Britain, at the 1949 Conference dissent was once again expressed at the 
absence of any proposals for overall nationalization of the land. In reply Shinwell, 
speaking on behalf of the NEC, emphasized that while the principle of nationalization 
had not been abandoned, the Government's existing powers of land control and 
acquisition were sufficient for the time being. If these powers were to prove 
insufficient at some future date, then they would be extended in the necessary 
directions. With regard to the question of nationalization as an immediate policy 
objective it was the NEC's view that such a policy would 'throw a spanner in the 
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works, disturb the farming community and, it may be, impede agricultural 
d . ,77 Th . f h pro uctlOn. e Importance 0 t e August 1947 expansion programme, launched 
in the face of serious world food shortages and Britain's worsening balance of 
payments problems, and the likely effect that nationalization would have on the 
farmers were powerful arguments against such a policy. 
The issue of land ownership was raised once again at the 1953 Conference during the 
debate on A Challenge to Britain, which contained no proposals relating to public 
ownership. An amendment was moved calling on the Party to place a plan for 
nationalization before the electorate in time for the next general election, but met with 
resistance from both Tom Williams and the National Union of Agricultural 
Workers.78 As late as 1948 the NUAW's biennial conference had unanimously 
passed a resolution calling on the Government to speed up its nationalization 
programme, but by 1950 the Union's mood had changed, and a resolution calling for 
nationalization at an early date was narrowly defeated. The NUA W's Executive 
Committee argued that while it had not dropped nationalization altogether, it was not 
'immediately practicable' or desirable in the prevailing circumstances. The 
Government, they opined, already had 'effective control of the land.79 
77 The Labour Party, Reeort of the 48th Annual Conference (1949), 
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This was the view that the Union's representatives expressed at the 1953 Labour Party 
Conference, when they argued that nationalization would inhibit production at a time 
when what was needed was increased production.80 This point was taken up by Tom 
Williams, who stressed the gains that had been made since the passing of the 1947 
Act, and the important role that the producers' belief in the long-term stability of their 
industry had played, and would continue to play, in that achievement. Why, Williams 
asked, should Labour, at a time when the whole agricultural community was worked 
up over Conservative policy, 'throw this ball of discord' into rural life for the sake of 
theory or 'snappy slogans which have no practical application,.81 By 1958 Williams 
was expressing doubts as to whether nationalization was actually desirable even as a 
long-term policy objective, although the overall tone of his speech at the 1953 Party 
Conference seemed to imply this attitude, as did the speech by his Parliamentary 
Secretary George Brown.82 In his 1958 Conference speech Williams emphasized the 
political damage an 'unconsidered' land nationalization proposal could wreak on the 
Party chances in the 1959 general election, damage which might consign Labour to 
'the political wilderness for a very long time'. 
How are we to judge Labour's pursuit of rural votes after 1945? Labour did win a 
number of county constituencies at the 1945 election, although the seats the Party won 
in East Anglia were largely gained with the help of the NUA W, and the decline in 
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Highlands. However, the eight county seats outside these two areas that fell to Labour 
in 1945 did not have a high level of agricultural employment and were in fact fairly 
industrialized.
83 
After the 1955 General Election out of the 110 'agricultural constit-
uencies' in Great Britain (ie those where agricultural employment was more than 15% 
of total male employment), 95 were held by the Conservatives, 11 by Labour and 4 
by the Liberals. Post-War boundary changes make it difficult to compare the position 
in 1955 with the immediate post-war period, although figures for 1946 suggest that 
the Conservatives held 3/4 of the total number of 'agricultural' seats with Labour 
having at best 20 seats.84 
Thus the available figures would suggest that Labour's post-war campaigning had little 
impact on the Conservatives' hold on rural Britain, despite the agricultural 
community'S growing dissatisfaction with Government policy after 1951. As Self and 
Storing have suggested the Conservatism of rural Britain was not, and indeed is not, 
founded solely on the support of farmers and their dependents but on a far wider 
cross-section of the rural population, on retired people, 'refugees' from city life, 
clergymen, shopkeepers and the 'professional classes', 85 none of whom would be very 
likely to be converted to the Socialist cause. IT Labour hoped that by winning the 
farmers' vote they could go on to win over rural Britain en masse (an argument not 
examined by Self and Storing), they ignored the social and economic divisions within 
83 In order of agricultural importance these constituencies were 
Derbyshire-West, Maldon, Taunton, Lowestoft, Kidderminster, 
Thornbury, Faversham and Frome. 
84 Self and storing, Ope cit., p.194. 
85 ibid., p.202-203. 
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rural society which cut across Party allegiances and would have prevented these other 
social groups from necessarily identifying their interests with those of the farmers. 
While Labour were able above to win over a small number of farmers to the Socialist 
cause the majority remained in the Conservative fold, despite their often vocal 
criticisms of Government policy. The Conservative Party was keen to stress that the 
values embodied in rural life were the same ones they stood for, an approach which 
had begun under Disraeli and which was still being used in the post-war period. The 
Conservatives certainly had stronger and much older links with rural Britain than 
Labour, the latter attempting to shed its image as a predominantly urban party. The 
innate conservatism of rural areas ultimately manifested itself in the political arena. 
Given the long-term nature of the production process in agriculture farmers tend to be 
wary of any sudden changes and the references to nationalization in the 1945 Labour 
manifesto, and the debates on the issues at subsequent Party conferences,86 cannot 
have helped the Party's standing amongst producers, even though Tom Williams and 
his colleagues were themselves backing away from the whole question of public 
ownership. During the 1950's the NFU's main source of complaint was the uncertainty 
engendered in farmers' minds by Government policy, although these fears were not 
strong enough to dent the industry's underlying conservatism. 
Although Labour enjoyed a good working relationship with NFU Headquarters, the 
Union's rank-and-file membership were often vocal critics of Labour policy and so it 
IS possible to over-emphasize the Party's popularity amongst the agricultural 
86 See Chapter II. 
372 
community as a whole. Despite what was achieved under the 1947 Act many farmers 
still preferred the Devil they knew to the Devil they did not know, or still did not 
wholly trust; respect for Tom Williams did not necessarily imply support for the 
Labour Party as a whole.87 Labour's campaign to organize and secure the active 
support of the agricultural workers was hampered by logistical problems and by the 
decline in the agricultural labour force, which broke up traditional rural communities 
and the mechanisms through which the Party's message could have reached a wider 
audience. As the labour force declined those remaining in employment found 
themselves increasingly isolated and this in tum hampered Labour's and the NUA W's 
recruitment drives. As was argued in Chapter II, Labour's and the NUA W's failure 
to gain greater support amongst agricultural workers stemmed, at least in part, from 
the Union's failure to secure wages parity with industry or the end of the 'tied' cottage, 
and from the belief that Labour was more concerned with the farmers' rather than with 
the farmworkers' welfare.88 These issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
VIII. 
How important was the 'agricultural vote', in the light of the importance invested in 
it by both the major Parties in the post-war period? In absolute terms the number of 
farmers was small; in 1951 there were 290,000 farmers and farm foremen in the UK, 
a figure which constituted less than 1 % of the total electorate. If all persons engaged 
in 'farm employment', including farm workers, are considered then the figure rises to 
87 
88 
To argue that farmers I i~st;inc~ively' vote cons~rvatide t~e t~c~i~i;h 
the strong Liberal trad~t~on ~n the We~t Coun ~ an n element of 
Highlands, but such a view does conta~n more an a 
truth. 
By 1959 only 30% of the agricultural labour force were members of 
the NUAW. Self and storing, op. cit., p.159. 
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1.1 million, roughly 3% of the total 1951 electorate. One analysis of the political 
importance of the agricultural vote is given by Roland Pennock, who bases his 
analysis on the 1955 General Election.89 Pennock argues that in 1955 there were 55 
county constituencies which could be defined as marginal seats, one where the 
victorious candidate in the previous election had a plurality of less than 8% of the 
total vote cast. 
Pennock's analysis uses data from the 1951 Census to obtain figures for males 
engaged in agricultural occupations in his marginal constituencies, and expresses this 
data as a percentage of the total electorate in 1955.90 The data is given in Table 
One. Pennock concludes that there were between 12 and 16 constituencies where the 
agricultural interest was large enough to be politically significant, as opposed to the 
24 or more seats suggested at Labour Party conferences. Pennock also concludes that 
of all those classed as being involved in 'agricultural occupations' less than 30% were 
farmers or farm workers.91 So within the marginal agricultural constituencies as 
defind in Pennock's analysis farmers formed a relatively small proportion of the 
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Data collected by Self and Storing suggests that in 1955 there were only 24 British 
constituencies where farmers, as defined in the Census, constituted even 5% of the 
total electorate. If all the wives and adult dependents were added then the 'farmers' 
vote' would have constituted more than 10% of the total vote in 126 constituencies 
and more than 20% in 37.92 This data still suggests that there were very few 
constituencies where farmers formed a politically important group. Although Self and 
Storing present no data on how many of these constituencies could be regarded as 
marginal seats, they conclude that the value placed on the 'agricultural vote' rested 
more on its strategic importance than on its physical size, as the 'Key' to winning rural 
Britain.93 As was argued above, however, even if the farmers had proved to be 
politically malleable it is unlikely that other rural social groupings would have proved 
receptive to Labour Party policy. A Labour victory in a dozen rural seats would have 
had little immediate impact in electoral terms, although it would have had a 
considerable impact on the Conservative Party and its traditional view of its links with 
rural England, and on the course agricultural policy took in the 1950's. 
As we have seen the NFU were often extremely critical of Conservative policy in the 
1950's, but always attempted to limit the scale of any disagreement, or potential 
disagreement, and to reach some form of compromise with the Government. Mter the 
disagreements of the late 1950's the NFU approached the Government in an attempt 
to repair the damage done to their relationship.94 Much the same can be said of the 
NFU's relationship with Labour between 1945 and 1951; in both cases the Union, 
92 self and storing Ope cit., p.202. 
93 ibid., p.202. 
94 See Cmnd 1249 (1960), Agriculture. 
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while voicing its criticisms of Government policy to the Opposition, sought to avoid 
being seen to stand too firmly with the Opposition and to avoid, wherever possible, 
serious conflict. The NFU leaders' attitude to the 1947 and 1957 Agriculture Acts are 
good examples of this strategy in action.95 As the NFU President, Sir James Turner, 
argued in 1958 the Union had to 'play with both sides',96 and a failure to do this 
would have jeopardized the Union's unique position in the policy-making process. 97 
95 . . ·ts criticism of the 1957 Act, The NFU was somewhat ret~cent 1~ l;. nevitably reserve judgement' 
96 
97 
saying only that producers ~ou h t been tested in practice ~ The 
until the worth of ~he g~ar~n ee~ hathe Act as it stood, but ~t ~as 
Union was clearly d~ssat~sf~ed w~t ld have a higher degree of pr~ce 
Labour who argued that farmers ~ ou Act some Labour MP's argu~~g 
protection than that suggested ~n. th~ at' this attrition of the~r ~hat the, NFU hadd ~up~ni~ a~dn~t~: ing, op. c it., p. 205 . ~ndustry. Quote ~n e 
The British Farmer, April 5th 1958. 
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Inverness 2.8 8.9 
Source : Pennock, 0V. cit. 
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(iii) 
In the immediate post-war period the Conservative Party, was struggling to find its 
own voice on the issue of agricultural policy and to move out from under the shadow 
cast by the 1947 Act. Given the latter's origins in Hudson's wartime Ministry this was 
always going to be a difficult task. Labour's 'failure' to introduce a genuinely radical 
policy for the land, and the NFU's support for the Bill, made this task even more 
problematic. A radical Socialist policy would have given the Conservatives 
considerable scope for opposition and criticism and would almost certainly have 
forced the NFU to break with its post-war policy of political neutrality between the 
major parties, the latter a product of the Union's role in the wartime policy-making 
process. It was the importance of maintaining this working relationship that explains 
the absence of any truly radical measures in Labour's agricultural policy after 1945. 
Clearly, a majority within the industry would have been opposed to the nationalization 
of the land, in comparison to, for example, the coal industry; the NUAW were poorly 
organized and did not possess the political weight within the Party that the NUM 
enjoyed.98 Farmers and, to a lesser extent, landowners also enjoyed more popularity 
than the coalowners. Although the Conservative Party would not have received much 
support for concerted opposition to the nationalization of the coal industry, agriculture 
would have provided a very different story. 
The Conservative Party failed to say anything very original or individual in the 
Awcultural Charter; as the Manchester Guardian observed the guarantees offered were 
98 These and related issues will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
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no more definite than the ones given by Labour. Agriculture was still expected to be 
'adaptable', and the 50% net output target was already enshrined in the expansion 
programme and regarded by Tom Williams as a permanent feature of British 
agricultural policy. One area of difference was the subject of the CAEC system, 
although Tom Williams was himself no great advocate of detailed cropping directions, 
except in times of national emergency, or of control for control's sake.99 
Conservative criticism of the Lucas Report was offset by the rather cool reception 
Williams gave to the proposals in the Commons. It is interesting to note that when 
Heathcoat-Amery abolished the CAEC's in 1957 it was carried out against the wishes 
of the NFU, who saw it as the beginning of the erosion of the whole fabric of post-
war policy. This part of the 1957 Act can be seen as a culmination of the gradual 
breaking down of a number of corporative ideals embodied in the provisions of 
Labour's legislation in the face of the Conservative's free-market policies, in a period 
which saw the basic principle underlying agricultural policy change from maximum 
production, initially at any price, to maximum cost-effectiveness. However, the 1947 
Act remained the touchstone of any policy for the industry and even as late as 1960 
the Conservatives found it necessary to reaffirm their commitment to the value of the 
guarantees under the 1947 Act. lOO The Party was clearly concerned at the possibility 
of losing rural votes, although the apparent cynicism with which the Government tried 
to mend it's fences with the NFU in election years suggests that the Government 
believed the farmers could be easily placated. However, the fact that Labour's rural 
99 See Chapter III. 
100 cmd 1249 (1960), p.S. 
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campaigning was taken at all seriously suggests that there was a genuine fear amongst 
Conservatives that the Party was losing its way on agricultural issues. 
Commenting on an early draft of the Agricultural Charter R. Dorman-Smith, a former 
NFU President and Minister of Agriculture, emphasized the need to make 'quite 
unambiguous statements' if farmers were to have any confidence in the Party's policy. 
He also contrasted Labour's post-war success with the Conservatives' 'not altogether 
. . ,. 101 
convmcmg mter-war record. Labour, in Dorman-Smith's view, had been lucky 
in not having to have faced a buyers' market; Labour had 'had the breaks - we had the 
sticky end of the wicket'. Thomas Dugdale, the Conservative Agriculture Minister, 
certainly saw the Party's problems as stemming from the need to adjust to abundance 
rather than scarcity, and from controls to freedom. 
The expansion of liquid milk production proved to be a problem for both Labour and 
the Conservatives, and the latter's solution to the problem of excess supply was to 
impose a quantitative limit on the production that qualified for a deficiency payment. 
One of the main problems for the Conservatives in their struggle to reduce expenditure 
was that the system of deficiency payments was 'open-ended', and the inevitable 
outcome of the Government's efficiency drive and cuts in support was expanding 
production. B.A. Holderness has suggested that the answer to the Government's 
problems was the general introduction of standard quantities, and this was in fact the 
solution adopted in the 1960'S.102 While such a policy would have helped the 
101 Note on the 'Conservative statement on Agriculture', undated (March 
19481), in CRD 2/13/2H. 
102 B.A. Holderness, British Agriculture since 1945 (1985), p.21. 
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Government in its attempts to reduce its expenditure on agriculture, any attempt to 
limit the overall size of the guaranteed market in the unsettled atmosphere of 
Government/NFU relations in the 1950's would almost certainly have plunged the 
Government into an even deeper conflict with the farmers. The battles fought over 
milk gave an indication of the likely results of such a course of action. Having 
identified this as one of the potential dangers of Labour's policies, the Opposition 
would have been able to make considerable political capital out of Conservative 
attempts to limit the size of the guaranteed market once they had taken office. 
Despite Labour's attempts to woo the farmers, and the disagreements which 
characterized GovernmentlUnion relations in the 1950's, rural Britain remained 
predominantly Conservative. As this chapter has attempted to show, however, there 
were very few constituencies where the agricultural community formed a significant 
proportion of the rural electorate. Both the major parties gave the 'farming vote' a 
greatly exaggerated importance, in Labour's case to the detriment of its relationship 
with the farmworkers, and it is an examination of this last relationship which forms 
the basis of Chapter VITI. 
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(VIII) 
A GREAT BETRAYAL? 
LABOUR AND THE AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, 1945-51 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have discussed the NFU's role in the policy-making process but 
comparatively little has been said about the relationship between Labour and the 
agricultural workers in this period. The object of this chapter is to examine this 
relationship, and to discuss the ways in which the National Union of Agricultural 
Workers (the NUA W) attempted to influence Government policy on a range of key 
issues and the extent to which these efforts were successful. While the NFU enjoyed 
an uneasy semi-neutrality in the inter-war years, endorsing Conservative candidates 
on the grounds that it was the only way the Union could gain a voice in Parliament, 
the NUAW had always been 'within the curtilage of Party Politics'.l In 1911 the 
agricultural workers' union elected it's first Socialist President, Walter Smith, and 
affiliated to the TUC in the same year. The union had been founded with the 
assistance of a number of Liberal MP's and 'at least some of those present were as 
concerned about the political possibilities of such a union as they were about the 
effect it could have on farmworkers' conditions,.2 
1 self and Storing, The State and the Farmer (1962), p.174. 
2 The Landworker, May 1956. (my italics). 
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The farm workers soon turned away from the Liberals to the Labour Party; the 
NUAW President from 1929 to 1964, E.G. Gooch, eventually became a Labour MP 
and the NUA W journal, The Landworker, urged its members to vote Labour in 
national and local elections. For its part Labour worked hard to encourage the growth 
of both Union and Party membership in rural areas, as was discussed in Chapter ll. 
In the inter-war years, agricultural workers were amongst the lowest paid workers in 
the country, a plight that was highlighted by both the NUAW and the Labour Party's 
fervent campaigning in the inter-war years. Throughout the inter-war period Labour 
supported the agricultural workers in their struggle for better wages, parity with other 
skilled workers, and for an end to the 'tied' cottage system. Both Labour and the 
NUA W advocated the nationalisation of the land and greater state control of the 
industry. Thus the agricultural workers seemed to have everything to gain from a 
Labour victory in 1945, a view that was clearly held by the NUAW itself as it urged 
it's members to work and vote for Labour. 
The war years saw the NFU move away from it's essentially defensive stance, and 
what Sir Ivor Jennings called it's 'discriminating support,3 for the Conservative Party, 
towards a more positive but more politically impartial stance. The County 
Landowners' Association (the CLA) had even stronger links with the Conservative 
Party, but like the NFU the Association sought to cultivate its links with Whitehall 
and the Agriculture Minister of the day, rather than try to argue it's case in the 
Commons or the Lords. If the NFU and the CLA attempted to 'play with both sides' 
after 1945, then the NUAW clearly expected Labour to play on their side when 
3 Sir Ivor Jennings, Parliament (1939), p.178. 
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formulating agricultural policy. This expectation is reflected in E.G. Gooch's comment 
on Tom Williams' refusal to intervene in the decisions of the Agricultural Wages 
Board; farmworkers, Gooch emphasized, expected Labour ministers to behave 
differently from Conservative ministers. 
As has been discussed in earlier chapters Labour's post-war agricultural policy was 
shaped by pressing economic and financial considerations, and within this by the need 
to retain the support and confidence of the farmers. On issues such as the 'tied' 
cottage, the CAEC's, and land nationalization the policies of the NUA Wand the NFU 
were fundamentally opposed. Thus the gains made by the agricultural workers after 
1945 were somewhat limited when compared with what they had hoped to achieve. 
Wages increased considerably but the goal of parity with other skilled workers 
remained elusive, and the NUA W were also denied equal representation with the NFU 
on the CAEC's. Agricultural workers gained a little more security as tenants but the 
'tied' cottage system remained intact, Labour's policy being to improve the system 
rather to destroy it altogether. To quote from one work on the period, 'Developed and 
nurtured by Labour, the Union found that it carried disappointingly little weight when 
Labour came to power in 1945'.4 
The Chapter is divided into four sections. The first gives a brief account of the 
Union's experiences up to 1945, while the second deals with the issue of agricultural 
wages. Section (iii) addresses the issues of worker representation on the CAEC's and 
4 Self and storing, op. cit., p.174. 
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the tied cottage, while the final section will assess the differing fortunes of the 
NUA W, the NFU, and the CLA after 1945. 
385 
(i) 
The first national agricultural workers' union, the National Agricultural Labourers' 
Union (the NALU), was founded in 1872 under the chairmanship of Joseph Arch, 
However, a succession of poor harvests and the inf1ux of grain imports from the 
United States caused a sharp decline in both agricultural employment and union 
membership, with the result that by the early years of the twentieth century the NALU 
had effectively collapsed. The harsh economic climate of the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century also took its toll on agricultural wages membership fell from 4,141 
in 1910 to 3,290 by 1912. The NUA W had it's origins in the Eastern Counties 
Agricultural Labourers' and Small Holders' Union, founded in 1908 to defend 
agricultural workers against their employers' wroth at the election of a Liberal 
Government. The Union's first clash with the farmers ended in defeat, with workers 
forced to return to work under their old conditions of employment and without any 
increase in wages. This deteat prompted a move towards the left, with the election 
of a Socialist President and affiliation to the TUC in 1911, and a vigourous 
recruitment campaign both inside and outside Norfolk. The Union also changed its 
name in 1911 to the National Agricultural Labourers' and Rural Workers' Union, 
finally becoming the NUAW in 1920.5 
5 . f th 'b' th' of agricultural trades A somewhat pole~cal a9count 0 e hr the Sickle (1949). A 
unionism can be found ~n Reg Grd~ves, 5, arp:n account of the growth 
more recent and somewhat more ~spas~~ona e ron Farmworkers 
of agric.ultural unioni~m c~n be fo~~~0~nt~1!~8~lt988 )g., Background 
: A Soc~al and Efono~c H~~tory It' f 1830-31 wh~ch acted as a ~;~~rt~lth: f~~ati~o~fe~~e fi;~t uni~ns, can b~ found in J.L. and 
B. Hammond, The Village Labourer (1978). 
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The Union's recruitment campaign was helped by the passing of the National 
Insurance Act, under which the Union became an 'Approved Society', with village sick 
clubs and workers able to use it to register their insurance. By 1914 membership had 
increased to 15,000 spread over 360 branches in England and Wales.6 As Table One 
shows, Agricultural wages began to show signs of improvement after 1910, although 
average wage rates disguise the differences that existed between counties and between 
different geographical areas; as Orwin and Whetham show wage rates could even vary 
considerably between parishes in the same county. 7 Many wage disputes were settled 
by negotiations with the employers, a process made possible by the NFU's official 
recognition of the Union, and discussions were often held on a county-wide basis. 
The First World War brought with it an increase in both agricultural wages and Union 
membership, the latter increasing to 126,911 by 1919. In 1919 average wage rates 
ranged from £1. 17s. in the Eastern and North-Eastern counties to £2 in the North and 
North-Western counties, the rates in 1914 having been ISs. 3d. and 19s. 5d. 
respectively. These increases helped to encourage Union membership, and the prestige 
associated with the industry'S part in the war effort also helped to swell the ranks of 
both the Workers' Union and the NFU between 1914 and 1918. The upward trend in 
wages was occasioned in part by the shortage of labour, coupled with the demands of 
wartime production, although as Armstrong shows the greatest increases occurred after 
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The Union had repeatedly called for the setting of a national minimum wage and in 
May 1913 the Labour Party had attempted to introduce legislation which provided for 
the creation of county wages boards empowered to fix wages, hours, and a weekly 
half-day holiday.9 The union had also argued the case for a wages board in its 
evidence to the Milner Committee, the latter having been appointed by the President 
of the Board of Agriculture to draw up a food production plan for England and Wales. 
The Government's wartime production programme drew heavily on the Committee's 
findings, which recommended amongst other things the creation of an agricultural 
wages board and the setting of a national minimum wage. The Com Production Act 
1917 established a Central Wages Board and District Wages Committees and 
empowered the Central Board to fix minimum rates after consultation with the District 
Wages Committees.lO Both consisted of equal numbers of employers' and workers' 
representatives, together with seven Board of Agriculture appointees. The 1917 Act 
set a minimum wage of 25s. per week to cover the period until the Board could 
assume its duties, although cash wages averaged 27s. 10d. in January 1918. At district 
level minimum rates soon began to increase, ranging from 42s. to 48s. per week by 




The Landworker, April 1945. 
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came into force in 
which had risen to 
Figures quoted in 
work by this time, and the wage fixing machinery had also reduced wage differentials 
between different areas,12 
The Agriculture Act 1920 reaffirmed the provisions of the 1917 Act but with the 
repeal of the Acts in 1921 the wartime machinery was replaced by a system of 
voluntary County Conciliation Committees composed of workers' and employers' 
representatives,13 Decisions reached at County level would be referred to MAP who 
could in turn make any wages agreement legally binding, By the end of 1923 wage 
agreements were in force in only 1/6 of the 62 districts covered by the scheme and 
the agricultural workers were unable to prevent drastic cuts being made in cash wages, 
The trend in wages can be followed in Table One and in Diagram One, As Alan 
Armstrong argues, after 1921 'the question of wages had been returned to market 
determination, and in the climate of depression there was little that the Committees 
could do to stem the tide of wage reductions',14 
The 1924 Labour Government prepared legislation to empower the County Wages 
Committees to fix minimum rates for their area, with a Central Wages Board 
empowered to ratify or amend agreements made at county level. During the Bill's 
12 
13 
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1939 (1978), p.141. 
14 A. Armstrong, Ope cit., p.180. 
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passage through the Commons the Liberals and the Conservatives succeeded in 
removing all the provisions relating to the creation of the Central Board with the right 
to intervene in Committee decisions, The Conservatives were in fact opposed to any 
form of organised wage regulation, believing that 'the voluntary settlement of wages 
between masters and workmen'15 was the best method of wage negotiation, 
However, the Conservatives needed the support of the Liberals to defeat Labour's 
proposals and the Liberals were only opposed to the Central Board having the right 
of veto over wage agreements, Under the Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act 1924 
the Central Board was granted limited advisory powers and the County Committees 
were given the full responsibility for fixing rates of pay, hours and conditions, The 
Central Board could only become involved in wage negotiations if a County 
Committee failed to reach a settlement, or if it was invited to do so by a Committee, 
MAP's Report of the Proceedings under the Agricultural Wages Act, published in 
1930, argued that the system had led to unjustified variations in wages and hours 
between counties,16 although there was some slight improvement in average 
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The NUA Wand the Labour Party continued to press for the introduction of a national 
minimum wage backed by some form of centralised wage-fixing machinery throughout 
the inter-war period. Wages increased in the early months of the Second World War 
but wide disparities remained between agricultural and industrial wages. MAF 
emphasized that the most important limiting factor on production would be a shortage 
of labour, and particularly of skilled labour; between the outbreak of the war and 
March 1940 MAF claimed that the industry had lost 50,000 workers, of which 42,000 
were regular, skilled workers. The Food Policy Committee agreed that the exodus of 
labour from the land had to be halted, and suggested that this could be achieved by 
increasing wages and by restricting the movement of agricultural workers into other 
occupations. In May 1940 the War Cabinet agreed to a national minimum wage of 
48s. and an order was passed prohibiting non-agricultural employers from engaging 
male workers employed in agriculture.18 
The NUA W argued for a return to the system of wage regulation that had been 
employed in 1914-18, on the grounds that as farmers' prices were being fixed 
nationally farmworkers were entitled to the same degree of security. The Union also 
argued that regional anomalies would be ironed out, settlements would he reached 
more quickly, and that central wages regulation would also be in keeping with general 
industrial practise.19 The NFU objected to a number of the NUA W's proposals and 
the resulting legislation was essentially a compromise between their differing view-
points. Under the provisions of the Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act 1940 the 
18 
19 
The Undertakings (Restrictions on Engagement) Order, 1940. 
See LP(46)98, April. ~5th 1946, '.Agrlicultur.al P~~g~~R~fI~!~iO~~~ 
memorandum by the M~n~ster of Agr~cu ture, ~n 
also Murray, Agriculture (1955), p.84. 
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existing County Committee system was retained but the Central board was empowered 
to fix, after consultation with the County Committees, a national minimum wage for 
adult male workers to act as a 'datum line' when wages were being fixed, 
The new legislation did not put an end to variations in minimum wages, and the 
Government also became increasingly concerned that County Committees might fix 
rates greatly in excess of the national minimum, which would in turn lead to pressure 
from the farmers to increase agricultural prices, In view of these problems a Defence 
Regulation was passed granting the Central Wages Boards for England and Wales and 
Scotland the power to fix a uniform national minimum wage while prices continued 
to be fixed nationally and a market guaranteed for agricultural produce,20 By 1945 
the minimum wage had risen to 70s. In Tom Williams' opinion the new system had 
'entirely justified itself on its own merits t21 and so the transfer of authority, due to 
end in December 1947, was made permanent under the Agricultural Wages (Regula-
tion) Act 1947. The Central Boards could still deal with wages on a county basis and 
were not obliged to fix a uniform minimum, but as the general trend had been towards 
greater uniformity Williams expected this trend to continue.22 Under the 1947 Act 
the County Committees would act as advisors to the two Boards, informing them of 
local circumstances and conditions, and the Central/Agricultural Wages Boards were 
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minimum wage levels.23 As constituted under the 1947 Act the Agricultural Wages 
Boards consisted of eight representatives of both the farmers and the workers, 
nominated by the NFU and the NUAW and TGWU respectively, together with five 
MAF appointees.24 As well as financial gains the war and early post-war years also 
brought with them a considerable expansion in NUA W membership, from 50,000 in 
1939 to 162,533 by the end of 1947, although the Union was ultimately unable to 
consolidate these gains and by 1957 membership had declined to 150,000.25 
23 O.R. standing committees, 1946/47, Vol. 1, Col. 16. H. of c. -
24 
. chosen by the NUAW, 
k representat~ves were Five of the eight wor ere 
three by the TGWU. 
25 h t t and 
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Table One The Average Weekl~ Wage of Ordinal:):: 
Agricultural Labours in England. 
(Source: Lord Ernie, English Farming : Past 
and Present (London, 1961) Appendix IX., 
and Reg. Groves, op. cit., p.252-253). 
1898 1910 1914 1919 1924 193~ 
s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 
Eastern & North-
Eastern Counties 
(Inc. Essex, Norfolk, 
Lincoln & East 
Riding of Yorks) 
Average Rate 12 8 14 0 15 3 37 3 30 5 34 11 
West Midland and 




Average Rate 12 11 13 9 14 11 38 8 30 11 35 2 
South-Eastern and 
Eastern Midlands 
(inc. Berks, Kent 
Northants and 
Sussex) 
Average Rate 13 10 15 1 16 1 37 9 31 




Durham, Lancs. and 
and the North-West 
Ridings of 
Yorkshire) 
16 11 18 0 19 5 40 1 31 
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95 
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Index 1911-13 = 100 
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Index of Agricultural Wa~e 
Rates, 1920-1950 (Source : 
K.A.M. Murray, Agriculture (HMSO, 
1951), p.19). 
(ii) 
The Government and the NUA W clashed over agricultural wages in January 1946. 
In December 1945 the Union had applied to the English and Welsh Wages Board for 
an increase of ZOs. in the national minimum wage, from £3. lOs. to £4. lOs., but their 
claim had been rejected. The Board's decision had generated considerable resentment 
amongst agricultural workers, who argued that the Board had given insufficient 
consideration to their arguments and that the decision had been unduly influenced by 
the fact that any increase in wages would add to the Exchequer's liability. This last 
accusation cast doubt on the Board's impartiality and competence and in a 
memorandum to the Lord President's Committee in January 1946 Tom Williams 
argued that the NUA W's claims were not borne out by the Board's statement on their 
decision. 26 
The Board's view was that the Union's claim had not been made out on its merits and 
Williams argued that the NUA W's calls for the Ministers of Agriculture and Labour 
to intervene in the dispute raised 'grave issues'. Although Labour was committed to 
the provision of 'adequate renumeration' and 'decent living conditions' for all those 
involved in the industry, any attempt to give precise definitions, either in terms of 
wages or farmers' income, would create serious problems for the Government. If the 
Government was to express views on wage settlements or guarantee price increases 
in advance it would fall into the trap that the last Government had only just avoided, 
namely: 
26 LP(46)15 January 22nd 1946, 'The Agricuftural Minim! Wage', memorand~ by the Minister of Agriculture, ~n PRO CAB 132 2. 
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'The acceptance of a direct relationship between wages and prices, with 
automatic adjustment of prices to compensate for any increase in wages 
costs and a consequential increase in the calls on the Exchequer and 
the Taxpayer',27 
Labour had been able to avoid making such a commitment until now and Williams 
maintained that the only course of action, given the Government's responsibility for 
price-fixing, was to pledge that Labour intended to establish conditions within the 
industry which would secure the objectives outlined in his December 1945 speech, 
whilst leaving the actual fixing of wages to an independent authority, Williams also 
emphasised the long struggle that had been required to secure this system of wage-
fixing, adding that all this effort would be 'thrown away' if the Board's competence 
was called into question by Government interference in their decisions,28 Any 
Government intervention would shift the responsibility for fixing the minimum rate 
onto the Government, and if Labour was concerned to maintain a particular 
relationship between agricultural wages and wages in other industries then it would 
also have to assume the responsibility for fixing the latter's wages,29 George Isaacs 
repeated Williams' warnings, arguing that any interference with the Wages Board 





'For twenty/ears I have been one of those who fought in Par~iam~nt 
on behalf 0 the Labour Party and the Agricultur,al Worker~ Un~on 
for the system of regulation of wages on a nat~onal bas~s by an 
independent statutory authority. The battle has now been won, but 
the results would be thrown away if the cOIl)-petence o,f th~ Board were 
to be called into question by Government ~ntervent~on ~n any shape 
or form'. ibid. 
George Isaacs the Minister of Labour, had also st<;ited in the 
Commons that the Government had no intention of depart~ng from the 
traditional policy of wage regulation through voluntary agreement. 
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bodies. Isaacs also argued that the workers and the employers should be brought 
together to discuss a grading scheme for agricultural wages, one which would take 
account of differences in workers' skills and experience.30 The Lord President's 
Committee endorsed MAF's view of the situation and invited Williams and Isaacs to 
take steps to encourage the NUA Wand the TGWU to meet the NFU to discuss the 
possibility of a graded wages structure. 31 In a note to Williams sent a few days after 
the Lord President's Committee meeting Attlee stressed that the whole issue was one 
of 'considerable importance' and invited him to submit a memorandum setting out the 
problems involved, and any decisions taken, to the Cabinet. 32 
The Landworker took the view that while the Government's position was 'technically 
correct' it came as a disappointment to the agricultural workers, who expected Labour 
ministers to behave differently from Conservative ministers and who did not believe 
that the Wages Board was beyond the Government's influence. 33 As the NUAW was 
quickly to point out the Government had already interfered, albeit indirectly, with the 
Wages Board's deliberations. In 1940 the minimum wage had stood at 38 s. and 
during their discussions the Board had envisaged an increase of some 4 s. per week. 
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suggested to the NFU and the NUA W that they should jointly submit a figure of 48 
s. to the Board, and the minimum was subsequently increased to this level in June 
1940. Hudson had had no direct dealings with the Wages Board, and Williams' view 
was that the Government had simply given a 'lead' to the Board in exceptional 
circumstances. The NUAW, on the other hand, seemed to regard Hudson's actions as 
setting a precedent for further state involvement in the wage-fixing process.34 The 
NUA W argued that the Government had a 'moral responsibility' to ensure that 
agricultural workers were offered wages in line with those paid to workers in 
industries not subject to Government restrictions, and that it could not divest itself of 
this responsibility.35 
For their part the NFU agreed that a skilled farm worker should receive a wage equal 
to that paid to an industrial worker, but the Union was concerned to distinguish 
between the willingness and the ability to pay. The NFU would only agree to an 
increase in wages on the understanding that prices would be reviewed on the basis of 
all the additional costs involved. 36 In February the Wiltshire branch of the NUAW 
passed a resolution calling for strike action in support of the Union's claims. At the 
Hants Union's conference the General Secretary A.C. Dann told delegates that he was 
not in favour of immediate strike action, but that if their demands were not met there 
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of the Union's money' to gain their objectives.37 Speaking at the NFU Council in 
March 1946, James Turner discussed the continuing disparity between agricultural and 
non-agricultural wages, arguing that what was needed was a wages policy that 
recognised the relative value of the basic industries to the community as a whole. 
British agriculture, he continued, resented 'this policy of relegating food prod uction 
to the bottom of the industrial ladder from the point of view of both farm worker and 
farmer'.38 
The question of a graded agricultural wages structure was raised agam at the 
beginning of February 1946. Isaacs and Williams told their Cabinet colleagues that 
the NFU were willing to consider the introduction of such a system if the Government 
accepted that any increase in costs would be matched by price increases, while the 
NUA W had stated that they had already discussed and rejected such a proposal. No 
reply had been received from the TGWU.39 Both sides were unwilling to meet 
together to discuss the issue and the Parliamentary Agriculture and Food Group were 
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Isaacs suggested that he should summon representatives of all three Unions to a 
meeting, while Tom Williams suggested taking what he saw as a more positive 
approach. He could be asked a question in the Commons as to whether it would be 
appropriate for the Wages Board to consider the general world food situation when 
judging a claim for an increase in the minimum wage. As the Board's terms of 
reference required that they considered general economic conditions, Williams 
suggested that he should answer such a question in the affirmative. The Cabinet, 
however, felt that such a response would serve as an invitation to the Board to grant 
an increase in wages and would therefore be 'inexpedient'. It was eventually decided 
that the best course of action would be to invite the Minister of Labour to call a 
meeting of the producers' and workers' representatives. 
At the first meeting the workers' representatives rejected any suggestion of wage 
grading, and were only prepared to discuss the subject if minimum wages were 
included on the agenda. The NFU were prepared to discuss the question of wage 
grading but felt that the fixing of minimum wage rates should be the sole 
responsibility of the Wages Board. Eventually the two sides reached agreement on 
a joint statement in which they stated that while there was no serious objection in 
principle to wage grading it could only be a long-term objective, and that at the 
present time such a system would be 'impracticable and unworkable'.41 
41 See CP(46)145, April 9th 1946,. 'Agricult~ral ~ag;~~'c~m~~~/~~ ~~ 
the Minister of Lab~ur and Nat~?na1 Serv~ce, ~n e structure was 
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Isaacs told the Cabinet that the NUA W were unwilling to approach the Wages Board 
again unless they saw a reasonable prospect of a change in the latter's attitude. The 
NFU would welcome a renewed application but were unwilling to assume any 
responsibility for an increase in the minimum wage without some assurance on prices. 
On the one hand, he continued, the Government had to avoid compromising the 
authority of the Board or committing itself to the automatic adjustment of agricultural 
prices, but on the other the already unsatisfactory labour situation would deteriorate 
still further unless some positive action was taken. Isaacs suggested the resumption 
of talks between the two Unions and that, with the agreement of the Minister of 
Agriculture, he would tell the NFU that MAP would be prepared to give a decision 
on prices as soon as possible in the event of an increase in the minimum wage, and 
would make any adjustment in prices deemed to be 'reasonable' in the 
circumstances.42 
In reply Williams argued that such assurances would create the impression that the 
Government was accepting responsibility for any decision to increase minimum wages, 
and stated that he could not commend this course of action to his colleagues. 
Williams's view was that there was no reason to think that the Wages Board had not 
considered all the relevant factors when making their decision, but that circumstances 
had altered considerably since then. Williams went on to repeat the suggestions he 
had made at the previous Cabinet meeting.43 The Cabinet concluded that both Isaacs' 
42 
43 
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and Williams' suggestions implied a commitment to the automatic adjustment of 
agricultural prices, and that the Minister of Labour should tell the NUA W to review 
their application to the Wages Board. He was to give no indication that the 
Government was prepared to consider any adjustment in producers' prices.44 The 
NUA W eventually secured a 10 s. increase and finally secured a minimum wage of 
£4 lOs. in August 1947. 
The increase eased the pressure on Labour to intervene in the Board's decisions but 
left the Government with two problems; what line to take on agricultural prices, and 
the likely effect of the increase on wages in other industries. These two problems 
were discussed in a memorandum submitted to the Lord President's Committee by 
Tom Williams in May 1946.45 The Board's decision, he maintained, had been 
influenced by a desire to reduce the disparity between wages in agriculture and 
industry and if labour was to be attracted onto the land, and a wage-price spiral 
avoided, this new wage relationship should not be disturbed. Any guidance given to 
other statutory wage-fixing bodies should, he continued, emphasize that a reduction 
in the gap between wages in agriculture and industry was necessary if a high level of 
food production was to be maintained. A dangerously unsettling position would arise 
if other groups of workers assumed that the increase in the minimum wage gave them 
cause to demand a wage increase; the time had come, Williams believed, to put an 
44 
45 
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end to the pre-war assumption that farm workers had always to remain at the bottom 
of the wages ladder. 46 
In a further memorandum Williams proposed making the centralised determination of 
wages by the Wages Board a permanent piece of legislation.47 Williams proposed 
bringing the Board's powers more into line with those of the Wages Councils, whilst 
divorcing centralised wage-fixing from any particular system of price fixing.48 The 
Working Party on Wages Policy concluded that the proposals were in accordance with 
the general principles approved by Ministers in connection with wage negotiating 
machinery in industry, although the Ministry of Labour had expressed concern over 
a number of Williams' proposals.49 
Isaacs argued that Williams proposals implied that other industries should fix their 
wage rates in relation to the agricultural minimum wage, and that this view was based 
on 'too narrow a conception of the needs of the situation,.50 There was a need for 
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would be undesirable for the Government to give the impression that the need for 
stability was stronger in relation to agriculture than to any other industry. It would 
be 'objectionable' if the Government attempted to directly influence wage negotiations 
in the way Williams seemed to be suggesting, and Isaacs also suggested that the 
problem was 'more fundamental than the relative level of the agricultural minimum 
rate'. The future status of agriculture, he continued, would depend on its ability to 
demonstrate that it offered men of ability the opportunity to advance themselves and 
to be rewarded for their efforts. The Lord President's Committee agreed that 
legislation should be prepared on the lines suggested by Tom Williams and invited 
Isaacs, Williams, Bevan, Barnes and Westwood to consider what immediate steps 
could be taken to prevent the relationship established by the Wages Board's decision 
being disturbed by wage rises in other industries.51 
In November 1946 Shinwell, with the support of Bevan and the left-wing of the Party, 
argued for the creation of new machinery for regulating wages and the labour market. 
Shinwell envisaged a central wages tribunal and a new policy of minimum wage rates 
for key industries, higher rates in 'unattractive' industries, and an agreed policy of 
relating wage increases to productivity. Shinwell pointed out that the Government had 
already intervened indirectly in the' fixing of agricultural wages and argued that 
Government intervention in the wage levels of different industries was inevitable. 
Isaacs, Bevin, Morrison, and Cripps all opposed Shinwell's proposals and the notion 
of Ministers having any direct involvement in the fixing of wages. All supported a 
policy of voluntary wage restraint and free collective bargaining, a policy which was 
51 LP(46)16th, May lOth 1946, in PRO CAB 132/1. 
405 
given its formal expression in the Statement on Personal Incomes. Costs and Prices 
published in 1948.52 
Wages continued to rise after 1946 reaching £5 by 1950, a figure almost three times 
as high as their 1938 level, while wages in general had slightly less than doubled. 
The 1947 Wages Act established the sort of centralised wage-fixing machinery that 
had long been sought by the NUA W, but these gains have to be set against the 
Union's failure to secure its basic objective of wage parity with other skilled workers. 
According to the Ministry of Labour Gazette, in 1959 average weekly earnings in 
agriculture were approximately 38% below those in manufacturing industry in both 
1949 and 1939.53 As the following section will show the Union's disappointment at 
the Government's refusal in intervene in wage-fixing was exacerbated by their failure 
to gain equal representation with the NFU on the CAEC's, and by the NUA W's failure 
to secure the end of the 'tied' cottage system. In 1950 E.G. Gooch, the NUAW 
President complained that Williams had 'leaned too much on the farmers. Let him 
lean our way for a while and he will be surprised at the response he and the Labour 
Party will get. We want a much larger share in the running of the industry,.54 After 
1951 the differences between Labour and the NUAW became less acute but the Union 
also began to stress its role in improving it's members' conditions regardless of which 
Party was in power. 
52 See K.O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951, (1985), p.13,2-133. ~ Statement on Personal Incomes, Costs and Pr~ces was publ~shed as Cm 
7321 (1948). 
53 Quoted in Self and storing, Ope cit., p.167. 
54 Quoted in ibid., p.174-175. 
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'Our gains would have been much less had we expected the employers 
or any of the political parties to do for us what we have done for 
ourselves'. 55 
Quoted (my italics) in ibid., p.175. 
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(iii) 
In the inter-war period Labour had advocated the creation of a national wages board, 
unemployment insurance for farmworkers, and the end of the tied cottage system. 
From the mid-1920's the Party had also begun to realise that it could never hope to 
form a majority Government while it remained solely an urban party, and so in 1926 
a campaign was launched to increase public awareness of Labour's agricultural policy 
in rural areas.56 However, in the early 1930's the NUAW had cast doubt on the 
extent of Labour's gains in the countryside, arguing that the Party had failed to offer 
'real and concrete' guarantees of better wages and living conditions. Subsequent Party 
Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the 'agricultural vote' to Labour's election 
prospects and promised that the NUA W would have 'first call' on a Labour 
Government's attentions. Between 1924 and 1939 NUA W membership increased from 
28,916 to over 50,000, an increase that convinced Labour of the overall success of it's 
rural campaigning and led to the launch of another campaign in the autumn of 1945. 
The NUA W Executive urged it's members to do everything in their power to ensure 
a Labour victory at the 1945 General Election, but by the end of the year the Union 
was expressing its disappointment at the absence of specific references to either wages 
or tied cottages in Williams' December 1945 policy speech. In Our Land Labour had 
pledged that it would abolish all 'tied' housing and that agricultural wages would be 
56 See chapter II. 
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raised to a level 'at least' equal to that paid to skilled workers in other industries. 57 
The relationship between Labour and the farm workers was further soured by disagree-
ments over the make-up of the reconstituted CAEC's. Labour had always maintained 
that employers and workers would be equally represented on the Committees,5s but 
in the face of strong NFU opposition to this suggestion the Union was allowed three 
representatives to the NUA W's (and CLA's) twO.59 The NUA W was quick to point 
out that agricultural workers could just as easily suffer at the hands of the CAEC's as 
the farmers, as the Committees could issue certificates enabling a farmer to obtain a 
court order for the dispossession of a tied cottage occupied by one of his employees. 
Over 1,000 such certificates had been issued in 1945 and as tied dwellings were not 
covered by the provisions of the Rent Restriction Acts a tenant could be evicted 
without being given any alternative accommodation. 60 
During the Committee stage of the Agriculture Bill E.G. Gooch accused the 
Government of having deliberately ignored many of the points that the Party had 
previously regarded as being essential for the future success of the industry. Williams 
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'Neither my Han. friend nor I, in 1926, had the faintest notion that in 
1947 we should be privileged to sit here taking a Bill through the 
House of Commons with power to place farms under supervision, 
power to give farmers directions as to what they shall and shall not 
grow, power to dispossess farmers and to acquire compulsory estates 
where owners are not doing their job'61 
At the time Gooch called the above an 'astonishing statement' and later asked Williams 
why he had 'bothered to draw up such a policy if he and others did not visualize the 
possibility of one day being able to put it into effect'.62 The Union continued to 
press for equal representation, moving a resolution at the 1948 TUC calling on 
Congress, to demand, in the light of the TUC's policy that workers had a right to 
participate in the running of industry, that all Committees concerned with agricultural 
issues should have equal numbers of employers and workers representatives.63 The 
matter was subsequently referred to the TUC's General Council, who in turn referred 
it to the Economic Committee.64 
The TUC had already discussed the issue with MAF in February 1947. The TUC had 
told Williams that Congress regarded the reconstitution of the CAEC's as an 'error of 
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implement policies that would drastically effect the interests of farmers or 
landowners.
65 
In reply Williams argued that farmers would be most affected by the 
activities of the CAEC's, and that no policy could hope to succeed without the farmers' 
support. There was, he continued, no possibility of increasing worker representation 
in the foreseeable future, for 'to do so would be to throwaway the enormous 
advantages of NFU confidence and support for the Bill'.66 
One member of the delegation suggested that it was more important for Labour to 
secure the confidence of the workers. In reply Williams argued that it was equally 
desirable but that the workers had not yet acquired a considerable share of the running 
of the industry. He had made, he believed, the best bargain possible. Williams told 
the delegation that he had faced two possible courses of action when preparing the 
legislation for the Agriculture Bill; the creation of a 'radical' bill which would have 
relied on the Party's majority in the Commons to force it through, or a milder bill 
drawn up in conjunction with the industry. Williams had chosen the latter course as 
he had doubted that he would be able to find enough willing Committee members to 
implement a radical policy. 
Replying on behalf of the General Council to a NUA W resolution on the CAEC's at 
the 1949 TUC Conference, Lincoln Evans argued that the issue was the adequacy 
65 
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rather than the equality of representation. The ruc view was that the NUA W had 
not provided them with any evidence that they felt themselves to be handicapped in 
any way by their unequal position vis-a-vis the NFU.67 The NUAW's main argument 
for equal representation at the 1949 and 1950 TUC Conferences was that it was 
necessary to ensure that the Government's production targets were reached.68 The 
Union continued to press for equality of representation with the NFU, but by January 
1951 the TUC's Economic Committee had concluded that in view of the 'extensive 
action' taken by the General Council on the issue, no further useful action could be 
taken in this direction.69 
The tied cottage was another issue on which the Union felt it had been let down by 
Labour. Labour policy as expressed in Our Land had called for the abolition of all 
'tied' property, but no mention of this issue was made in the 1945 manifesto or in 
Williams' first policy speech to the Commons in December 1945. There were in fact 
two types of tied or service dwelling. Some properties were provided by employers 
for their workers to live in, the occupancy of the property being a major condition of 
their employment. No rent was paid for these cottages and as no tenancy agreement 
existed in law such properties were not covered by the Rent Restriction Acts and so 
the owner could regain possession without a court order. For some properties a 
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were party covered by the Rent Acts. A tenant leaving his job could still be evicted 
but only if the owner was in possession of a court order, which in turn required the 
authority of a CAEC. The landlord was not required to provide a tenant with 
alternative accommodation.70 
In 1945 the Inter-Departmental Committee on Rent Control found against altering the 
law in respect to service cottages, although the two Labour members produced a 'Note 
of Reservation' in which they argued that cottages occupied by agricultural workers 
should be brought within the sphere of any new legislation. In their evidence to the 
Committee the NFU had 'strongly urged' the retention of the existing system, while 
the NUAW had made 'strong representations' against the service cottage system.71 
Labour's post-war attitude to the whole question of agricultural housing was revealed 
in Bevan's response to a resolution moved at the 1947 Party Conference, calling on 
the NEC to approach the Government and to request the abolition of all tied 
accommo-dation and the amendation of the Rent Acts to protect the occupants of such 
properties. The NEC was to press the Government to implement fully its policies with 
regard to the provision of housing in rural areas.72 In reply Bevan agreed that the 
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of life' that certain cottages were part of the farm as a whole and that certain jobs 
could only be done by men who lived reasonably close to the farmstead. Labour was 
doing its best to give farmworkers a standard of life at least equal to that enjoyed by 
an urban worker, and Bevan was confident that the Party would soon 'break the back' 
of the rural housing problem.74 
Bevan's view was that the Conservatives were responsible for the shortage of rural 
accommodation that had made the tied cottage an evil for 'it only becomes an evil if 
there is no adequate alternative accommodation ..... the real solution of the problem 
is the building of additional houses'.75 Until the rural housing shortage was solved 
the abolition of the tied cottage would only cause further problems for the 
farmworkers. When Bevan had made similar points in a speech to the NUA W in July 
1946 the Union had reacted by arguing that his proposals did not by themselves 
provide an adequate solution to the problem. The Landworker had argued that 
Labour's handling of the tied cottage question would be the test of the sincerity of the 
Party's pledges to the agricultural workers.76 In his speech to the NUAW Bevan had 
promised that the Government would deal with the issue as soon as the Parliamentary 
Timetable allowed, arguing that agricultural housing could not be dealt with in 
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any future legislation would have to deal with service accommodation and rent 
restriction as a whole. 77 
Bevan asked the Conference to vote against the NUAW resolution, arguing that it was 
impossible for delegates, ignorant of the Parliamentary situation, to determine the 
Parliamentary timetable. All the conference could do, he continued, was 'record its 
views in principle, and ask that they be implemented at the earliest possible 
moment'.78 The issue was raised by A.C. Dann the following year and Dann was 
quick to point out the potentially damaging effects Labour's stance on the tied cottage 
could have on it's rural campaigning. Large numbers of rural dwellings were unfit for 
human habitation and there were insufficient new properties being built to house the 
families living in these decaying dwellings.79 Bevan once again argued that it was 
not the Conference's job to try and determine the timing of legislation and that the 
issue could only be dealt with in the context of a new Rent Restriction Act. However, 
despite Bevan's arguments the resolution was passed and the NUA W continued to 
G h · 80 press both the NEC and the ovemment on t e Issue. 
Labour Believes in Britain, published in 1949, repeated the claim that the best way 
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In reply the NUA W argued that 'to advocate new building as a solution to the problem 
is skirting the real issue', pointing out that between June 1945 and December 1948 
12th, 12,679 of the permanent new homes built in rural areas had been let to 
agricultural workers while there had been 23,000 new entrants to the industry in 1948 
alone.
81 
The Party's 1950 manifesto pledged that the Rent Restriction Acts would 
be discussed in the new Parliament and that the Union would be consulted as to the 
best method of increasing the security of farmworkers. 82 However, no progress had 
been made in this direction by the time Labour left office. 
Bevan did, however, introduce legislation designed to encourage the demise of the tied 
cottage. Under the Housing Act 1949 service cottages let without some form of 
tenancy agreement were not eligible for local authority reconditioning grants.83 One 
of the main problems Labour faced when approaching the whole question of rural 
housing was the support of the farmers and the Conservatives for the system as it 
stood. An editorial in The British Farmer in June 1949 argued that from a 'practical 
and not a political' point of view the tied cottage was an essential part of the fabric 
of a farm, and that the real answer was to build more cottages. It was also claimed 
that the majority of agricultural workers were 'more than content' to live in service 
accommodation. 
81 The Landworker, May 1949. 
82 See F.W.S. Craig, British General Election Manifestos (1945), p.156. 
~he Housinngt ~~u~~;a~od~:liln!~t ~;~!i~~~ ~h~;i~:~ b~~~it~h~f~~dtd~~ Lmproveme ~l' t 20 The Act had been ue 




'The Government would be more usefully employed in driving ahead 
with the campaign for more houses in the country than in attempting 
to interfere with a system which experience has proved to be essential 
not only in agriculture, but in many other industries and professions'.S4 
The NFU stated its opposition to any attempt to bring tied cottages under the Rent 
Restriction Acts and similar views were expressed in the pages of the fanning press. 
The Farmer and Stockbreeder argued that a 'reasonable' number of such dwellings 
would always be necessary and The Fanner's Weekly opined that until there was an 
adequate supply of cottages in rural areas, and until workers were prepared to pay for 
them on the same basis as any other tenant, any talk of abolition was simply 'playing 
to the gallery' and was not practical politics.85 
Bevan and Tom Williams met the NFU in September 1949 to urge the fanners to 
adopt a 'moral code' in the hope of avoiding unfair and inhumane evictions. In reply 
the Union declared that it would fight any 'interference' by the Government, although 
the NFU did outline a number of proposals which had been approved by the Union 
Council and submitted to the County branches. Firstly, any NFU member who 
experienced any difficulties on the termination of the employment of one of his 
workers should consult with the leading office holder in his County Branch. If at any 
time instances arose of unreasonable conditions being imposed on an occupier, either 
the County Branch or the Union Headquarters should be prepared to investigate the 
84 
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matter. Finally, Union members should arrange that their employees III tied 
accommodation would have four rather than one week's notice to quit. The Union's 
aim was to show that its attitude was practical rather than political and that it was 
their 'sincere aim' to remove the pOSSibility of any hardship.86 Not surprisingly the 
NUA W showed little enthusiasm for the NFU's proposals, arguing that their 
suggestions were 'entirely inadequate'.87 The Conservatives agreed with Labour on 
the need to build more houses in rural areas, but like the NFU regarded the tied 
cottage as an essential part of the equipment of a farm, and the Conservatives were 
also very critical of the Government's policy on the reconditioning of tied cottages. 88 
The NUA W were also very critical of what they regarded as the Government's over-
generous treatment of the farmers. In 1950 the Union, together with the Clerical and 
Administrative Workers' Union, wrote to the TUC questioning the necessity of the 
price increases granted at the 1950 APR and asking the General Council to take the 
matter up with the Government. The matter was subsequently referred to the 
Economic Committee who held a meeting with the NUA W on July 24th. The Union 
stressed the importance of increasing the efficiency of British agriculture but 
emphasized their strong support for the principle of guaranteed prices. 89 NUAW 
representatives were also present when the Economic Committee met the Ministers of 
Agriculture and Food. The TUC delegation stressed that the APR settlement had 
caused some concern amongst many trade unionists, in view of the efforts being made 
86 Reported in The Landworker, September 1949. 
87 ibid. 
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to restrain wage increases and the growing disparity between the cost of home-
produced and imported foodstuffs. There had also been suggestions that prices were 
too high and that they were yielding excessive profits and subsidizing inefficiency. 90 
The TUC were, however, quick to emphasize that they were not questioning the basic 
principles of Government policy. In reply Tom Williams argued that while prices 
might appear high they did not represent spendable income, as farmers had been 
investing approximately £40 million per annum in new machinery alone since 1947. 
The expansion of agricultural output required a 'reasonable level' of prices, particularly 
as the expansion programme required the cultivation of a large area of high-cost 
marginal land. Williams assured the Committee that the farmers did not always get 
the prices they asked for, and that the Government would not pay higher prices than 
it needed to.91 
The NUAW put forward a resolution at the 1950 TUC calling on the Government to 
undertake more vigourous action to secure it's production targets, particularly those 
for bread grains and animal feeds. The progress that had already been made, 'while 
not discreditable', was failing to secure the production of home-grown food on a scale 
adequate for the country's needs. The Union's proposals included the reorganisation 
of the CAECs and any other bodies concerned with food production and distribution 
to secure greater worker representation, and the reintroduction of cropping directions. 
The resolution was referred to the Economic Committee, which focused its attentions 
on the issue of cropping directions, and in January 1951 the Committee received a 
90 
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letter on this subject from Tom Williams. He argued that the imposition of detailed 
directions as to the areas of specific crops that should be grown would hinder, rather 
than help, the progress of the expansion programme, and that farmers who failed to 
maintain a suitable area under crops were still subject to directions.92 
Agricultural marketing was another issue over which the NUA W clashed with the 
Government. At the NUA W's 1948 Conference a resolution was passed calling on the 
Government to give 'due consideration' to the Lucas Report and to establish the public 
control of agricultural marketing.93 Two years later the Union was still pressing for 
the implementation of the Lucas and Williams' Committee proposals; one delegate 
argued that no action had been taken because MAF and the Government were afraid 
to stand up to the farmers, and that: 
'On this question, as on many others, the time had arrived to make a 
stand and impose Labour policy on the farmers'.94 
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(iv) 
As Alan Armstrong argues in Farmworkers, Labour's victory at the 1945 General 
Election seemed an auspicious moment for the NUA W. The Party's commitment to 
protecting the industry from price instability and an unchecked free market seemed 
likely to benefit the agricultural workers as well as the farmers and the landowners. 95 
Despite the loss of P.O.W. and W.L.A. labour after the war the number of full-time 
workers engaged in agriculture increased from 515,400 in 1945 to 563,800 in 1948.96 
Wages and consumption standards also increased, the national minimum wage rising 
from 80 s. in July 1946 to 94s by March 1949. Agricultural workers also benefitted 
from the introduction of family allowances and the NHS. Under the National 
Insurance arrangements brought in 1948 farmworkers' contributions were set at a 
special low rate. Union membership continued to increase in the early post-war 
period, increasing from 128,678 in 1945 to a peak of 160,000, although by 1959 
membership had fallen to 147,938, roughly 30% of the total agricultural labour 
force. 97 
The agricultural workers' gains in the post-war period were not sufficient to prevent 
a resumption of the trend for agricultural workers to leave the land; between 1949 and 
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In part, this reduction was due to natural wastage, with farmers 
replacing missing workers by machines, a trend encouraged by the rapid growth of 
mechanisation and by the increasing cost of agricultural labour, wage increases tending 
to outstrip increases in product prices and subsidies. The cost of employing a full time 
worker was further increased by the employers' National Insurance and liability 
insurance contributions. As we have seen, however, agricultural workers remained at 
the bottom of the industrial wages ladder and this fact, together with the increasingly 
transferable nature of farmworkers' skills, largely explains the drift from the land in 
the 1950's and 1960's, with workers leaving the countryside to seek better paid jobs 
in industry. The Union's failure to achieve it's main policy objectives must, at least 
in part, explain it's inability to consolidate the membership increases of the war and 
early post-war years and the subsequent fall in numbers, a view that was expressed 
by A.C. Dann amongst others. In the 1950's the Union increasingly expressed the 
view that, notwithstanding the absolute decline in the number of agricultural workers, 
recruitment was being hampered by the impact of mechanisation and new farming 
techniques, which brought with them changes that made the recruitment and 
organisation of farmworkers very difficult.99 The Union argued that the fall in the 
number of workers employed had brought both an absolute decline in its membership 
and a relative decline, since those workers that remained in the industry were 
increasingly isolated, and rural life was becoming far less communal than it had been 




If the agricultural workers had the most to gain from a Labour victory then the 
landowners clearly had the most to lose from such an occurrence. Although land 
nationalization was not part of Labour1s immediate programme in 1945 it was far from 
being a dead issue and the potential threat of state acquisition led many owner-
occupiers, the majority of whom were already members of the NFU, to join the CLA 
in the post-war period. Between 1945 and 1949 the Association1s membership 
increased from 10,000 to 25,000,100 and the growth and broadening of its 
membership base gave the CLA greater financial security and a wider political appeal, 
making it a more effective source of resistance to any policy of land nationalisation. 
Although the CLA was opposed to the state ownership of the land the Association 
remained in public politically neutral, despite the fact that many high-ranking CLA 
officials had close links with the Conservative Party. Lord Carrington and Lord 
Aldwyn were both Chairmen of the Association1s Executive and both went on to serve 
as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture. R.G. Proby, the 
Association's President after the war, was also Chairman of the Conservative Party and 
in 1961 the CLA had fifty members in the Commons and a larger number in the 
Lords. 
The Conservative Party was naturally more sympathetic towards the landowners on 
issues such as the tied cottage and security of tenure, but the CLA did not give its 
official support to the Conservatives, preferring to use its statutory right to 
consultation under the 1947 Act to forge links with successive Ministers of 
Agriculture and with Whitehall. The CLA told its members that it was their 1key to 
100 country Landowner, December 1960. in 1953. 
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NFU membership stood at 210,000 
Government and Official bodies'.101 The CLA enjoyed an uneasy relationship with 
Labour in the early post-war period. Tom Williams' view was that although, 'for 
better or worse', nationalization was not a part of the Government's programme, the 
existing land tenure system had to be made a help rather than a hinderance in the 
pursuit of the goals of stability and efficiency. 102 Although the CLA, together with 
the Workers' Union, had been involved in the discussions that had laid the foundations 
of the 1947 Act, Williams had rejected an amendment giving other agricultural 
organisations the right to take part in the APR, arguing the NFU were 'supposed to be 
representative of every phase and factor of the agricultural industry,.103 
The 1947 Act made provision for the supervision and dispossession of landlords while 
at the same time reducing their authority over their tenants. The CAEC retained 
control over cultivation, disputes over rent were to be settled by arbitration, and a 
landlord could only remove a tenant by applying to his CAEC for a certificate of bad 
husbandry or by gaining their approval for a Notice to Quit. The 1947 Act also 
attempted to remove any uncertainties in the relationship between a landlord and his 
tenant; where no written contract of tenancy existed a tenant (or landlord) could 
require the other party to go to arbitration to get the existing terms of tenancy reduced 
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area, widening his powers under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1923 to enter onto a 
holding in pursuit of his responsibilities under the rules of good estate management. 
The launch of the expansion programme brought in its wake a thaw in Labour's 
attitude towards the landowners. lo5 Tom Williams stressed the importance of the 
industry's contribution to the national economy and emphasized that the success of the 
expansion programme was not solely the Government's responsibility. The 
responsibility for 'seeing the job through' rested equally with MAF's 'other partners' 
in the industry. Supervision, he argued, was not the only way of eradicating 
efficiency and landowners should be prepared to take action to increase their tenants' 
standards of husbandry themselves, and not simply wait for someone else to do it for 
them.106 Labour continued to emphasize the role the landowners could, and indeed 
should, play in the administration of the 1947 Act and the expansion programme, 
although after 1951 some of Labour's old hostility began to re-emerge. I07 The 
Conservatives were somewhat more sympathetic to the CLA's point of view; the 1958 
Act introduced an 'open market' principle for the fixing of agricultural rents, despite 
opposition from both Labour and the NFU. The 1958 Act also vested the 
responsibility for hearing applications for notices to quit with the Agricultural Land 
Tribunals rather than the CAEC's, and re-iterated the grounds for approval in a more 
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The success of the CLA's policy of co-operation was demonstrated by the fact that the 
Association was able to gain a number of financial concessions for landowners from 
a Government that might have been thought to have been wholly unsympathetic to the 
Association's aims. 108 In this it was clearly helped by the demands of the post-war 
economy and by the changing nature of the CLA itself, which reflected broader trends 
in the pattern of post-war land ownership. Earlier chapters have discussed in some 
detail Labour's reasons for abandoning its policy of land nationalization; the CLA and 
the NFU were united in their resistance to this aspect of Labour's agricultural policy, 
and in the post-war period a large number of NFU members also belonged to the 
CLA.
109 
However, on issues such as rents and security of tenure there was far less 
agreement between the Union and the Association. Although the CLA pressed for 
reform of the provisions of the 1947 Act the NFU 'occupied the political sunlight 
while landlordism was still in the shadow'Yo The changes in tenure introduced 
under the 1958 Act had previously been agreed between the two groups on the 
Government's insistence, and applications for notices to quit were to be in keeping 
with the actions of a 'fair and reasonable' landlord. 111 
The NUA W also languished in the NFU's shadow in the post-war years and the 
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post-war years can, to some extent, be explained by the Union's failure to make any 
real headway on a number of its key policy objectives after 1945. As earlier chapters 
have shown, having gained the co-operation of the NFU in the operation of the 1947, 
Tom Williams, and indeed the Government as a whole, were unwilling to contemplate 
any action which would jeopardize this relationship. Legislation to abolish the tied 
cottage would have posed just such a threat, and the NFU were keen to emphasize the 
importance of the tied cottage for agricultural efficiency at a time when the 
Government was seeking to maximise agricultural output. The abolition of the tied 
cottage was also hampered by the continuing rural housing shortage, which left 
workers dependent on their employers for accommodation which had not been 
remedied by the 1960's. 
Despite their public expressions of disappointment with Labour the Union remained 
closely allied to the Party in it's struggles; in The Landworker in May 1958 Harold 
Collinson, the General Secretary, told members that after talks with 'our friends of the 
Labour Party' he had been assured that the next Labour Government would deal with 
tied cottages as part of its housing policy. However, as we have seen even when in 
opposition Labour shied away from the abolition of service accommodation, and no 
moves towards abolition were made between 1964 and 1970. The NUAW was not 
invited to take part in the policy discussions which preceded the introduction of the 
Agriculture Act 1958, and this gave the Union the opportunity to look back 
nostalgically to the years before 1951. In 1958 Gooch, complaining about the Union's 
exclusion, emphasized that Labour had treated the NUA W as an 'equal partner' with 
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the NFU and had always sought their opinions. 112 This was certainly true (with the 
notable exception of the APR and the CAEC's) but the NFU's opinions had generally 
carried more weight with the Government. Despite the TUC's support for the 
NUAW's struggle for wage parity with other skilled workers, and a considerable 
increase in the national minimum, wages in agriculture remained between 2/3 and 3/4 
of the average weekly earnings in industry, and farm workers remained in their 
traditional place at the bottom of the wages ladder. 




As Bowers argues, 'by any standards, British farmers had a good war'l and the 
industry's contribution to the war effort placed agriculture in a strong position when 
the post-war settlement began. 
'Farmers were one of the groups that had a claim on the better world 
that was to emerge from the ruins of victory.,2 
All the major parties had pledged that a 'healthy and well-balanced agriculture' would 
form an 'essential and permanent feature' of post-war economic policy. These 
promises, the industry's contribution to the war effort and growing doubts about post-
war food supplies combined to make a second 'Great Betrayal' extremely unlikely. 
During the 1930's the NFU had enjoyed the benefits of a wide range of state support, 
and had begun to develop close links with the government. The Union also pursued 
a vigourous recruitment policy in this period and sought to promote itself as the only 
responsible agricultural body. Although the government had accepted a degree of 
responsibility for the condition of the industry, support was still limited and the 
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J. K. Bowers, 'British Agricultural Policy since the Second World 
War', Agricultural History Review V33 (1985) Part 1, p 66. 
ibid., p.SS 
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Treasury opposed any system of comprehensive guarantees.3 Even as late as 1939 
the government did not want to encourage a large increase in production. However, 
in February 1939 the Minister of Agriculture initiated weekly meetings with NFU 
leaders to discuss the possibility of extending price insurance to a number of 
commodities. This gave the NFU an active role in the creation of policy and began 
the institutionalisation of government-farmer relations.4 
This process was gIven a considerable boost by the War, which transformed the 
economic importance of the industry and with it the political position of the NFU. 
Earlier chapters have traced the evolution of the price review mechanism from the first 
ad hoc wartime reviews conducted with the NFU; the dispute with the farmers over 
the 1943 settlement led to the stronger assurances embodied in the APR. The 
government's pledge to review prices in the event of any change in costs, and the 
creation of the 'transitional' APR mechanism served to institutionalize the concept of 
price support for the industry. The Union's role in the policy process allowed it to 
exclude other interest groups and to establish itself as the sale agricultural negotiating 
body.5 The APR was made a permanent feature of post-war policy in the 1947 Act 
and continued until 1972, when Britain's entry into the EEe robbed the annual review 




Martin J. smith, 'The Annual Review: The Emerge~?e of a corporatist 
Institution, in political studies (1989), xxxv~~ 81 - 96, p. 88. 
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The Farmer (1962), p. 63. 
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procedure is still used as a means of determining British farming's position in the EEe 
price review. 
The APR grew out of the interdependence of the government and the farmers. The 
farmers sought price guarantees and the promise of 'stability' from the government. 
For their part, the government wanted increased production and so naturally turned to 
the farmers, as represented by the NFU.6 This relationship transformed the Union 
from an ordinary pressure group to one with a privileged and virtually unassailable 
position in the post-war economy. The review mechanism limited demands on the 
government by forcing producers to accept certain responsibilities as a corollary to 
guaranteed prices, and by excluding non-farm interests. In this way it made the policy 
process more straightforward.7 
As this thesis has shown, the APR functioned effectively, if wastefully, as a 
mechanism for encouraging increased production, but less so when expansion ceased 
to be the main goal of agricultural policy. The APR failed to address the industry's 
underlying structural problems; the wide variation in standards and incomes between 
producers, and the particular problems faced by small producers. Once in operation, 
it would have been difficult for any government to scrap the APR, given the NFU's 
desire for stability and the need for producers co-operation in expanding production. 
Even after expansion ceased to be the overriding goal, the perceived political 
importance of the farmers would have discouraged such a course of action. However, 
6 
7 
Martin J. Smith, Ope cit., p. 95. 
An agreement on prices at the APR also served to legitimize the new 
arrangements to all producers. 
431 
neither Labour nor the Conservatives ever contemplated the end of the APR. The 
NFU's monopoly position in the policy process served to exclude other points of view 
and prevented any discussion of alternative policies. The APR therefore represented 
an effective closure on agricultural policy in the post-war period, and allowed the 
NFU to maintain its privileged position.s 
Agriculture's role in Britain's post-war recovery allowed the industry to make 
considerable gains under Labour. The price mechanism, rather than controls or 
directions, was to be the engine of increased production in this period. The need to 
ensure the continued co-operation and active support of the industry also led Labour 
to back down on controversial issues such as nationalisation of the land and 
agricultural marketing. During the 1950's, political considerations replaced economic 
ones, as Labour sought to make electoral gains in the countryside. As this thesis has 
shown, however, both major parties greatly over-emphasized the importance of the 
'agricultural vote'. 
This new role in the policy process required the NFU to strive to remain politically 
neutral, and to work with the government of the day. In tum this required the NFU 
leaders to damp down any protests or militant action by the county and district 
branches. As early as 1938 the NFU hierarchy were asking members not to 
demonstrate in support of their demands, as this would damage the Union's developing 
relationship with the government.9 James Turner and his colleagues had to remain 
8 Martin J. Smith, Ope cit., p. 95. 
9 See the NFU Record, August 1938. 
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publicly silent on issues such as agricultural marketing. Excluded from the review 
process, bodies such as the MMB could freely express their criticisms of the Lucas 
Committee proposals. 
The APR has often been seen as 'a clear example of a working corporatist 
institution,.l0 The NFU were granted an important role in the policy process, and in 
implementing policy by 'selling' the APR agreement to the industry as a whole. The 
review mechanism certainly embodied elements of corporatism, primarily the 
incorporation of a monopoly. However, the NFU were not involved in the making of 
policy at the APR, and only undertook a very weak form of implementation. This 
limited role is illustrated by the fact that prices could be imposed without the Union's 
agreement, although this was a comparatively rare occurrence. 
The APR was also not intended to reconcile the differences between competing 
economic interests, as all other such groups were excluded from the process. For the 
duration of Labour's stay in office, the NFU were not in conflict with the general 
direction of agricultural policy, although the NFU clashed with successive 
Conservative governments during the 1950'S.11 The relationship could also not be 
described as pluralist, in that other groups were excluded and the reviews were 
conducted without any consultation with Parliament or the public. While other 
10 
11 
See G. Cox, P. Lowe and M. Winter, 'From State Dire~tio~ to ~e~f­
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departments criticized APR settlements or the emphasis on particular commodities, 
there was no questioning of the overall thrust of policy or of the APR mechanism as 
a whole.12 
Despite Treasury attempts to rein in expenditure on agriculture MAF, and ultimately 
the Cabinet as a whole, were unwilling to risk a break with the Union over the APR 
settlement in the immediate post-war period. The new prices were 'sold' to the 
industry by the NFU's agreement, which legitimized the arrangements to all producers. 
This explains why securing agreements at the APR was so important during Labour's 
time in office, when the expansion of production was the main aim of agricultural 
policy. An agreement was imposed on the NFU at the 1946 SPR, but the resulting 
uproar ended with the Union securing a number of concessions from the government. 
However, as the BOP position and world food supplies began to improve after 
1951/52, the pressure to reach an agreed settlement was reduced, and in 1956 an APR 
settlement was imposed on the industry. Although the Conservative government 
subsequently made a number of concessions the economic importance of the industry, 
and with it the power of the NFU in the policy process, had clearly begun to decline. 
While the Conservatives continued to stress their commitment to the principles of the 
1947 Act, changing economic conditions made an APR agreement increasingly 
difficult to secure. 
12 See Chapter VI. 
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British agriculture underwent a painful period of transition in the 1950's, as successive 
Conservative governments moved away from state control and the sort of long-term 
planning the industry had enjoyed under Labour. The latter occurred despite NFU 
calls for talks on long-term planning. In the early 1950's the Conservatives had 
themselves advocated a limited degree of production planning, but quickly withdrew 
from this commitment despite NFU protests. By the end of the 1950's the CAECs had 
lost most of their original powers and duties, and a system of efficiency payments had 
replaced fixed guaranteed prices. Under the Conservatives, a growing proportion of 
government support was given in the form of direct subsidies, rather than through 
price guarantees, although this did little to remedy inequalities in the distribution of 
government support. The Agriculture Act 1957 limited the scope for price 
adjustments at subsequent reviews, although the level of support declined steadily as 
the industry was called upon to meet a growing proportion of cost increases through 
increased efficiency. By limiting the scope for discussion between the government 
and the NFU, the 1957 Act also reduced the importance of the price review 
mechanism. 
How are we to assess the impact of 1945-51 on the post-war development of British 
agriculture? The problems the industry faced in the 1950's had their origins in the 
policies pursued in the immediate post-war period. By the mid 1950's farmers had to 
contend with the overproduction of certain commodities, at a heavy cost to the 
Exchequer. The products in question were pigs, milk and eggs and the problem was, 
at least in part, an inheritance from the expansionist policy Labour had pursued. 
However, the 1951 Conservative government had itself boosted egg and pig 
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production as a short-term measure to help facilitate derationing and decontrol. Both 
Labour and the Conservatives encouraged production at prices that proved to be 
unrealistically high in the long-term. In Labour's defence it must be pointed out that 
the recovery of food supplies could not have been foreseen when the expansion 
programme was launched in August 1947. 
'During the hungry and rationed forties it seemed impossible to suppose 
that any measures which would bring back eggs and bacon to the 
Englishman's breakfast table could be anything by desirable'.13 
Colin Clark had predicted In 1940 that, by 1960, pnmary products would have 
doubled in price in relation to manufactured goods by comparison with 1935-38. 14 As 
earlier chapters have shown, adjustments in relative prices were only made in the face 
of strong opposition from the NFU. 
The war and the immediate post-war period saw two sharp increases in aggregate 
income. The second occurred in 1947, as the expansion programme was launched on 
the back of price increases of between 15% and 20%. These increases were intended 
both to compensate producers for increased farm wages and to act as a direct incentive 
to increased production. Earnings rose more slowly thereafter. Allowing for changes 
in the value of money, the value of total earnings declined slightly in real terms after 
1950. However, the gains made under the expansion programme were largely 
13 Self and Storing, Ope cip., p. 71. 
14 Quoted in B A Holderness, British Agriculture Since 1945 (1985), p. 
94. 
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retained, and so 'the objective of stability in the general level of farm income was 
certainly fully met.d5 
However, as this thesis has shown, the Exchequer cuts that followed decontrol hit 
small producers particularly severely. The APR was built on a basis of 
'undiscriminating aid to producers generally',16 and no consideration was given to the 
special problems faced by small producers, or to the industry's underlying structural 
problems. It was not until 1959 that the first limited measures to help small producers 
were introduced, and the wide divergence in incomes and standards between producers 
remains a problem to this day. 
If the objective of stability was achieved after 1945, it was only maintained by a high 
level of Exchequer support. 17 The problem lay in Labour's inflation of agricultural 
incomes in 1947, and the failure to agree realistic settlements at subsequent price 
reviews. The Treasury's influence on the price review was limited by the closed 
nature of the APR mechanism, and by the need to secure maximum levels of 
production throughout most of Labour's period in office. This need to retain the 
farmers' active support discouraged MAF, and ultimately the Cabinet as a whole, from 
attempting to 'hard bargain' with the NFU over prices. Thus the achievement of the 
expansion programme in saving foreign exchange has to be set against the long-terms 
15 Self and storing, op. cit. , p. 81-
16 Self and Storing, op. cit. , p. 84. 
17 Between £240 and 280 Million from 1954 
onwards. 
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effects of Labour policy on the industry, and the cost of maintaining the stability of 
the industry in the post-war period. 18 
As was argued above, the weaknesses in the APR mechanism were finally revealed 
in the 1950's. During the 1930's Labour had helped to create a broad consensus which 
called for the national ownership of land and the reconstruction of British agriculture 
on a large-scale and more efficient basis. Once in office, however Labour were 
content to use the powers of the CAECs and the Ministry of Food and the review 
mechanism to control and direct production. The 1945 Party Conference emphasised 
the scale of the task that would be involved in implementing a policy of 
nationalisation. Given the overriding need to expand production after 1945, the NFU's 
response to any policy of national land ownership, and more pressing economic and 
financial issues, it is not surprising that Labour moved away from such a policy after 
1945. Some measure of reorganisation could, however, have helped the industry 
adjust more readily to the changing economic climate of the 1950's. 
There was some increase in farm ownership during the war, but not on the scale seen 
during World War One. Tenants were given increased security of tenure under the 
Defence Regulations, and rents were fixed according to criteria more favourable to the 
landholders, rather than the landowners. There was also no massive increase in owner 
occupation in the immediate post-war period, as low rents combined with fears of a 
18 In British Economic Performance (1988 )., Al~ord ar~ues tha~, ~udged 
on the criteria applied to manufactur~ng ~ndustr~es~ ~g~~cu tura~ 
output in the period since 1950 has been art~~~c~ally an 
substantially inflated. Given the size of the ~ndustry, he 
continues, this represented a serious loss of resources to other 
sectors of the economy (pp. 49-50). 
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second 'Great Betrayal' to discourage any headlong rush into land ownership. The 
1947 Act and the 1948 Agricultural (Holdings) Act gave tenants increased security of 
tenure, greater freedom of cropping and protection from arbitrary rent increases. By 
1950, the proportion of owner-occupied land had only increased by 2% over 1927. 
However, with the repeal of the Agricultural Holdings Act and sharp increases in 
rents, the 1950's saw an acceleration in owner-farming. Sturmey attributes the 
increase, at least in part, to the continued break-up of the large agricultural estates, 
under the weight of death and estate duties, greater security for tenants, and relatively 
poor returns from land ownership. CAEC interference also helped encourage the sale 
of land.19 By the 1970's owner-occupation had risen to over 70% of agricultural 
land.20 
Newby, however, questions the validity of this view, suggesting that a large proportion 
of the increase in owner-occupation stemmed from landowners taking more of their 
property 'in hand' and farming it themselves.21 The fiscal penalties involved in 
letting land rather than farming it and tenants greater security would have acted as 
disincentives to let. While investment in land offered a poorer yield than other forms 
of investment, at least until the 1960's, post-war policy halted any major decline and 
landowners also enjoyed the benefit of increasing capital gains. In the immediate 
post-war period, landlords enjoyed the benefits of priority for building materials, while 
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subsidies benefitted them still further. While the lack of any register of land 
ownership makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions, it would seem fair to argue that 
the increase in owner occupation attributable to tenants, and with it any change in the 
pattern of land ownership, has been over -emphasised in the post-war period. 
By the end of the 1950's deficiency payments had replaced fixed guaranteed prices, 
the CABC's had been shorn of their wartime farmers, and cost efficiency had replaced 
expansion as the main aim of policy. The Conservatives had moved away from any 
semblance of production planning, and the 1957 Agriculture Act had reduced the 
scope, and with it some of the importance, of the APR. One damaging legacy of the 
post-war years was the overproduction of a range of commodities at excessively high 
prices. Another was the failure of both parties to address the issue of the industry's 
underlying structural problems, evidenced in the wide variation in both incomes and 
standards. The 1950's had seen a decline in the economic importance of the farmers, 
although their political importance, at least in the eyes of the major parties, increased. 
As this thesis has shown, however, both Labour and the Conservatives over-estimated 
the power of the 'farming vote', and Labour were able to make few inroads into rural 
Britain. 
Although the economIC importance of the industry had begun to decline. the 
Conservatives remained committed to the principles embodied in the 1947 Act, and 
the NFU retained their monopoly position at the APR. The 1947 Act remained the 
touchstone for agricultural policy matters into the 1960's, and the annual review 
continued to operate until 1972. The importance of both the 1947 Act and the review 
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mechanism to post-war policy demonstrates why a study of policy in the immediate 
post-war period is so important. This period saw the evolution of the annual review 
from a transitional measure to a permanent feature of economic policy, and the 
construction of the 'twin pillars' of stability and efficiency on which any policy was 
to rest. The unique role the NFU were assigned in the policy process, and the 
comparison between 1945-1951 and the years after 1918, also demonstrate the 
importance of this period in the development of the industry. In the inter-war period 
the farmers were consigned to the political wilderness; in the years after 1945 they 
attained a position closer to actual power than any other pressure group has achieved, 
whic..h 
and this thesis has revealed the economic and political factors helped the NFU attain 
t 
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